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* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6). Refs: INFRA-6 * Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of using an unmanaged key. Adapted fromf175323on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped: the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR. Refs: INFRA-107 * Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order cancellation had already created a skeleton row. Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one. * Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token. Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it. Refs: INFRA-74 * Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate + SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO revision/cancellation merge behavior. Adapted fromd91f45eon security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself (deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework). Refs: INFRA-107 * fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and Lambda environment variables. Refs: PR-97 * Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is unset or unreadable. Refs: INFRA-74 * Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic. Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored _get_auth_token() region. The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same explicit secret name at deploy time. Refs: INFRA-74 * Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this: - Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing. - Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true un-cancel transition. Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky, authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status) OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already -Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path; _is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds. Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment, status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation. Refs: #97
208 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
208 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
# Procurement Ingest
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Unified email ingestion pipelines for Amazon procurement data. Two independent pipelines — purchase orders (Coupa) and work orders (APM/Hexagon EAM) — share a single repo and CDK app but deploy as separate CloudFormation stacks.
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## Pipelines
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### Purchase Orders (`po-ingest` stack)
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Coupa PO emails are received at `amazon_po@int.seahaven.com`, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5, and written to the `purchase-orders` DynamoDB table.
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**Flow:**
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1. Coupa sends a PO email (new, revision, or cancellation).
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2. SES (`INBOUND_MAIL` rule set) drops the raw MIME into `s3://po-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/`.
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3. S3 `ObjectCreated` triggers the `po-email-processor` Lambda.
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4. Claude extracts structured JSON (PO number, status, supplier, site code, trade classification, line items, fiscal year).
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5. Merge write to DynamoDB:
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- `new_po` — merge insert. Creates the PO, or backfills data into a pre-existing `Cancelled` skeleton left by an out-of-order cancellation (preserving the `Cancelled` status). No longer silently dropped when a record already exists.
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- `revision` — field-level merge (`update_item` SETs only the fields present in the revision). A revision that omits `line_items`/`supplier` no longer deletes them. Will not un-cancel a `Cancelled` PO.
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- `cancellation` — marks the row `Cancelled` (creating a minimal skeleton if the cancellation arrives before the `new_po`).
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6. DynamoDB Streams feeds downstream consumers:
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- **LedgerFlow** (`seahaven-slack-bot/po-sync`) — daily KB sync
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- **Site extractor** (`po-ingest-site-extractor`) — real-time site address extraction into `verified-sites` table
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**Lambdas** (`lambdas/po/`):
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| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
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| `po-email-processor` | S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
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| `po-ingest-site-extractor` | DynamoDB Streams | Site code/address extraction -> `verified-sites` |
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| `po-web-ui` | Manual invoke | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
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**Tables:**
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- `purchase-orders` (PK: `po_number`, Streams: NEW_IMAGE) — shared with seahaven-slack-bot (read-only; see Shared Resources)
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- `verified-sites` (PK: `siteCode`) — ~1,100 unique Amazon facility sites (`by-state` GSI removed 2026-06-03, audit M-20)
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- `pending-site-review` (PK: `po_number`) — unresolvable POs for manual Payee Central verification
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### Work Orders (`WorkorderIngestStack` stack)
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Amazon APM work order emails (from Hexagon EAM / HxGN SmartCloud) are received at `apm@int.seahaven.com`, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5, and written to the `WorkOrders` DynamoDB table.
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**Flow:**
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1. Hexagon EAM sends email notifications (new assignments, comments, updates, cancellations) to `amazon@seahavenind.com`.
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2. Gmail filter forwards APM emails to `apm@int.seahaven.com` (SES).
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3. SES drops the raw MIME into `s3://workorder-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/`.
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4. S3 triggers the `workorder-email-processor` Lambda.
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5. Claude extracts structured JSON (work order ID, site code, severity, priority, dates, assigned technician).
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6. Work order upserted to `WorkOrders`, event/comment appended to `WorkOrderComments`.
