mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/seahaven-org-baseline.git
synced 2026-09-30 08:03:19 +00:00
2d3ba94140
All five services delegated to seahaven-security 2026-07-14 after the hard preconditions verified (root MFA, OU placement, baseline live). Member adoption and central findings flow verified end-to-end with a sample finding; evidence recorded inline per SEC-BASE-A.
449 lines
26 KiB
Markdown
449 lines
26 KiB
Markdown
# seahaven-org-baseline
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Organization-wide security and governance baseline for Sea Haven Industries,
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managed as a single CDK TypeScript app. Covers the management account
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(**328440206208**: primary baseline in **us-east-1**, secondary-region
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baselines in **us-east-2**/**us-west-2**, offsite backup vault in
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**us-west-2**) and org **member accounts** (first tenant:
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`seahaven-external-dev` **396287094661**, absorbed from the retired
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`seahaven-external-dev-baseline` repo). This is where account-wide detective
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and recovery controls live, so they are versioned, reviewed, and drift-checked
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like any other stack.
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> **History:** this repo was `seahaven-account-baseline` (management account
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> only) until 2026-07-14, when the external-dev member baseline was merged in
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> and the repo renamed. Deployed CloudFormation stack names are unchanged.
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Stacks (deployed by the CD workflow — one job per target account):
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| Stack | Account | Region | Purpose |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `seahaven-account-baseline` | 328440206208 | us-east-1 | CloudTrail + detective controls (C-1) |
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| `seahaven-dynamodb-cmk` | 328440206208 | us-east-1 | Shared customer-managed KMS key for finance/PII DynamoDB tables; ARN published to SSM `/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn` (INFRA-95 / M-3) |
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| `seahaven-regional-baseline-us-west-2` | 328440206208 | us-west-2 | Bedrock invocation logging (INFRA-91) |
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| `seahaven-regional-baseline-us-east-2` | 328440206208 | us-east-2 | Bedrock invocation logging + AWS Config recorder + Security Hub (INFRA-91 / INFRA-16) |
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| `seahaven-backup` | 328440206208 | us-east-1 | Primary AWS Backup vault + plan + role (C-7) |
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| `seahaven-backup-offsite` | 328440206208 | us-west-2 | Governance-locked offsite copy vault (C-7) |
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| `seahaven-external-dev-baseline` | 396287094661 | us-east-1 | Member-account baseline: Config, GuardDuty, Security Hub (FSBP + CIS v3.0), Access Analyzer, flow logs, budget |
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| `seahaven-security-baseline` | 001520130573 | us-east-1 | Member-account baseline for the delegated security-admin account (same construct set) |
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## CDK app
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The repo is a single AWS CDK app written in TypeScript. `cdk.json` is the
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project config the `cdk` CLI reads on every command: its `app` key
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(`npx ts-node bin/app.ts`) tells CDK how to synthesize the app straight from
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the TypeScript source — no separate compile step needed for `cdk synth` /
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`diff` / `deploy` — and its `context` block carries the AWS CDK feature flags.
