The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107, CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes). Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com. amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded -- every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it. Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable, verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are unchanged. Refs: INFRA-107
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Procurement Ingest
Unified email ingestion pipelines for Amazon procurement data. Two independent pipelines — purchase orders (Coupa) and work orders (APM/Hexagon EAM) — share a single repo and CDK app but deploy as separate CloudFormation stacks.
Pipelines
Purchase Orders (po-ingest stack)
Coupa PO emails are received at amazon_po@int.seahaven.com, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5, and written to the purchase-orders DynamoDB table.
Flow:
- Coupa sends a PO email (new, revision, or cancellation).
- SES (
INBOUND_MAILrule set) drops the raw MIME intos3://po-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/. - S3
ObjectCreatedtriggers thepo-email-processorLambda. - Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): the SES-stamped
Authentication-Resultsheader must showdkim=passforamazon.coupahost.com(see Sender authentication); otherwise the email is logged and dropped. - Claude extracts structured JSON (PO number, status, supplier, site code, trade classification, line items, fiscal year).
- Conditional write to DynamoDB:
new_po— idempotent insert (no-op if PO exists)revision— unconditional overwritecancellation— marks existing rowCancelled
- DynamoDB Streams feeds downstream consumers:
- LedgerFlow (
seahaven-slack-bot/po-sync) — daily KB sync - Site extractor (
po-ingest-site-extractor) — real-time site address extraction intoverified-sitestable
- LedgerFlow (
Lambdas (lambdas/po/):
| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
po-email-processor |
S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
po-ingest-site-extractor |
DynamoDB Streams | Site code/address extraction -> verified-sites |
po-web-ui |
Manual invoke | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
Tables:
purchase-orders(PK:po_number, Streams: NEW_IMAGE) — shared with seahaven-slack-bot (read-only; see Shared Resources)verified-sites(PK:siteCode, GSI:by-state) — ~1,100 unique Amazon facility sitespending-site-review(PK:po_number) — unresolvable POs for manual Payee Central verification
Work Orders (WorkorderIngestStack stack)
Amazon APM work order emails (from Hexagon EAM / HxGN SmartCloud) are received at apm@int.seahaven.com, parsed by Claude Haiku 4.5, and written to the WorkOrders DynamoDB table.
Flow:
- Hexagon EAM sends email notifications (new assignments, comments, updates, cancellations) to
amazon@seahavenind.com. - Gmail filter forwards APM emails to
apm@int.seahaven.com(SES). - SES drops the raw MIME into
s3://workorder-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/. - S3 triggers the
workorder-email-processorLambda. - Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): the SES-stamped
Authentication-Resultsheader must showdkim=passforseahaven.com(the Google Groups forward re-signs the mail; see Sender authentication); otherwise the email is logged and dropped. - Claude extracts structured JSON (work order ID, site code, severity, priority, dates, assigned technician).
- Work order upserted to
WorkOrders, event/comment appended toWorkOrderComments.
Lambdas (lambdas/wo/):
| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
workorder-email-processor |
S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
workorder-web-ui |
Manual invoke | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
Tables:
WorkOrders(PK:work_order_id, GSIs:site-code-index,status-index)WorkOrderComments(PK:work_order_id, SK:comment_id)
Architecture
IaC: AWS CDK (Python), two stacks in one app, region us-east-1.
All Lambdas: Python 3.12, ARM64, 60-day log retention.
Secrets:
po-ingest/anthropic-api-key— Anthropic API key for PO parsingworkorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key— Anthropic API key for WO parsing
SES: Both stacks add rules to the shared INBOUND_MAIL receipt rule set on int.seahaven.com.
Sender authentication (INFRA-107)
The From header and any Authentication-Results header inside the raw MIME are attacker-forgeable, so neither is trusted. Instead, both email processors (lambdas/*/email_processor/ses_auth.py) authenticate the sender against the verdicts SES itself stamps at delivery time, failing closed:
- Take only the topmost
Authentication-Resultsheader (SES prepends its trace headers; any lower copies arrived inside the message and are ignored). - Require its authserv-id to be
amazonses.com. - Require a
dkim=passclause whoseheader.d=/header.i=domain is in the pipeline's allowlist.
