Extdev root credentials were deleted 2026-07-14 via centralized root
management (four-surface verified), closing the deferred root-hardening
blocker. Root recovery is central (assume-root, drill-proven) plus a
temporary gated detach, so the OU now gets the same root lockout as the
other six.
Gates: GPT-4.1 cross-review APPROVE; /sh-security-review PASS (0 confirmed
critical/high). Note: this attach puts the extdev OU at the 5-SCP hard
quota - future guardrails attach at the account or consolidate.
* Add seahaven-prod member baseline (Phase 5)
Account 011934824531 is the target for all new production stacks; the
management account is frozen for new workloads. First proven exercise
of the automatic enrollment sweep (Enabled in 124s, no manual
create-members) and of AutoEnableStandards=NONE (no pre-enabled
standards, so CFN owns FSBP + CIS v3.0 cleanly). Default VPC deleted;
budget starts at $100 and resizes as tenants land.
* Apply Phase-5 review findings
Fleet gap closed: EBS encryption-by-default + IAM password policy were
management-account-only (the runbook's unscoped 'applied' claim hid
it); now applied and verified in all three member accounts, runbook
scoped per account. README stack inventory corrected (eleven stacks,
org-governance rows restored). Sweep comments reconciled: the
automatic enrollment sweep is proven (seahaven-prod, ~2min).
* Add seahaven-dev member baseline with org-managed detection
Account 710827005802 (internal dev/staging) is the first account born
after delegation: GuardDuty/Security Hub enroll it via the org admin,
so DetectiveControls gains a localDetectiveServices flag (default true
— zero diff on the three deployed consumers, verified) and the dev
instance sets orgManagedDetection to skip the colliding local
detector/hub/analyzer. Default VPC kept and flow-logged (dev runs real
workloads). Enrollment verified Enabled in both services before this
commit.
* Fix Phase-4 review findings: standards + analyzer stay CFN-owned
SH-DEV-001: org AutoEnableStandards DEFAULT gave dev legacy CIS v1.2.0
and nothing owned CIS v3.0 — org config set to NONE, standards are now
unconditional in DetectiveControls (attach fine to an org-enabled hub),
legacy ruleset disabled in dev. SH-DEVBASE-002: the ORGANIZATION
analyzer treats the whole org as trusted so it cannot flag intra-org
exposure — account analyzer restored unconditionally (coexistence
verified live). Enrollment comments corrected: manual create-members,
the automatic sweep is still unexercised. Zero diff re-verified on all
three deployed baseline stacks.
All five services delegated to seahaven-security 2026-07-14 after the
hard preconditions verified (root MFA, OU placement, baseline live).
Member adoption and central findings flow verified end-to-end with a
sample finding; evidence recorded inline per SEC-BASE-A.
* Add seahaven-security member baseline (Phase 3)
Account 001520130573 is the org's delegated security administrator.
Same member-baseline construct set as external-dev; own CD job under
its own OIDC role. Created at org root pending manual root hardening
before the OU move (deny-root-user invariant).
* Document delegated security administration runbook
Delegation to seahaven-security has no CloudFormation types; the CLI
sequence is the record, same pattern as the other account toggles.
* Apply Phase-3 security-review findings
Delegation runbook marked PENDING with hard preconditions (baseline
deployed, root MFA verified, account inside the security OU) — it had
read as applied before execution, the org's known claimed-done-but-NOT
failure mode (SEC-BASE-A/B). New security-guardrails SCP on the
security OU: region lock, IAM user/key lockout, privileged-role
protection, delegated-admin membership protection (SEC-BASE-C,
cross-reviewed APPROVE). deploy-security gains stack-name pre-flight
(SEC-BASE-D). Default VPC in 001520130573 deleted; empty flow-log list
and aws@ alert routing documented as deliberate (SEC-BASE-F/H).