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| Path | Role |
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|---|---|
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| `cdk.json` | CDK config: `app` synth command, `watch` includes/excludes, `context` feature flags |
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| `bin/app.ts` | App entry point — instantiates every stack with an explicit kebab-case `stackName` and its target `env` (account `328440206208`, per-region) |
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| `lib/*-stack.ts` | Stack definitions (one class per stack; larger stacks compose the constructs in `lib/*.ts`) |
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| `tsconfig.json` | TypeScript compiler options (`outDir: cdk.out`) |
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| `package.json` | Pinned `aws-cdk-lib`, CDK CLI, and the `build` / `synth` / `diff` / `deploy` npm scripts |
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`bin/app.ts` synthesizes seven stacks across three regions and two accounts:
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| Construct id | Stack name | Account | Region | Source |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| `account-baseline` | `seahaven-account-baseline` | 328440206208 | us-east-1 | `lib/account-baseline-stack.ts` |
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| `dynamodb-cmk` | `seahaven-dynamodb-cmk` | 328440206208 | us-east-1 | `lib/dynamodb-cmk-stack.ts` |
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| `regional-baseline-us-west-2` | `seahaven-regional-baseline-us-west-2` | 328440206208 | us-west-2 | `lib/regional-baseline-stack.ts` |
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| `regional-baseline-us-east-2` | `seahaven-regional-baseline-us-east-2` | 328440206208 | us-east-2 | `lib/regional-baseline-stack.ts` |
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| `backup-offsite` | `seahaven-backup-offsite` | 328440206208 | us-west-2 | `lib/backup-offsite-stack.ts` |
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| `backup` | `seahaven-backup` | 328440206208 | us-east-1 | `lib/backup-stack.ts` |
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| `external-dev-baseline` | `seahaven-external-dev-baseline` | 396287094661 | us-east-1 | `lib/member-baseline-stack.ts` |
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| `security-baseline` | `seahaven-security-baseline` | 001520130573 | us-east-1 | `lib/member-baseline-stack.ts` |
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The member-account stack (`external-dev-baseline`) deploys with credentials for
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**396287094661** — the CD workflow runs it as a separate job assuming that
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account's OIDC deploy role (`githubdeploy-seahaven-external-dev-baseline`,
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repo secret `AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_ARN_EXTDEV`). Local deploys/diffs of that stack
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assume `OrganizationAccountAccessRole` in 396287094661. Its shared constructs
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(`DetectiveControls`, `FlowLogs`, `GovernanceToggles`) are prefix-parameterized
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(`seahaven` vs `seahaven-extdev`) — construct ids and physical names must stay
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byte-identical to the deployed stack (logical IDs are path-derived).
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`backup` declares an explicit dependency on `backup-offsite` so the offsite copy
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vault exists before the primary plan that copies into it. Stack names are set
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explicitly to enforce kebab-case (CDK defaults to PascalCase). Synthesized
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CloudFormation templates land in `cdk.out/` (git-ignored).
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Common commands:
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```
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npm ci # install pinned deps
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npm run build # tsc type-check (compiles to cdk.out/)
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npx cdk synth # synthesize CloudFormation for all stacks
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npx cdk diff # diff synthesized stacks against deployed state
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npx cdk deploy --all # deploy every stack
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npx cdk deploy <stack-name> # deploy a single stack
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```
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The `--context <key>=<value>` flag overrides `cdk.json` context at the command
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line (e.g. the `encryptTrailLogGroup` toggle under *Monitoring + logging*).
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## Documentation
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The canonical map of Sea Haven's AWS infrastructure lives in Confluence. This project's `seahaven-account-baseline`, `seahaven-backup`, and `seahaven-backup-offsite` stacks are represented there as Mermaid subgraphs.
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- **[AWS Architecture Map](https://seahaven.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IT/pages/1540098)** (Confluence, IT space, page 1540098)
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## What it deploys
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### CloudTrail (audit finding C-1)
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| Resource | Logical ID | Notes |
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|---|---|---|
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| Multi-region trail | `Trail` (`seahaven-org-trail`) | Management events read+write, global service events, **log-file validation on**, **CloudTrail Insights on** (ApiCallRate + ApiErrorRate, §37) |
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| Log bucket | `TrailLogBucket` (`seahaven-cloudtrail-logs-328440206208`) | Private (Block Public Access all), SSE-KMS, versioned, **TLS-only**, **Object Lock GOVERNANCE 365d**, lifecycle (Glacier @90d, expire @365d), server access logging → `seahaven-s3-access-logs` |
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| KMS CMK | `TrailKey` (`alias/cloudtrail-logs`) | Encrypts log files; **automatic rotation enabled** |
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| CloudWatch Logs group | created by the L2 `Trail` | 365-day retention; this is the group the CIS Section 4 metric filters (H-1) attach to |
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**Data flow:** API activity across all regions → CloudTrail → (a) KMS-encrypted,
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Object-Locked S3 bucket for durable/tamper-resistant storage and (b) CloudWatch
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Logs for real-time querying and metric-filter alarms.
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**Compliance impact:** closes CIS 3.1 (multi-region trail), 3.2 (log-file
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validation), 3.4 (CloudWatch Logs integration), 3.6 (bucket access logging),
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3.7 (KMS CMK encryption), and 3.8 (CMK rotation). Unblocks CIS Section 4 /
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finding H-1 (metric filters + alarms now have a log group to target).
