* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
The repo had no automated tests, so regressions in the email
parsing pipeline could only be caught manually. The reusable
ci-python-sam workflow already supports a run-tests input at the
pinned SHA; enable it and add a first suite covering the pure
functions pad_zip and parse_raw_email.
tests/conftest.py sets AWS_DEFAULT_REGION and dummy credentials
before any handler import because the handlers create boto3
clients at module import time, and loads each handler.py via
importlib under a unique module name since the files share a
basename. pytest.ini scopes discovery to tests/ so the manual
test_local.py script at the repo root is not collected.
The README had drifted from the deployed stacks: it still listed
the removed shared/ directory, the by-state / site-code-index /
status-index GSIs deleted in the 2026-06-03 audit (M-20), the
WebUIUrl CloudFormation output retired with the public Function
URLs (INFRA-74), and it attributed the shared DynamoDB CMK to the
work-order tables when only purchase-orders is migrated (the WO
migration is still tracked in INFRA-6). Setup steps also told the
reader to create the CDK-managed secrets by hand, which would
collide on deploy. Align all of it with cdk/po_stack.py,
cdk/wo_stack.py, and the actual repo layout, and document the DLQ
messages alarms that were missing from the alarms section.
Refs: INFRA-74
The existing workorder-email-processor-errors alarm fires on any errored
async invocation, but a message only reaches the DLQ after Lambda exhausts
its async retries and gives up — a genuinely dropped work-order email that
the errors alarm alone does not distinguish.
Add an ALARM-only CloudWatch alarm (workorder-email-processor-dlq-messages)
on the EmailProcessorDlq ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible metric
(Statistic MAXIMUM, period 5m, evaluationPeriods 1, threshold > 0,
treatMissingData NOT_BREACHING). Routes to the same shared site-alerts SNS
topic via SnsAction, mirroring the errors-alarm construct style.
Refs INFRA-41 / audit H-8.
Page when any message lands in the EmailProcessorDlq, which means a PO
email was permanently dropped after po-email-processor exhausted its
async Lambda retries. Without this, the errors alarm catches the failing
invocations but nothing surfaces the resulting dead-lettered email.
AWS/SQS ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible, Maximum over a single 5-min
period > 0, notBreaching on missing data. Reuses the shared site-alerts
SNS topic, ALARM-only, matching the existing po-email-processor-errors
alarm. The metric helper derives the QueueName dimension from the queue
construct (Fn::GetAtt QueueName), so the alarm tracks the CDK-generated
queue name without hardcoding it.
Add block_public_access=BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL to the po-ingest and
workorder-ingest EmailBucket constructs. The buckets are already private
at runtime via account-level and AWS-default BPA, so this is a no-op for
behavior; it closes the codification gap that left CKV_AWS_53-56 firing
on the synthesized templates and blocking the security pre-push gate
(and the DLQ-alarm PRs that ride on it).
* Add CloudWatch alarm coverage for po-ingest and workorder-ingest
Expands alarm coverage across both CDK stacks. All alarms are ALARM-only
(no OK action) to the shared site-alerts SNS topic, with TreatMissingData
NOT_BREACHING. The site-alerts topic is now imported once near the top of
each stack so every alarm reuses one Topic instance.
po-ingest (cdk/po_stack.py):
- Errors: po-ingest-site-extractor
- Throttles: po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- Duration (p99, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): po-email-processor (orphan adoption),
po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: purchase-orders, verified-sites,
pending-site-review
workorder-ingest (cdk/wo_stack.py):
- Throttles: workorder-email-processor
- Duration (p95, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): workorder-email-processor (orphan adoption)
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: WorkOrders, WorkOrderComments
DynamoDB ThrottledRequests/SystemErrors emit only at the TableName+Operation
dimension set, so each table alarm is a Sum math expression across operations
via the non-deprecated metric_*_for_operations helpers (metric_throttled_requests
is deprecated/invalid in aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0).
Refs INFRA-41 / audit H-8.
* Drop NEEDS ADAM SIGN-OFF wording from alarm comments
Duration alarm thresholds are owner-approved; remove the sign-off flag
from po_stack.py and wo_stack.py comments. Threshold values, eval config,
and orphan-delete notes are unchanged.
The purchase-orders table was migrated to SSE-KMS (alias/seahaven-dynamodb,
INFRA-95/M-3) out-of-band, but po_stack never declared the key, so
grant_read_write_data did not propagate kms perms. po-email-processor failed
~99.6% of invocations with kms:Decrypt AccessDeniedException, a data-loss
outage on the PO ingestion write path.
- po_stack: declare encryption_key on purchase-orders (reconciles SSE drift;
no-op against the already-encrypted live table) so the existing grants add
kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey/DescribeKey to EmailProcessor, WebUI, SiteExtractor.
- wo_stack: pre-emptive grant_encrypt_decrypt on the WO processor role ahead of
the WorkOrders CMK migration (INFRA-6); tables left unencrypted, no table change.
GPT-4.1 cross-review: no blockers.
Make CDK the source of truth for two sets of changes applied out-of-band
via CLI to the po-ingest and WorkorderIngestStack stacks.
INFRA-74 (audit C-5): remove the public FunctionUrlAuthType.NONE Function
URL construct (and its auto-generated Principal:* invoke permission +
output) from both po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui. The URLs were already
deleted live via CLI; CFN's delete is idempotent.
INFRA-41 (audit H-8): add a CDK-managed SQS dead-letter queue
(dead_letter_queue=, 14d retention, SSL-enforced, CDK-generated name) and
an ALARM-only Errors alarm (Sum, threshold>0, site-alerts topic) for both
po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor, mirroring the
apm-wo-analysis-classifier DLQ and payments-payroll-batch alarm patterns.
Interim CLI resources (per-fn -dlq queues, -errors alarms, dlq-send inline
policies, OnFailure event-invoke-configs) removed post-deploy.