Budget alerts and CIS alarm subscriptions now go to aws@seahaven.com
(management) and aws-external-dev@seahaven.com (external-dev) instead
of personal addresses (Adam, 2026-07-14; resolves security-review flag
SH-ORG-007). Owner tags are informational and stay decoupled.
cdk import by Id (non-mutating), content byte-exact from
describe-policy, targetIds = exact live attachments. Post-import drift
detection: IN_SYNC, 0 drifted. All four Retain — the full org guardrail
set is now drift-checked IaC.
* Add org-governance stack: OU skeleton + generalized SCPs
Phase 2 of the multi-account segregation plan: codifies the OU tree
(workloads/prod/nonprod, security, sandbox, graveyard) and three
org-wide SCPs (workloads-region-lock, protect-security-baseline,
deny-root-user) generalized from the proven external-dev guardrails.
All resources Retain — CFN must never detach a live guardrail. New SCPs
attach only to the new empty OUs; extending to external-dev is a
separate gated targetIds change after live verification.
* Record SCP cross-review dispositions in org-governance
Root hardening must precede the OU move (deny-root-user blocks root MFA
enrollment), delegated-admin flows ride service-linked roles that SCPs
never evaluate, and the cdk exec-role exemption is accepted risk
mirroring the external-dev guardrails.
* Add org-governance to the management deploy job
Explicit stack selectors require every new stack to join exactly one
CD job (SH-ORG-005 discipline documented in this file).
* Parameterize baseline constructs for multi-account reuse
DetectiveControls, FlowLogs, and GovernanceToggles were forked into
seahaven-external-dev-baseline with only physical-name and VPC-sourcing
differences. Prefix/name props let one implementation serve both
accounts; synthesized templates are unchanged (verified: empty cdk diff
against all deployed stacks).
* Absorb external-dev member baseline stack
Moves seahaven-external-dev-baseline's stack in as MemberBaselineStack,
construct ids and physical names byte-identical to the deployed stack
(logical IDs are path-derived; empty cdk diff verified via change set
against 396287094661). Retires the forked repo so member-account
baselines share one drift surface and one dependency pin.
* Rename package to seahaven-org-baseline
Prepares the repo rename: the app now spans the management account and
org member accounts, so 'account-baseline' undersells the scope. README
documents the two-account deploy topology and logical-ID constraints.
* Commit extdev flow-log VPC ids in code, not -c context
Security review SH-ORG-004 (confirmed high): with the ids sourced from
ephemeral cdk context, any context-less deploy silently removes every
flow log in the isolated account. A committed list makes the attachment
set reviewable and immune to a forgotten -c flag. Empty list matches
the deployed stack (zero diff).
* Split CD into per-account deploy jobs
The app now spans two AWS accounts; cdk deploy --all under one role
fails on the other account's stacks (security review IAC-01). Each job
passes explicit stack selectors and its own account's OIDC role via the
new cd-cdk stacks input.
The intro summary table listed only 3 of the 6 stacks that bin/app.ts
synthesizes, omitting seahaven-dynamodb-cmk and the two secondary-region
baselines. Bring it in line with the detailed CDK-app table and fix the
region summary sentence.
The README covered what the stacks deploy but never documented the
CDK app itself — the cdk.json config, the bin/app.ts entry point, or
the full set of stacks it synthesizes (only three of six were listed).
Add a CDK app section mapping cdk.json, bin/, and lib/ to their roles,
listing all six stacks with their names/regions/source files, and the
common build/synth/deploy commands.
ts-node 10.x is incompatible with the TypeScript 7 compiler API (cdk synth
fails with "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'fileExists')").
Switch the cdk.json app runner to tsx (pinned 4.23.0, matching sh-mcp) and
bump typescript to ~7.0.2. Synthesized templates are byte-identical across
all six stacks; toolchain-only change.
Switch UnauthorizedApiCalls alarm from 3/3 consecutive to 3/6 M-of-N
so a single quiet 5-min window can't reset detection. The 3/3 setting
pre-dates #36 and was sized to suppress CFN/Config noise that #36 now
removes at the filter level, making a wider M-of-N evaluation window
safe from flap risk.
