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acc1961d21
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved for the long tail. The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>" double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails. Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback rate rises. Refs: #23 * Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a miss/invalid result. Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a 12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key (literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent). Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency. Refs: #23 * Migrate PO processor to Bedrock Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency. * Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime. Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation. Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the existing stack idiom. * Add offline WO parser test suite Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By, address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue #23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model. Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new template-first + Bedrock flow. Refs: #23 * Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow, the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift, and offline test instructions. Refs: #23 * Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders (F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check` pass in CI. * Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint (ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and could never page on template-drift coverage collapse. Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present. * Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's `*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume. Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14 ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order, malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable, wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to comment_text without steering the structured fields. * Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups) A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time. The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path. A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the fallback-rate alarm depends on. A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line; multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real fixtures accordingly. Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff: - _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation. - _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic path on a crafted large blank run. - work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#' range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
279 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
279 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
# Procurement Ingest
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Unified email ingestion pipelines for Amazon procurement data. Two independent pipelines — purchase orders (Coupa) and work orders (APM/Hexagon EAM) — share a single repo and CDK app but deploy as separate CloudFormation stacks.
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## Pipelines
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### Purchase Orders (`po-ingest` stack)
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Coupa PO emails are received at `amazon_po@int.seahaven.com`, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5 **on Amazon Bedrock**, and written to the `purchase-orders` DynamoDB table. PO parsing is fully AI (no deterministic parser).
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**Flow:**
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1. Coupa sends a PO email (new, revision, or cancellation).
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2. SES (`INBOUND_MAIL` rule set) drops the raw MIME into `s3://po-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/`.
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3. S3 `ObjectCreated` triggers the `po-email-processor` Lambda.
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4. Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): the SES-stamped `Authentication-Results` header must show `dkim=pass` for `amazon.coupahost.com` (see [Sender authentication](#sender-authentication-infra-107)); otherwise the email is logged and dropped.
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5. Claude (via Bedrock `InvokeModel`) extracts structured JSON (PO number, status, supplier, site code, trade classification, line items, fiscal year). Numeric amounts are decoded with `parse_float=Decimal` (DynamoDB rejects floats).
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6. Merge write to DynamoDB:
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- `new_po` — merge insert. Creates the PO, or backfills data into a pre-existing `Cancelled` skeleton left by an out-of-order cancellation (preserving the `Cancelled` status). No longer silently dropped when a record already exists.
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- `revision` — field-level merge (`update_item` SETs only the fields present in the revision). A revision that omits `line_items`/`supplier` no longer deletes them. Will not un-cancel a `Cancelled` PO.
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- `cancellation` — marks the row `Cancelled` (creating a minimal skeleton if the cancellation arrives before the `new_po`).
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7. DynamoDB Streams feeds downstream consumers:
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- **LedgerFlow** (`seahaven-slack-bot/po-sync`) — daily KB sync
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- **Site extractor** (`po-ingest-site-extractor`) — real-time site address extraction into `verified-sites` table
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**Lambdas** (`lambdas/po/`):
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| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
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| `po-email-processor` | S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
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| `po-ingest-site-extractor` | DynamoDB Streams | Site code/address extraction -> `verified-sites` |
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| `po-web-ui` | Manual invoke | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
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**Tables:**
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- `purchase-orders` (PK: `po_number`, Streams: NEW_IMAGE) — shared with seahaven-slack-bot (read-only; see Shared Resources)
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- `verified-sites` (PK: `siteCode`) — ~1,100 unique Amazon facility sites (`by-state` GSI removed 2026-06-03, audit M-20)
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- `pending-site-review` (PK: `po_number`) — unresolvable POs for manual Payee Central verification
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### Work Orders (`WorkorderIngestStack` stack)
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Amazon APM work order emails (from Hexagon EAM / HxGN SmartCloud) are received at `apm@int.seahaven.com`, parsed **deterministic-template-first with a Claude-on-Bedrock fallback**, and written to the `WorkOrders` DynamoDB table.
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**Flow:**
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1. Hexagon EAM sends email notifications (new assignments, comments, updates, cancellations) to `amazon@seahavenind.com`.
