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* Add AWS Backup with offsite vault (audit C-7)
The account had zero AWS Backup vaults/plans, so 22 of 23 data stores
had no immutable, cross-region recovery path (audit finding C-7). One
ransomware event or rogue delete would erase primary plus same-region
snapshots/PITR.
Phase 1 ("critical data first") protects the seven highest-risk stores
with no offsite leg today (2 RDS, 2 DynamoDB, 3 S3) via a daily plan in
a new us-east-1 vault, copied cross-region into a governance-locked
us-west-2 vault. Governance (not compliance) mode first so the plan can
be validated before committing to irreversible immutability.
The backup service role is backup-only (no restore policies) to stay
least-privilege; restores get a separate audited path later. Resources
are selected by explicit ARN to avoid drifting the stacks that own them.
Deploys via the shared cdk deploy --all alongside the C-1 CloudTrail
stack. See the README pre-deploy gates (S3 versioning, database-1
unencrypted copy smoke-test, DynamoDB PITR) before the first run.
* Grant AWS Backup service use of vault CMKs
The L2 BackupVault does not grant the backup service principal use of a
customer-managed key; the synthesized key policy only delegated to
account IAM. Cross-region copy of encrypted RDS/EBS recovery points uses
KMS grants on the destination key, so without an explicit grant those
copy jobs fail — and silently, since the account has no CloudTrail yet.
Add backup.amazonaws.com crypto + CreateGrant statements to both vault
keys, scoped by aws:SourceAccount (cross-review BLOCK 2; mirrors the
discipline used on the C-1 CloudTrail key). Same class of bug the C-1
cross-review caught on the CloudTrail CMK.
188 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
188 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
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import * as kms from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-kms";
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import * as iam from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-iam";
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import * as events from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-events";
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import * as backup from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-backup";
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import { Construct } from "constructs";
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/**
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* Primary AWS Backup vault + plan for Sea Haven (account 328440206208), us-east-1.
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*
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* Closes audit finding C-7 (AWS Backup entirely unused) together with
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* backup-offsite-stack. Phase 1 ("critical data first"): protect the data
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* stores with no offsite leg today and copy each recovery point cross-region
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* to the GOVERNANCE-locked `seahaven-offsite` vault (us-west-2).
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*
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* Coexistence: this SUPPLEMENTS the existing EBS DLM snapshots and DynamoDB
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* PITR — it does not replace them. It adds the missing Copy3 (offsite) +
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* immutability leg. The DLM/PITR overlap is rationalized in a later phase.
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*
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* Selection is by explicit ARN (not tag-based) so we don't have to tag — and
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* drift — resources owned by other stacks (proposal-system, payments-dashboard).
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* Switch to tag-based selection when expanding past the phase-1 set.
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*
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* PRE-DEPLOY GATES (validate before the first scheduled run):
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* - S3 backup requires bucket versioning. `accounting.seahaven.com` already
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* has it (audit C-9); `seahaven-payments-csv-328440206208` and
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* `google-workspace-seahavenind.com` must have versioning enabled first or
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* their jobs fail silently (folds in audit H-21).
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* - `database-1` is unencrypted (audit H-19). Cross-region copy of an
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* unencrypted RDS recovery point may fail or land unencrypted. Smoke-test
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* an on-demand backup of `database-1` FIRST and confirm the copy job to
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* us-west-2 succeeds; if not, encrypt database-1 (H-19) or drop it from the
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* copy until then.
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* - DynamoDB PITR (H-7) is independent of this plan; enable it on the two
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* tables for between-window point-in-time recovery.
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*/
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export class BackupStack extends cdk.Stack {
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constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props?: cdk.StackProps) {
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super(scope, id, props);
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// CMK encrypting the primary (operational) vault. RETAIN + rotation.
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const vaultKey = new kms.Key(this, "PrimaryVaultKey", {
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alias: "backup-primary-vault",
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description: "Encrypts primary AWS Backup recovery points (us-east-1)",
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enableKeyRotation: true,
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removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
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});
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// The L2 BackupVault does NOT grant the backup service use of a customer
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// CMK; the default key policy only delegates to account IAM. Grant
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// backup.amazonaws.com the minimum KMS actions (incl. CreateGrant for
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// RDS/EBS recovery points) so backup jobs can write to this vault.
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vaultKey.addToResourcePolicy(
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new iam.PolicyStatement({
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sid: "AllowAwsBackupUseOfTheKey",
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principals: [new iam.ServicePrincipal("backup.amazonaws.com")],
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// Action set matches AWS's documented Backup vault-key policy; scoped
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// to this account so only this account's Backup service can use it.
