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0f9d27fbf0
* chore(infra): retarget prod to seahaven-prod account + OIDC deploy-role artifacts Retarget the CDK prod env from mgmt (328440206208, now frozen for workloads) to the dedicated seahaven-prod workload account (011934824531). proposal-system is the org's first prod tenant. Hard-block env=staging (still targets frozen mgmt) in resolveConfig until it is retargeted to seahaven-dev (710827005802). Add a WARN-only out-of-pipeline deploy guard in bin/app.ts. Add infra/deploy-role/: OIDC trust policy (sub scoped to Sea-Haven-Industries/proposal-system:ref:refs/heads/main), least-privilege permissions policy (AssumeRole on the verified cdk-hnb659fds bootstrap roles, deterministic site bucket, account-scoped CloudFront invalidation), and an idempotent creation script. Verified against live prod: bootstrap qualifier hnb659fds v32, OIDC provider present. Passed GPT-4.1 cross-review (APPROVE) and workflow red-team (CLEAN). Role NOT yet created — gated on /sh-security-review + the deploy go-ahead. Docs: README + CLAUDE.md reflect the prod account and pipeline-only deploy. * chore(infra): region-bound deploy-role DescribeStacks to us-east-1 (sh-security-review IAM-L2) * feat(infra): Aurora prod backup retention 14d + window; prod-only CDK context Bump Aurora automated-backup (PITR) retention 7->14d and set a preferred backup window for the prod tenant. Dedicated AWS Backup vault + cross-account restore test is a tracked follow-up (no org central-backup design exists yet). Prune the stale mgmt-account AZ context; prod (011934824531) is the only deploy target.
64 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# seahaven-prod OIDC deploy role — proposal-system
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IAM artifacts for the GitHub Actions OIDC deploy role that lets the
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`Sea-Haven-Industries/proposal-system` repo deploy the CDK stacks and sync the
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frontend site bucket into **seahaven-prod**. Artifacts only — nothing here has
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been applied to AWS.
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## Resolved facts (Phase 0, read-only verification)
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| Field | Value |
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| Account | `011934824531` (seahaven-prod) |
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| Region | `us-east-1` |
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| CDK qualifier | `hnb659fds` (AWS CDK **default** — bootstrap v32; no custom synthesizer needed) |
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| OIDC provider ARN | `arn:aws:iam::011934824531:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com` (EXISTS) |
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| Role name | `githubdeploy-proposal-system` |
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| Subject scope | `repo:Sea-Haven-Industries/proposal-system:ref:refs/heads/main` (exact, no wildcard) |
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| Site bucket | `proposal-system-web-011934824531` (frontend-stack convention) |
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## Files
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- **trust-policy.json** — Web-identity trust policy. Federated principal is the
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existing GitHub OIDC provider. `sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` gated by two
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StringEquals conditions: `aud == sts.amazonaws.com` and an **exact** `sub`
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match on the proposal-system repo's `main` branch (no `StringLike`, no
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wildcard). Mirrors the structure of the existing
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`githubdeploy-seahaven-org-baseline` role.
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- **permissions-policy.json** — Least-privilege inline policy:
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- `sts:AssumeRole` on the four CDK bootstrap roles (deploy, file-publishing,
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lookup, image-publishing) scoped to qualifier `hnb659fds`, account, and
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region. This is how a CDK deploy actually gains its power — no direct
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service permissions are granted to the deploy role itself.
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- `cloudformation:DescribeStacks` on `*` for the `cdk deploy` /
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change-set health check.
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- `s3:PutObject`/`DeleteObject`/`ListBucket` on the site bucket and its
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objects for the frontend asset sync.
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- `cloudfront:CreateInvalidation` on `*`, constrained by
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`aws:ResourceAccount == 011934824531` (distribution ARNs aren't known at
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author time; the account condition prevents cross-account use).
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- **create-deploy-role.sh** — Idempotent bash (`aws --profile prod`). Verifies
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the profile resolves to `011934824531`, then create-role (or
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update-assume-role-policy if it exists) + put-role-policy. Safe to re-run.
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**Gated:** do not execute until GPT-4.1 cross-review AND `/sh-security-review`
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pass (IAM/trust change).
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## Applying (after gates pass)
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```bash
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./create-deploy-role.sh
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```
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Then point the GitHub Actions workflow's `aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials`
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step at the printed role ARN.
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## Placeholders / follow-ups
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- **None outstanding.** Qualifier resolved to the real value `hnb659fds`; no
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`<QUALIFIER>` placeholder remains. OIDC provider exists, so no provider
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creation prerequisite.
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- CloudFront invalidation is scoped by account, not by distribution ARN — tighten
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to the specific distribution ARN once frontend-stack is deployed if you want
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per-resource least privilege.
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