2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
# Procurement Ingest
2026-06-11 14:44:27 -04:00
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
Unified email ingestion pipelines for Amazon procurement data. Two independent pipelines — purchase orders (Coupa) and work orders (APM/Hexagon EAM) — share a single repo and CDK app but deploy as separate CloudFormation stacks.
## Pipelines
### Purchase Orders (`po-ingest` stack)
feat: template-first PO parser with fail-closed gate and Bedrock fallback (#105)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* feature: Add PO template parser scaffold and design doc
Mirror WO PR #99's template-first approach for the Coupa PO processor. Two templates identified from a full 3,448-email triage:
- coupa_new_po (95.5%): scaffolded; fails closed to the LLM until extract_new_po lands.
- coupa_cancellation (2.9%): implemented.
Nested contract with recursive validation, Decimal money, and a fail-closed gate. Derived fields (site_code/trade/fiscal_year) are deferred to a shared post-stage. Comments, revisions, multi-line, and non-USD emails fall back to Bedrock. docs/po-template-parser.md records the investigation, decisions, and remaining work.
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
* Implement PO new_po extraction and value-level gate
Replace the extract_new_po scaffold stub with the full
section-windowed extractor (duplicate-label anchoring, sentinel
ship-to, label-keyed U+2022 bullet split, Decimal money from three
anchored contexts only) and add value-level gate rules V1-V13.
Both new_po_not_implemented scaffold guards are removed; rules 6-8
(unrecognized_status, multiline_unsupported, non_usd) go live.
The gate re-derives every byte proof from the email body so an
extractor bug cannot vouch for itself: amount re-serialization
with a digit/comma border check (the thousands-separator
truncation kill switch), sum(lines)==total against both Total
blocks, anchor/supplier identity proofs, USPS address shape on
the raw pre-enrichment zip, bullet label discipline, and
sentinel/artifact hygiene. Any failure falls closed to the LLM;
a validation failure is never a parsed result.
Refs: #99
* Wire template-first parse into PO handler with EMF metric
Run try_deterministic_parse ahead of the Bedrock extractor and
fall back only on a miss/invalid (fail-closed) result. The shared
enrich_parsed post-stage and the save_cancellation/save_revision/
save_new_po routing are untouched, so both paths write identical
DynamoDB shapes and the po-ingest-site-extractor stream contract
is preserved.
Each record emits one ParseMethod EMF line (Seahaven/PoIngest/
ParseOutcome, dimension sets [ParseMethod] and
[ParseMethod,TemplateId], ReasonCode/po_number ride-alongs)
mirroring the WO idiom. The metric fires before the Bedrock call
so a Bedrock-side error still records the ai_fallback outcome.
Refs: #99
* Add PO fallback-rate alarm retuned for ~57 emails/day
The WO alarm's 15-min period and >=10-sample floor assume
~760/day and would be structurally dead at PO volume (a 15-min
period holds ~0.6 emails, so the floor is never met). Retune:
6-hour periods (~14.25 expected emails), IF((fb+tmpl)>=8,...)
volume floor so a single email can never breach a datapoint
(1/8 = 12.5% < 20%), threshold >20% against a ~1% expected
baseline, eval 4 / datapoints 2 (24h span) so noise self-clears
while total template drift pages within ~12h. No element-wise
MAX in the math expression (post-#102 rule); ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, NOT_BREACHING. Gated with
'npx cdk synth po-ingest'.
Also add template_parser.py to the bundling cp list -- without it
every deployed invocation would ImportError (unit tests cannot
catch an asset-bundling omission).
Refs: #99, #102
* Add offline PO parser suite with scrubbed fixture corpus
132 tests: golden-file comparison for all 25 positive fixtures
(17 single-line new-PO + 8 cancellations, Decimal-exact via
parse_float=Decimal), every fail-closed gate reason code covered
(body-level triggers via 17 synthetic adversarial .eml mutations,
candidate-level via direct validate() unit tests), real multi-line
and comment/non-Coupa fallback fixtures, dual line-ending parse
identity, two-path enrich/save parity (site-extractor stream
guard), V10 URL-id corpus sweep, fixture hygiene (ses_auth pass +
scrub-marker leak sweep), and Bedrock dispatch/EMF assertions.
The suite loads handler/template_parser via importlib under
unique module names and binds the handler's bare sibling imports
around exec (tests/conftest.py load_handler gets the same
treatment) -- the WO suite caches bare 'handler'/'template_parser'
names in sys.modules, and bare imports here would silently bind
to the wrong pipeline. moto is imported before the handler so its
botocore stubber hook precedes boto3 session creation (the PO
conftest chain now loads at pytest session start).
Fixtures are scrubbed real S3 samples: transport/auth header
values replaced with same-shape placeholders (structure kept so
ses_auth still passes), per-file digit ciphers, amounts remapped
with sum==total re-established. The .gitignore exception is
scoped to the PO fixtures path only.
Refs: #99
* Document PO template-first parser and retuned alarm
README: PO flow is now template-first with Bedrock fallback;
parser/gate section mirroring the WO writeup; Seahaven/PoIngest
ParseOutcome namespace and the fallback-rate alarm numbers with
their volume justification (deliberately not WO's settings);
test-suite and repo-layout updates.
Design doc: mark PR #1 complete in progress/checklist sections;
document the six value-level gate reason codes and the scaffold
guard removal; correct the stale data-access note (default CLI
session is 328440206208) and note the ~90-day S3 lifecycle aging
of the corpus; record the 2.3 layout addendum (leading Supplier
bullet segment, EA evidence lines, summary unit-price tokens,
decode-path line endings), the fixture-build pins (address join
convention, quantity/unit/price source), the V10 sweep outcome,
and resolutions for open questions Q3/Q6. Cross-family review and
the Confluence architecture-map update are flagged outstanding
for merge.
Refs: #99
* Record cross-family review outcome for handler wiring
GPT-4.1 cross_review.py run against the real handler diff
returned no BLOCK and no security findings; both FIX items
verified as no-change-needed (fallback logging already correct;
non-dict AI output is the pre-existing issue #101 pattern this
PR deliberately does not touch).
Refs: #99
* Pin line-item currency to USD in the PO gate
The non_usd rule only checked the Total-block top-level currency, so a
new_po whose line item read 'for 55,206.00 CAD' under a USD Total block
still template-parsed as ok -- a fail-open hole in the fail-closed
gate. Every line item's captured currency and its re-derived body token
must now byte-equal the proven-USD top-level currency; covered by a
line-level CAD adversarial fixture (the existing adv-non-usd only
exercised the Total-block variant) and a candidate-mutation unit test.
* Scrub residual transport tokens from PO fixtures
The first-pass harvest scrub sanitized only the primary SES/DKIM
header blocks, leaving the real SES Feedback-ID sender-identity hash
in 49 committed fixtures and, on the two non-Coupa fixtures, an
embedded second SES block's X-Ses-Receipt, the Exchange cross-tenant
UPN ciphertext, and Gmail ARC fh= / X-Gm-* tokens -- exactly the
token classes the PR #99 fixture lesson requires placeholdered.
Replace each with a same-shape ScrubbedFixture value (byte-safe,
CRLF and folding preserved) so header structure and ses_auth
behavior are unchanged.
* Converge quantity/price to Decimal on both paths
EXTRACTION_PROMPT declares quantity and price as JSON strings, so a
prompt-obedient Bedrock response stores DynamoDB Strings where the
template parser stores Numbers -- divergent attribute types for the
same email on the purchase-orders stream. Coerce numeric strings to
Decimal in the shared enrich_parsed post-stage (thousands-separator
safe; non-numeric strings kept verbatim) so both paths converge;
prompt rewording itself remains PR #2 scope.
The two-path parity test was circular -- it replayed the parser-
derived golden as 'the LLM output', so it could never see the type
divergence. It now feeds a prompt-shaped payload (string quantity/
price, LLM-filled site_code) through enrich_parsed and save_new_po,
and the fixture-hygiene test now asserts the scrubbed transport-token
header classes so fixture regressions are caught.
* Coerce bare-int quantity/price to Decimal in enrich_parsed
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the final PR diff (no BLOCK) flagged
residual type drift: parse_float=Decimal rules out floats on the LLM
path, but a bare JSON int survived as Python int. Coerce it so both
parse paths emit one canonical Decimal type.
* Scrub fixture-body PII and harden cancellation gate (sec review)
/sh-security-review of PR #105 (5 fresh-context detectors + proof-or-kill
verifier) confirmed two diff-introduced findings; both fixed here.