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### Design decisions
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- **Management events only.** Object-level S3/Lambda data events (CIS 3.10/3.11)
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are deferred to control cost; revisit with targeted S3 *write* data events on
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sensitive buckets (payments / accounting / kb) if needed.
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- **Object Lock GOVERNANCE, not COMPLIANCE.** Tamper-resistant but still
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deletable by a principal holding `s3:BypassGovernanceRetention` — avoids the
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irreversibility of COMPLIANCE mode. Revisit if a stricter posture is required.
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- **RETAIN** on the bucket and KMS key so a stack teardown never destroys the
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audit trail.
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### AWS Backup (audit finding C-7)
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Phase 1 ("critical data first") of fixing the account's complete lack of AWS
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Backup. Protects the data stores with no offsite leg today and copies each
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recovery point cross-region into a governance-locked vault.
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| Resource | Logical ID | Notes |
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| Primary vault | `seahaven-primary` (us-east-1) | KMS-CMK encrypted, unlocked (working copy), RETAIN |
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| Offsite vault | `seahaven-offsite` (us-west-2) | KMS-CMK encrypted, **Vault Lock GOVERNANCE** (min-retention 30d, no cooling-off window), RETAIN |
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| Backup plan | `seahaven-critical-daily` | Daily 06:00 UTC, delete-after 35d, **cross-region CopyAction → offsite** (retain 90d) |
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| Service role | `seahaven-backup-service-role` | **Backup-only** (Backup + S3-Backup managed policies); restore perms intentionally deferred |
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**Phase-1 scope** (selected by explicit ARN, not tags, to avoid drifting other
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stacks): RDS `proposal-system-db`, DynamoDB `PaymentsDashboard`,
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DynamoDB `purchase-orders`, S3 `accounting.seahaven.com`,
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`seahaven-payments-csv-328440206208`, `google-workspace-seahavenind.com`.
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*(RDS `database-1` was originally in this set but was retired 2026-06-03 —
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audit H-19, idle 0 conn/60d — and removed from the selection; its final
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encrypted recovery point is retained in `seahaven-offsite` for 7 years.)*
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**Coexists with** existing EBS DLM snapshots and DynamoDB PITR — it supplements
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them with the missing offsite + immutable leg; it does not replace them.
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**Design decisions:**
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- **Governance lock first, not compliance.** Recovery points can't be silently
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deleted, but a principal with explicit permission can still intervene while
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we validate. Graduate to COMPLIANCE (irreversible) later by adding
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`changeableFor` to the offsite vault lock + redeploy.
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- **Backup-only role.** Restore policies and `allowRestores` are not granted;
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restores get a separate audited path once a restore-test process exists.
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**Pre-deploy gates** (must clear before the first scheduled run):
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1. Enable S3 versioning on `seahaven-payments-csv-328440206208` and
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`google-workspace-seahavenind.com` (`accounting.seahaven.com` already has it,
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audit C-9), or their jobs fail silently (folds in H-21).
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2. `database-1` is unencrypted (H-19): smoke-test an on-demand backup + copy of
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it to us-west-2 first; if the copy fails, encrypt it or drop it from the copy.
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3. Enable DynamoDB PITR (H-7) on the two tables for between-window recovery.
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### AWS Backup phase 2 (audit Day 4)
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Expands the same `seahaven-critical-daily` plan to every remaining data store, so
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all of DynamoDB + EBS get the offsite + immutable leg ("offsite for everything").
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| Resource | Logical ID | Notes |
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| Phase-2 selection | `Plan/Phase2Resources` (`phase2-offsite-everything`) | Same plan, same `seahaven-backup-service-role`, same daily + cross-region copy rule |
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**Phase-2 scope:** the 15 remaining DynamoDB tables (all except the two phase-1
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financial tables + the deleted ledgerflow tables) and all 9 in-use EBS volumes,
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again **by explicit ARN** — tag-based selection was deliberately avoided because
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the file-share volumes are standalone-managed and the tables are owned by other
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stacks, so tagging here would drift them.