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**Lambdas** (`lambdas/wo/`):
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| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
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| `workorder-email-processor` | S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
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| `workorder-web-ui` | Manual invoke | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
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**Tables:**
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- `WorkOrders` (PK: `work_order_id`) — `site-code-index` and `status-index` GSIs removed 2026-06-03 (audit M-20)
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- `WorkOrderComments` (PK: `work_order_id`, SK: `comment_id`)
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## Architecture
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**IaC:** AWS CDK (Python), two stacks in one app, region `us-east-1`.
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All Lambdas: Python 3.12, ARM64, 60-day log retention.
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**Secrets:**
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- `po-ingest/anthropic-api-key` — Anthropic API key for PO parsing
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- `workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key` — Anthropic API key for WO parsing
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The email processors **require** `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN` to be set and resolve the key from Secrets Manager at runtime. There is no plaintext `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` env fallback — a deploy missing the ARN fails loudly instead of silently running on an unmanaged key.
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**SES:** Both stacks add rules to the shared `INBOUND_MAIL` receipt rule set on `int.seahaven.com`.
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**Failure handling (INFRA-41):** Each email-processor is async-invoked (S3 → Lambda). Both have a CDK-managed SQS dead-letter queue (`dead_letter_queue=`, 14-day retention, SSL-enforced) so a failed parse is captured rather than silently dropped after Lambda's retries.
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### CloudWatch alarms
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Every alarm is **ALARM-only** (no OK action), sends to the shared `site-alerts` SNS topic (imported once per stack via `Topic.from_topic_arn`), and uses `TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING`.
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**Lambda alarms** (`AWS/Lambda`, `FunctionName` dimension):
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| Alarm | Functions | Metric / config |
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| `<fn>-errors` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `workorder-email-processor` | `Errors` Sum, 5 min, `> 0`, eval 1 |
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| `<fn>-throttles` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `po-web-ui`, `workorder-email-processor` | `Throttles` Sum, 5 min, `> 0`, eval 1 |
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| `<fn>-duration` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `po-web-ui` (p99); `workorder-email-processor` (p95) | `Duration` percentile, 5 min, `>= 45000` ms (75% of the 60s timeout), eval 3 / datapoints 2 |
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The `<fn>-duration` and `<fn>-throttles` alarms for `po-email-processor` and `workorder-email-processor` supersede the orphaned, CLI-created `Lambda-Duration-*` / `Lambda-Throttles-*` alarms (deleted post-deploy).
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**DLQ alarms** (`AWS/SQS`): `po-email-processor-dlq-messages` and `workorder-email-processor-dlq-messages` fire when any message is visible on an email-processor DLQ (`ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible` Maximum, 5 min, `> 0`, eval 1) — a message there means an email was dropped after Lambda exhausted its async retries.
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**DynamoDB alarms** (`AWS/DynamoDB`): each owned table gets `<table>-throttles` (`ThrottledRequests`) and `<table>-system-errors` (`SystemErrors`). These metrics emit only at the `TableName` + `Operation` dimension set, so each alarm is a `Sum` math expression across the operations the table uses (Get/BatchGet/Query/Scan/Put/Update/Delete/BatchWrite). Tables covered: `purchase-orders`, `verified-sites`, `pending-site-review` (po-ingest); `WorkOrders`, `WorkOrderComments` (workorder-ingest).
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## Security
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**Web UI auth (defense-in-depth).** The `po-web-ui` / `workorder-web-ui` handlers refuse unauthenticated requests even though their public Function URLs were removed (INFRA-74). Each requires a shared secret in the `X-Auth-Token` header (or `Authorization: Bearer <token>`), compared in constant time against the configured token. The handler **fails closed** if the token is unset or unreadable (denies all). The token lives in the Secrets Manager secret `procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token`; only its ARN is passed to the Lambda (`WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN`), and the value is fetched at runtime — never embedded in the CloudFormation template or Lambda env vars. The fetched value is cached in the warm container with a short TTL (5 min) so a rotated secret propagates without waiting for the execution environment to recycle. This is a defense-in-depth floor for a detached URL, not primary auth.