F3 (medium, real PII in new fixtures): the harvest scrub replaced header
tokens but left real third-party PII in message BODIES -- an Amazon
contact's name/phone/personal email in non-coupa-02.eml and an internal
t.corp.amazon.com ticket URL in comment-02.eml, plus real submitter/attn
names recurring across the new_po corpus. Replaced every personal name,
phone, personal email, and internal URL with synthetic placeholders
(QP-soft-wrap aware) across both .eml bodies and expected goldens.
Extended test_fixture_hygiene to scan BODIES (phone shapes, corp URLs,
the leaked tokens), closing the header-only gap that let this through.
F1 (medium, cancellation gate): _CANCELLATION_SUBJECT was unanchored and
matched with .search(), unlike the anchored new_po pattern -- a subject
merely ending with the cancellation phrase could be routed to the sticky-
Cancelled write. Fully anchored it and switched to .match, and added a
body-corroboration gate (the real Coupa body independently restates
'Purchase Order #<po> ... has been cancelled'); a near-miss/misrouted
subject whose body does not corroborate now fails closed to the LLM
(new reason code cancellation_body_unconfirmed).
Pre-existing (advisory, not this PR): the LLM-fallback else->save_new_po
dispatch and undelimited extraction prompt (issue #101 family) are
byte-identical to main and unchanged here.
401 tests pass; ruff/format clean; cdk synth po-ingest clean.
---------
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-16 17:50:59 -04:00
Coupa PO emails are received at `amazon_po@int.seahaven.com` , parsed **deterministic-template-first with a Claude-Haiku-4.5-on-Bedrock fallback** , and written to the `purchase-orders` DynamoDB table.
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
**Flow:**
1. Coupa sends a PO email (new, revision, or cancellation).
2. SES (`INBOUND_MAIL` rule set) drops the raw MIME into `s3://po-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/` .
3. S3 `ObjectCreated` triggers the `po-email-processor` Lambda.
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
4. Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): the SES-stamped `Authentication-Results` header must show `dkim=pass` for `amazon.coupahost.com` (see [Sender authentication ](#sender-authentication-infra-107 )); otherwise the email is logged and dropped.
2026-07-17 11:47:33 -04:00
5. **Parse:** a pure, offline template parser (`template_parser.py` ) tries the two known Coupa templates first — `coupa_new_po` (95.5% of traffic) and `coupa_cancellation` (2.9%) — behind a strict fail-closed validation gate. Only on a miss/invalid result does the Lambda fall back to the Claude-on-Bedrock AI extractor (`InvokeModel` ), which extracts the identical structured-JSON contract (PO number, status, supplier, nested ship-to, line items). Numeric amounts are `Decimal` on both paths (the AI decode uses `parse_float=Decimal` ; DynamoDB rejects floats). The derived classification fields (`site_code` , `trade` , `fiscal_year` ) are computed by a deterministic Python classifier in the shared `enrich_parsed()` post-stage (zip padding, `ship_to_raw` /`state` promotion, metadata) which runs identically on both paths — Python-authoritative on the template path and an LLM-authoritative-with-Python-shadow bake on the AI-fallback path (see the **Derived fields** note below).
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
6. Merge write to DynamoDB:
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
- `new_po` — merge insert. Creates the PO, or backfills data into a pre-existing `Cancelled` skeleton left by an out-of-order cancellation (preserving the `Cancelled` status). No longer silently dropped when a record already exists.
- `revision` — field-level merge (`update_item` SETs only the fields present in the revision). A revision that omits `line_items` /`supplier` no longer deletes them. Will not un-cancel a `Cancelled` PO.
- `cancellation` — marks the row `Cancelled` (creating a minimal skeleton if the cancellation arrives before the `new_po` ).
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
7. DynamoDB Streams feeds the **site extractor** (`po-ingest-site-extractor` ) — real-time site address extraction into the `verified-sites` table. (LedgerFlow / `seahaven-slack-bot/po-sync` , the former second stream consumer, was decommissioned 2026-07-23.)
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
PO ai-fallback fail-closed gate + prompt hardening (refactor phase 1) (#108)
* feat: PO ai-fallback fail-closed gate + prompt hardening, parity with #104 (refactor phase 1)
Ports WO's #104 AI-fallback security hardening to the PO email
processor, adapted for PO's nested contract instead of copying the
WO gate verbatim.
validate_ai_fallback() (template_parser.py) fail-closes raw Bedrock
output before it reaches enrich_parsed or any dispatch/save:
recursive key-set check with missing-key normalization (nested
contract: supplier{}, ship_to{}, line_items[]); po_number checked
against the same hardened prefix+hyphen+digits regex family that
guards the DynamoDB partition key the handler builds from it
(rejects fullwidth-digit and trailing-artifact injection); email_type
enforced against the {new_po, revision, cancellation} allow-list
before dispatch so a miss can never fall into the else -> save_new_po
branch; money fields accept Decimal/int/None only, matching PO's
parse_float=Decimal decode (a float-typed check would be wrong here).
A gate failure emits ParseMethod=ai_fallback_rejected and `continue`s
to the next record -- it never raises, so attacker-controlled input
can't churn the retry/DLQ path.
extract_with_claude() wraps the untrusted email in an <email> data
block and neutralizes forged <email>-tag lookalikes in the body with
the same linear-time regex approach as WO's _EMAIL_TAG_RE, and sets
temperature=0 on the Bedrock call.
Deliberate double-count: PO emits ParseMethod=ai_fallback before the
Bedrock call (so a Bedrock-side error still records the outcome), so
a rejected email always produces both an ai_fallback datapoint
(pre-call) and an ai_fallback_rejected datapoint (post-gate). This is
intentional, not a bug -- documented in handler.py, template_parser.py,
and the README.
cdk/po_stack.py: in-place property update to the existing
po-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm (same logical ID, no
rename/replacement) -- the fb/(fb+tmpl) expression is left
byte-identical to its pre-Phase-1 form and ai_fallback_rejected is
deliberately excluded from the numerator/denominator/volume floor,
since folding it in as WO does would double-count every rejection
(PO's pre-call emit already counts it once via fb). A net-new
EmailProcessorAiFallbackRejectedAlarm watches the rejected series on
its own, retuned for ~57 emails/day with the 6h/IF-floor/eval-4/
datapoints-2 idiom (not WO's 5-minute sparse idiom, which is
structurally dead at PO volume). Both alarms remain ALARM-only to
site-alerts, NOT_BREACHING, with no element-wise MAX in the math
(post-#102 rule).
* Block "Cancelled" po_status off the AI cancellation route
The AI-fallback gate type-checked po_status but let any string
through, unlike the template path which never emits "Cancelled" on a
new_po. Dispatch routes on email_type, so an AI-path new_po or revision
carrying po_status="Cancelled" would reach save_new_po/save_revision and
cancel a live PO via _merge_update's sticky-cancel write without ever
hitting save_cancellation. Reject the exact sticky marker on any
non-cancellation email_type so the AI path matches the template path's
guard; arbitrary non-marker status strings still pass.
email_type is already validated to the enum before this check, and a
cancellation reaches save_cancellation (which hardcodes the status), so
po_status stays irrelevant on that route.
2026-07-17 14:50:47 -04:00
**Deterministic template parser.** `template_parser.try_deterministic_parse()` classifies by exact subject regex, extracts the nested contract (`supplier{}` , `ship_to{}` — 8 keys, `line_items[]` — 10 keys per item), and returns a parsed result **only if** it passes a fail-closed validation gate: recursive exact key-set at every nesting level; `email_type` emitted **only** on the exact new-PO subject *and* a confirmed-safe `Status` (never defaulted — a cancellation misrouted as `new_po` would defeat the sticky-`Cancelled` guard); `po_number` shape + byte-equality with the subject, the body `PO ID` , the `Amazon Purchase Order #` heading, and the `orders/<id>` URL; duplicate-label anchor integrity (`Supplier` /`Shipping` /`Total` each appear twice, the first `Shipping` must be the literal `None` placeholder); money fidelity (every `Decimal` re-serializes byte-identically to its source token with a digit/comma border check — the thousands-separator-truncation kill switch — plus `sum(line amounts) == total` , proven against **both** `Total` blocks); bullet-metadata label discipline (closed label set, assigned by leading label, never ordinal — immune to the optional `Part Number` segment); USPS address shape on the raw pre-enrichment value; and rejection of any unparseable sentinel or residual `\r` /`\xa0` artifact. Multi-line-item (0.18%) and non-USD (0 observed) new-POs, comment emails, and anything else falls back to the AI extractor. The AI path is gated too: the untrusted email reaches Bedrock inside a neutralized `<email>` data block (forged tag lookalikes in the body are defanged) with `temperature=0` , and the raw model output must pass the fail-closed `validate_ai_fallback()` gate — the PO-specific nested contract (exact key-set at every level, with missing keys normalized rather than rejected), a `po_number` shape check hardened against fullwidth-digit and trailing-artifact injection (the same regex family protecting the DynamoDB partition key the handler builds from it), an `email_type` allow-list enforced *before* dispatch so a miss can never fall into the `new_po` default branch, and `Decimal` /`int` /`None` money typing (PO decodes with `parse_float=Decimal` ) — before any DynamoDB write. **The template path is gate-enforced end-to-end; the AI-fallback path is validated and fail-closed — output that fails the gate is skipped, never written (see `ai_fallback_rejected` below), so a malformed or injected email raises the fallback rate rather than corrupting a record.** Every record emits one CloudWatch EMF metric (see below).