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2. Gmail filter forwards APM emails to `apm@int.seahaven.com` (SES).
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3. SES drops the raw MIME into `s3://workorder-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/`.
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4. S3 triggers the `workorder-email-processor` Lambda.
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5. Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): the SES-stamped `Authentication-Results` header must show `dkim=pass` for the domain that re-signs the forward (currently allowlisted as `seahaven.com` — see the validation caveat under [Sender authentication](#sender-authentication-infra-107)); otherwise the email is logged and dropped.
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6. **Parse:** a pure, offline template parser (`template_parser.py`) tries the two known Hexagon templates first, behind a strict fail-closed validation gate. Only on a miss/invalid result does the Lambda fall back to the Claude-on-Bedrock AI extractor. Both paths emit the identical structured-JSON contract (work order ID, site code, severity, priority, dates, assigned technician).
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7. Work order upserted to `WorkOrders`, event/comment appended to `WorkOrderComments`.
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**Deterministic template parser.** ~93.6% of WO traffic is the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS \<id\>" comment template (T1) and ~6.4% is the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order \<id\> on building \<SITE\>" assignment template (T2). `template_parser.try_deterministic_parse()` classifies by subject, extracts the contract fields, and returns a parsed result **only if** it passes a strict validation gate (exact contract-key set; `work_order_id` matches the subject and is all-digits; the T1 `Work Order: <id>` double-space is literally present; `email_type` matches the template; `site_code` shape; per-type required fields; and a label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into another field fails). Anything that fails — the rare update/cancellation shapes, Hexagon template drift, or an extractor exception — falls back to the AI extractor. **Data is never corrupted; only the fallback rate rises.** Every record emits one CloudWatch EMF metric (see below).
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**Lambdas** (`lambdas/wo/`):
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| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
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| `workorder-email-processor` | S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
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| `workorder-web-ui` | Manual invoke | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
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**Tables:**
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- `WorkOrders` (PK: `work_order_id`) — `site-code-index` and `status-index` GSIs removed 2026-06-03 (audit M-20)
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- `WorkOrderComments` (PK: `work_order_id`, SK: `comment_id`) — see the `comment_id` format note below
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## Architecture
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**IaC:** AWS CDK (Python), two stacks in one app, region `us-east-1`.
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All Lambdas: Python 3.12, ARM64, 60-day log retention.
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**LLM provider — Amazon Bedrock.** Both email processors call Claude Haiku 4.5 through the Bedrock inference profile `us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0` (`bedrock-runtime` `InvokeModel`), configured via the `BEDROCK_MODEL_ID` env var. There is **no Anthropic API key and no Secrets Manager secret** any more. Each processor role is granted `bedrock:InvokeModel` + `bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream` on **both** the inference-profile ARN **and** the per-region foundation-model ARNs for `us-east-1` / `us-east-2` / `us-west-2` (empty-account foundation-model ARNs) — the `us.*` profile can route cross-region, so a profile-only grant would `AccessDenied` at runtime under load.
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> **Retired secrets (manual cleanup outstanding):** the former secrets `po-ingest/anthropic-api-key` and `workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key` had `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN`, so removing them from the CDK stacks **orphans** them rather than deleting them. Delete both by hand post-deploy and revoke the stored keys at the provider. The processors no longer read any `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN` — authentication to Bedrock is via the Lambda execution-role IAM grant, so there is no provider API key or Secrets Manager fetch on the parse path.
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**SES:** Both stacks add rules to the shared `INBOUND_MAIL` receipt rule set on `int.seahaven.com`.
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### Sender authentication (INFRA-107)
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The `From` header and any `Authentication-Results` header inside the raw MIME are attacker-forgeable, so neither is trusted. Instead, both email processors (`lambdas/*/email_processor/ses_auth.py`) authenticate the sender against the verdicts SES itself stamps at delivery time, failing closed:
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1. Take **only the topmost** `Authentication-Results` header (SES prepends its trace headers; any lower copies arrived inside the message and are ignored).
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2. Require its authserv-id to be `amazonses.com`.
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3. Require a `dkim=pass` clause whose `header.d=`/`header.i=` domain is in the pipeline's allowlist.
