sh-mcp/auth/pre-token-gen/src/sync-state.ts
Adam Moussa b5e604dabe
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Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4)
* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas

Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.

infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
  - Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
    trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
    Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
  - Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
    trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
    finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
  - Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
  - sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
    refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
  - Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
    the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
    seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).

auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
  scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
  ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.

auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
  (jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
  marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
  failing closed.

37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.

App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.

* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review

Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:

- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
  documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
  reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
  deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
  a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
  out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
  now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
  includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
  "nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.

Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00

54 lines
2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Reads the group-sync freshness marker the pre-token Lambda fails closed on.
*
* The group-sync Lambda writes `lastSuccessfulSyncMs` (epoch ms) to a single
* item in the sync-state table on every successful Google→Cognito sync. If that
* marker is missing or older than {@link MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS}, group membership may
* be stale (a revoked user could still appear entitled), so the pre-token Lambda
* drops to base scopes (design.md §2.3 fail-closed; agentforce-plan §0.1 CR-5).
*/
import { DynamoDBClient } from '@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb';
import { DynamoDBDocumentClient, GetCommand } from '@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb';
/** Stale threshold: 30 min. A 5-min sync cadence means >6 missed runs is a fault. */
export const MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000;
/** Fixed partition key of the singleton sync-state item. */
export const SYNC_STATE_PK = 'group-sync';
let cached: DynamoDBDocumentClient | undefined;
function doc(): DynamoDBDocumentClient {
cached ??= DynamoDBDocumentClient.from(new DynamoDBClient({}));
return cached;
}
/**
* Fetch the last successful sync timestamp (epoch ms), or `null` if the marker
* is absent or unreadable. A read failure resolves to `null` (treated as stale)
* so an outage of the sync-state table fails CLOSED, never open.
*/
export async function readLastSuccessfulSyncMs(
tableName: string,
client: DynamoDBDocumentClient = doc(),
): Promise<number | null> {
try {
const res = await client.send(
new GetCommand({ TableName: tableName, Key: { pk: SYNC_STATE_PK } }),
);
const ts = res.Item?.['lastSuccessfulSyncMs'];
return typeof ts === 'number' && Number.isFinite(ts) ? ts : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** True iff `lastSyncMs` is present and within {@link MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS} of `nowMs`. */
export function isSyncFresh(
lastSyncMs: number | null,
nowMs: number,
maxAgeMs: number = MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS,
): boolean {
return lastSyncMs !== null && nowMs - lastSyncMs <= maxAgeMs && lastSyncMs <= nowMs;
}