SES-AR-01: treat ")" at depth 0 as an unmatched close, rejecting the
value as not well-formed so a ")(...)" pair cannot manufacture a depth-0
gap where a smuggled dkim=pass clause gets parsed.
SES-AR-02: emit a space when a comment is removed so comments act as
CFWS folding whitespace (RFC 5322). Without this, "dk(z)im=pass" would
become "dkim=pass" and an attacker comment could glue unrelated tokens.
Alarm: widen evaluation_periods from 3→6 (30-min window) with
datapoints_to_alarm still at 2, closing the sparse-outage residual where
rejections >10-15 min apart fail to place breaching datapoints in 2 of 3
consecutive periods.
Both ses_auth.py copies stay byte-identical. All 86 tests pass.
Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
The EmailProcessorTemplateFallbackRateAlarm added in #99 used
MAX([FILL(fb,0)+FILL(tmpl,0),1]) as a divide-by-zero guard, but
CloudWatch metric math has no element-wise MAX over an array; it
rejects the array operand at deploy time with 'Unsupported operand
type(s) for MAX', failing the WorkorderIngestStack update (it rolled
back cleanly). The outer IF((...)>=10, ...) volume floor already
guarantees a non-zero denominator in the true branch, so divide by
(FILL(fb,0)+FILL(tmpl,0)) directly and drop the invalid guard.
Unblocks the #99 deploy (PO stack already applied; WO rolled back).
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
The repo had no automated tests, so regressions in the email
parsing pipeline could only be caught manually. The reusable
ci-python-sam workflow already supports a run-tests input at the
pinned SHA; enable it and add a first suite covering the pure
functions pad_zip and parse_raw_email.
tests/conftest.py sets AWS_DEFAULT_REGION and dummy credentials
before any handler import because the handlers create boto3
clients at module import time, and loads each handler.py via
importlib under a unique module name since the files share a
basename. pytest.ini scopes discovery to tests/ so the manual
test_local.py script at the repo root is not collected.
The README had drifted from the deployed stacks: it still listed
the removed shared/ directory, the by-state / site-code-index /
status-index GSIs deleted in the 2026-06-03 audit (M-20), the
WebUIUrl CloudFormation output retired with the public Function
URLs (INFRA-74), and it attributed the shared DynamoDB CMK to the
work-order tables when only purchase-orders is migrated (the WO
migration is still tracked in INFRA-6). Setup steps also told the
reader to create the CDK-managed secrets by hand, which would
collide on deploy. Align all of it with cdk/po_stack.py,
cdk/wo_stack.py, and the actual repo layout, and document the DLQ
messages alarms that were missing from the alarms section.
Refs: INFRA-74
The existing workorder-email-processor-errors alarm fires on any errored
async invocation, but a message only reaches the DLQ after Lambda exhausts
its async retries and gives up — a genuinely dropped work-order email that
the errors alarm alone does not distinguish.
Add an ALARM-only CloudWatch alarm (workorder-email-processor-dlq-messages)
on the EmailProcessorDlq ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible metric
(Statistic MAXIMUM, period 5m, evaluationPeriods 1, threshold > 0,
treatMissingData NOT_BREACHING). Routes to the same shared site-alerts SNS
topic via SnsAction, mirroring the errors-alarm construct style.
Refs INFRA-41 / audit H-8.
Page when any message lands in the EmailProcessorDlq, which means a PO
email was permanently dropped after po-email-processor exhausted its
async Lambda retries. Without this, the errors alarm catches the failing
invocations but nothing surfaces the resulting dead-lettered email.
AWS/SQS ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible, Maximum over a single 5-min
period > 0, notBreaching on missing data. Reuses the shared site-alerts
SNS topic, ALARM-only, matching the existing po-email-processor-errors
alarm. The metric helper derives the QueueName dimension from the queue
construct (Fn::GetAtt QueueName), so the alarm tracks the CDK-generated
queue name without hardcoding it.
Add block_public_access=BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL to the po-ingest and
workorder-ingest EmailBucket constructs. The buckets are already private
at runtime via account-level and AWS-default BPA, so this is a no-op for
behavior; it closes the codification gap that left CKV_AWS_53-56 firing
on the synthesized templates and blocking the security pre-push gate
(and the DLQ-alarm PRs that ride on it).
* Add CloudWatch alarm coverage for po-ingest and workorder-ingest
Expands alarm coverage across both CDK stacks. All alarms are ALARM-only
(no OK action) to the shared site-alerts SNS topic, with TreatMissingData
NOT_BREACHING. The site-alerts topic is now imported once near the top of
each stack so every alarm reuses one Topic instance.
po-ingest (cdk/po_stack.py):
- Errors: po-ingest-site-extractor
- Throttles: po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- Duration (p99, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): po-email-processor (orphan adoption),
po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: purchase-orders, verified-sites,
pending-site-review
workorder-ingest (cdk/wo_stack.py):
- Throttles: workorder-email-processor
- Duration (p95, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): workorder-email-processor (orphan adoption)
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: WorkOrders, WorkOrderComments
DynamoDB ThrottledRequests/SystemErrors emit only at the TableName+Operation
dimension set, so each table alarm is a Sum math expression across operations
via the non-deprecated metric_*_for_operations helpers (metric_throttled_requests
is deprecated/invalid in aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0).
Refs INFRA-41 / audit H-8.
* Drop NEEDS ADAM SIGN-OFF wording from alarm comments
Duration alarm thresholds are owner-approved; remove the sign-off flag
from po_stack.py and wo_stack.py comments. Threshold values, eval config,
and orphan-delete notes are unchanged.
The purchase-orders table was migrated to SSE-KMS (alias/seahaven-dynamodb,
INFRA-95/M-3) out-of-band, but po_stack never declared the key, so
grant_read_write_data did not propagate kms perms. po-email-processor failed
~99.6% of invocations with kms:Decrypt AccessDeniedException, a data-loss
outage on the PO ingestion write path.
- po_stack: declare encryption_key on purchase-orders (reconciles SSE drift;
no-op against the already-encrypted live table) so the existing grants add
kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey/DescribeKey to EmailProcessor, WebUI, SiteExtractor.
- wo_stack: pre-emptive grant_encrypt_decrypt on the WO processor role ahead of
the WorkOrders CMK migration (INFRA-6); tables left unencrypted, no table change.
GPT-4.1 cross-review: no blockers.