feat: template-first PO parser with fail-closed gate and Bedrock fallback (#105)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* feature: Add PO template parser scaffold and design doc
Mirror WO PR #99's template-first approach for the Coupa PO processor. Two templates identified from a full 3,448-email triage:
- coupa_new_po (95.5%): scaffolded; fails closed to the LLM until extract_new_po lands.
- coupa_cancellation (2.9%): implemented.
Nested contract with recursive validation, Decimal money, and a fail-closed gate. Derived fields (site_code/trade/fiscal_year) are deferred to a shared post-stage. Comments, revisions, multi-line, and non-USD emails fall back to Bedrock. docs/po-template-parser.md records the investigation, decisions, and remaining work.
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
* Implement PO new_po extraction and value-level gate
Replace the extract_new_po scaffold stub with the full
section-windowed extractor (duplicate-label anchoring, sentinel
ship-to, label-keyed U+2022 bullet split, Decimal money from three
anchored contexts only) and add value-level gate rules V1-V13.
Both new_po_not_implemented scaffold guards are removed; rules 6-8
(unrecognized_status, multiline_unsupported, non_usd) go live.
The gate re-derives every byte proof from the email body so an
extractor bug cannot vouch for itself: amount re-serialization
with a digit/comma border check (the thousands-separator
truncation kill switch), sum(lines)==total against both Total
blocks, anchor/supplier identity proofs, USPS address shape on
the raw pre-enrichment zip, bullet label discipline, and
sentinel/artifact hygiene. Any failure falls closed to the LLM;
a validation failure is never a parsed result.
Refs: #99
* Wire template-first parse into PO handler with EMF metric
Run try_deterministic_parse ahead of the Bedrock extractor and
fall back only on a miss/invalid (fail-closed) result. The shared
enrich_parsed post-stage and the save_cancellation/save_revision/
save_new_po routing are untouched, so both paths write identical
DynamoDB shapes and the po-ingest-site-extractor stream contract
is preserved.
Each record emits one ParseMethod EMF line (Seahaven/PoIngest/
ParseOutcome, dimension sets [ParseMethod] and
[ParseMethod,TemplateId], ReasonCode/po_number ride-alongs)
mirroring the WO idiom. The metric fires before the Bedrock call
so a Bedrock-side error still records the ai_fallback outcome.
Refs: #99
* Add PO fallback-rate alarm retuned for ~57 emails/day
The WO alarm's 15-min period and >=10-sample floor assume
~760/day and would be structurally dead at PO volume (a 15-min
period holds ~0.6 emails, so the floor is never met). Retune:
6-hour periods (~14.25 expected emails), IF((fb+tmpl)>=8,...)
volume floor so a single email can never breach a datapoint
(1/8 = 12.5% < 20%), threshold >20% against a ~1% expected
baseline, eval 4 / datapoints 2 (24h span) so noise self-clears
while total template drift pages within ~12h. No element-wise
MAX in the math expression (post-#102 rule); ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, NOT_BREACHING. Gated with
'npx cdk synth po-ingest'.
Also add template_parser.py to the bundling cp list -- without it
every deployed invocation would ImportError (unit tests cannot
catch an asset-bundling omission).
Refs: #99, #102
* Add offline PO parser suite with scrubbed fixture corpus
132 tests: golden-file comparison for all 25 positive fixtures
(17 single-line new-PO + 8 cancellations, Decimal-exact via
parse_float=Decimal), every fail-closed gate reason code covered
(body-level triggers via 17 synthetic adversarial .eml mutations,
candidate-level via direct validate() unit tests), real multi-line
and comment/non-Coupa fallback fixtures, dual line-ending parse
identity, two-path enrich/save parity (site-extractor stream
guard), V10 URL-id corpus sweep, fixture hygiene (ses_auth pass +
scrub-marker leak sweep), and Bedrock dispatch/EMF assertions.
The suite loads handler/template_parser via importlib under
unique module names and binds the handler's bare sibling imports
around exec (tests/conftest.py load_handler gets the same
treatment) -- the WO suite caches bare 'handler'/'template_parser'
names in sys.modules, and bare imports here would silently bind
to the wrong pipeline. moto is imported before the handler so its
botocore stubber hook precedes boto3 session creation (the PO
conftest chain now loads at pytest session start).
Fixtures are scrubbed real S3 samples: transport/auth header
values replaced with same-shape placeholders (structure kept so
ses_auth still passes), per-file digit ciphers, amounts remapped
with sum==total re-established. The .gitignore exception is
scoped to the PO fixtures path only.
Refs: #99
* Document PO template-first parser and retuned alarm
README: PO flow is now template-first with Bedrock fallback;
parser/gate section mirroring the WO writeup; Seahaven/PoIngest
ParseOutcome namespace and the fallback-rate alarm numbers with
their volume justification (deliberately not WO's settings);
test-suite and repo-layout updates.
Design doc: mark PR #1 complete in progress/checklist sections;
document the six value-level gate reason codes and the scaffold
guard removal; correct the stale data-access note (default CLI
session is 328440206208) and note the ~90-day S3 lifecycle aging
of the corpus; record the 2.3 layout addendum (leading Supplier
bullet segment, EA evidence lines, summary unit-price tokens,
decode-path line endings), the fixture-build pins (address join
convention, quantity/unit/price source), the V10 sweep outcome,
and resolutions for open questions Q3/Q6. Cross-family review and
the Confluence architecture-map update are flagged outstanding
for merge.
Refs: #99
* Record cross-family review outcome for handler wiring
GPT-4.1 cross_review.py run against the real handler diff
returned no BLOCK and no security findings; both FIX items
verified as no-change-needed (fallback logging already correct;
non-dict AI output is the pre-existing issue #101 pattern this
PR deliberately does not touch).
Refs: #99
* Pin line-item currency to USD in the PO gate
The non_usd rule only checked the Total-block top-level currency, so a
new_po whose line item read 'for 55,206.00 CAD' under a USD Total block
still template-parsed as ok -- a fail-open hole in the fail-closed
gate. Every line item's captured currency and its re-derived body token
must now byte-equal the proven-USD top-level currency; covered by a
line-level CAD adversarial fixture (the existing adv-non-usd only
exercised the Total-block variant) and a candidate-mutation unit test.
* Scrub residual transport tokens from PO fixtures
The first-pass harvest scrub sanitized only the primary SES/DKIM
header blocks, leaving the real SES Feedback-ID sender-identity hash
in 49 committed fixtures and, on the two non-Coupa fixtures, an
embedded second SES block's X-Ses-Receipt, the Exchange cross-tenant
UPN ciphertext, and Gmail ARC fh= / X-Gm-* tokens -- exactly the
token classes the PR #99 fixture lesson requires placeholdered.
Replace each with a same-shape ScrubbedFixture value (byte-safe,
CRLF and folding preserved) so header structure and ses_auth
behavior are unchanged.
* Converge quantity/price to Decimal on both paths
EXTRACTION_PROMPT declares quantity and price as JSON strings, so a
prompt-obedient Bedrock response stores DynamoDB Strings where the
template parser stores Numbers -- divergent attribute types for the
same email on the purchase-orders stream. Coerce numeric strings to
Decimal in the shared enrich_parsed post-stage (thousands-separator
safe; non-numeric strings kept verbatim) so both paths converge;
prompt rewording itself remains PR #2 scope.
