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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
81 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
81 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# sh-mcp-finance
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Finance-tier Sea Haven MCP server. Exposes the **finance** tool registry
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(qbo `search_vendors`, payments `lookup_payment_by_*` — see `docs/design.md §3`)
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over the same two interfaces as `sh-mcp-ops` (MCP Streamable HTTP + OpenAPI 3.1),
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through the same shared dispatch path.
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Finance is **sensitive, read-only, and fully audited**: every tool call emits a
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structured audit record and the response is redacted on egress (bank account /
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routing / card / SSN / tax-id masked) before it leaves the server
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(`docs/design.md §2.5, §7.3`).
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## Run locally (no AWS, no Cognito)
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```bash
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npm install
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npm run build
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SH_MCP_ENV=local PORT=8082 npm run start -w @sh-mcp/server-finance
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# or: SH_MCP_ENV=local npm run dev -w @sh-mcp/server-finance
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```
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### Endpoints
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Identical shape to `sh-mcp-ops`: `GET /healthz`, `GET /openapi.json` (both
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unauthenticated), `POST /mcp`, and `POST /tools/:name` (both authenticated).
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### Dev bearer tokens (local only)
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| Token | Identity | Scopes |
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| ------------------- | -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- |
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| `dev-finance` | accounting@seahavenind.com | `ops:read`, `finance:read` |
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| `dev-finance-admin` | adam@seahavenind.com | `ops:read`, `finance:read`, `finance:admin` |
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Ops-tier tokens (`dev-ops-only`, `dev-assistant`) are **rejected** by this server
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(audience binding).
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### Sample curl — redaction on egress
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```bash
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TOKEN=dev-finance
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curl -s -X POST localhost:8082/tools/lookup_payment_by_vendor \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"vendor":"Harbor"}' | jq
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# → bankAccountNumber / bankRoutingNumber / cardNumber are "[REDACTED]";
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# vendor, amount, invoice number are intact.
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```
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Each call writes one structured audit line to stdout (CloudWatch in Lambda):
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```json
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{
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"kind": "audit",
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"sub": "...",
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"tool": "lookup_payment_by_vendor",
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"argsHash": "<sha256>",
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"decision": "allow",
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"result": "ok",
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"ts": "..."
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}
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```
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Args are **hashed, never logged raw** — secrets never reach the audit log.
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### MCP Inspector
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Point it at `http://localhost:8082/mcp` (Streamable HTTP) with
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`Authorization: Bearer dev-finance`.
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## Environment
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Same as `sh-mcp-ops` plus `PAYMENTS_TABLE` (aws mode). Finance additionally
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applies the **15-minute TTL ceiling** on `finance:*` tokens in `aws` mode
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(`docs/design.md §2.5`). `aws` mode is not runtime-exercised in Phase 1.
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## CDK
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`cdk/app.ts` is a **synth-only** placeholder (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) — the
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finance least-privilege role and audit wiring land in a later phase behind the
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mandatory IAM cross-review.
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