Enable CloudTrail Insights (ApiCallRateInsight + ApiErrorRateInsight)
on seahaven-org-trail as a compensating control for the residual risk
accepted in #36 — the CFN/Config-proxied denials intentionally excluded
from CIS 4.1 — and as a backstop for low-and-slow patterns the 5-min
alarm may miss. Cost ≈$35–$53/month at current org trail volume.
Refs: #37
Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix noisy CIS 4.1 unauthorized-API alarm; drop redundant billing alarm
CIS 4.1 (cis-UnauthorizedAPICalls) flapped OK<->ALARM 15 times in 30 days,
all from benign AWS-service AccessDenied noise (CloudFormation deploy/drift
describe-scans, AWS Config recorder). A single CFN run on 2026-07-07 emitted
100+ such denials in 15 min, tripping the alarm and burying the real CIS 4.1
security signal in email noise (alert fatigue).
- Group both error codes so the exclusions apply to the whole filter (the old
pattern leaked the UnauthorizedOperation branch past the exclusions due to
&& binding tighter than ||).
- Exclude denials whose sourceIPAddress is an AWS service host (*.amazonaws.com)
— AWS acting on our behalf, not a principal of concern. Real unauthorized
calls from a console/CLI/attacker present a routable IP and are still counted.
Validated against the trail log group: spike window 107 -> 4 matches, the 4
remaining all from a routable admin IP (genuine activity CIS should retain).
- Keep the 3/3 evaluation as a backstop against one-off human fat-fingers.
Billing: deleted the manually-created AWS-MonthlyBilling CloudWatch alarm
($50 threshold on EstimatedCharges, routed to site-alerts). It was unmanaged
drift, permanently in ALARM, and fully redundant with the managed M-10 budget
(seahaven-monthly-cost). README updated with rationale + restore command.
* Address sh-security-review: scope CIS 4.1 exclusion to named benign sources
The high-recall security review (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier)
confirmed a MEDIUM detection blind spot in the first revision: excluding all
`*.amazonaws.com` source hosts would hide denials driven through ANY AWS
service (SSM Automation, Step Functions, Lambda, etc.), which CloudTrail
records with that service's host as sourceIPAddress — i.e. service-proxied
privesc/recon attempts would evade CIS 4.1.
Remediation: scope the exclusion to the specific benign sources that actually
flap this account — `*cloudformation.amazonaws.com` (covers both
cloudformation. and hooks.cloudformation.) and `config.amazonaws.com` — plus
the pre-existing delivery.logs exclusion. Every other service-proxied denial
is now retained. Residual (accepted, documented inline): CloudFormation/Config-
proxied denials are still excluded — that path needs near-admin privilege
(CreateStack + PassRole), successful changes still trip the other CIS 4.x
alarms, and GuardDuty backstops.
Validated on the live trail log group: spike window still 107 -> 4 matches
(identical noise suppression), the 4 from a routable admin IP. tsc + synth clean.
This pure CDK app is built and synthed on Node 24 (no Lambdas), so
@types/node is pinned to ^24. A too-new types major still compiles, so a
major bump passes CI while describing APIs absent at the build Node.
Add a scoped Dependabot ignore for @types/node semver-major bumps so the
alignment can only be broken deliberately, alongside a Node upgrade.
Minor/patch within the major still flow. Sanctioned exception to the
no-blanket-ignore rule (engineering-handbook github-standards Pinning
Principle).
The cis-UnauthorizedAPICalls alarm fired on a single breaching 5-min period
(1/1), so any CloudFormation/CDK deploy burst of benign describe-API denials or
a one-off console fat-finger paged and self-recovered, producing notification
storms (~17 flips on 2026-06-10). Require 3 consecutive breaching periods so
only sustained unauthorized activity alarms; CIS detection of a real persistent
problem is preserved (detection window up to ~15 min). Per-control override so
the other 14 CIS alarms keep their 1/1 sensitivity (templates untouched).
GPT-4.1 cross-review: no blockers (documentation FIX noted re: detection latency).
