procurement-ingest/README.md
Adam Moussa 7c74ac1761
Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.

Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).

Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 19:13:55 -04:00

217 lines
16 KiB
Markdown

# Procurement Ingest
![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3776AB?logo=python&logoColor=white)
![AWS CDK](https://img.shields.io/badge/AWS-CDK-FF9900?logo=amazonaws&logoColor=white)
![CI](https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/procurement-ingest/actions/workflows/ci.yaml/badge.svg)
Unified email ingestion pipelines for Amazon procurement data. Two independent pipelines — purchase orders (Coupa) and work orders (APM/Hexagon EAM) — share a single repo and CDK app but deploy as separate CloudFormation stacks.
## Pipelines
### Purchase Orders (`po-ingest` stack)
Coupa PO emails are received at `amazon_po@int.seahaven.com`, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5, and written to the `purchase-orders` DynamoDB table.
**Flow:**
1. Coupa sends a PO email (new, revision, or cancellation).
2. SES (`INBOUND_MAIL` rule set) drops the raw MIME into `s3://po-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/`.
3. S3 `ObjectCreated` triggers the `po-email-processor` Lambda.
4. Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): the SES-stamped `Authentication-Results` header must show `dkim=pass` for `amazon.coupahost.com` (see [Sender authentication](#sender-authentication-infra-107)); otherwise the email is logged and dropped.
5. Claude extracts structured JSON (PO number, status, supplier, site code, trade classification, line items, fiscal year).
6. Conditional write to DynamoDB:
- `new_po` — idempotent insert (no-op if PO exists)
- `revision` — unconditional overwrite
- `cancellation` — marks existing row `Cancelled`
7. DynamoDB Streams feeds downstream consumers:
- **LedgerFlow** (`seahaven-slack-bot/po-sync`) — daily KB sync
- **Site extractor** (`po-ingest-site-extractor`) — real-time site address extraction into `verified-sites` table
**Lambdas** (`lambdas/po/`):
| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `po-email-processor` | S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
| `po-ingest-site-extractor` | DynamoDB Streams | Site code/address extraction -> `verified-sites` |
| `po-web-ui` | Manual invoke | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
**Tables:**
- `purchase-orders` (PK: `po_number`, Streams: NEW_IMAGE) — shared with seahaven-slack-bot (read-only; see Shared Resources)
- `verified-sites` (PK: `siteCode`, GSI: `by-state`) — ~1,100 unique Amazon facility sites
- `pending-site-review` (PK: `po_number`) — unresolvable POs for manual Payee Central verification
### Work Orders (`WorkorderIngestStack` stack)
Amazon APM work order emails (from Hexagon EAM / HxGN SmartCloud) are received at `apm@int.seahaven.com`, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5, and written to the `WorkOrders` DynamoDB table.
**Flow:**
1. Hexagon EAM sends email notifications (new assignments, comments, updates, cancellations) to `amazon@seahavenind.com`.
2. Gmail filter forwards APM emails to `apm@int.seahaven.com` (SES).
3. SES drops the raw MIME into `s3://workorder-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/`.
4. S3 triggers the `workorder-email-processor` Lambda.
5. Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): the SES-stamped `Authentication-Results` header must show `dkim=pass` for the domain that re-signs the forward (currently allowlisted as `seahaven.com` — see the validation caveat under [Sender authentication](#sender-authentication-infra-107)); otherwise the email is logged and dropped.
6. Claude extracts structured JSON (work order ID, site code, severity, priority, dates, assigned technician).
7. Work order upserted to `WorkOrders`, event/comment appended to `WorkOrderComments`.
**Lambdas** (`lambdas/wo/`):
| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `workorder-email-processor` | S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
| `workorder-web-ui` | Manual invoke | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
**Tables:**
- `WorkOrders` (PK: `work_order_id`, GSIs: `site-code-index`, `status-index`)
- `WorkOrderComments` (PK: `work_order_id`, SK: `comment_id`)
## Architecture
**IaC:** AWS CDK (Python), two stacks in one app, region `us-east-1`.
All Lambdas: Python 3.12, ARM64, 60-day log retention.