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**Output escaping.** All caller-influenced values (including prompt-injectable strings Claude may return for `total_amount`/line-item amounts) are HTML-escaped before interpolation to prevent stored XSS.
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## Shared Resources
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### `purchase-orders` table (owned here)
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The `purchase-orders` DynamoDB table is **owned by this repo's `po-ingest` stack** (defined in `cdk/po_stack.py` with `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN`, `StreamViewType.NEW_IMAGE`, and SSE-KMS encryption with the shared customer-managed CMK `alias/seahaven-dynamodb`, INFRA-95 / M-3). The `po-email-processor` Lambda is the authoritative writer — it performs the merge inserts, field-level revision merges, and cancellation updates described above.
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**Consumers (read-only):**
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| Repo | How it reads | Purpose |
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| `seahaven-slack-bot` | `po-sync` (DynamoDB Streams + daily scan) and `wo-po-lookup` | Daily KB sync + Bedrock agent PO lookups |
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The consumer imports the table via `Table.fromTableName(...)` and is granted read-only access (`grantReadData`); it does not own or define it.
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**Schema-coordination rule:** Any change to the `purchase-orders` schema (partition key, item shape, attribute names, streams view type) must be coordinated with `seahaven-slack-bot`. The owner here ships the change; the consumer must be updated in lockstep so its readers do not break. Treat schema changes as a cross-repo migration, not a local edit.
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**Known exception (INFRA-51):** `amazon-po-parser` currently writes directly to `purchase-orders` outside this stack (backfill/enrichment scripts). This second writer is being folded into the `po-ingest` pipeline so this stack is the sole writer; until INFRA-51 closes, coordinate any schema change with `amazon-po-parser` as well.
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### `WorkOrders` and `WorkOrderComments` tables (owned here)
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Both tables are **owned by this repo's `WorkorderIngestStack`** (`cdk/wo_stack.py`, `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN`):
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- `WorkOrders` — PK `work_order_id` (S).
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- `WorkOrderComments` — PK `work_order_id` (S), SK `comment_id` (S).
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Both currently use default DynamoDB encryption — they are **not** yet on the shared customer-managed CMK (`alias/seahaven-dynamodb`, INFRA-95 / M-3); that migration is tracked in INFRA-6. The `workorder-email-processor` role no longer holds a pre-emptive encrypt/decrypt grant on that CMK (removed in the 2026-06-17 security sweep — it was unused while the tables are unencrypted and extended the role's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting `purchase-orders`). Re-add the grant as part of the INFRA-6 migration, at which point `grant_read_write_data` on the then-encrypted tables propagates the needed key permissions automatically.
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**Consumer (read-only) — data contract:** `seahaven-slack-bot` imports both tables via `Table.fromTableName(...)` (`grantReadData`) and reads them from two Lambdas: `workorder-sync` (daily full-table scan into the Bedrock knowledge base) and `wo-po-lookup` (the Bedrock agent's direct WO lookup action group). The bot depends on the PK/SK schema above and these attributes: on `WorkOrders` — `description`, `wo_status`, `customer`, `site_code`, `building`, `address`, `severity`, `priority`, `assigned_to`, `date_reported`, `scheduled_start`, `due_date`, `updated_at`; on `WorkOrderComments` — `created_at` (used to sort comments), `commenter`, `text`. Any change to table name, key schema, these attribute names, or the encryption configuration (e.g. the INFRA-6 CMK migration) must be coordinated with `seahaven-slack-bot` before it ships, or the Bedrock agent breaks at runtime (not at deploy — the tables are imported by name, so there is no compile-time link).
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### `verified-sites` table (owned here)
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Owned by this repo's `po-ingest` stack (`cdk/po_stack.py`). PK `siteCode` (S); default DynamoDB encryption (NOT the shared CMK).