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**No IAM change:** `AWSBackupServiceRolePolicyForBackup` already grants the
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DynamoDB/RDS/EBS backup actions, so phase 2 reuses the phase-1 role unchanged
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(cross-reviewed, no BLOCK).
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**Known tradeoff (→ Jira INFRA-31):** explicit-ARN EBS entries go stale if a
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volume is replaced (new volume id), silently dropping it from backup. Migrating
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the EBS portion to tag-based selection (with the tag codified in each owning
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stack) is the resilient follow-up; scheduled drift detection is the interim
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backstop.
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**Also enabled outside this stack (audit H-7, via CLI — codify per stack →
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INFRA-30):** PITR + `DeletionProtectionEnabled` on 12 more DynamoDB tables
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(account-wide PITR now 19/21).
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### Detective controls + budget (audit Day 1)
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Account-level detective layer, in `lib/detective-controls.ts`, plus the cost
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budget in `lib/governance-toggles.ts`. **Scope is us-east-1 only** (all workloads
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live here); multi-region coverage is a follow-up.
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| Resource | Logical ID | Finding | Notes |
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| Config delivery bucket | `seahaven-config-328440206208` | H-2 | Private (BPA all), SSE-S3, versioned, TLS-only, 365d lifecycle |
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| Config recorder role | `seahaven-config-recorder-role` | H-2 | `AWS_ConfigRole` + scoped S3 delivery; **IAM cross-reviewed** |
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| Config recorder + channel | `DetectiveControls/ConfigPutRecorder`, `ConfigPutChannel`, `ConfigStartRecorder` | H-2 | `AwsCustomResource` calls `PutConfigurationRecorder` → `PutDeliveryChannel` → `StartConfigurationRecorder` in sequence; idempotent upsert avoids the L1 CFN deadlock (INFRA-17). Custom-resource role cross-reviewed. |
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| GuardDuty detector | `DetectiveControls/GuardDutyDetector` | H-3 | Findings every 15 min |
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| Security Hub | `DetectiveControls/SecurityHub` | H-4 | FSBP v1.0.0 + CIS v3.0.0; controls evaluate once Config is recording |
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| Access Analyzer | `seahaven-account-analyzer` | M-5 | ACCOUNT external-access analyzer (free) |
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| Monthly budget | `GovernanceToggles/MonthlyCostBudget` (`seahaven-monthly-cost`) | M-10 | $1,200/mo, 80%/100% actual + 100% forecast → adam@seahavenind.com |
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**Config recorder + delivery channel are managed by `AwsCustomResource` (INFRA-17).**
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The L1 `AWS::Config::ConfigurationRecorder` deadlocks the stack (recorder never
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reaches `CREATE_COMPLETE` without a delivery channel; channel can't be created
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without a recorder — hit 2026-06-01). The custom resource sidesteps this by
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calling the Config SDK directly: `Put*` is an upsert, so the deploy adopts the
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existing CLI-created recorder and channel without destroying them. Active
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recording is never interrupted.
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### CLI-applied governance toggles (no CloudFormation resource)
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These account toggles have no native CloudFormation resource, so they are applied
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via CLI and recorded here. Applied 2026-06-01.
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```bash
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# M-3 EBS encryption-by-default (new volumes; existing 5 plaintext volumes are H-19-adjacent)
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aws ec2 enable-ebs-encryption-by-default --region us-east-1
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# M-6 Inspector2 (EC2 + Lambda + ECR)
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aws inspector2 enable --resource-types EC2 LAMBDA ECR --region us-east-1
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# M-7 IAM password policy (CIS 1.8/1.9): >=14 chars, full complexity, no reuse of last 24
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aws iam update-account-password-policy \
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--minimum-password-length 14 \
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--require-symbols --require-numbers \
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--require-uppercase-characters --require-lowercase-characters \
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--allow-users-to-change-password --password-reuse-prevention 24
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# M-11 Activate cost-allocation tags (only activates keys already seen on resources)
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aws ce update-cost-allocation-tags-status --cost-allocation-tags-status \
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'TagKey=Project,Status=Active' 'TagKey=Owner,Status=Active' 'TagKey=Environment,Status=Active'
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```
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### Delegated security administration (Phase 3, no CloudFormation resource)
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Account **seahaven-security (001520130573)** is the org's delegated
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administrator for the detective services. **STATUS: APPLIED 2026-07-14,
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verified** (see evidence below). The hard preconditions were enforced before
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the first delegation call (security review SEC-BASE-B/D — never delegate to an
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account with unhardened root or before its baseline stack exists):
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- Baseline stack `UPDATE_COMPLETE`; root `AccountMFAEnabled: 1`; account
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parent `ou-nbuj-v0s9630u` with SCPs deny-root-user +
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protect-security-baseline + security-guardrails inherited.