**Secrets:**
- `po-ingest/anthropic-api-key` — Anthropic API key for PO parsing
- `workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key` — Anthropic API key for WO parsing
**SES:** Both stacks add rules to the shared `INBOUND_MAIL` receipt rule set on `int.seahaven.com`.
### Sender authentication (INFRA-107)
The `From` header and any `Authentication-Results` header inside the raw MIME are attacker-forgeable, so neither is trusted. Instead, both email processors (`lambdas/*/email_processor/ses_auth.py`) authenticate the sender against the verdicts SES itself stamps at delivery time, failing closed:
1. Take **only the topmost** `Authentication-Results` header (SES prepends its trace headers; any lower copies arrived inside the message and are ignored).
2. Require its authserv-id to be `amazonses.com`.
3. Require a `dkim=pass` clause whose `header.d=`/`header.i=` domain is in the pipeline's allowlist.
The allowlist is the `ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS` Lambda environment variable (comma-separated, set per stack in CDK — no code change needed to adjust):
| Pipeline | `ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS` | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Work orders | `seahaven.com` | APM mail reaches `apm@int.seahaven.com` via a forward off `amazon@seahavenind.com`; the allowlist trusts the domain that **re-signs** DKIM on that forward (the original `hxgnsmartcloud.com` signature does not survive it). **Must be validated against a live SES-stamped header** — a plain Gmail auto-forward re-signs under the *sending Workspace* domain (`seahavenind.com` / a `*.gappssmtp.com` key), **not** `seahaven.com`; only a Google Group (or Workspace routing) with "sign as `seahaven.com`" produces `dkim=pass header.i=@seahaven.com`. If the observed re-signing domain differs, update this value (do **not** widen it to a shared key like `*.gappssmtp.com`, which any Google customer's mail would pass). The `workorder-email-processor-sender-auth-rejected` alarm pages if this assumption is wrong instead of silently dropping every work order. |
| Purchase orders | `amazon.coupahost.com` | Coupa signs as `amazon.coupahost.com`. `amazonses.com` also passes but is deliberately not allowlisted — every SES customer's mail passes for it |
> **Clause-injection hardening:** SES echoes attacker-controlled SMTP-session tokens (`envelope-from`, `helo`, `header.from`) into its own `Authentication-Results` value, and an RFC 5321 quoted-local-part MAIL FROM may legally contain `;` and spaces. The parser therefore tokenises comment- and quoted-string-aware (RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): CFWS comments `(...)` are stripped and clauses are split only on semicolons **outside** a quoted string, so a `;` inside a quoted `envelope-from=` value can never be torn into a forged `dkim=pass` clause.
On any failure (env var unset, header missing/unparseable, verdict fail, unaligned domain) the processor logs a structured `sender_auth_rejected` warning with the reason and S3 key, skips the email, and returns normally — rejected mail never triggers Lambda retries or DLQ messages, but the `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` CloudWatch alarm (see [CloudWatch alarms](#cloudwatch-alarms)) pages on a rejection spike so a drift-induced outage is not silent. Unit tests live in `tests/test_ses_auth.py`.
**Failure handling (INFRA-41):** Each email-processor is async-invoked (S3 → Lambda). Both have a CDK-managed SQS dead-letter queue (`dead_letter_queue=`, 14-day retention, SSL-enforced) so a failed parse is captured rather than silently dropped after Lambda's retries.
### CloudWatch alarms
Every alarm is **ALARM-only** (no OK action), sends to the shared `site-alerts` SNS topic (imported once per stack via `Topic.from_topic_arn`), and uses `TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING`.
