mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/proposal-system.git
synced 2026-09-30 14:43:13 +00:00
0f9d27fbf0
* chore(infra): retarget prod to seahaven-prod account + OIDC deploy-role artifacts Retarget the CDK prod env from mgmt (328440206208, now frozen for workloads) to the dedicated seahaven-prod workload account (011934824531). proposal-system is the org's first prod tenant. Hard-block env=staging (still targets frozen mgmt) in resolveConfig until it is retargeted to seahaven-dev (710827005802). Add a WARN-only out-of-pipeline deploy guard in bin/app.ts. Add infra/deploy-role/: OIDC trust policy (sub scoped to Sea-Haven-Industries/proposal-system:ref:refs/heads/main), least-privilege permissions policy (AssumeRole on the verified cdk-hnb659fds bootstrap roles, deterministic site bucket, account-scoped CloudFront invalidation), and an idempotent creation script. Verified against live prod: bootstrap qualifier hnb659fds v32, OIDC provider present. Passed GPT-4.1 cross-review (APPROVE) and workflow red-team (CLEAN). Role NOT yet created — gated on /sh-security-review + the deploy go-ahead. Docs: README + CLAUDE.md reflect the prod account and pipeline-only deploy. * chore(infra): region-bound deploy-role DescribeStacks to us-east-1 (sh-security-review IAM-L2) * feat(infra): Aurora prod backup retention 14d + window; prod-only CDK context Bump Aurora automated-backup (PITR) retention 7->14d and set a preferred backup window for the prod tenant. Dedicated AWS Backup vault + cross-account restore test is a tracked follow-up (no org central-backup design exists yet). Prune the stale mgmt-account AZ context; prod (011934824531) is the only deploy target.
218 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
218 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# Proposal System
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Internal proposal management platform for Sea Haven Industries. Dispatchers submit proposal requests, AI generates draft line items from historical data via Bedrock RAG, admins review and approve in a pricing workspace, and the system produces branded PDFs for delivery.
|
|
|
|
## Architecture Overview
|
|
|
|
Monorepo with five primary services:
|
|
|
|
- **.NET 8 API** -- Clean Architecture REST API hosted on Lambda behind API Gateway (JWT-authorized) with Function URL (AWS_IAM) for internal access
|
|
- **React 19 Web** -- MUI v9 admin/dispatcher workspace served via CloudFront + S3
|
|
- **React Native Mobile** -- iOS-first field app for dispatchers (offline-capable)
|
|
- **Python Lambdas** -- PDF extraction, PDF generation, library ingestion, AI suggestions, Aurora pgvector bootstrap
|
|
- **CDK Infrastructure** -- Three TypeScript stacks managing all AWS resources
|
|
|
|
## Repository Structure
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
proposal-system/
|
|
├── api/ .NET 8 Web API (Lambda-hosted, EF Core + PostgreSQL)
|
|
├── web/ React 19 + MUI v9 + Vite frontend
|
|
├── mobile/ React Native 0.86 iOS app
|
|
├── lambdas/ Python 3.12 processing functions (arm64)
|
|
├── infra/ CDK TypeScript (3 stacks)
|
|
├── shared/ TypeScript API contracts (shared between web + mobile)
|
|
├── scripts/ Post-deploy and utility scripts
|
|
├── .github/ CI/CD workflows
|
|
└── docker-compose.yml
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Tech Stack
|
|
|
|
| Component | Technologies |
|
|
|---|---|
|
|
| API | .NET 8, ASP.NET Core, EF Core + Npgsql, FluentValidation, Cognito JWT, Amazon.Lambda.AspNetCoreServer |
|
|
| Web | React 19, TypeScript, MUI v9, Vite, TanStack Query, react-hook-form + zod, axios |
|
|
| Mobile | React Native CLI 0.86, React 19, React Native Paper, React Navigation, react-native-app-auth (PKCE), amazon-cognito-identity-js (SRP), Keychain, offline draft queue |
|
|
| Lambdas | Python 3.12, arm64, pdfplumber, reportlab, httpx, boto3 |
|
|
| Infrastructure | CDK TypeScript (aws-cdk-lib pinned exact, kept current by Dependabot) |
|
|
| AI/RAG | Bedrock Knowledge Base (Titan Embeddings v2), Aurora PostgreSQL + pgvector vector store (see ADR 0001), Claude Sonnet via Bedrock cross-region inference |
|
|
| Auth | Cognito User Pool + Google OAuth IdP (groups: dispatchers, admins, sysadmins) |
|
|
|
|
## AWS Resources
|
|
|
|
All resources deploy to **us-east-1** in the **seahaven-prod** workload account (`011934824531`).
|
|
The mgmt account (`328440206208`) is frozen for new workloads. Staging is not currently
|
|
deployable — it still references the frozen mgmt account and is hard-blocked in `infra/lib/config.ts`
|
|
until retargeted to seahaven-dev (`710827005802`). Prod deploys go through the `deploy.yaml`
|
|
pipeline (workflow_dispatch) only; no manual/local `cdk deploy` to prod.