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Verification evidence (2026-07-14):
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- `organizations list-delegated-administrators` → `001520130573` (all five
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service principals registered).
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- GuardDuty: `AutoEnableOrganizationMembers: ALL`; members 328440206208 +
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396287094661 both `Enabled`.
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- Security Hub: org auto-enable on; both members `Enabled`.
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- Org Access Analyzer `seahaven-org-analyzer` created; Config org aggregator
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`seahaven-org-aggregator` (AllAwsRegions) on the Config SLR; Inspector2
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auto-enable ec2/ecr/lambda + both members associated.
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- **Findings flow verified end-to-end:** GuardDuty sample findings created in
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member 396287094661 were listed and fully readable from the admin detector
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in 001520130573 (`Recon:EC2/PortProbeUnprotectedPort`, AccountId
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396287094661, sample=true), then archived.
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The delegation runbook (all calls idempotent, run from the **management
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account**):
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```bash
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# GuardDuty: delegate + auto-enable all org members (adopts existing detectors)
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aws guardduty enable-organization-admin-account --admin-account-id 001520130573
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# then AS 001520130573: update-organization-configuration --auto-enable-organization-members ALL
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# + create-members for pre-existing accounts (mgmt, external-dev)
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# Security Hub: delegate + auto-enable new members
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aws securityhub enable-organization-admin-account --admin-account-id 001520130573
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# then AS 001520130573: update-organization-configuration --auto-enable
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# IAM Access Analyzer: delegate + ORGANIZATION-scoped analyzer
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aws organizations register-delegated-administrator \
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--account-id 001520130573 --service-principal access-analyzer.amazonaws.com
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# then AS 001520130573: create-analyzer --type ORGANIZATION
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# Config: delegate the aggregator (recorders stay per-account in the baselines;
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# the aggregator's recorder-status view is the drift detector)
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aws organizations register-delegated-administrator \
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--account-id 001520130573 --service-principal config.amazonaws.com
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# then AS 001520130573: put-configuration-aggregator --organization-aggregation-source
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# Inspector2: delegate + associate members
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aws inspector2 enable-delegated-admin-account --delegated-admin-account-id 001520130573
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```
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ONLY once delegation is live AND auto-enrollment is verified (a new member
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shows enrolled in the security account's GuardDuty/Security Hub consoles):
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new member accounts are then detected/enrolled automatically, and future
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member baselines can drop per-account GuardDuty/SecurityHub resources.
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Until then, every member baseline MUST keep them (slimming the existing
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member stacks is a separate, verification-gated change; note the DA
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account's own CFN-owned detector/hub become co-managed after delegation —
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never rename/remove them via CFN while the account is delegated admin).
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Accepted read-surface note (SEC-BASE-I): the org Config aggregator +
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ORGANIZATION Access Analyzer give principals in 001520130573 org-wide READ of
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resource configurations (including recorded Lambda env vars) and IAM policies.
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Main-branch write access to this repo therefore implies that read surface —
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verify no prod Lambda keeps secrets in env vars before creating the
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aggregator, and keep branch protection tight.
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**L-8 (billing-metrics preference) is OUTSTANDING — console only.** Enabling the
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CloudWatch `EstimatedCharges` metric in us-east-1 requires turning on *Receive
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Billing Alerts* under Billing → Billing preferences; there is no public API/CLI.
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The M-10 budget (`seahaven-monthly-cost`, 80%/100% actual + 100% forecast)
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provides cost alerting independent of that metric.
