sh-mcp/auth/pre-token-gen/src/sync-state.ts

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Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4) * Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against (SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google secrets); CI synthesizes the stack. infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth: - Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined). - Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance), finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d. - Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin. - sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt'). - Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync). auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale. auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min (jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda failing closed. 37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass; tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled. App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision. Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys. * Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker → fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated: - C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative. - C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d. - C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented "nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address. Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous (it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b, cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
/**
* Reads the group-sync freshness marker the pre-token Lambda fails closed on.
*
* The group-sync Lambda writes `lastSuccessfulSyncMs` (epoch ms) to a single
* item in the sync-state table on every successful Google→Cognito sync. If that
* marker is missing or older than {@link MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS}, group membership may
* be stale (a revoked user could still appear entitled), so the pre-token Lambda
* drops to base scopes (design.md §2.3 fail-closed; agentforce-plan §0.1 CR-5).
*/
import { DynamoDBClient } from '@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb';
import { DynamoDBDocumentClient, GetCommand } from '@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb';
/** Stale threshold: 30 min. A 5-min sync cadence means >6 missed runs is a fault. */
export const MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000;
/** Fixed partition key of the singleton sync-state item. */
export const SYNC_STATE_PK = 'group-sync';
let cached: DynamoDBDocumentClient | undefined;
function doc(): DynamoDBDocumentClient {
cached ??= DynamoDBDocumentClient.from(new DynamoDBClient({}));
return cached;
}
/**
* Fetch the last successful sync timestamp (epoch ms), or `null` if the marker
* is absent or unreadable. A read failure resolves to `null` (treated as stale)
* so an outage of the sync-state table fails CLOSED, never open.
*/
export async function readLastSuccessfulSyncMs(
tableName: string,
client: DynamoDBDocumentClient = doc(),
): Promise<number | null> {
try {
const res = await client.send(
new GetCommand({ TableName: tableName, Key: { pk: SYNC_STATE_PK } }),
);
const ts = res.Item?.['lastSuccessfulSyncMs'];
return typeof ts === 'number' && Number.isFinite(ts) ? ts : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** True iff `lastSyncMs` is present and within {@link MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS} of `nowMs`. */
export function isSyncFresh(
lastSyncMs: number | null,
nowMs: number,
maxAgeMs: number = MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS,
): boolean {
return lastSyncMs !== null && nowMs - lastSyncMs <= maxAgeMs && lastSyncMs <= nowMs;
}