|
|
|
|
| CDK Stack | Key Resources |
|
|
|---|---|
|
|
| `proposal-system-foundation` | Aurora PostgreSQL 15 Serverless v2 (RDS Data API, pgvector), S3 buckets, SQS queue + DLQ, Cognito user pool, Secrets Manager |
|
|
| `proposal-system-compute` | API Gateway HTTP API (JWT authorizer + access logging), .NET 8 API Lambda + Function URL (AWS_IAM), Python Lambdas (pdf-extract, pdf-generate, library-ingest, suggestions, aurora-pgvector-init bootstrap), Bedrock KB (Aurora pgvector store) |
|
|
| `proposal-system-frontend` | CloudFront distribution (S3 OAC) |
|
|
|
|
| Resource Type | Names |
|
|
|---|---|
|
|
| S3 Buckets | `proposal-system-uploads`, `proposal-system-generated`, `proposal-system-library`, `seahaven-ios-certificates` |
|
|
| SQS | `proposal-system-jobs` (720s visibility, SQS-managed encryption, reportBatchItemFailures) + `proposal-system-jobs-dlq` (SQS-managed encryption, message body filtering by jobType) |
|
|
| Secrets | `proposal-system/db-credentials`, `proposal-system/internal-api-key` |
|
|
|
|
## Local Development
|
|
|
|
### Prerequisites
|
|
|
|
- .NET 8 SDK
|
|
- Node.js 24+
|
|
- Python 3.12
|
|
- PostgreSQL 16 (via docker-compose or native)
|
|
|
|
### Database
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
docker compose up -d # starts PostgreSQL on port 5432
|
|
# database: proposalsystem, password: localdev
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### API
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd api
|
|
dotnet restore
|
|
dotnet run --project src/ProposalSystem.Api
|
|
# runs on http://localhost:5000
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
In development mode (`DevMode=true` in appsettings.Development.json):
|
|
- JWT auth uses a local symmetric HMAC key (no Cognito required)
|
|
- S3 service returns fake presigned URLs
|
|
- SQS publisher logs messages without sending
|
|
|
|
### Web Frontend
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd web
|
|
npm install
|
|
npm run dev
|
|
# runs on http://localhost:5173, proxies /api to localhost:5000
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
When `VITE_COGNITO_CLIENT_ID` is not set, the login screen shows role-selector buttons for local development.
|
|
|
|
### Infrastructure
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd infra
|
|
npm install
|
|
npx cdk synth
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## CI/CD
|
|
|
|
### CI (on pull request to main)
|
|
|
|
Six parallel jobs calling org reusable workflows:
|
|
|
|
| Job | Workflow | What it checks |
|
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
| .NET Build & Test | `ci-dotnet.yaml` | Restore, build, test the API solution (xUnit) |
|
|
| Web Frontend Check | `ci-typescript-frontend.yaml` | Prettier `format:check`, build (includes `tsc -b`), vitest suite, Playwright chromium smoke (dev-login → proposal list, API mocked) |
|
|
| Mobile Typecheck | `ci-typescript-cdk.yaml` | TypeScript typecheck for mobile |
|
|
| Python Lint | `ci-python-sam.yaml` | ruff check + format on lambdas/ |
|
|
| Python Tests | inline job | pytest suite (37 tests — pdf-generate, suggestions, library-ingest, internal API signing) |
|
|
| CDK Synth | `ci-typescript-cdk.yaml` | Synthesize CDK stacks (includes .NET publish) |
|
|
|
|
### Deploy (manual)
|
|
|
|
Auto-deploy on push to main is currently disabled (PR #167) — both deploy workflows run via `workflow_dispatch` from the Actions tab. `deploy.yaml` calls the `cd-cdk.yaml` reusable workflow:
|
|
1. Publishes .NET 8 API and Python Lambdas
|
|
2. Runs `cdk deploy --all`
|
|
3. Executes `scripts/post-deploy.sh` (builds web, syncs to S3, invalidates CloudFront)
|
|
|
|
Deploy uses OIDC role `githubdeploy-proposal-system`. Concurrency group prevents parallel deploys.
|
|
|
|
### Mobile Deploy
|
|
|
|
Workflow: `deploy-mobile.yaml` -- builds and uploads to TestFlight via `cd-mobile-ios.yaml` reusable workflow on `macos-26`.
|
|
|
|
Trigger: **manual only** (`workflow_dispatch`) while the app is pre-V1, to save macOS runner cost.
|
|
|
|
## Mobile iOS
|
|
|
|
The iOS app uses **Fastlane** with **match** for code signing. Certificates and profiles are stored in the `seahaven-ios-certificates` S3 bucket (versioning enabled, public access blocked).
