proposal-system/infra/deploy-role/README.md
Adam Moussa 0f9d27fbf0
chore(infra): prep proposal-system for seahaven-prod deployment (#227)
* chore(infra): retarget prod to seahaven-prod account + OIDC deploy-role artifacts

Retarget the CDK prod env from mgmt (328440206208, now frozen for workloads) to the
dedicated seahaven-prod workload account (011934824531). proposal-system is the org's
first prod tenant. Hard-block env=staging (still targets frozen mgmt) in resolveConfig
until it is retargeted to seahaven-dev (710827005802). Add a WARN-only out-of-pipeline
deploy guard in bin/app.ts.

Add infra/deploy-role/: OIDC trust policy (sub scoped to
Sea-Haven-Industries/proposal-system:ref:refs/heads/main), least-privilege permissions
policy (AssumeRole on the verified cdk-hnb659fds bootstrap roles, deterministic site
bucket, account-scoped CloudFront invalidation), and an idempotent creation script.
Verified against live prod: bootstrap qualifier hnb659fds v32, OIDC provider present.
Passed GPT-4.1 cross-review (APPROVE) and workflow red-team (CLEAN). Role NOT yet created
— gated on /sh-security-review + the deploy go-ahead.

Docs: README + CLAUDE.md reflect the prod account and pipeline-only deploy.

* chore(infra): region-bound deploy-role DescribeStacks to us-east-1 (sh-security-review IAM-L2)

* feat(infra): Aurora prod backup retention 14d + window; prod-only CDK context

Bump Aurora automated-backup (PITR) retention 7->14d and set a preferred backup
window for the prod tenant. Dedicated AWS Backup vault + cross-account restore
test is a tracked follow-up (no org central-backup design exists yet). Prune the
stale mgmt-account AZ context; prod (011934824531) is the only deploy target.
2026-07-15 14:44:35 -04:00

2.9 KiB

seahaven-prod OIDC deploy role — proposal-system

IAM artifacts for the GitHub Actions OIDC deploy role that lets the Sea-Haven-Industries/proposal-system repo deploy the CDK stacks and sync the frontend site bucket into seahaven-prod. Artifacts only — nothing here has been applied to AWS.

Resolved facts (Phase 0, read-only verification)

Field Value
Account 011934824531 (seahaven-prod)
Region us-east-1
CDK qualifier hnb659fds (AWS CDK default — bootstrap v32; no custom synthesizer needed)
OIDC provider ARN arn:aws:iam::011934824531:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com (EXISTS)
Role name githubdeploy-proposal-system
Subject scope repo:Sea-Haven-Industries/proposal-system:ref:refs/heads/main (exact, no wildcard)
Site bucket proposal-system-web-011934824531 (frontend-stack convention)

Files

  • trust-policy.json — Web-identity trust policy. Federated principal is the existing GitHub OIDC provider. sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity gated by two StringEquals conditions: aud == sts.amazonaws.com and an exact sub match on the proposal-system repo's main branch (no StringLike, no wildcard). Mirrors the structure of the existing githubdeploy-seahaven-org-baseline role.

  • permissions-policy.json — Least-privilege inline policy:

    • sts:AssumeRole on the four CDK bootstrap roles (deploy, file-publishing, lookup, image-publishing) scoped to qualifier hnb659fds, account, and region. This is how a CDK deploy actually gains its power — no direct service permissions are granted to the deploy role itself.
    • cloudformation:DescribeStacks on * for the cdk deploy / change-set health check.
    • s3:PutObject/DeleteObject/ListBucket on the site bucket and its objects for the frontend asset sync.
    • cloudfront:CreateInvalidation on *, constrained by aws:ResourceAccount == 011934824531 (distribution ARNs aren't known at author time; the account condition prevents cross-account use).
  • create-deploy-role.sh — Idempotent bash (aws --profile prod). Verifies the profile resolves to 011934824531, then create-role (or update-assume-role-policy if it exists) + put-role-policy. Safe to re-run. Gated: do not execute until GPT-4.1 cross-review AND /sh-security-review pass (IAM/trust change).

Applying (after gates pass)

./create-deploy-role.sh

Then point the GitHub Actions workflow's aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials step at the printed role ARN.

Placeholders / follow-ups

  • None outstanding. Qualifier resolved to the real value hnb659fds; no <QUALIFIER> placeholder remains. OIDC provider exists, so no provider creation prerequisite.
  • CloudFront invalidation is scoped by account, not by distribution ARN — tighten to the specific distribution ARN once frontend-stack is deployed if you want per-resource least privilege.