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> The legacy, manually-created `AWS-MonthlyBilling` CloudWatch alarm ($50
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> threshold on `EstimatedCharges`, routed to `site-alerts`) was **deleted
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> 2026-07-07** as unmanaged drift: it was fully redundant with the M-10 budget,
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> sat permanently in ALARM (spend has far exceeded $50/mo), and was never in
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> IaC. Billing alerting is now solely the managed M-10 budget. To restore the
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> old alarm if ever needed: `aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name
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> AWS-MonthlyBilling --namespace AWS/Billing --metric-name EstimatedCharges
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> --dimensions Name=Currency,Value=USD --statistic Maximum --period 86400
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> --evaluation-periods 1 --threshold 50 --comparison-operator GreaterThanThreshold
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> --alarm-actions arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:328440206208:site-alerts`.
|
||
|
||
### Monitoring + logging (audit Day 2)
|
||
|
||
| Resource | Logical ID | Finding | Notes |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| CIS metric filters + alarms | `CisMonitoring/*` | H-1 | 15 filters (CIS 4.1–4.15) on the CloudTrail log group, each with an alarm → `seahaven-cis-alarms`. ALARM-only actions (no OK). 4.16 = Security Hub (Day 1) |
|
||
| CIS alarm topic | `seahaven-cis-alarms` | H-1 | SNS, SSE (`alias/aws/sns`), email sub to adam@seahavenind.com |
|
||
| VPC flow logs | `FlowLogs/FlowLog0..4` | H-14 | ALL traffic on all 5 VPCs → S3 |
|
||
| Flow-logs bucket | `seahaven-vpc-flow-logs-328440206208` | H-14 | Private, SSE-S3, TLS-only, Glacier @90d / expire @365d; delivery bucket policy cross-reviewed |
|
||
| SES config set | `seahaven-email-events` | M-13 | Bounce/complaint/reject → CloudWatch metrics for reputation visibility |
|
||
| Sensitive-logs CMK | `LogsKey/Key` (`alias/seahaven-logs`) | M-24 | Encrypts sensitive CloudWatch Logs groups. Key policy grants `logs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com` Encrypt*/Decrypt*/ReEncrypt*/GenerateDataKey*/DescribeKey scoped by `kms:EncryptionContext:aws:logs:arn` (required or log delivery breaks). Rotation on, RETAIN. Applied in place to `TrailLogGroup` via escape hatch (same logical id/name). Cross-reviewed |
|
||
|
||
**M-24 sensitive log groups:** `alias/seahaven-logs` encrypts the CloudTrail CW
|
||
log group (codified here) plus the finance/PII Lambda groups owned by other
|
||
stacks — `exec-aide-*`, `payments-*`, `po-email-processor`, `vendor-reply-processor`
|
||
— which are associated via `aws logs associate-kms-key` and tracked as drift to
|
||
codify in their owning repos. The CloudTrail group is encrypted in place (escape
|
||
hatch on the existing `AWS::Logs::LogGroup`) so it is additive: same logical id +
|
||
physical name, no replacement, CIS Section-4 metric filters keep working. A
|
||
context flag `encryptTrailLogGroup` (default `true`) allows rolling the CMK out
|
||
and smoke-testing it on a low-risk Lambda group before the CloudTrail group:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
# Phase 1: deploy CMK only, validate on a low-risk group
|
||
cdk deploy account-baseline --context encryptTrailLogGroup=false
|
||
# Phase 2: encrypt the CloudTrail group (default)
|
||
cdk deploy account-baseline
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**H-1 log group:** the metric filters attach to the existing CloudTrail
|
||
CloudWatch Logs group by name (`seahaven-account-baseline-TrailLogGroup4CBE3AF5-…`),
|
||
imported read-only so the live audit trail is never replaced. Stable unless the
|
||
Trail is recreated.
|
||
|
||
**H-14 bucket policy note:** the flow-logs delivery policy keeps
|
||
`s3:x-amz-acl=bucket-owner-full-control` and the `arn:aws:logs:…:*` source-ARN
|
||
wildcard — both are required by AWS's documented flow-logs-to-S3 policy
|
||
(`flow-logs-s3-permissions.html`). A cross-review suggested dropping them; that
|
||
was rejected as it would break delivery. `s3:ListBucket` was dropped (not needed).