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**Consumer (read-only) — data contract:** `seahaven-slack-bot`'s `wo-po-lookup` Lambda imports this table via `Table.fromTableName(...)` for the Bedrock agent's `lookup_site` action. It does point lookups by `siteCode` and reads `address`, `fullAddress`, `city`, `state`, `zip`, `latitude`, `longitude`, `notes`. Coordinate any change to the table name, key schema, or these attribute names with `seahaven-slack-bot`.
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> **GSI drift (INFRA-138):** the `by-state` GSI was removed here on 2026-06-03 (audit M-20, "0 reads in 30d"), but `seahaven-slack-bot` still queries `IndexName: 'by-state'` for its state-listing path, so that path fails at runtime today. Restoring the GSI or removing the consumer's state path needs to be reconciled cross-repo. This is the kind of silent owner-side lifecycle change this data-contract note exists to prevent.
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## Documentation
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The canonical map of Sea Haven's AWS infrastructure lives in Confluence. This project's `po-ingest` and `WorkorderIngestStack` stacks are represented there as Mermaid subgraphs.
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- **[AWS Architecture Map](https://seahaven.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IT/pages/1540098)** (Confluence, IT space, page 1540098)
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## CI/CD
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GitHub Actions with reusable workflows from `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github` (all pinned to a commit SHA of `main`):
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- **CI** (`ci.yaml`, PR to `main`): linting + `cdk synth` via `ci-python-sam.yaml`
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- **CD** (`deploy.yaml`, push to `main`): CDK deploy via `cd-cdk.yaml` (OIDC auth)
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- Plus dependency review and PR labeler workflows on every PR
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Branch protection on `main` — all changes through PR.
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## Setup
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1. Bootstrap CDK: `cdk bootstrap aws://{AccountId}/us-east-1`
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2. Create the web UI auth-gate shared secret. Unlike the Anthropic keys, this
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secret is **imported by name** (`Secret.from_secret_name_v2`), not CDK-managed,
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so it must exist before deploy or the web-ui Lambdas fail closed:
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```bash
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aws secretsmanager create-secret --name procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token --secret-string "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
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```
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3. Deploy both stacks (this also creates the two Anthropic Secrets Manager secrets — they are CDK-managed, so don't `create-secret` them by hand):
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```bash
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cd cdk
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pip install -r requirements.txt
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cdk deploy --all
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```
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4. Set the Anthropic API key values:
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```bash
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aws secretsmanager put-secret-value --secret-id po-ingest/anthropic-api-key --secret-string "sk-ant-..."
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aws secretsmanager put-secret-value --secret-id workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key --secret-string "sk-ant-..."
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```
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5. Dashboards: `po-web-ui` and `workorder-web-ui` have no public endpoint (the Function URLs were removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74). Invoke them through an authenticated path that forwards the `X-Auth-Token` header, e.g. `aws lambda invoke --function-name po-web-ui /tmp/out.json`.
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## Scripts
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**Reprocess PO emails** (re-run parser against all emails still in S3):
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```bash
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python scripts/reprocess.py # dry-run
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python scripts/reprocess.py --execute # invoke po-email-processor for each
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```
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**Backfill verified sites** (one-time scan of historical POs):
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```bash
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python scripts/backfill_sites.py
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```
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## Directory Structure
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```
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cdk/
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app.py # Two stacks: po-ingest + WorkorderIngestStack
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po_stack.py # Purchase order pipeline resources
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wo_stack.py # Work order pipeline resources
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lambdas/
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po/ # PO pipeline Lambdas
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email_processor/
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site_extractor/
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web_ui/
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wo/ # WO pipeline Lambdas
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email_processor/
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web_ui/
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scripts/
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reprocess.py
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backfill_sites.py
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test_local.py # Parse sample emails through Claude locally (no AWS)
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```
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