**Lambda alarms** (`AWS/Lambda`, `FunctionName` dimension):
| Alarm | Functions | Metric / config |
|---|---|---|
| `<fn>-errors` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `workorder-email-processor` | `Errors` Sum, 5 min, `> 0`, eval 1 |
| `<fn>-throttles` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `po-web-ui`, `workorder-email-processor` | `Throttles` Sum, 5 min, `> 0`, eval 1 |
| `<fn>-duration` | `po-email-processor`, `po-ingest-site-extractor`, `po-web-ui` (p99); `workorder-email-processor` (p95) | `Duration` percentile, 5 min, `>= 45000` ms (75% of the 60s timeout), eval 3 / datapoints 2 |
| `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` | `po-email-processor`, `workorder-email-processor` | Log-metric-filter count (namespace `Seahaven/ProcurementIngest`, `default_value=0`) on `sender_auth_rejected` warnings, `Sum` 15 min, `>= 3`, eval 1 |
The `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` alarm closes the silent-drop gap in INFRA-107: a rejected email returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so without a log-metric filter a signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would discard 100% of legitimate mail while every other alarm stayed green. `>= 3` rejections in 15 minutes tolerates the occasional spoofed probe to the internal ingest address but pages quickly on a genuine false-reject storm; the threshold is easy to tune in the CDK helper.
The `<fn>-duration` and `<fn>-throttles` alarms for `po-email-processor` and `workorder-email-processor` supersede the orphaned, CLI-created `Lambda-Duration-*` / `Lambda-Throttles-*` alarms (deleted post-deploy).
**DynamoDB alarms** (`AWS/DynamoDB`): each owned table gets `<table>-throttles` (`ThrottledRequests`) and `<table>-system-errors` (`SystemErrors`). These metrics emit only at the `TableName` + `Operation` dimension set, so each alarm is a `Sum` math expression across the operations the table uses (Get/BatchGet/Query/Scan/Put/Update/Delete/BatchWrite). Tables covered: `purchase-orders`, `verified-sites`, `pending-site-review` (po-ingest); `WorkOrders`, `WorkOrderComments` (workorder-ingest).
## Shared Resources
### `purchase-orders` table (owned here)
The `purchase-orders` DynamoDB table is **owned by this repo's `po-ingest` stack** (defined in `cdk/po_stack.py` with `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN` and `StreamViewType.NEW_IMAGE`). The `po-email-processor` Lambda is the authoritative writer — it performs the conditional inserts, revision overwrites, and cancellation updates described above.
**Consumers (read-only):**
| Repo | How it reads | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `seahaven-slack-bot` | `po-sync` (DynamoDB Streams + daily scan) and `wo-po-lookup` | Daily KB sync + Bedrock agent PO lookups |
The consumer imports the table via `Table.fromTableName(...)` and is granted read-only access (`grantReadData`); it does not own or define it.
**Schema-coordination rule:** Any change to the `purchase-orders` schema (partition key, item shape, attribute names, streams view type) must be coordinated with `seahaven-slack-bot`. The owner here ships the change; the consumer must be updated in lockstep so its readers do not break. Treat schema changes as a cross-repo migration, not a local edit.
**Known exception (INFRA-51):** `amazon-po-parser` currently writes directly to `purchase-orders` outside this stack (backfill/enrichment scripts). This second writer is being folded into the `po-ingest` pipeline so this stack is the sole writer; until INFRA-51 closes, coordinate any schema change with `amazon-po-parser` as well.
### `WorkOrders` and `WorkOrderComments` tables (owned here)
Both tables are **owned by this repo's `WorkorderIngestStack`** (`cdk/wo_stack.py`, `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN`, shared customer-managed CMK per INFRA-95 / M-3):
- `WorkOrders` — PK `work_order_id` (S).
- `WorkOrderComments` — PK `work_order_id` (S), SK `comment_id` (S).