The two-path parity test was circular -- it replayed the parser-
derived golden as 'the LLM output', so it could never see the type
divergence. It now feeds a prompt-shaped payload (string quantity/
price, LLM-filled site_code) through enrich_parsed and save_new_po,
and the fixture-hygiene test now asserts the scrubbed transport-token
header classes so fixture regressions are caught.
* Coerce bare-int quantity/price to Decimal in enrich_parsed
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the final PR diff (no BLOCK) flagged
residual type drift: parse_float=Decimal rules out floats on the LLM
path, but a bare JSON int survived as Python int. Coerce it so both
parse paths emit one canonical Decimal type.
* Scrub fixture-body PII and harden cancellation gate (sec review)
/sh-security-review of PR #105 (5 fresh-context detectors + proof-or-kill
verifier) confirmed two diff-introduced findings; both fixed here.
F3 (medium, real PII in new fixtures): the harvest scrub replaced header
tokens but left real third-party PII in message BODIES -- an Amazon
contact's name/phone/personal email in non-coupa-02.eml and an internal
t.corp.amazon.com ticket URL in comment-02.eml, plus real submitter/attn
names recurring across the new_po corpus. Replaced every personal name,
phone, personal email, and internal URL with synthetic placeholders
(QP-soft-wrap aware) across both .eml bodies and expected goldens.
Extended test_fixture_hygiene to scan BODIES (phone shapes, corp URLs,
the leaked tokens), closing the header-only gap that let this through.
F1 (medium, cancellation gate): _CANCELLATION_SUBJECT was unanchored and
matched with .search(), unlike the anchored new_po pattern -- a subject
merely ending with the cancellation phrase could be routed to the sticky-
Cancelled write. Fully anchored it and switched to .match, and added a
body-corroboration gate (the real Coupa body independently restates
'Purchase Order #<po> ... has been cancelled'); a near-miss/misrouted
subject whose body does not corroborate now fails closed to the LLM
(new reason code cancellation_body_unconfirmed).
Pre-existing (advisory, not this PR): the LLM-fallback else->save_new_po
dispatch and undelimited extraction prompt (issue #101 family) are
byte-identical to main and unchanged here.
401 tests pass; ruff/format clean; cdk synth po-ingest clean.
---------
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-16 17:50:59 -04:00
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
**Derived fields (`site_code` , `trade` , `fiscal_year` ).** These three are **classified** , not verbatim-extracted, so neither parse path emits them directly — instead a deterministic Python classifier (`derived_fields.derive_all()` ) computes them inside the shared `enrich_parsed()` post-stage, which runs identically on both paths. `derived_fields.py` is byte-frozen this phase (shadow-bake freeze, per the constraint-9 module-diff gate); note for accuracy that its in-file docstring's "FAITHFUL v1 port" self-description is aspirational, not descriptive — the module is a deliberate **spec-superset** of the original `EXTRACTION_PROMPT` rule text (its own inline backtest-tuning comments diverge from those three prompt sections), with the LLM staying runtime-authoritative on the AI-fallback path during the bake regardless. The docstring reword is deferred to the first post-bake PR, since even a text-only edit is barred by this phase's machine-checked empty-diff gate on the file. `trade` is a closed label set (the same one the AI prompt enumerates): `Plumbing - PM` , `Plumbing - Reactive` , `Electrical` , `HVAC` , `Dock Doors` , `Doors` , `Signage` , `Carpentry` , `Fencing/Gates` , `Conveyance/MHE` , `Painting` , `Flooring` , `Janitorial` , `Fire/Life Safety` , `Landscaping/Yard` , `Roofing` , `Security/Locksmith` , `Snow Removal` , `PO Uplift` , `General Building - Emergency` , `General Building - Handyman` , `General Building - Project` , `General Building` . Authority differs by path:
2026-07-17 11:47:33 -04:00
- **Template path** — the parser leaves all three `null` , so Python is authoritative: it fills them.
- **AI-fallback path** — the LLM value stays **authoritative during the bake** (Python fills only a gap the LLM left `null` , never overwrites), and Python additionally runs in **shadow mode** : `enrich_parsed()` emits one `DerivedFieldAgreement` EMF record per field comparing the two.
**`DerivedFieldAgreement` metric** — namespace `Seahaven/PoIngest` , metric name `DerivedFieldAgreement` (Unit Count, value 1), dimensioned **only** by `Field` × `Agreement` (cardinality fixed at 3 × `Agreement` ∈ {`agree` (both non-null, equal after str-strip), `disagree` (both non-null, different), `llm_null_python_filled` (LLM null, Python supplied a value), `python_null` (LLM non-null, Python null)}; the record is skipped entirely when both are null. `po_number` , `PythonValue` , and `LlmValue` ride along as non-dimensioned Logs-Insights properties so a disagreement can be reviewed by example without inflating cardinality. Only the **AI-fallback** path emits these — the template path has no LLM value to shadow.
Review disagreements during the bake with this CloudWatch Logs Insights query over `/aws/lambda/po-email-processor` :
```
fields @timestamp , Field, Agreement, LlmValue, PythonValue, po_number
| filter ispresent(DerivedFieldAgreement)
| filter Agreement = "disagree"
| sort @timestamp desc
| limit 200
```
Or aggregate overall agreement per field: `| filter ispresent(DerivedFieldAgreement) | stats count(*) by Field, Agreement` .
> **Post-bake follow-up:** once agreement is acceptable, make Python authoritative on the AI-fallback path too (stop keeping the LLM value) and **drop the `site_code`/`trade`/`fiscal_year` rule sections from `EXTRACTION_PROMPT`** — the LLM stays authoritative on the fallback path only until then.
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
**Lambdas** (`lambdas/po/` ):
| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `po-email-processor` | S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
| `po-ingest-site-extractor` | DynamoDB Streams | Site code/address extraction -> `verified-sites` |
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
| `po-web-ui` | Manual invoke (authenticated — see Setup §6) | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
**Tables:**
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
- `purchase-orders` (PK: `po_number` , Streams: NEW_IMAGE) — read by `procurement-api` (see Shared Resources; the former `seahaven-slack-bot` reader was decommissioned 2026-07-23)
2026-07-15 19:00:43 -04:00
- `verified-sites` (PK: `siteCode` ) — ~1,100 unique Amazon facility sites (`by-state` GSI removed 2026-06-03, audit M-20)
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
- `pending-site-review` (PK: `po_number` ) — unresolvable POs for manual Payee Central verification
### Work Orders (`WorkorderIngestStack` stack)
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
Amazon APM work order emails (from Hexagon EAM / HxGN SmartCloud) are received at `apm@int.seahaven.com` , parsed **deterministic-template-first with a Claude-on-Bedrock fallback** , and written to the `WorkOrders` DynamoDB table.
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
**Flow:**
1. Hexagon EAM sends email notifications (new assignments, comments, updates, cancellations) to `amazon@seahavenind.com` .
2. Gmail filter forwards APM emails to `apm@int.seahaven.com` (SES).
3. SES drops the raw MIME into `s3://workorder-ingest-emails-{AccountId}/inbound/` .
4. S3 triggers the `workorder-email-processor` Lambda.
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
5. Fail-closed sender authentication (INFRA-107): the SES-stamped `Authentication-Results` header must show `dkim=pass` for the domain that re-signs the forward (currently allowlisted as `seahaven.com` — see the validation caveat under [Sender authentication ](#sender-authentication-infra-107 )); otherwise the email is logged and dropped.
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
6. **Parse:** a pure, offline template parser (`template_parser.py` ) tries the two known Hexagon templates first, behind a strict fail-closed validation gate. Only on a miss/invalid result does the Lambda fall back to the Claude-on-Bedrock AI extractor. Both paths emit the identical structured-JSON contract (work order ID, site code, severity, priority, dates, assigned technician).
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
7. Work order upserted to `WorkOrders` , event/comment appended to `WorkOrderComments` .
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
fix: add fail-closed validation gate and XML-delimited prompt on ai_fallback path (#104)
* fix: add fail-closed validation gate and XML-delimited prompt on ai_fallback path
The ai_fallback parse path applied no validation gate to raw Bedrock/LLM
output before DynamoDB writes, and the extraction prompt concatenated the
untrusted email body directly with no instructions-vs-data delimiter. A
DKIM-passing attacker could prompt-inject arbitrary field values into the
work-order store.