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The allowlist is the `ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS` Lambda environment variable (comma-separated, set per stack in CDK — no code change needed to adjust):
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| Pipeline | `ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS` | Why |
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| Work orders | `seahaven.com` | APM mail reaches `apm@int.seahaven.com` via a forward off `amazon@seahavenind.com`; the allowlist trusts the domain that **re-signs** DKIM on that forward (the original `hxgnsmartcloud.com` signature does not survive it). **Validated against live SES-stamped headers (2026-07-16)** — real APM deliveries carry `dkim=pass header.i=@seahaven.com`. Note a plain Gmail auto-forward re-signs under the *sending Workspace* domain (`seahavenind.com` / a `*.gappssmtp.com` key), **not** `seahaven.com`; only a Google Group (or Workspace routing) with "sign as `seahaven.com`" produces `dkim=pass header.i=@seahaven.com`. If the observed re-signing domain differs, update this value (do **not** widen it to a shared key like `*.gappssmtp.com`, which any Google customer's mail would pass). The `workorder-email-processor-sender-auth-rejected` alarm pages if this assumption is wrong instead of silently dropping every work order. |
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| Purchase orders | `amazon.coupahost.com` | Coupa signs as `amazon.coupahost.com`. `amazonses.com` also passes but is deliberately not allowlisted — every SES customer's mail passes for it |
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> **Clause-injection hardening:** SES echoes attacker-controlled SMTP-session tokens (`envelope-from`, `helo`, `header.from`) into its own `Authentication-Results` value, and an RFC 5321 quoted-local-part MAIL FROM may legally contain `;` and spaces. The parser therefore tokenises comment- and quoted-string-aware (RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): CFWS comments `(...)` are stripped and clauses are split only on semicolons **outside** a quoted string, so a `;` inside a quoted `envelope-from=` value can never be torn into a forged `dkim=pass` clause. The DKIM signer domain is read from `header.d=` when present (falling back to `header.i=`, taking the domain after the AUID's last top-level `@` so a quoted local-part cannot smuggle an allowlisted domain). Two latent comment-parsing edge cases (early comment-close, no-separator-on-strip) are tracked as hardening follow-ups — see the SES-AR-01/02 issue; neither is reachable through SES's real header encoding today.
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> **Risk acceptance — forwarder-domain binding (INFRA-107, accepted 2026-07-16):** for work orders this control authenticates the domain that *re-signs* the `apm@` forward (`seahaven.com`), not the Hexagon originator (`hxgnsmartcloud.com`, whose signature does not survive the forward). Its strength therefore rests on the `apm@` Google Group's posting policy being restricted to trusted internal senders — that restriction is the **load-bearing control** and is accepted as documented risk. **If the `apm@` group is ever opened to external posting, this finding escalates to HIGH** (anyone able to post to the group could inject a forged work order) and the correct fix is to bind acceptance to the originator via DMARC alignment rather than the forwarder's re-signature. The PO pipeline is unaffected — `amazon.coupahost.com` is an external domain an attacker cannot get SES to sign.
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On any failure (env var unset, header missing/unparseable, verdict fail, unaligned domain) the processor logs a structured `sender_auth_rejected` warning with the reason and S3 key, skips the email, and returns normally — rejected mail never triggers Lambda retries or DLQ messages, but the `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` CloudWatch alarm (see [CloudWatch alarms](#cloudwatch-alarms)) pages on a rejection spike so a drift-induced outage is not silent. Unit tests live in `tests/test_ses_auth.py`.
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**Failure handling (INFRA-41):** Each email-processor is async-invoked (S3 → Lambda). Both have a CDK-managed SQS dead-letter queue (`dead_letter_queue=`, 14-day retention, SSL-enforced) so a failed parse is captured rather than silently dropped after Lambda's retries.
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### CloudWatch alarms
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Every alarm is **ALARM-only** (no OK action), sends to the shared `site-alerts` SNS topic (imported once per stack via `Topic.from_topic_arn`), and uses `TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING`.