**Consumer (read-only) — data contract:** `seahaven-slack-bot` imports both tables via `Table.fromTableName(...)` (`grantReadData` plus an explicit `kms:Decrypt` grant on the shared CMK) and reads them from two Lambdas: `workorder-sync` (daily full-table scan into the Bedrock knowledge base) and `wo-po-lookup` (the Bedrock agent's direct WO lookup action group). The bot depends on the PK/SK schema above, the CMK encryption, and these attributes: on `WorkOrders` — `description`, `wo_status`, `customer`, `site_code`, `building`, `address`, `severity`, `priority`, `assigned_to`, `date_reported`, `scheduled_start`, `due_date`, `updated_at`; on `WorkOrderComments` — `created_at` (used to sort comments), `commenter`, `text`. Any change to table name, key schema, these attribute names, or the encryption key must be coordinated with `seahaven-slack-bot` before it ships, or the Bedrock agent breaks at runtime (not at deploy — the tables are imported by name, so there is no compile-time link).
### `verified-sites` table (owned here)
Owned by this repo's `po-ingest` stack (`cdk/po_stack.py`). PK `siteCode` (S); AWS-managed encryption (NOT the shared CMK).
**Consumer (read-only) — data contract:** `seahaven-slack-bot`'s `wo-po-lookup` Lambda imports this table via `Table.fromTableName(...)` for the Bedrock agent's `lookup_site` action. It does point lookups by `siteCode` and reads `address`, `fullAddress`, `city`, `state`, `zip`, `latitude`, `longitude`, `notes`. Coordinate any change to the table name, key schema, or these attribute names with `seahaven-slack-bot`.
> **GSI drift (INFRA-138):** the `by-state` GSI was removed here on 2026-06-03 (audit M-20, "0 reads in 30d"), but `seahaven-slack-bot` still queries `IndexName: 'by-state'` for its state-listing path, so that path fails at runtime today. Restoring the GSI or removing the consumer's state path needs to be reconciled cross-repo. This is the kind of silent owner-side lifecycle change this data-contract note exists to prevent.
## Documentation
The canonical map of Sea Haven's AWS infrastructure lives in Confluence. This project's `po-ingest` and `workorder-ingest` stacks are represented there as Mermaid subgraphs.
- **[AWS Architecture Map](https://seahaven.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IT/pages/1540098)** (Confluence, IT space, page 1540098)
## CI/CD
GitHub Actions with reusable workflows from `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github`:
- **CI** (PR to `main`): linting + `cdk synth` via `ci-python-sam.yaml@main`
- **CD** (push to `main`): `cdk deploy --all` via `cd-cdk.yaml@main` (OIDC auth)
Branch protection on `main` — all changes through PR.
## Setup
1. Bootstrap CDK: `cdk bootstrap aws://{AccountId}/us-east-1`
2. Store Anthropic API keys:
```bash
aws secretsmanager create-secret --name po-ingest/anthropic-api-key --secret-string "sk-ant-..."
aws secretsmanager create-secret --name workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key --secret-string "sk-ant-..."
```
3. Deploy both stacks:
```bash
cd cdk
pip install -r requirements.txt
cdk deploy --all
```
4. CloudFormation outputs include `WebUIUrl` for each stack's dashboard.
## Scripts
**Reprocess PO emails** (re-run parser against all emails still in S3):
```bash
python scripts/reprocess.py # dry-run
python scripts/reprocess.py --execute # invoke po-email-processor for each
```
**Backfill verified sites** (one-time scan of historical POs):
```bash
python scripts/backfill_sites.py
```
## Directory Structure
```
cdk/
app.py # Two stacks: po-ingest + WorkorderIngestStack
po_stack.py # Purchase order pipeline resources
wo_stack.py # Work order pipeline resources
lambdas/
po/ # PO pipeline Lambdas
email_processor/
site_extractor/
web_ui/
wo/ # WO pipeline Lambdas
email_processor/
web_ui/
shared/
models.py # Work order dataclasses/enums
scripts/
reprocess.py
backfill_sites.py
tests/
conftest.py # AWS env stubs + per-pipeline module loader
test_ses_auth.py # Sender-authentication parser tests (INFRA-107)
```