Changes:
- wrap untrusted email in \<email\> XML block with prompt instructing the
model to treat its contents as data only
- add validate_ai_fallback() in template_parser that enforces the same
contract keys, enums, and patterns as the template path before any write
- call validate_ai_fallback() in handler() dispatch; emit an
ai_fallback_rejected EMF metric on failure and skip the record
- add 17 unit tests covering every gate rule and two end-to-end dispatch
tests (injected email_type, injected status)
Refs #101
* style: apply ruff formatting to fix CI check
* harden ai_fallback gate: review fixes + security-review findings
Review follow-up on the ai_fallback validation gate (PR #104), plus
findings from a fan-out /sh-security-review of the change surface.
Reviewer FIX items:
- Neutralize forged <email> delimiters in the untrusted body before
wrapping, so an in-body </email> cannot escape the data block.
- Fail closed on non-dict model output instead of crashing the handler
into async retries; count ai_fallback_rejected parses in the
fallback-rate alarm and add a dedicated rejected-parse alarm so a
gate-rejection drift outage is not silent.
- Return a distinct invalid_status reason (was malformed_site_code);
validate ISO-8601 dates; README + docstring updates.
Security-review findings (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier):
- ReDoS (confirmed, medium): the tag neutralizer used two \s* around an
optional /, backtracking quadratically on "<" + a long whitespace run
(~32s at 100k chars -- one email could time out the Lambda). Collapse
to a single [\s/]* class: linear, same defanging.
- Unhashable-type crash (confirmed): a JSON list/dict for email_type or
status made `x in <set>` raise TypeError, escaping the gate into
retries. Guard with isinstance(str) before membership.
- Unicode/newline regex (confirmed): _WO_ID_RE/_SITE_CODE_RE used ^..$
with \d, admitting fullwidth digits ("１２３４５" as a lookalike
partition key) and trailing newlines. Switch to \A[0-9]+\Z (and the
handler's inline recheck to [0-9]) so neither passes.
- Alarm comment (confirmed, low): corrected the "slow trickle still
pages" wording -- rejections >~25-30 min apart page on neither alarm,
the same knowingly-accepted residual as sender-auth-rejected.
Refuted: residual free-text prompt injection is inherent to trusting
allowlisted senders, not a new primitive; no DynamoDB key-poisoning
bypass survives both gates ('#' can never enter work_order_id).
7 new regression tests. All 260 tests pass; ruff clean; cdk synth OK.
---------
Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
2026-07-16 16:23:28 -04:00
**Deterministic template parser.** ~93.6% of WO traffic is the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS \<id\>" comment template (T1) and ~6.4% is the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order \<id\> on building \<SITE\>" assignment template (T2). `template_parser.try_deterministic_parse()` classifies by subject, extracts the contract fields, and returns a parsed result **only if** it passes a strict validation gate (exact contract-key set; `work_order_id` matches the subject and is all-digits; the T1 `Work Order: <id>` double-space is literally present; `email_type` matches the template; `site_code` shape; per-type required fields; and a label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into another field fails). Anything that fails — the rare update/cancellation shapes, Hexagon template drift, or an extractor exception — falls back to the AI extractor. The AI path is gated too: the untrusted email reaches Bedrock inside a neutralized `<email>` data block (tag lookalikes in the body are defanged), and the raw model output must pass the fail-closed `validate_ai_fallback()` schema/enum/date gate before any DynamoDB write — output that fails is dropped and paged (see the `ai-fallback-rejected` alarm below), a prompt-injection defence for DKIM-passing but attacker-influenced mail. **Data is never corrupted; only the fallback rate rises.** Every record emits one CloudWatch EMF metric (see below).
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
**Lambdas** (`lambdas/wo/` ):
| Function | Trigger | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `workorder-email-processor` | S3 ObjectCreated | Claude extraction + DynamoDB write |
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
| `workorder-web-ui` | Manual invoke (authenticated — see Setup §6) | HTML dashboard (public Function URL removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74) |
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
| `workorder-shoc-emitter` | DynamoDB Streams, both WO tables (**ESMs ship disabled** — see [SHOC webhook feed ](#shoc-webhook-feed-workorder-shoc-emitter )) | HMAC-signed webhook push of every WO mutation to the SHOC backend |
| `workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator` | Secrets Manager rotation schedule (30 days) | Rotates the webhook HMAC signing keys (dual-key overlap) |
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
**Tables:**
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
- `WorkOrders` (PK: `work_order_id` , Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES) — `site-code-index` and `status-index` GSIs removed 2026-06-03 (audit M-20)
- `WorkOrderComments` (PK: `work_order_id` , SK: `comment_id` , Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES) — see the `comment_id` format note below
### SHOC webhook feed (`workorder-shoc-emitter`)
**Flow:** `WorkOrders` / `WorkOrderComments` DynamoDB Streams (`NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES` — the OLD image is what lets the emitter detect the `wo_status → cancelled` transition) → `workorder-shoc-emitter` → HMAC-signed HTTPS POST → SHOC backend. Every WO mutation becomes one webhook event (`work_order.created` / `.updated` / `.cancelled` / `.comment_added` ) within seconds of the DynamoDB commit; DynamoDB stays the source of truth.
- **Contract:** `docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md` (Rev 2026-07-23) is the producer/consumer contract SHOC builds its receiver against, and `docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json` is the shared receiver-verification vector set — both sides pin their HMAC implementation against the same vectors (producer-side via the golden-vector tests over `delivery.sign_body` ).
2026-07-30 12:03:02 -04:00
- **ACTIVE since 2026-07-30.** Both event-source mappings run with `enabled=True` , flipped after the SHOC receiver on `api.dev.seahaven.com` passed the shared test vectors live (valid current-kid signature accepted, duplicate `delivery_id` deduplicated, tampered/stale/unknown-kid all rejected 401). The stack originally shipped dark (`enabled=False` ) so it could deploy and be tested with zero deliveries while SHOC had no receiver. The ESMs start at `LATEST` — no historical flood; SHOC backfills history through the `procurement-api` read API, not the stream.
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
- **Ordering/retry semantics.** `parallelization_factor=1` , `bisect_batch_on_error=False` , `retry_attempts=-1` , `maximum_record_age=24h` : a retryable failure (429/5xx/timeout/connection error) blocks the shard and retries from the failed record — per-work-order commit order is the guarantee, and blocking is the intended behavior when SHOC is down. `report_batch_item_failures` keeps earlier in-batch successes from being re-delivered. Records that exhaust the 24h age are parked as ESM **failure metadata** (not full records) on `workorder-shoc-emitter-failures` (`on_failure` destination); a non-retryable 4xx (a contract bug, never worth blocking the shard for 24h) parks the **full `{envelope, response_status}` payload** on `workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected` and the loop continues. Both queues: 14-day retention, SSL-enforced, alarmed (see [CloudWatch alarms ](#cloudwatch-alarms )); recovery is `scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py` (see [Scripts ](#scripts )).
- **Secret + KMS.** The HMAC signing keys live in Secrets Manager secret `workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac` (value `{"keys": [{"kid", "secret"}, ...]}` , newest first, max 2), encrypted with the dedicated CMK `workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms` — deliberately **not** `alias/seahaven-dynamodb` , so the SHOC cross-account grant's decrypt reach covers exactly this one secret and nothing else. The secret's removal policy is ** `DESTROY` , deliberately not `RETAIN` **: the value is machine-generated HMAC material, fully regenerable by a single rotation, so `RETAIN` buys nothing and would expose the fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock (a failed create orphans an empty shell holding the global name; every later create fails `AlreadyExists` ). **Accidental-deletion recovery runbook:** redeploy to recreate the secret, force a rotation (`aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac` ), notify the SHOC team — receivers re-fetch within their ≤5-minute cache TTL, so no coordination window is needed — then watch the `-failures` queue and replay the gap with the replay script.
- **Rotation.** `workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator` runs on a 30-day schedule: it prepends a fresh 64-hex-char key as `keys[0]` and truncates the list to 2 entries (one overlap cycle). `kid` format is `YYYY-MM-DDTHH` . The emitter always signs with `keys[0]` behind a 5-minute TTL cache; the receiver accepts any listed `kid` and re-fetches on an unknown one — there is no delivery window in which signatures can't verify.
- **Cross-account grants (exact ARN only):** `arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev` is granted `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue` on the secret's resource policy **and** `kms:Decrypt` on the CMK's key policy — both halves are required; either one alone fails silently at the receiver. Future staging/prod receiver roles are each a deliberate, individually-reviewed policy addition — no wildcard/prefix trust.
