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* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
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|---|---|---|
| .github/workflows | ||
| .security-review | ||
| auth | ||
| docs | ||
| infra | ||
| packages | ||
| servers | ||
| .editorconfig | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .prettierignore | ||
| .prettierrc | ||
| cdk.json | ||
| eslint.config.js | ||
| package-lock.json | ||
| package.json | ||
| README.md | ||
| tsconfig.base.json | ||
| tsconfig.json | ||
| vitest.config.ts | ||
sh-mcp
Sea Haven MCP platform. A TypeScript monorepo of trust-tiered MCP servers that expose
Sea Haven's proprietary integrations as tools, plus the Cognito/Google auth broker and the
rebuilt scheduled jobs. This service replaces seahaven-slack-bot and exec-aide, which are
deprecated completely; the conversational surface becomes a configurable Slack task agent.
Status: BUILDING. Platform + auth substrate built; nothing deployed to AWS yet. Phase 0b (monorepo +
@sh-mcp/sharedcore), Phase 1 (runnablesh-mcp-ops/sh-mcp-financeover MCP + OpenAPI), and Phase 2a (the Cognito auth substrate CDK stack + pre-token/group-sync Lambdas) are onmain. The servers run locally (SH_MCP_ENV=local);SH_MCP_ENV=awsis wired but not yet deployed. The authoritative spec isdocs/design.md.
Auth substrate (Phase 2a — infra/ + auth/)
infra/ is the root CDK app; cdk synth builds the sh-mcp-auth stack:
a Google-federated Cognito user pool (ESSENTIALS feature plan), per-tier app
clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes are the trust-tier boundary
(sh-agentforce-ops / -finance / -exec), a suppress-only V2 pre-token
Lambda (auth/pre-token-gen), a 5-minute group-sync Lambda
(auth/group-sync), and the sync-state + deny-list tables.
Revocation has two layers. Group membership (Google → Cognito, 5-min cadence)
is the primary entitlement control, with a fail-closed 30-minute freshness
window: if group-sync stalls, the pre-token Lambda drops every caller to base
ops:read. The sh-mcp-deny-list table is a hard-kill overlay the pre-token
Lambda consults on every mint — a sub listed there is stripped to no tier scopes
immediately (TTL-expiring), ahead of the next sync. The deny-list read is fail-open
(a DynamoDB blip logs deny_list_read_failed and does not lock everyone out, since
group membership + its fail-closed window remain authoritative). The finance app
client additionally caps its refresh token at 8h (vs 30d for ops/exec) so a stolen
finance refresh token cannot ride past the short access-token TTL for a month.
Deploy is gated on two manual prerequisites (owner: Adam):
- Google Cloud OAuth 2.0 web client (Cognito federation) → Secrets Manager
sh-mcp/google-oidc({client_id, client_secret}). - Google Workspace service account w/ domain-wide delegation (Directory
groups.readonly) → Secrets Managersh-mcp/google-directory-sa.
App-client OAuth callback URLs are a placeholder (-c callbackUrls=...)
until the conversational surface (Agentforce vs Bolt) is chosen — the substrate
is surface-agnostic. The optional alias/seahaven-logs CMK for the Lambda log
groups is supplied at deploy via -c logsKmsArn=....
Shape (planned)
- MCP servers (trust-tiered, remote HTTP, per-server IAM):
sh-mcp-ops— read-mostly, agent-facing (WO/PO/site lookups, KB search, Google Maps, Gmail/Calendar, tasks, reminders).sh-mcp-finance— sensitive, read-only, audited (QBO vendor search, payment lookups).sh-mcp-physical— DEFERRED, admin/out-of-band only (Lenel/Yealink/3CX control).
- Auth — Google Workspace is the single IdP; an Amazon Cognito user pool federated to Google issues scoped, audience-bound JWTs; group → scope mapping via a pre-token Lambda. See design §2.
- Jobs — rebuilt proactive Lambdas (email classify/digest, KB syncs).
- Language — TypeScript everywhere (servers, packages, CDK, jobs).
Open decisions
- Task-agent surface: Agentforce (recommended) vs marketplace Claude app vs custom Bolt assistant (design §12). Drives the model + guardrail story.
- Endpoint exposure specifics (Slack egress ranges / WAF) — design §9 / §11.
Layout (target)
packages/ shared + one package per integration
servers/ sh-mcp-ops, sh-mcp-finance (CDK stacks)
auth/ cognito, pre-token-lambda, group-sync-lambda
jobs/ rebuilt scheduled Lambdas
docs/ design.md (the canonical plan)
See docs/design.md for the authoritative spec.