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**Lambda alarms** (`AWS/Lambda`, `FunctionName` dimension):
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| Alarm | Functions | Metric / config |
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| `<fn>-errors` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `workorder-email-processor` | `Errors` Sum, 5 min, `> 0`, eval 1 |
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| `<fn>-throttles` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `po-web-ui`, `workorder-email-processor` | `Throttles` Sum, 5 min, `> 0`, eval 1 |
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| `<fn>-duration` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `po-web-ui` (p99); `workorder-email-processor` (p95) | `Duration` percentile, 5 min, `>= 45000` ms (75% of the 60s timeout), eval 3 / datapoints 2 |
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| `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` | `po-email-processor`, `workorder-email-processor` | Log-metric-filter count (namespace `Seahaven/ProcurementIngest`, `default_value=0`) on `sender_auth_rejected` warnings, `Sum` 5 min, `>= 1`, eval 3 / datapoints 2 |
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The `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` alarm closes the silent-drop gap in INFRA-107: a rejected email returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so without a log-metric filter a signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would discard 100% of legitimate mail while every other alarm stayed green. It counts `sender_auth_rejected` warnings per 5-minute period (`default_value=0` keeps the series continuous) and pages when 2 of the last 3 periods each see at least one rejection — a lone stray spoof probe to the internal ingest address self-clears, but a sustained false-reject storm pages within ~10–15 minutes even at low mail volume; the config is easy to tune in the CDK helper. (A residual gap remains for a *very* sparse total-reject outage — see the SES-AR-01/02 hardening issue.)
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The `<fn>-duration` and `<fn>-throttles` alarms for `po-email-processor` and `workorder-email-processor` supersede the orphaned, CLI-created `Lambda-Duration-*` / `Lambda-Throttles-*` alarms (deleted post-deploy).
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**DLQ alarms** (`AWS/SQS`): `po-email-processor-dlq-messages` and `workorder-email-processor-dlq-messages` fire when any message is visible on an email-processor DLQ (`ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible` Maximum, 5 min, `> 0`, eval 1) — a message there means an email was dropped after Lambda exhausted its async retries.
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**Parse-outcome metric + fallback-rate alarm (workorder-ingest):** the WO processor writes one CloudWatch **EMF** line per email to namespace `Seahaven/WorkorderIngest`, metric `ParseOutcome` (Unit Count, value 1), dimensioned by `ParseMethod` (`template` | `ai_fallback`) and `TemplateId` (`update_plaintext` | `assign_html` | `unknown`). Non-dimension EMF properties `ReasonCode` and `work_order_id` are queryable in Logs Insights but not promoted to metrics (kept low-cardinality). EMF is used instead of `PutMetricData` so there is no extra sync call / latency / IAM grant on the async hot path (the role already has `logs:PutLogEvents`). The alarm `workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate` fires when the AI-fallback share of parses exceeds **15%** sustained (a `MathExpression` with `FILL(...,0)` and a ≥10-sample volume floor over 15-minute periods, eval 3 / datapoints 2) — catching Hexagon template-drift coverage collapse while the volume floor + `FILL` prevent low-volume false pages / `INSUFFICIENT_DATA`. ALARM-only `SnsAction` to `site-alerts`, no OK action, `NOT_BREACHING`. The 15-minute period is a deliberate deviation from the 5-minute house style to accumulate a stable denominator at the low ~760/day volume.
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**DynamoDB alarms** (`AWS/DynamoDB`): each owned table gets `<table>-throttles` (`ThrottledRequests`) and `<table>-system-errors` (`SystemErrors`). These metrics emit only at the `TableName` + `Operation` dimension set, so each alarm is a `Sum` math expression across the operations the table uses (Get/BatchGet/Query/Scan/Put/Update/Delete/BatchWrite). Tables covered: `purchase-orders`, `verified-sites`, `pending-site-review` (po-ingest); `WorkOrders`, `WorkOrderComments` (workorder-ingest).