2026-04-20 19:31:22 -04:00
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
### Procurement API (`procurement-api` stack)
A read-only REST API (API Gateway + the `procurement-api` Lambda, `lambdas/api/` ) over both pipelines' tables, plus a token-gated OpenAPI docs page. Primary consumer: the SHOC backend, for which this replaces the retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB scan as the reconciliation/backfill path (and the initial-history load for the outbound work-order webhook, which starts at LATEST).
| Method + path | Auth | Backing read |
|---|---|---|
| `GET /work-orders` · `/purchase-orders` · `/verified-sites` | IAM SigV4 | unordered paginated Scan (`limit` 1– `cursor` = base64 `LastEvaluatedKey` ; malformed cursor → 400) |
| `GET /work-orders/{id}` · `/purchase-orders/{id}` · `/verified-sites/{siteCode}` | IAM SigV4 | GetItem (404 on miss) |
| `GET /work-orders/{id}/comments` | IAM SigV4 | Query on the partition key, paginated |
| `POST /work-orders/{id}/comments` , `PATCH /work-orders/{id}` | — | **phase-2 planned** (`x-planned` in the spec); handler answers 501 |
feat(api): swap /docs from Swagger UI to Redoc (vendored offline) (#129)
Redoc 2.5.3 standalone bundle (MIT) replaces the three swagger-ui-dist
assets: one ~1.05MB JS file instead of ~1.8MB of JS+CSS+preset, and the
layout traps (StandaloneLayout/BaseLayout) go away. Redoc is read-only by
design, which matches the existing posture: try-it-out was already
disabled since data routes need SigV4 (Postman for live calls).
Unchanged: single token-gated response, offline vendoring (no CDN),
per-request server-URL injection, script-breakout guards, cached shell
with per-request spec splice. Bundle self-containment verified: the
search worker is an inlined Blob, and the only new Worker(filename) path
is Prism's async mode, which Redoc never invokes.
Verified via headless-Chrome render of the real handler output: all
routes, the OpenAPI 3.1 webhooks section, and planned-route markers
render; no placeholder leakage.
2026-07-24 12:00:22 -04:00
| `GET /docs` , `GET /openapi.json` | shared docs token (`X-Auth-Token` header or `?token=` in a browser) | Redoc reference docs (vendored offline, no CDN) with the spec inlined / the committed spec |
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
- **Spec is source of truth:** `lambdas/api/openapi.json` (OpenAPI 3.1). Its top-level `webhooks` section documents the outbound SHOC work-order feed, so one page describes both directions (call + be-called). `tests/test_api_spec_drift.py` pins the spec's paths to the router table, so spec and implementation cannot drift.
- **Auth:** data routes use API Gateway `AWS_IAM` (SigV4) plus a resource policy allowing exactly `arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev` on `GET/*` ; same-account admin callers authorize via identity policy (Postman signs SigV4 natively). Docs routes are auth `NONE` at the gateway (resource-policy carve-out for exactly those two GETs) but the handler fails closed on the shared token (`lambdas/shared/web_ui_auth.py` , secret `procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token` ) — not an unauthenticated data path (INFRA-74 posture).
2026-07-24 18:41:10 -04:00
- **Custom domain:** `https://procurement-api.seahaven.com` (REGIONAL API Gateway domain, TLS 1.2, empty base-path mapping to the `prod` stage, so callers hit `/work-orders` with no `/prod` segment). The stable SHOC-facing endpoint; the raw `*.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/prod` URL still works. **Cross-account DNS:** the `seahaven.com` public zone is in the mgmt account (`328440206208` ), so the ACM cert's validation record and the A-alias are added there out of band — `scripts/setup_procurement_api_domain.sh cert` issues the cert (DNS-validated against the mgmt zone) and writes its ARN to prod SSM `/procurement-api/custom-domain/certificate-arn` , which the stack reads (`value_for_string_parameter` , CFN-resolved at deploy); after `cdk deploy procurement-api` , `scripts/setup_procurement_api_domain.sh alias` adds the A-alias from the stack's `ProcurementApiAliasTarget` /`ProcurementApiAliasHostedZoneId` outputs. SigV4 is unaffected (same underlying API id + resource policy); the docs page injects whichever host served the request into `servers[0].url` .
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
- **KMS:** `purchase-orders` is CMK-encrypted; the imported-by-name table doesn't carry the key association, so the stack grants `kms:Decrypt` /`DescribeKey` on the CMK from SSM `/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn` explicitly (the INFRA-104 failure class).
- **No access logging in v1** (keeps the `?token=` shim out of any log and avoids the account-level API Gateway CloudWatch role); rotate the docs token before ever enabling it. No CORS (server-to-server + Postman callers).
- **Alarms:** `procurement-api-errors` /`-throttles` /`-duration` (p99 ≥ 22.5 s) + gateway `procurement-api-5xx` , all ALARM-only → `site-alerts` . No 4XX alarm (401/403/404 are expected traffic).
feat(api): Redocly lint gate + SHOC-themed /docs (Redoc theming, topbar, collapsible samples) (#130)
* feat(api): Add @redocly/cli as a dev dependency
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
* feat(api): Add Redocly configuration file with custom rules
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
* chore(api): Redocly lint config + bring openapi.json into compliance
redocly.yaml from the Redocly guidelines builder, with three generated
rules corrected: response-contains-property had the status codes as the
required body fields (intent was the Error schema's top-level 'error';
403 exempt since API Gateway emits AWS's {message} shape, 501 not 503);
operation-4xx-problem-details-rfc7807 off (adopting RFC 7807 would be a
runtime + SHOC-contract change, decided against); the two inert casing
rules (parameter names, schema properties) removed because both name
sets are contract-pinned (gateway resource paths, DynamoDB items).
Spec changes, no runtime impact: operationIds renamed to method-prefixed
kebab-case (get-work-orders, post-work-order-comment, ...); tags added to
all 15 operations + root tags object (groups the Redoc sidebar); examples
on all six parameters; license field; server description punctuation; two
descriptions reworded to start capitalized. Real linter catches fixed:
the two x-planned ops were missing their {workOrderId} path parameter
and any 4xx response (403 added - true today, gateway rejects unsigned).
.redocly.lint-ignore.yaml pins the six deliberate exceptions: webhook
keys are the shipped SHOC contract event names (not renameable), and the
x-planned ops answer only 501 (no 2xx to document).
package.json: npm run lint:api. Verified: lint 0 errors, 675 pytest,
headless-Chrome render of the tagged docs page.
* feat(api): SHOC design-system theme for /docs (vendored fonts)
Themes the Redoc page with the canonical SHOC token set: Montserrat 600
headings / DM Sans body / JetBrains Mono code, primary #1c75bc, navy
#262262 sidebar text + right panel, #f9fafb background, 244px sidebar.
sortRequiredPropsFirst on; 200 responses pre-expanded.
Fonts ship as lambdas/api/fonts.css (latin woff2 subsets from
@fontsource 5.3.0, embedded as data URIs, ~90KB) and inline via a new
__FONTS_CSS__ placeholder with the same </style breakout guard --
the offline single-response invariant holds, nothing fetches Google
Fonts (test-pinned). Bundling cp + bundle-consistency pin + spec-drift
asset checks extended.
Verified: headless-Chrome render (theme + fonts applied), ruff, 675
pytest, cdk synth + staged-asset check.
* feat(api): SHOC gradient topbar on /docs
64px fixed header with the SHOC shell gradient token (#1b1f52 ->
#1c4f8f -> #1c75bc), Sea Haven wordmark in Montserrat 600, page name
right-aligned in DM Sans. Redoc's scrollYOffset: 64 keeps the sticky
sidebar and anchor scrolling clear of the fixed bar. Verified via
headless-Chrome render.
* style(api): normalize /docs header and right-panel blues
The right panel's #262262 is a purple-leaning navy that clashed with
the cyan-leaning gradient, and the bar's brightest point sat directly
over the dark panel. Right panel now uses #1b1f52 (the gradient's own
dark endpoint) and the gradient runs bright-to-dark so its dark end
lands flush on the panel -- no seam, one blue family. Verified via
headless-Chrome render.
* style(api): right-panel gradient on /docs via bundle-pinned override
Redoc's theme only takes solid colors (it derives shades from
rightPanel.backgroundColor), so the gradient (#1b3d79 -> #1b3068 ->
#1b1f52, continuing the topbar blend) rides as a CSS override on the
styled-components classes of the per-section right-panel divs
(.sc-iGgWBj.sc-gsFSXq + the .sc-dExYaf stub). Those names are
deterministic for the vendored 2.5.3 bundle (verified across loads) but
change on any Redoc bump: re-derive via headless probe (find elements
whose computed background equals the rightPanel color). If they stop
matching, the panel falls back to the solid #1b1f52 theme color --
cosmetic only. Verified via headless-Chrome render.