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actions: [
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"kms:Decrypt",
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"kms:GenerateDataKey",
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"kms:GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext",
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"kms:ReEncrypt*",
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"kms:DescribeKey",
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],
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resources: ["*"],
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conditions: { StringEquals: { "aws:SourceAccount": this.account } },
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})
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);
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vaultKey.addToResourcePolicy(
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new iam.PolicyStatement({
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sid: "AllowAwsBackupCreateGrant",
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principals: [new iam.ServicePrincipal("backup.amazonaws.com")],
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actions: ["kms:CreateGrant"],
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resources: ["*"],
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conditions: {
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Bool: { "kms:GrantIsForAWSResource": "true" },
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StringEquals: { "aws:SourceAccount": this.account },
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},
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})
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);
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// Primary vault is intentionally NOT locked — it is the working copy; the
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// offsite vault carries the immutability guarantee.
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const primaryVault = new backup.BackupVault(this, "PrimaryVault", {
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backupVaultName: "seahaven-primary",
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encryptionKey: vaultKey,
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removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
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});
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// Cross-region copy destination, referenced by literal ARN (the offsite
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// stack is in another region; a literal ARN avoids crossRegionReferences /
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// SSM exports). Stack ordering is enforced via addDependency in bin/app.ts.
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const offsiteVault = backup.BackupVault.fromBackupVaultArn(
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this,
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"OffsiteVaultRef",
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`arn:aws:backup:us-west-2:${this.account}:backup-vault:seahaven-offsite`
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);
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// AWS Backup service role. Explicit (not auto-generated) because S3 backup
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// needs the S3-specific managed policy on top of the standard backup one.
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// Least-privilege: BACKUP + S3-backup only. Restore policies
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// (AWSBackupServiceRolePolicyForRestores / ...ForS3Restore) and
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// BackupSelection allowRestores are intentionally NOT granted — restores
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// are a deliberate, audited action and will get their own scoped role/path
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// once a restore-test process exists (cross-review F-1/F-2). A known role
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// name lets the deploy role's iam:PassRole be scoped to this exact ARN.
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// NOTE: creating this role is an IAM change → Sea Haven cross-review gate.
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const backupRole = new iam.Role(this, "BackupRole", {
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roleName: "seahaven-backup-service-role",
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assumedBy: new iam.ServicePrincipal("backup.amazonaws.com"),
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description: "AWS Backup service role (backup-only) for seahaven-primary",
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managedPolicies: [
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iam.ManagedPolicy.fromAwsManagedPolicyName(
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"service-role/AWSBackupServiceRolePolicyForBackup"
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),
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iam.ManagedPolicy.fromAwsManagedPolicyName(
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"AWSBackupServiceRolePolicyForS3Backup"
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),
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],
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});
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// Daily backup → primary vault (35d), cross-region copy → offsite (90d).
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const plan = new backup.BackupPlan(this, "Plan", {
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backupPlanName: "seahaven-critical-daily",
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backupVault: primaryVault,
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backupPlanRules: [
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new backup.BackupPlanRule({
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ruleName: "daily-crr-offsite",
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backupVault: primaryVault,
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// 06:00 UTC — offset from the file-share DLM run.
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scheduleExpression: events.Schedule.cron({ hour: "6", minute: "0" }),
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startWindow: cdk.Duration.hours(1),
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completionWindow: cdk.Duration.hours(6),
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deleteAfter: cdk.Duration.days(35),
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copyActions: [
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{
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destinationBackupVault: offsiteVault,
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deleteAfter: cdk.Duration.days(90),
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},
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],
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}),
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],
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});
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// Phase-1 critical set, by explicit ARN (identifiers verified against the
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// live account 2026-05-29).
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plan.addSelection("CriticalResources", {
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backupSelectionName: "critical-data",
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role: backupRole,
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// allowRestores omitted (defaults false) — backup-only, see role comment.
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resources: [
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// RDS
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backup.BackupResource.fromArn(
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`arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:${this.account}:db:database-1`
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),
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backup.BackupResource.fromArn(
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`arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:${this.account}:db:proposal-system-db`
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),
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// DynamoDB (financial)
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backup.BackupResource.fromArn(
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`arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${this.account}:table/PaymentsDashboard`
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),
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backup.BackupResource.fromArn(
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`arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:${this.account}:table/purchase-orders`
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),
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// S3 (single-copy critical buckets) — versioning required (see header)
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backup.BackupResource.fromArn("arn:aws:s3:::accounting.seahaven.com"),
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backup.BackupResource.fromArn(
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"arn:aws:s3:::seahaven-payments-csv-328440206208"
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),
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backup.BackupResource.fromArn(
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"arn:aws:s3:::google-workspace-seahavenind.com"
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),
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],
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});
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cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Project", "account-baseline");
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cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Owner", "adam@seahavenind.com");
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cdk.Tags.of(this).add("Environment", "prod");
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cdk.Tags.of(this).add("ManagedBy", "cdk");
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new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "PrimaryVaultName", { value: "seahaven-primary" });
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new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "PrimaryVaultKmsKeyArn", { value: vaultKey.keyArn });
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new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "BackupPlanId", { value: plan.backupPlanId });
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new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "BackupRoleArn", { value: backupRole.roleArn });
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}
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}
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