The allowlist is the ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS Lambda environment variable (comma-separated, set per stack in CDK — no code change needed to adjust):
| Pipeline | ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS |
Why |
|---|---|---|
| Work orders | seahaven.com |
APM mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which re-signs as seahaven.com (the original hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not survive the forward) |
| Purchase orders | amazon.coupahost.com |
Coupa signs as amazon.coupahost.com. amazonses.com also passes but is deliberately not allowlisted — every SES customer's mail passes for it |
On any failure (env var unset, header missing/unparseable, verdict fail, unaligned domain) the processor logs a structured sender_auth_rejected warning with the reason and S3 key, skips the email, and returns normally — rejected mail never triggers Lambda retries or DLQ messages. Unit tests live in tests/test_ses_auth.py.
Failure handling (INFRA-41): Each email-processor is async-invoked (S3 → Lambda). Both have a CDK-managed SQS dead-letter queue (dead_letter_queue=, 14-day retention, SSL-enforced) so a failed parse is captured rather than silently dropped after Lambda's retries.
CloudWatch alarms
Every alarm is ALARM-only (no OK action), sends to the shared site-alerts SNS topic (imported once per stack via Topic.from_topic_arn), and uses TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING.
Lambda alarms (AWS/Lambda, FunctionName dimension):
| Alarm | Functions | Metric / config |
|---|---|---|
<fn>-errors |
po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, workorder-email-processor |
Errors Sum, 5 min, > 0, eval 1 |
<fn>-throttles |
po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui, workorder-email-processor |
Throttles Sum, 5 min, > 0, eval 1 |
<fn>-duration |
po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui (p99); workorder-email-processor (p95) |
Duration percentile, 5 min, >= 45000 ms (75% of the 60s timeout), eval 3 / datapoints 2 |
The <fn>-duration and <fn>-throttles alarms for po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor supersede the orphaned, CLI-created Lambda-Duration-* / Lambda-Throttles-* alarms (deleted post-deploy).
DynamoDB alarms (AWS/DynamoDB): each owned table gets <table>-throttles (ThrottledRequests) and <table>-system-errors (SystemErrors). These metrics emit only at the TableName + Operation dimension set, so each alarm is a Sum math expression across the operations the table uses (Get/BatchGet/Query/Scan/Put/Update/Delete/BatchWrite). Tables covered: purchase-orders, verified-sites, pending-site-review (po-ingest); WorkOrders, WorkOrderComments (workorder-ingest).
Shared Resources
purchase-orders table (owned here)
The purchase-orders DynamoDB table is owned by this repo's po-ingest stack (defined in cdk/po_stack.py with RemovalPolicy.RETAIN and StreamViewType.NEW_IMAGE). The po-email-processor Lambda is the authoritative writer — it performs the conditional inserts, revision overwrites, and cancellation updates described above.
Consumers (read-only):
| Repo | How it reads | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
seahaven-slack-bot |
po-sync (DynamoDB Streams + daily scan) and wo-po-lookup |
Daily KB sync + Bedrock agent PO lookups |
The consumer imports the table via Table.fromTableName(...) and is granted read-only access (grantReadData); it does not own or define it.
Schema-coordination rule: Any change to the purchase-orders schema (partition key, item shape, attribute names, streams view type) must be coordinated with seahaven-slack-bot. The owner here ships the change; the consumer must be updated in lockstep so its readers do not break. Treat schema changes as a cross-repo migration, not a local edit.
Known exception (INFRA-51): amazon-po-parser currently writes directly to purchase-orders outside this stack (backfill/enrichment scripts). This second writer is being folded into the po-ingest pipeline so this stack is the sole writer; until INFRA-51 closes, coordinate any schema change with amazon-po-parser as well.