* feat(api): collapsible samples column on /docs
Redoc CE has no built-in panel toggle, so the topbar gains a Hide/Show
samples button that flips .samples-collapsed on <html>: the right-panel
divs hide (same bundle-pinned styled-components classes as the gradient
override) and each section's content half takes the full width. Choice
persists in localStorage; aria-pressed tracks state. If the pinned
classes stop matching after a Redoc bump the toggle goes inert --
cosmetic only. Both states verified via headless-Chrome render.
* ci(api): spec-lint CI gate + npm Dependabot coverage
New spec-lint job mirrors the local npm run lint:api so openapi.json
cannot drift from redocly.yaml with green CI. Dependabot gains the npm
ecosystem (package.json is new; nothing watched @redocly/cli).
* feat(api): docs finishing touches - x-tagGroups, favicon, docs:preview
x-tagGroups sections the Redoc sidebar (Read API / Meta / SHOC Feed);
inline data-URI SVG favicon (SHOC blue) stops the browser's follow-up
/favicon.ico request 403ing at the gateway; npm run docs:preview wraps
the real-handler local render (scripts/preview_docs.py); README gains a
docs-page architecture section covering the inline pattern, theme,
pinned-selector caveat, and tooling. Lint 0 errors, 675 pytest,
headless render verified.
---------
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
2026-07-24 14:04:30 -04:00
- **Docs page:** `/docs` serves Redoc (read-only reference docs; live calls go through Postman since data routes need SigV4) as ONE token-gated response: the handler inlines the vendored `redoc.standalone.js` , the design-system fonts (`fonts.css` , data-URI `@font-face` — nothing may fetch from Google Fonts, test-pinned), and the spec into `docs.html` , with `</script>` /`</style>` breakout guards on every blob. Theme = SHOC tokens (Montserrat/DM Sans/JetBrains Mono, primary `#1c75bc` , 64px gradient topbar). The right-panel gradient and the topbar's Hide/Show-samples toggle target styled-components class names that are deterministic for the pinned Redoc bundle but change on any bump — re-derive them then (headless probe: elements whose computed background equals the `rightPanel` color); stale selectors degrade to a solid panel / inert toggle, cosmetic only. Tooling: `npm run lint:api` lints the spec against `redocly.yaml` (CI job `spec-lint` ; deliberate exceptions live in `.redocly.lint-ignore.yaml` ), `npm run docs:preview` renders the real handler output locally.
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
## Architecture
2026-04-30 14:30:54 -04:00
2026-08-04 20:24:38 -04:00
**IaC:** AWS CDK (Python), three stacks in one app, region `us-east-1` . The `cdk.Environment` is deliberately **account-agnostic** (region-only, no `account=` ): the stacks deploy to whichever account the deploy credentials target. **Live target is only seahaven-prod `011934824531`** (migrated 2026-07; mgmt stacks deleted in PLAT-67 on 2026-08-05). Never deploy from `main` to mgmt `328440206208` — templates would recreate against cold-archive RETAIN leftovers. Every account-derived template value — bucket names, `Lambda::Permission` source account, the site-alerts SNS action ARN, the Bedrock ARN below — renders as the CloudFormation `AWS::AccountId` pseudo-parameter rather than a literal. Pinning `account=` was evaluated in Phase 4 and rejected: it would resolve those tokens to literals, and against the deployed (account-agnostic) templates CloudFormation flags the `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN` email buckets as requiring replacement — a data-loss risk — for no functional gain.
2026-04-30 14:30:54 -04:00
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
All Lambdas: Python 3.12, ARM64, 60-day log retention.
2026-04-30 14:30:54 -04:00
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
**LLM provider — Amazon Bedrock.** Both email processors call Claude Haiku 4.5 through the Bedrock inference profile `us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0` (`bedrock-runtime` `InvokeModel` ), configured via the `BEDROCK_MODEL_ID` env var. There is **no Anthropic API key and no Secrets Manager secret** any more. Each processor role is granted `bedrock:InvokeModel` + `bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream` on **both** the inference-profile ARN **and** the per-region foundation-model ARNs for `us-east-1` / `us-east-2` / `us-west-2` (empty-account foundation-model ARNs) — the `us.*` profile can route cross-region, so a profile-only grant would `AccessDenied` at runtime under load.
2026-04-20 19:31:22 -04:00
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
> **Retired secrets (manual cleanup outstanding):** the former secrets `po-ingest/anthropic-api-key` and `workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key` had `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN`, so removing them from the CDK stacks **orphans** them rather than deleting them. Delete both by hand post-deploy and revoke the stored keys at the provider. The processors no longer read any `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN` — authentication to Bedrock is via the Lambda execution-role IAM grant, so there is no provider API key or Secrets Manager fetch on the parse path.
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
**SES:** Both stacks add rules to the shared `INBOUND_MAIL` receipt rule set on `int.seahaven.com` .
2026-05-01 19:17:19 -04:00
feat: collapse duplicated CDK into cdk/common.py plain helpers (refactor phase 4) (#112)
The ~379 lines po_stack.py and wo_stack.py defined identically (DynamoDB
alarms, the sender-auth-rejected metric filter + alarm, the standard
per-Lambda alarm set, the Bedrock InvokeModel grant, the raw-email
bucket, the async DLQ, the template-fallback-rate math alarm) move into
cdk/common.py.
Every helper is a PLAIN function taking (scope, id, ...), called with each
stack's own Stack as scope and the exact literal construct ids used inline
before, so every synthesized logical ID is byte-stable. A Construct
subclass would reparent the tree and make CloudFormation attempt to
replace the RETAIN-protected purchase-orders/WorkOrders tables and named
buckets -- data loss -- so it is forbidden. Per-function alarm variance
(PO p99 vs WO p95 duration, po-web-ui throttles+duration only,
site-extractor no DLQ alarm, workorder-web-ui zero alarms) is preserved
through call-site arguments, not baked into the helpers.
make_bedrock_invoke_statement derives the inference-profile and us-east-1
foundation-model ARNs from Stack.of(scope).account/.region instead of the
hardcoded 328440206208/us-east-1 literals. The environment stays
account-agnostic (region-only), so the account resolves to the
AWS::AccountId pseudo-parameter: the derived ARN resolves at deploy to the
same ARN the literal named in-account (a benign in-place IAM policy
update, never a replacement) and is account-portable rather than pinned to
the frozen management account.
The account= pin evaluated for cdk.Environment was deliberately NOT added:
resolving every account-derived value (bucket names, Lambda::Permission
source account, SNS action ARN) to literals makes CloudFormation flag the
RETAIN email buckets as requiring replacement against the deployed
account-agnostic templates -- a data-loss risk that outranks the pin, which
buys nothing (the resolved values are unchanged).
Also: net-new CfnOutputs for the five Lambda function ARNs and the
owned/consumed table names, exact-pin constructs==10.6.0, and fix the
stale aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0 -> 2.261.0 version comment.
The common.py extraction is zero-cdk-diff on both stacks (byte-stable
logical IDs, no asset/property change); the only deltas versus deployed
are the intended benign Bedrock IAM in-place update and the additive
CfnOutputs. Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review ran on the Bedrock IAM
move; its BLOCK was a verified false positive (it read AWS::AccountId as a
wildcard -- it is a deploy-time-resolved concrete value naming one account
and one inference-profile, region is pinned us-east-1, and the grant is
strictly more least-privilege-correct than the hardcoded literal).
2026-07-20 14:14:57 -04:00
### Shared CDK helpers (`cdk/common.py`, Phase 4)
The ~379 lines that `po_stack.py` and `wo_stack.py` both defined identically (DynamoDB alarms, the sender-auth-rejected metric filter + alarm, the standard per-Lambda alarm set, the Bedrock `InvokeModel` grant, the raw-email bucket, the async-invoke DLQ, and the template-fallback-rate math alarm) are collapsed into `cdk/common.py` .
**Logical-ID-safety rule (load-bearing).** Every helper is a **plain function** taking `(scope, id, ...)` — never a `Construct` subclass. Each stack calls a helper with its **own Stack instance as `scope`** and the **exact same literal construct id** it used inline before the extraction, so every synthesized logical ID is byte-stable. A `Construct` subclass would insert an extra tree node, reparent every child's logical ID, and CloudFormation would attempt to **replace** the `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN` -protected `purchase-orders` / `WorkOrders` / `WorkOrderComments` tables and the named S3 buckets — a data-loss event. Nothing in `common.py` subclasses `Construct` , and it imports only the CDK constructs its helpers touch (`dynamodb` , `cloudwatch` /`cw_actions` , `iam` , `logs` , `s3` , `sqs` — no `kms` , `ssm` , or Lambda event-source imports).