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## Security
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**Web UI auth (defense-in-depth).** The `po-web-ui` / `workorder-web-ui` handlers refuse unauthenticated requests even though their public Function URLs were removed (INFRA-74). Each requires a shared secret in the `X-Auth-Token` header (or `Authorization: Bearer <token>`), compared in constant time against the configured token. The handler **fails closed** if the token is unset or unreadable (denies all). The token lives in the Secrets Manager secret `procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token`; only its ARN is passed to the Lambda (`WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN`), and the value is fetched at runtime — never embedded in the CloudFormation template or Lambda env vars. The fetched value is cached in the warm container with a short TTL (5 min) so a rotated secret propagates without waiting for the execution environment to recycle. This is a defense-in-depth floor for a detached URL, not primary auth.
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**Output escaping.** All caller-influenced values (including prompt-injectable strings Claude may return for `total_amount`/line-item amounts) are HTML-escaped before interpolation to prevent stored XSS.
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## Shared Resources
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### `purchase-orders` table (owned here)
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The `purchase-orders` DynamoDB table is **owned by this repo's `po-ingest` stack** (defined in `cdk/po_stack.py` with `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN`, `StreamViewType.NEW_IMAGE`, and SSE-KMS encryption with the shared customer-managed CMK `alias/seahaven-dynamodb`, INFRA-95 / M-3). The `po-email-processor` Lambda is the authoritative writer — it performs the merge inserts, field-level revision merges, and cancellation updates described above.
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**Consumers (read-only):**
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| Repo | How it reads | Purpose |
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| `seahaven-slack-bot` | `po-sync` (DynamoDB Streams + daily scan) and `wo-po-lookup` | Daily KB sync + Bedrock agent PO lookups |
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The consumer imports the table via `Table.fromTableName(...)` and is granted read-only access (`grantReadData`); it does not own or define it.
|
||
|
||
**Schema-coordination rule:** Any change to the `purchase-orders` schema (partition key, item shape, attribute names, streams view type) must be coordinated with `seahaven-slack-bot`. The owner here ships the change; the consumer must be updated in lockstep so its readers do not break. Treat schema changes as a cross-repo migration, not a local edit.
|
||
|
||
**Known exception (INFRA-51):** `amazon-po-parser` currently writes directly to `purchase-orders` outside this stack (backfill/enrichment scripts). This second writer is being folded into the `po-ingest` pipeline so this stack is the sole writer; until INFRA-51 closes, coordinate any schema change with `amazon-po-parser` as well.
|
||
|
||
### `WorkOrders` and `WorkOrderComments` tables (owned here)
|
||
|
||
Both tables are **owned by this repo's `WorkorderIngestStack`** (`cdk/wo_stack.py`, `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN`):
|
||
|
||
- `WorkOrders` — PK `work_order_id` (S).
|
||
- `WorkOrderComments` — PK `work_order_id` (S), SK `comment_id` (S).
|
||
|
||
> **`comment_id` format change (issue #23).** The `WorkOrderComments` range key is now
|
||
> `work_order_id#<comment_time|nocomment>#<sha256(s3_object_key)[:12]>`
|
||
> (e.g. `11144580730#2026-04-27T23:51:48#a1b2c3d4e5f6`, or `…#nocomment#…` when the source
|
||
> email carries no comment time). Previously it was `work_order_id#<timestamp>`, where two
|
||
> emails on the same WO with an identical/absent comment time collided and overwrote each other.
|
||
> The 12-hex suffix is derived from the **S3 object key alone** — deterministic, so a Lambda
|
||
> async **retry** of the same object produces a byte-identical key (idempotent, no duplicate row),
|
||
> while two distinct emails on the same WO get distinct keys. Wall-clock `now()` is kept **out** of
|
||
> the key. Consumers that split on `#` and read index `[0]`/`[1]` are unaffected; anything that
|
||
> treated "everything after the first `#`" as a bare timestamp now also captures the hash segment.
|
||
|
||
> **Timestamp format shift.** All stored ISO timestamps (`created_at`, `updated_at`, `ingested_at`
|
||
> on WO; `processed_at`, `cancelled_at` on PO) moved from naive `datetime.utcnow().isoformat()`
|
||
> to timezone-aware `datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()`, so they now carry a `+00:00` suffix
|
||
> (e.g. `2026-07-15T12:00:00+00:00`). Downstream parsers that assumed a naive/no-offset string
|
||
> must accept the offset.
