sh-mcp/auth/group-sync/src/groups.ts

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Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas (#4) * Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against (SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google secrets); CI synthesizes the stack. infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth: - Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined). - Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance), finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d. - Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin. - sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt'). - Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync). auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale. auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min (jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda failing closed. 37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass; tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled. App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision. Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys. * Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker → fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated: - C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative. - C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d. - C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented "nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address. Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous (it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b, cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
2026-06-26 14:33:46 -04:00
/**
* The Google Group → Cognito group mapping this sync reconciles, and the pure
* membership-diff logic. Google Groups are the single source of truth for
* entitlement (design.md §2.3); this Lambda mirrors their membership into the
* matching Cognito groups every 5 minutes so the pre-token Lambda can map
* Cognito group → suppressed scopes without a hot-path Directory call.
*/
/** Workspace domain the managed groups live under. Overridable via env at deploy. */
export const DEFAULT_DOMAIN = 'seahavenind.com';
/** The four managed groups (Cognito group name === Google Group local-part). */
export const MANAGED_GROUP_NAMES = [
'sh-mcp-ops',
'sh-mcp-assistant',
'sh-mcp-finance',
'sh-mcp-admin',
] as const;
export type ManagedGroupName = (typeof MANAGED_GROUP_NAMES)[number];
export interface ManagedGroup {
/** Cognito group name. */
cognito: ManagedGroupName;
/** Fully-qualified Google Group address. */
googleEmail: string;
}
/** Build the managed-group list for a workspace domain. */
export function managedGroups(domain: string = DEFAULT_DOMAIN): ManagedGroup[] {
return MANAGED_GROUP_NAMES.map((cognito) => ({ cognito, googleEmail: `${cognito}@${domain}` }));
}
/** Normalize an email for set comparison (Google/Cognito casing is not stable). */
export function normalizeEmail(email: string): string {
return email.trim().toLowerCase();
}
export interface MembershipDiff {
toAdd: string[];
toRemove: string[];
}
/**
* Compute the membership changes to make a Cognito group match the Google group.
* Comparison is case-insensitive; returned values are normalized (lowercased).
*
* @param current members currently in the Cognito group.
* @param desired members the Google group says should be present.
*/
export function computeMembershipDiff(
current: readonly string[],
desired: readonly string[],
): MembershipDiff {
const cur = new Set(current.map(normalizeEmail));
const des = new Set(desired.map(normalizeEmail));
return {
toAdd: [...des].filter((e) => !cur.has(e)),
toRemove: [...cur].filter((e) => !des.has(e)),
};
}