|
||
|
||
**M-13 follow-up:** associate `seahaven-email-events` as the default config set
|
||
on the live sending identities to capture events from existing senders:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
aws sesv2 put-email-identity-configuration-set-attributes \
|
||
--email-identity int.seahaven.com --configuration-set-name seahaven-email-events
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Log-group retention + alarm wiring (audit L-4, L-5)
|
||
|
||
Applied via CLI (auto-created groups spread across stacks; one alarm in another
|
||
stack). Applied 2026-06-02.
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
# L-4 90-day retention on the 13 never-expire log groups (CodeBuild + CDK helpers)
|
||
for lg in <the 13 groups>; do aws logs put-retention-policy --log-group-name "$lg" --retention-in-days 90; done
|
||
|
||
# L-5 wire the actionless forgejo backup-verification alarm to site-alerts
|
||
aws cloudwatch put-metric-alarm --alarm-name forgejo-backup-verification-errors \
|
||
--alarm-actions arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:328440206208:site-alerts # (preserve existing alarm config)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Roadmap (same stack)
|
||
|
||
Detective layer multi-region expansion (GuardDuty/Config/Security Hub beyond
|
||
us-east-1). Backup: phase 2 is deployed (see above); remaining is migrating the
|
||
phase-2 EBS entries to tag-based selection (INFRA-31) and graduating the offsite
|
||
vault to compliance mode.
|
||
|
||
## Deploy
|
||
|
||
CI/CD via the org reusable workflows (`ci-typescript-cdk.yaml`,
|
||
`cd-cdk.yaml`); pushes to `main` deploy through the OIDC role in
|
||
`secrets.AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_ARN`. Local: `npm ci && npm run build && npx cdk diff`.
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
npx cdk deploy seahaven-account-baseline
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Verify
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name seahaven-org-trail # IsLogging: true
|
||
aws cloudtrail describe-trails --trail-name-list seahaven-org-trail
|
||
aws cloudtrail validate-logs --trail-arn <arn> --start-time <t> # digest integrity
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
AWS Backup (C-7):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
aws backup list-backup-vaults # seahaven-primary
|
||
aws backup list-backup-vaults --region us-west-2 # seahaven-offsite
|
||
aws backup describe-backup-vault --backup-vault-name seahaven-offsite --region us-west-2 # Locked, MinRetentionDays
|
||
aws backup get-backup-plan --backup-plan-id <id> # daily rule + CopyAction
|
||
# Smoke test: on-demand backup of one resource, then confirm the cross-region copy lands
|
||
aws backup start-backup-job --backup-vault-name seahaven-primary \
|
||
--resource-arn arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:328440206208:db:proposal-system-db \
|
||
--iam-role-arn arn:aws:iam::328440206208:role/seahaven-backup-service-role
|
||
aws backup list-copy-jobs --region us-west-2 # copy to offsite present + COMPLETED
|
||
# Phase-2 selections live on the plan:
|
||
aws backup list-backup-selections --backup-plan-id <id> --query 'BackupSelectionsList[].SelectionName' # critical-data + phase2-offsite-everything
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Detective layer + governance (Day 1):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
aws configservice describe-configuration-recorder-status # recording: true
|
||
aws guardduty list-detectors # one detector id
|
||
aws securityhub get-enabled-standards # FSBP + CIS v3.0.0
|
||
aws accessanalyzer list-analyzers # seahaven-account-analyzer ACTIVE
|
||
aws inspector2 batch-get-account-status --region us-east-1 # ec2/ecr/lambda ENABLED
|
||
aws iam get-account-password-policy # length 14, reuse 24
|
||
aws ec2 get-ebs-encryption-by-default --region us-east-1 # EbsEncryptionByDefault: true
|
||
aws budgets describe-budgets --account-id 328440206208 # seahaven-monthly-cost $1,200
|
||
aws ce list-cost-allocation-tags --status Active # Project/Owner/Environment Active
|
||
```
|