|
||
|
||
Both currently use default DynamoDB encryption — they are **not** yet on the shared customer-managed CMK (`alias/seahaven-dynamodb`, INFRA-95 / M-3); that migration is tracked in INFRA-6. The `workorder-email-processor` role no longer holds a pre-emptive encrypt/decrypt grant on that CMK (removed in the 2026-06-17 security sweep — it was unused while the tables are unencrypted and extended the role's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting `purchase-orders`). Re-add the grant as part of the INFRA-6 migration, at which point `grant_read_write_data` on the then-encrypted tables propagates the needed key permissions automatically.
|
||
|
||
**Consumer (read-only) — data contract:** `seahaven-slack-bot` imports both tables via `Table.fromTableName(...)` (`grantReadData`) and reads them from two Lambdas: `workorder-sync` (daily full-table scan into the Bedrock knowledge base) and `wo-po-lookup` (the Bedrock agent's direct WO lookup action group). The bot depends on the PK/SK schema above and these attributes: on `WorkOrders` — `description`, `wo_status`, `customer`, `site_code`, `building`, `address`, `severity`, `priority`, `assigned_to`, `date_reported`, `scheduled_start`, `due_date`, `updated_at`; on `WorkOrderComments` — `created_at` (used to sort comments), `commenter`, `text`. Any change to table name, key schema, these attribute names, or the encryption configuration (e.g. the INFRA-6 CMK migration) must be coordinated with `seahaven-slack-bot` before it ships, or the Bedrock agent breaks at runtime (not at deploy — the tables are imported by name, so there is no compile-time link).
|
||
|
||
### `verified-sites` table (owned here)
|
||
|
||
Owned by this repo's `po-ingest` stack (`cdk/po_stack.py`). PK `siteCode` (S); default DynamoDB encryption (NOT the shared CMK).
|
||
|
||
**Consumer (read-only) — data contract:** `seahaven-slack-bot`'s `wo-po-lookup` Lambda imports this table via `Table.fromTableName(...)` for the Bedrock agent's `lookup_site` action. It does point lookups by `siteCode` and reads `address`, `fullAddress`, `city`, `state`, `zip`, `latitude`, `longitude`, `notes`. Coordinate any change to the table name, key schema, or these attribute names with `seahaven-slack-bot`.
|
||
|
||
> **GSI drift (INFRA-138):** the `by-state` GSI was removed here on 2026-06-03 (audit M-20, "0 reads in 30d"), but `seahaven-slack-bot` still queries `IndexName: 'by-state'` for its state-listing path, so that path fails at runtime today. Restoring the GSI or removing the consumer's state path needs to be reconciled cross-repo. This is the kind of silent owner-side lifecycle change this data-contract note exists to prevent.
|
||
|
||
## Documentation
|
||
|
||
The canonical map of Sea Haven's AWS infrastructure lives in Confluence. This project's `po-ingest` and `WorkorderIngestStack` stacks are represented there as Mermaid subgraphs.
|
||
|
||
- **[AWS Architecture Map](https://seahaven.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IT/pages/1540098)** (Confluence, IT space, page 1540098)
|
||
|
||
## CI/CD
|
||
|
||
GitHub Actions with reusable workflows from `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github` (all pinned to a commit SHA of `main`):
|
||
- **CI** (`ci.yaml`, PR to `main`): linting + `cdk synth` via `ci-python-sam.yaml`
|
||
- **CD** (`deploy.yaml`, push to `main`): CDK deploy via `cd-cdk.yaml` (OIDC auth)
|
||
- Plus dependency review and PR labeler workflows on every PR
|
||
|
||
Branch protection on `main` — all changes through PR.
|
||
|
||
## Setup
|
||
|
||
1. Bootstrap CDK: `cdk bootstrap aws://{AccountId}/us-east-1`
|
||
2. Ensure the Bedrock inference profile `us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0` is enabled in `us-east-1` (it is; the CDK grants cover cross-region routing to `us-east-2`/`us-west-2`). No API key or secret to set — the processors authenticate to Bedrock via their IAM roles.
