sh-mcp/README.md

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# sh-mcp
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Sea Haven MCP platform. A TypeScript monorepo of trust-tiered **MCP servers** that expose
Sea Haven's proprietary integrations as tools, plus the **Cognito/Google auth broker** and the
**rebuilt scheduled jobs**. This service replaces `seahaven-slack-bot` and `exec-aide`, which are
deprecated completely; the conversational surface becomes a configurable Slack task agent.
> **Status: BUILDING. Platform + auth substrate built; nothing deployed to AWS yet.**
> Phase 0b (monorepo + `@sh-mcp/shared` core), Phase 1 (runnable `sh-mcp-ops` /
> `sh-mcp-finance` over MCP + OpenAPI), and Phase 2a (the Cognito auth substrate
> CDK stack + pre-token/group-sync Lambdas) are on `main`. The servers run
> locally (`SH_MCP_ENV=local`); `SH_MCP_ENV=aws` is wired but not yet deployed.
> The authoritative spec is [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md).
## Documentation
The canonical map of Sea Haven's AWS infrastructure lives in Confluence. This project's `sh-mcp-auth`, `sh-mcp-ops`, and `sh-mcp-finance` stacks are represented there as Mermaid subgraphs.
- **[AWS Architecture Map](https://seahaven.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IT/pages/1540098)** (Confluence, IT space, page 1540098)
## Auth substrate (Phase 2a — `infra/` + `auth/`)
`infra/` is the root CDK app; `cdk synth` builds the **`sh-mcp-auth`** stack:
a Google-federated Cognito user pool (ESSENTIALS feature plan), per-tier app
clients whose `AllowedOAuthScopes` are the trust-tier boundary
(`sh-agentforce-ops` / `-finance` / `-exec`), a **suppress-only** V2 pre-token
Lambda (`auth/pre-token-gen`), a 5-minute group-sync Lambda
(`auth/group-sync`), and the sync-state + deny-list tables.
**Revocation has two layers.** Group membership (Google → Cognito, 5-min cadence)
is the primary entitlement control, with a fail-**closed** 30-minute freshness
window: if group-sync stalls, the pre-token Lambda drops every caller to base
`ops:read`. The `sh-mcp-deny-list` table is a hard-kill **overlay** the pre-token
Lambda consults on every mint — a `sub` listed there is stripped to no tier scopes
immediately (TTL-expiring), ahead of the next sync. The deny-list read is fail-**open**
(a DynamoDB blip logs `deny_list_read_failed` and does not lock everyone out, since
group membership + its fail-closed window remain authoritative). The finance app
client additionally caps its refresh token at 8h (vs 30d for ops/exec) so a stolen
finance refresh token cannot ride past the short access-token TTL for a month.
**Deploy is gated on two manual prerequisites (owner: Adam):**
1. Google Cloud OAuth 2.0 web client (Cognito federation) → Secrets Manager `sh-mcp/google-oidc` (`{client_id, client_secret}`).
2. Google Workspace service account w/ domain-wide delegation (Directory `groups.readonly`) → Secrets Manager `sh-mcp/google-directory-sa`.
**App-client OAuth callback URLs are a placeholder** (`-c callbackUrls=...`)
until the conversational surface (Agentforce vs Bolt) is chosen — the substrate
is surface-agnostic. The optional `alias/seahaven-logs` CMK for the Lambda log
groups is supplied at deploy via `-c logsKmsArn=...`.
## Shape (planned)
- **MCP servers** (trust-tiered, remote HTTP, per-server IAM):
- `sh-mcp-ops` — read-mostly, agent-facing (WO/PO/site lookups, KB search, Google Maps,
Gmail/Calendar, tasks, reminders).
- `sh-mcp-finance` — sensitive, read-only, audited (QBO vendor search, payment lookups).
- `sh-mcp-physical` — DEFERRED, admin/out-of-band only (Lenel/Yealink/3CX control).
- **Auth** — Google Workspace is the single IdP; an Amazon Cognito user pool federated to Google
issues scoped, audience-bound JWTs; group → scope mapping via a pre-token Lambda. See design §2.
- **Jobs** — rebuilt proactive Lambdas (email classify/digest, KB syncs).
- **Language** — TypeScript everywhere (servers, packages, CDK, jobs).
## Open decisions
- Task-agent surface: Agentforce (recommended) vs marketplace Claude app vs custom Bolt assistant
(design §12). Drives the model + guardrail story.
- Endpoint exposure specifics (Slack egress ranges / WAF) — design §9 / §11.
## Layout (target)
```
packages/ shared + one package per integration
servers/ sh-mcp-ops, sh-mcp-finance (CDK stacks)
auth/ cognito, pre-token-lambda, group-sync-lambda
jobs/ rebuilt scheduled Lambdas
docs/ design.md (the canonical plan)
```
See [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md) for the authoritative spec.