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* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines' tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB scan as the reconciliation/backfill path. - lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch), router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400), Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies. - OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned (router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN. - Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and /openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture). - KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM (name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class). - Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of logs); cloud_watch_role=False. - Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings. - Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge). * harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved: Correctness / DoS: - pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey -> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's work_order_id to the path entity. - handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm. - web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too. Docs page: - typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML. - spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script> breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful. - Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer. - spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--". IAM / IaC: - resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach. - kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition. - stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast radius below the 10k account default. - corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate). - documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack. Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX. 675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
35 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
35 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
# Deploy role: githubdeploy-procurement-ingest (seahaven-prod)
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OIDC deploy role for this repo's GitHub Actions pipeline in AWS account
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`011934824531` (seahaven-prod), us-east-1. Created as part of the migration
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from the management account (328440206208); the mgmt role of the same name
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stays untouched until decommission as the emergency mgmt deploy path.
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## Files
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| File | Purpose |
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|---|---|
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| `trust-policy.json` | OIDC trust: `repo:Sea-Haven-Industries/procurement-ingest:ref:refs/heads/main` only |
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| `permissions-policy.json` | `sts:AssumeRole` on the four `cdk-hnb659fds-*` bootstrap roles, `cloudformation:DescribeStacks` scoped to this repo's stacks + `CDKToolkit` (cd-cdk health check), and `lambda:InvokeFunction` on exactly the three smoke-gated function ARNs (post-deploy smoke gate) |
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| `create-deploy-role.sh` | Idempotent create-or-update from the two JSON files, profile `seahaven-prod` |
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> **Maintenance note:** `DescribeStacks` is scoped to `stack/po-ingest/*`, `stack/WorkorderIngestStack/*`, `stack/procurement-api/*` (added with the procurement-api stack), and `stack/CDKToolkit/*`. If another stack is ever added to this CDK app, add its ARN pattern here and re-run the review-then-apply flow — otherwise the cd-cdk health check on the new stack will `AccessDenied`.
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## Why the SmokeInvokeLambda statement exists
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`deploy.yaml` runs `scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh` under the deploy role's own
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session, not the assumed `cdk-*` roles. Without `lambda:InvokeFunction` on the
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smoke-gated function ARNs (the two email processors + `procurement-api`) the
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smoke gate hits AccessDenied and every deploy fails closed. The mgmt-era grant
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was applied out-of-band and undocumented; keeping it in these reviewed
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artifacts closes that gap. Scope it to exactly the named ARNs, never
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`Resource: "*"`.
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## Change process
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1. Edit the JSON artifacts on a branch; both gates must pass on the exact
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files before anything is applied: GPT-4.1 cross-family review
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(cross_review.py) and /sh-security-review.
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2. Run `./create-deploy-role.sh` (idempotent) with the seahaven-prod profile.
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3. Verify: `aws iam simulate-principal-policy` for the bootstrap-role
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AssumeRole and both InvokeFunction ARNs, then a real pipeline run.
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