CI and deploy both run on Node 24; @types/node was stale at ^22. Dependabot
proposed jumping to ^25 (#2), but Node 25 is a non-LTS, non-Lambda release
ahead of the runtime. Pinning to ^24 to match. Build + cdk synth verified clean.
Previously the L2 cloudtrail.Trail auto-created a log group with a
CDK-generated hash suffix in its name. The 15 CIS Section 4 metric
filters in CisMonitoring imported that group by the hardcoded generated
name. If the Trail or log group was ever recreated the suffix changes
and all 15 filters would silently detach with no error, leaving the
account unmonitored.
Replace with an explicit logs.LogGroup named
seahaven-account-baseline-trail-logs (stable, no hash suffix) with
RemovalPolicy.RETAIN. Pass the CDK object — not a name constant — to
the Trail via cloudWatchLogGroup and forward it to CisMonitoring via a
new trailLogGroup prop. All 15 filters now reference the CDK object so
they can never drift from the group the Trail actually delivers to.
The old auto-named log group is orphaned by this deploy (CloudFormation
loses track of it and does not delete it). Historical audit logs in the
old group remain accessible in CloudWatch under the old name; no audit
history is destroyed.
Refs: INFRA-19
The L1 AWS::Config::ConfigurationRecorder deadlocks the CDK stack
(recorder can't complete without a delivery channel; channel can't be
created without a recorder — observed 2026-06-01).
Fix: three AwsCustomResource nodes call PutConfigurationRecorder →
PutDeliveryChannel → StartConfigurationRecorder in sequence. Put* is
an idempotent upsert, so the deploy adopts the existing CLI-created
recorder and channel without destroying or interrupting them. onDelete
stops recording rather than deleting the per-account singleton.
New IAM permissions on the custom-resource role (cross-reviewed,
GPT-4.1 APPROVE — no BLOCK):
config:PutConfigurationRecorder
config:PutDeliveryChannel
config:StartConfigurationRecorder
config:StopConfigurationRecorder
iam:PassRole → seahaven-config-recorder-role (service=config)
cdk diff shows [+] adds only — no existing resources destroyed or
replaced. Removes README note that recorder/channel are CLI-only.
Refs: INFRA-17
* [INFRA-96] CMK-encrypt sensitive CloudWatch log groups (M-24)
Add a dedicated customer-managed CMK (alias/seahaven-logs) for encrypting
the sensitive CloudWatch Logs groups (CloudTrail + finance/PII Lambdas).
- lib/logs-key.ts: LogsKey construct. Key policy grants the CloudWatch Logs
service principal (logs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com) Encrypt*/Decrypt*/
ReEncrypt*/GenerateDataKey*/DescribeKey, scoped by the
kms:EncryptionContext:aws:logs:arn condition (REQUIRED per AWS docs or log
delivery breaks). Cross-reviewed (GPT-4.1): tightened Describe* -> DescribeKey;
CreateGrant omitted (not needed for plain log-group encryption).
- account-baseline-stack.ts: instantiate LogsKey and set KmsKeyId on the L2
Trail's CloudWatch log group in place (escape hatch on the existing
AWS::Logs::LogGroup) so it keeps the same logical id + physical name -
additive, no replacement, CIS Section-4 metric filters (which import the
group by name) keep working, live audit trail not disrupted. Gated by
context `encryptTrailLogGroup` so the CMK can be smoke-tested on a low-risk
Lambda group before the most-sensitive CloudTrail group.
Finance/PII Lambda log groups (exec-aide-*, payments-*, po-email-processor,
vendor-reply-processor) are owned by other stacks and associated to this CMK
via the CLI for now; codifying KmsKeyId in those repos is tracked as drift.