WorkOrders and WorkOrderComments tables (owned here)
Both tables are owned by this repo's WorkorderIngestStack (cdk/wo_stack.py, RemovalPolicy.RETAIN, shared customer-managed CMK per INFRA-95 / M-3):
WorkOrders— PKwork_order_id(S).WorkOrderComments— PKwork_order_id(S), SKcomment_id(S).
Consumer (read-only) — data contract: seahaven-slack-bot imports both tables via Table.fromTableName(...) (grantReadData plus an explicit kms:Decrypt grant on the shared CMK) and reads them from two Lambdas: workorder-sync (daily full-table scan into the Bedrock knowledge base) and wo-po-lookup (the Bedrock agent's direct WO lookup action group). The bot depends on the PK/SK schema above, the CMK encryption, and these attributes: on WorkOrders — description, wo_status, customer, site_code, building, address, severity, priority, assigned_to, date_reported, scheduled_start, due_date, updated_at; on WorkOrderComments — created_at (used to sort comments), commenter, text. Any change to table name, key schema, these attribute names, or the encryption key must be coordinated with seahaven-slack-bot before it ships, or the Bedrock agent breaks at runtime (not at deploy — the tables are imported by name, so there is no compile-time link).
verified-sites table (owned here)
Owned by this repo's po-ingest stack (cdk/po_stack.py). PK siteCode (S); AWS-managed encryption (NOT the shared CMK).
Consumer (read-only) — data contract: seahaven-slack-bot's wo-po-lookup Lambda imports this table via Table.fromTableName(...) for the Bedrock agent's lookup_site action. It does point lookups by siteCode and reads address, fullAddress, city, state, zip, latitude, longitude, notes. Coordinate any change to the table name, key schema, or these attribute names with seahaven-slack-bot.
GSI drift (INFRA-138): the
by-stateGSI was removed here on 2026-06-03 (audit M-20, "0 reads in 30d"), butseahaven-slack-botstill queriesIndexName: 'by-state'for its state-listing path, so that path fails at runtime today. Restoring the GSI or removing the consumer's state path needs to be reconciled cross-repo. This is the kind of silent owner-side lifecycle change this data-contract note exists to prevent.
Documentation
The canonical map of Sea Haven's AWS infrastructure lives in Confluence. This project's po-ingest and workorder-ingest stacks are represented there as Mermaid subgraphs.
- AWS Architecture Map (Confluence, IT space, page 1540098)
CI/CD
GitHub Actions with reusable workflows from Sea-Haven-Industries/.github:
- CI (PR to
main): linting +cdk synthviaci-python-sam.yaml@main - CD (push to
main):cdk deploy --allviacd-cdk.yaml@main(OIDC auth)
Branch protection on main — all changes through PR.
Setup
- Bootstrap CDK:
cdk bootstrap aws://{AccountId}/us-east-1 - Store Anthropic API keys:
aws secretsmanager create-secret --name po-ingest/anthropic-api-key --secret-string "sk-ant-..." aws secretsmanager create-secret --name workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key --secret-string "sk-ant-..." - Deploy both stacks:
cd cdk pip install -r requirements.txt cdk deploy --all - CloudFormation outputs include
WebUIUrlfor each stack's dashboard.
Scripts
Reprocess PO emails (re-run parser against all emails still in S3):
python scripts/reprocess.py # dry-run
python scripts/reprocess.py --execute # invoke po-email-processor for each
Backfill verified sites (one-time scan of historical POs):
python scripts/backfill_sites.py
Directory Structure
cdk/
app.py # Two stacks: po-ingest + WorkorderIngestStack
po_stack.py # Purchase order pipeline resources
wo_stack.py # Work order pipeline resources
lambdas/
po/ # PO pipeline Lambdas
email_processor/
site_extractor/
web_ui/
wo/ # WO pipeline Lambdas
email_processor/
web_ui/
shared/
models.py # Work order dataclasses/enums
scripts/
reprocess.py
backfill_sites.py
tests/
conftest.py # AWS env stubs + per-pipeline module loader
test_ses_auth.py # Sender-authentication parser tests (INFRA-107)