|
|
|
|
Build and upload to TestFlight is handled by the `cd-mobile-ios.yaml` reusable workflow. Required secrets:
|
|
|
|
| Secret | Purpose |
|
|
|---|---|
|
|
| `AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_ARN` | OIDC role for match S3 access |
|
|
| `MATCH_PASSWORD` | Decryption passphrase for signing assets |
|
|
| `ASC_KEY_ID` | App Store Connect API key ID |
|
|
| `ASC_ISSUER_ID` | App Store Connect issuer |
|
|
| `ASC_KEY_CONTENT` | App Store Connect API key (base64) |
|
|
|
|
## Authentication & Authorization
|
|
|
|
Two-layer auth architecture with defense-in-depth:
|
|
|
|
| Path | Authorizer | Authentication |
|
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
| External clients → API Gateway `/{proxy+}` | Cognito JWT authorizer (web + mobile client IDs) | .NET JWT middleware (ValidateAudience=true) |
|
|
| `/api/health` | None (public) | None |
|
|
| `/api/auth/callback`, `/api/auth/dev-login` | None (unauthenticated) | None (pre-auth endpoints) |
|
|
| Internal Lambdas → Function URL | AWS_IAM (grantInvokeUrl) | Internal API key (`X-Internal-Api-Key` header, value from Secrets Manager) |
|
|
|
|
**Role-based access:** Cognito groups (`dispatchers`, `admins`, `sysadmins`) map to API roles via `cognito:groups` claim. Dispatchers can only see their own proposals (ownership enforced in service layer). VendorProposals and GeneratedPdfs endpoints restricted to admins/sysadmins.
|
|
|
|
**Internal API key:** Python Lambdas call the .NET API via a Lambda Function URL with AWS_IAM auth (bypasses API Gateway JWT check). The `InternalApiKeyMiddleware` validates the `X-Internal-Api-Key` header and assigns the `admins` role to the synthetic identity. Lambdas cache the API key from Secrets Manager with a 5-minute TTL.
|
|
|
|
**Optimistic concurrency (ADR 0004):** proposal responses carry an opaque `rowVersion` token; mutations of the proposal aggregate (update, approve, return-to-review, send, revise, bulk line-item update) require `proposalVersion` in the body. Missing token → 422 `ProposalVersionRequired`, malformed → 422 `InvalidRowVersion`, stale → **409 `{ message, currentState }`** with the reloaded proposal embedded (unguarded races → 409 `{ status, message, code }`). Line-item create/delete are token-less but bump the aggregate version. Audit rows commit atomically with their mutation (stage-then-single-SaveChanges).
|
|
|
|
**Deploy note for schema changes:** EF migrations auto-apply at API startup under a `pg_advisory_lock`. Before deploying a migration: take a manual RDS snapshot; additive-only migrations are backward-compatible with the previous Lambda version. Test the down-script against a snapshot-restored copy before any production rollback.
|
|
|
|
## Data Flow
|
|
|
|
1. Dispatcher submits proposal request (web or mobile)
|
|
2. API creates proposal record (with advisory-locked number generation), publishes SQS message
|
|
3. If vendor PDF attached: `pdf-extract` Lambda parses and structures data
|
|
4. Suggestions Lambda queries Bedrock KB for similar proposals, generates line items via Claude
|
|
5. Admin reviews/edits line items in pricing workspace
|
|
6. On approval: `pdf-generate` Lambda creates branded PDF
|
|
7. On send: `library-ingest` Lambda adds approved proposal to KB for future matching
|
|
|
|
Failed SQS messages are reported via `batchItemFailures` and retried up to 3 times before moving to the DLQ.
|
|
|
|
## Testing
|
|
|
|
186 tests across three stacks, all run in CI on every PR:
|
|
|
|
| Suite | Framework | Count | Coverage |
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
| .NET API | xUnit | 123 | State machine transitions, authorization attributes, middleware, validators, ProposalNumberGenerator, LineItemService state guards |
|
|
| Web | vitest | 26 | ProtectedRoute, RoleGuard, API client interceptor (401 logout, token attachment) |
|
|
| Python Lambdas | pytest | 37 | pdf-generate, suggestions, library-ingest handler contracts, internal API signing |
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cd api && dotnet test # .NET tests
|
|
cd web && npm test # vitest
|
|
cd lambdas && python -m pytest # pytest
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Security
|
|
|
|
Hardening applied across all layers (see AUDIT-REPORT.md for full details):
|
|
|
|
- **Auth:** Cognito JWT validation with audience check, startup fails if auth not configured, DevMode gated to `IsDevelopment()`
|
|
- **API:** FluentValidation on all DTOs, generic error responses (no stack traces or config leaks), structured audit logging with before/after diffs
|
|
- **Function URL:** AWS_IAM auth + internal API key (two-layer defense)
|
|
- **Infrastructure:** S3 `enforceSSL` + `BLOCK_ALL`, SQS managed encryption, Aurora in private subnets, Cognito optional TOTP MFA, API Gateway access logging
|
|
- **Lambdas:** Prompt injection sanitization, PDF size limits, numeric validation on AI suggestions, S3 key sanitization, idempotent SQS processing
|
|
- **CI/CD:** OIDC (no long-lived credentials), org reusable workflows (`@main`), `--require-approval broadening` on local deploys
|
|
- **Web:** sessionStorage for tokens (not localStorage), error boundaries, role guards on all admin routes, 401 interceptor clears auth state
|