* [INFRA-96] Document sensitive-logs CMK (M-24) in README
Reintroduce the scoped vault access policy that was split out of INFRA-89
after two lockout-class bugs. Adds a Deny on the destructive recovery-point
and vault-lifecycle actions (DeleteRecoveryPoint, UpdateRecoveryPointLifecycle,
DeleteBackupVault, DeleteBackupVaultAccessPolicy,
DeleteBackupVaultLockConfiguration, PutBackupVaultLockConfiguration) for every
principal except three exempted operational identities via StringNotLike on
aws:PrincipalArn:
1. SSO AdministratorAccess role (break-glass human admin)
2. seahaven-backup-service-role (AWS Backup lifecycle)
3. cdk-hnb659fds-cfn-exec-role-* (CloudFormation manages the vault)
The CFN-exec-role exemption is the fix for the 2026-06-08 strand failure: without
it CloudFormation cannot re-assert the vault lock config and the deploy strands
the policy. Uses Deny + AnyPrincipal + StringNotLike (not NotPrincipal, which
rejects wildcard ARNs). aws:PrincipalArn normalizes assumed-role sessions to the
IAM role ARN, so the iam::role/ ARN forms are correct (AWS docs: "Do not specify
the assumed role session ARN as a value for this condition key").
Deployed and verified: deploy succeeded (proves exec role not locked out),
access policy present with all three exemptions, vault still Locked
(min1/max2555, LockDate null, 168 RPs), follow-up cdk diff clean (no drift).
* Codify primary vault lock + add backups (INFRA-89, INFRA-88)
INFRA-89: codify the GOVERNANCE Vault Lock applied out-of-band on the
seahaven-primary vault (MinRetention 1d, MaxRetention 2555d, no
changeableFor = admin-removable) so it lives in IaC. Values match the
live lock exactly, so the deploy is a no-op adoption.
Add a scoped vault access policy that denies manual recovery-point
deletion and lock/policy tampering to all principals except the AWS
Backup service role and the break-glass SSO AdministratorAccess role,
so automatic lifecycle expiry still works but humans cannot prune
recovery points by hand.
Cross-review (GPT-4.1) BLOCK: NotPrincipal does not support wildcard
ARN matching, so the SSO exemption is expressed as Effect DENY with
Principal * and a StringNotLike condition on aws:PrincipalArn, which
does support wildcards. This avoids an unrecoverable vault lockout.
INFRA-88: add 6 S3 buckets (kb-docs, payroll-emails [PII], amazon-po,
extracted-amazon-po, proposal-system uploads + generated) to the
phase2-offsite-everything selection. Versioning verified enabled on
all 6 against the live account (S3 backup requires versioning).
Refs: INFRA-89, INFRA-88
* Promote account trail to organization trail (INFRA-73)
INFRA-73: set isOrganizationTrail on seahaven-org-trail and pass orgId
(o-9kufuzz6b4) so the L2 Trail attaches the AWSLogs/<org-id>/* bucket
PutObject statement for member-account delivery. CloudTrail org
trusted-access is already enabled on the management account.
Broaden the KMS key policy with an org-scoped GenerateDataKey/DescribeKey
statement for member-account trail delivery, guarded by
aws:PrincipalOrgID. The existing single-account statements are
preserved so management-account delivery is unaffected.
Cross-review (GPT-4.1) BLOCK: the member KMS SourceArn and encryption
context must be wildcarded across accounts (org-trail shadow trails
present the member account id), not pinned to the management account,
or member delivery silently fails. Fixed before checkpoint.
CHECKPOINT: delicate org-trail KMS/bucket-policy change — code +
diff captured for review, NOT deployed.
Refs: INFRA-73
* Add secondary-region baseline stacks (INFRA-91, INFRA-16)
INFRA-91: codify the Bedrock model-invocation logging applied
out-of-band in us-west-2 and us-east-2 (per-region delivery role
seahaven-bedrock-invocation-logging-<region> + log group
/aws/bedrock/model-invocations 90d, CloudWatch-only). The account-level
logging config itself has no CFN resource type and is applied via CLI
(already live), same as us-east-1.
INFRA-16: add the still-missing us-east-2 detective controls — AWS
Config recorder role + delivery bucket (recorder/channel via CLI to
avoid the CFN stabilization deadlock seen in us-east-1) and Security
Hub with FSBP + CIS v3.0. GuardDuty + flow logs already live in
us-east-2 and are left for a follow-up adoption to keep this change
non-destructive.