|
||
3. Create the web UI auth-gate shared secret. This secret is **imported by name**
|
||
(`Secret.from_secret_name_v2`), not CDK-managed, so it must exist before deploy
|
||
or the web-ui Lambdas fail closed:
|
||
```bash
|
||
aws secretsmanager create-secret --name procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token --secret-string "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
|
||
```
|
||
4. Deploy both stacks:
|
||
```bash
|
||
cd cdk
|
||
pip install -r requirements.txt
|
||
cdk deploy --all
|
||
```
|
||
5. **Post-deploy cleanup (one-time):** the retired `RETAIN`-policy secrets `po-ingest/anthropic-api-key` and `workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key` are orphaned by this deploy, not deleted. Remove them and revoke the keys at the provider:
|
||
```bash
|
||
aws secretsmanager delete-secret --secret-id po-ingest/anthropic-api-key --force-delete-without-recovery
|
||
aws secretsmanager delete-secret --secret-id workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key --force-delete-without-recovery
|
||
```
|
||
6. Dashboards: `po-web-ui` and `workorder-web-ui` have no public endpoint (the Function URLs were removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74). Invoke them through an authenticated path that forwards the `X-Auth-Token` header, e.g. `aws lambda invoke --function-name po-web-ui /tmp/out.json`.
|
||
|
||
## Tests
|
||
|
||
Offline unit tests (no AWS, no network) run via pytest from the repo root:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
pip install pytest
|
||
pytest
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Coverage:
|
||
- `tests/` — shared handler + cross-pipeline tests: `parse_raw_email` and `pad_zip`, the PO merge-write semantics (`test_po_merge.py`, #97, moto-backed), and the fail-closed sender-authentication parser (`test_ses_auth.py`, INFRA-107).
|
||
- `lambdas/wo/email_processor/tests/` — the deterministic WO parser suite: golden-file tests over 55 real scrubbed `.eml` fixtures (`test_parser.py`), fail-closed validation-gate rules and adversarial/injection cases (`test_validation_gate.py`), the issue #23 `comment_id` idempotency invariants (`test_comment_id.py`), and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch/EMF-metric behavior with a mocked `invoke_model` (`test_bedrock_fallback.py`). Golden JSON lives under `tests/fixtures/expected/`.
|
||
|
||
Both roots are discovered by `pytest.ini` (`testpaths`).
|
||
|
||
## Scripts
|
||
|
||
**Reprocess PO emails** (re-run parser against all emails still in S3):
|
||
```bash
|
||
python scripts/reprocess.py # dry-run
|
||
python scripts/reprocess.py --execute # invoke po-email-processor for each
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**Backfill verified sites** (one-time scan of historical POs):
|
||
```bash
|
||
python scripts/backfill_sites.py
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Directory Structure
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
cdk/
|
||
app.py # Two stacks: po-ingest + WorkorderIngestStack
|
||
po_stack.py # Purchase order pipeline resources
|
||
wo_stack.py # Work order pipeline resources
|
||
lambdas/
|
||
po/ # PO pipeline Lambdas
|
||
email_processor/ # handler.py (Bedrock, fully AI)
|
||
site_extractor/
|
||
web_ui/
|
||
wo/ # WO pipeline Lambdas
|
||
email_processor/
|
||
handler.py # template-first + Bedrock fallback, EMF metric, #23 comment_id
|
||
template_parser.py # pure deterministic parser + fail-closed validation gate
|
||
tests/ # golden-file + validation-gate + comment_id + fallback tests
|
||
web_ui/
|
||
scripts/
|
||
reprocess.py
|
||
backfill_sites.py
|
||
test_local.py # Parse sample emails through Bedrock locally (no AWS mutation)
|
||
tests/
|
||
requirements.txt # Test-only deps (moto)
|
||
conftest.py # AWS env stubs + per-pipeline module loader
|
||
test_pad_zip.py # PO zip-code padding tests
|
||
test_parse_raw_email.py # MIME parsing tests (PO + WO handlers)
|
||
test_po_merge.py # PO merge-write semantics tests (#97)
|
||
test_ses_auth.py # Sender-authentication parser tests (INFRA-107)
|
||
```
|