The us-east-1 baseline stays region-pinned; these are separate
RegionalBaselineStack instances composed opt-in per region.
CHECKPOINT: new multi-region stacks. The live Bedrock role + log group
already exist (CLI-created), so a plain deploy would collide — these
need cdk import / changeset adoption, not cdk deploy. Code + diff
captured for review, NOT deployed.
Refs: INFRA-91, INFRA-16
* Drop vault access policy from this deploy; tracked in INFRA-94 (kept governance lock codify + selection)
* Add dependency-review caller workflow
Add a pull_request-triggered caller that invokes the org-level
callable-dependency-review workflow to scan dependency changes and
fail on high-severity advisories.
* chore: retrigger checks
* chore: retrigger dep review (post-fix)
Audit L-14, plus a latent Day-2 bug: seahaven-cis-alarms was
encrypted with the AWS-managed alias/aws/sns key, whose policy cannot
grant cloudwatch.amazonaws.com - CloudWatch alarms silently fail to
publish to topics it encrypts. All 15 CIS alarms would have fired
into the void.
New customer-managed key (rotation on) grants CloudWatch
GenerateDataKey*/Decrypt/DescribeKey scoped by SourceAccount. The
unmanaged site-alerts topic now uses the same key (set via CLI).
Cross-reviewed: no BLOCKs. Verified: forced ALARM on the payroll DLQ
alarm published successfully through the encrypted site-alerts.
Audit finding H-20: no audit trail of model I/O for seahaven-alex,
which returns payments, invoices, WO/PO, and HR/SA8000 data.
S3 bucket (Glacier at 90d, expire 365d) + CloudWatch log group (90d)
+ delivery role assumable only by bedrock.amazonaws.com scoped by
SourceAccount/SourceArn. The account-level logging configuration has
no CloudFormation resource type, so it is applied via CLI post-deploy
(documented in the construct header) - same pattern as the Config
recorder (INFRA-17).
Cross-reviewed: no BLOCKs. Verified live: converse invocation logged
to /aws/bedrock/model-invocations.
cfn-stack-decommission.sh: report-by-default stack retirement; pre-flight
predicts DeletionPolicy:Retain orphans + consumed-export blocks before delete
(distilled from the LedgerFlow decommission). --execute to act.
resource-usage-probe.sh: is-it-used probe (RDS connections/Lambda invocations/
DDB capacity/EBS attachment) to choose retire-vs-harden before acting on an
encrypt/migrate finding (the database-1 H-19 lesson).
README: document AWS Backup phase-2 (phase2-offsite-everything selection),
remove retired database-1 from phase-1 scope (audit H-19), update roadmap +
verify smoke-test to a live resource.
scripts/iam-user-delete.sh: reusable full IAM user teardown (keys, policies,
groups, MFA, login profile, certs, SSH keys, service creds, then user) with
--profile/--yes and a guard against deleting the caller's own identity. Built
from the Day 4 audit IAM cleanup.
database-1 (audit H-19) and the LedgerFlow stack (incl. ledgerflow-pos) were
decommissioned 2026-06-03. Drop database-1 from the critical-data selection and
ledgerflow-pos from phase2-offsite-everything so daily jobs don't target missing
resources. database-1's final recovery point is retained encrypted in the
seahaven-offsite vault (7yr); ledgerflow-pos has a final on-demand DynamoDB
backup. Deployed before merge (seahaven-backup UPDATE_COMPLETE).
Add a second BackupSelection 'phase2-offsite-everything' on the existing
seahaven-critical-daily plan covering the 15 remaining DynamoDB tables and
all 9 in-use EBS volumes, with the same daily backup + cross-region copy to
the GOVERNANCE-locked seahaven-offsite vault ('offsite for everything').
Reuses seahaven-backup-service-role (AWSBackupServiceRolePolicyForBackup
already grants DDB/RDS/EBS) - no IAM change. Explicit-ARN (not tag-based) to
avoid drifting the standalone file-share volumes and stack-owned tables, same
as phase-1. The 4 deprecated ledgerflow delete-targets are excluded.
Cross-reviewed (no BLOCK). Follow-up: migrate EBS to tag-based selection with
tags codified in owning stacks for resilience to volume replacement.
Deployed to seahaven-backup before merge; selection verified live (24 resources).
seahaven-app-waf (CLOUDFRONT scope, us-east-1): AWS managed Common + Known Bad
Inputs rule groups + per-IP rate limit (2000/5min). ARN published to SSM
/seahaven/waf/app-web-acl-arn for app stacks (meal-order/orders) to consume.
seahaven.com already has its own WAF; ledgerflow is being decommissioned
(INFRA-26); proposal-system-web skipped (not live).
* Add account detective layer + budget (audit Day 1: H-2/H-3/H-4/M-5/M-10)
Adds to the seahaven-account-baseline stack:
- AWS Config recorder (all + global resources) + delivery channel + role +
hardened delivery bucket (H-2, CIS 3.3/3.5). Recorder role IAM cross-reviewed.
- GuardDuty detector, us-east-1 (H-3)
- Security Hub with AWS FSBP v1.0.0 + CIS v3.0.0 standards, depends on Config (H-4)
- IAM Access Analyzer, account scope (M-5)
- Monthly cost budget $1,200 with 80/100% actual + 100% forecast alerts to
adam@seahavenind.com (M-10)
Scope us-east-1 only (all workloads here); multi-region is a follow-up.
The CLI-applied governance toggles (M-6/M-3/M-7/L-8/M-11) are documented
separately in the README runbook.
* Document Day 1 detective layer + CLI governance toggles in README
* Move Config recorder+channel to CLI (L1 stabilization deadlock)
The L1 AWS::Config::ConfigurationRecorder hangs the stack: it never reaches
CREATE_COMPLETE until recording is active (needs a delivery channel), and the
delivery channel cannot be created until the recorder completes — a deadlock
that hung the deploy ~27 min before manual cancel (2026-06-01).
Keep the cross-reviewed recorder role + delivery bucket in IaC; create the
recorder, delivery channel, and start recording via CLI (documented in README).
Security Hub no longer takes a CFN dependency on the recorder; CIS/FSBP controls
evaluate once Config is recording. Verified live: recording=true, SUCCESS.
* Add AWS Backup with offsite vault (audit C-7)
The account had zero AWS Backup vaults/plans, so 22 of 23 data stores
had no immutable, cross-region recovery path (audit finding C-7). One
ransomware event or rogue delete would erase primary plus same-region
snapshots/PITR.
Phase 1 ("critical data first") protects the seven highest-risk stores
with no offsite leg today (2 RDS, 2 DynamoDB, 3 S3) via a daily plan in
a new us-east-1 vault, copied cross-region into a governance-locked
us-west-2 vault. Governance (not compliance) mode first so the plan can
be validated before committing to irreversible immutability.
The backup service role is backup-only (no restore policies) to stay
least-privilege; restores get a separate audited path later. Resources
are selected by explicit ARN to avoid drifting the stacks that own them.
Deploys via the shared cdk deploy --all alongside the C-1 CloudTrail
stack. See the README pre-deploy gates (S3 versioning, database-1
unencrypted copy smoke-test, DynamoDB PITR) before the first run.
* Grant AWS Backup service use of vault CMKs
The L2 BackupVault does not grant the backup service principal use of a
customer-managed key; the synthesized key policy only delegated to
account IAM. Cross-region copy of encrypted RDS/EBS recovery points uses
KMS grants on the destination key, so without an explicit grant those
copy jobs fail — and silently, since the account has no CloudTrail yet.
Add backup.amazonaws.com crypto + CreateGrant statements to both vault
keys, scoped by aws:SourceAccount (cross-review BLOCK 2; mirrors the
discipline used on the C-1 CloudTrail key). Same class of bug the C-1
cross-review caught on the CloudTrail CMK.