Extracted helpers: `add_ddb_alarms` , `add_sender_auth_rejected_alarm` , `add_standard_lambda_alarms` (bespoke `descriptions=` dict passed through verbatim per call site — no alarm text is generated or homogenized), `make_bedrock_invoke_statement` , `make_email_bucket` , `make_processor_dlq` , `make_fallback_rate_alarm` . Per-function alarm variance is preserved exactly through call-site arguments, not baked into the helpers: PO's email-processor duration alarm uses `p99` , WO's uses `p95` ; `po-web-ui` gets throttles + duration only (no errors, no DLQ); `po-ingest-site-extractor` has no DLQ alarm (it's a DynamoDB-stream consumer, not async-invoked); `workorder-web-ui` gets **zero** alarms — the helper is simply never called for it, so it cannot silently add any. The two "AI-fallback-rejected" alarms (PO's 6-hour count-floor `IF(FILL(rej,0)>=1,...)` , WO's 5-minute/2-of-6 sparse idiom) are a different shape from `make_fallback_rate_alarm` and stay as distinct inline call sites in each stack rather than being forced through the shared helper.
**Bedrock ARN, now account/region-derived.** `make_bedrock_invoke_statement(scope)` builds the inference-profile ARN and the `us-east-1` foundation-model ARN from `Stack.of(scope).account` / `.region` instead of the previous hardcoded `328440206208` /`us-east-1` literals (the `us-east-2` /`us-west-2` foundation-model ARNs stay literal — they're fixed cross-region reach targets, not the stack's own region). Because the environment is account-agnostic (above), `stack.account` is the `AWS::AccountId` pseudo-parameter, so the derived ARN synthesizes as an `Fn::Sub` /`Ref` that **resolves at deploy time to the same ARN** the hardcoded literal named in-account. Versus the deployed stack this is a benign **in-place** IAM policy update (IAM policies never require replacement) — and it makes the grant account-portable instead of pinned to the management account. This IAM PolicyStatement change is the surface the mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review covers.
**New `CfnOutput` s.** Each stack now exports its Lambda function ARNs and the DynamoDB table names it owns/consumes, all net-new/additive (no existing output changes): `po-ingest` — `EmailProcessorFunctionArn` , `WebUiFunctionArn` , `SiteExtractorFunctionArn` , `PurchaseOrdersTableName` , `PendingSiteReviewTableName` (the existing `VerifiedSitesTableName` output is unchanged); `workorder-ingest` — `EmailProcessorFunctionArn` , `WebUiFunctionArn` , `WorkOrdersTableName` , `WorkOrderCommentsTableName` .
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
### Sender authentication (INFRA-107)
feat: extract lambdas/shared/ — single-source ses_auth, web_ui auth, email parsing, EMF emitter (refactor phase 3) (#111)
Four modules move into the handbook-mandated lambdas/shared/ location,
collapsing duplicated logic that had to be kept in sync by hand across
the PO and WO pipelines:
- ses_auth.py: the PO and WO copies were verified sha256-identical
against the feature/phase-7-ops-recovery baseline before the move
(no drift since the last audit). shared/ses_auth.py is the exact
bytes of that one copy; both originals are git rm'd (the PO copy
via rename, the WO copy as a straight delete). Bundling lands the
module flat in /asset-output for both email processors, so the
handlers keep `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email`
unchanged — zero handler diff for this move, which is what keeps
fail-closed auth byte-identical through the change.
- web_ui_auth.py: extracts the byte-identical _get_auth_token /
_header / is_authenticated block plus the four token-cache globals
out of both web_ui handlers. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay
in each handler as-is (deliberately drifted wording, stack-specific)
rather than being unified into the shared module. Fail-closed
semantics (unset ARN or Secrets Manager exception -> deny) are
unchanged.
- email_parsing.py: parse_raw_email ships as the superset version that
returns cc unconditionally. WO's output is bit-identical to before;
PO simply ignores the cc field rather than being "cleaned up" to
consume it. No second variant is kept.
- emf.py: a generic emitter parameterized by namespace, dimension
sets, and properties. Every call site's emitted EMF envelope is
unchanged, including the load-bearing
[["ParseMethod"],["ParseMethod","TemplateId"]] dimension-set shape
the alarms and metric filters depend on. Emission ordering is
untouched: PO still emits ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, WO
still emits its mutually-exclusive ai_fallback/ai_fallback_rejected
after its gate. The deliberate-double-count comments survive.
_emit_derived_agreement_metric was found living inside
derived_fields.py, so per the DERIVED-FIELDS exception it is left
as a third, unconverted copy (derived_fields.py and the shadow
DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stay untouchable while that bake
runs) — a comment there points at shared/emf.py for the eventual
follow-up.
Bundling: both email-processor cdk bundling commands gain a trailing
`cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` (they were already cp-only post-Phase
7, so no pip step or manylinux pin is reintroduced). Both web_ui
functions gain the same widened-root staging so web_ui_auth.py ships
beside their handler; site_extractor's from_asset is untouched.
Tests: PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES gains the shared modules that now
ship, the AST sibling-import check resolves imports whose source now
lives under shared/, and the new shared cp line has its own
revert/mutation detection. _SIBLING_MODULES resolution and
_po_parser_support.py now load ses_auth/email_parsing/emf from
shared/; the two-copy ses_auth byte-identity fixture-hygiene test is
retired as obsolete now that there is one copy, and the ses_auth
fixture parameterization over two identical copies is dropped. The
sys.modules save/restore dance for template_parser (still duplicated
per-pipeline) is left in place.
2026-07-20 13:38:23 -04:00
The `From` header and any `Authentication-Results` header inside the raw MIME are attacker-forgeable, so neither is trusted. Instead, both email processors authenticate the sender against the verdicts SES itself stamps at delivery time, failing closed. The authenticator is **single-sourced** at `lambdas/shared/ses_auth.py` (Phase 3) — previously duplicated byte-for-byte in each pipeline's `email_processor/` dir and kept in sync by a fixture-hygiene test; now one copy, so a future hardening fix to the fail-closed logic lands **once** instead of needing two identical edits. The CDK bundling `cp` s it flat beside each handler so the handlers' unchanged `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email` still resolves at runtime (see [`lambdas/shared/` ](#deploy-pipeline-guards-phase-0 )). The gate:
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
1. Take **only the topmost** `Authentication-Results` header (SES prepends its trace headers; any lower copies arrived inside the message and are ignored).
2. Require its authserv-id to be `amazonses.com` .
3. Require a `dkim=pass` clause whose `header.d=` /`header.i=` domain is in the pipeline's allowlist.
The allowlist is the `ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS` Lambda environment variable (comma-separated, set per stack in CDK — no code change needed to adjust):
| Pipeline | `ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS` | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Work orders | `seahaven.com` | APM mail reaches `apm@int.seahaven.com` via a forward off `amazon@seahavenind.com` ; the allowlist trusts the domain that **re-signs** DKIM on that forward (the original `hxgnsmartcloud.com` signature does not survive it). **Validated against live SES-stamped headers (2026-07-16)** — real APM deliveries carry `dkim=pass header.i=@seahaven.com` . Note a plain Gmail auto-forward re-signs under the *sending Workspace* domain (`seahavenind.com` / a `*.gappssmtp.com` key), **not** `seahaven.com` ; only a Google Group (or Workspace routing) with "sign as `seahaven.com` " produces `dkim=pass header.i=@seahaven.com` . If the observed re-signing domain differs, update this value (do **not** widen it to a shared key like `*.gappssmtp.com` , which any Google customer's mail would pass). The `workorder-email-processor-sender-auth-rejected` alarm pages if this assumption is wrong instead of silently dropping every work order. |
| Purchase orders | `amazon.coupahost.com` | Coupa signs as `amazon.coupahost.com` . `amazonses.com` also passes but is deliberately not allowlisted — every SES customer's mail passes for it |
> **Clause-injection hardening:** SES echoes attacker-controlled SMTP-session tokens (`envelope-from`, `helo`, `header.from`) into its own `Authentication-Results` value, and an RFC 5321 quoted-local-part MAIL FROM may legally contain `;` and spaces. The parser therefore tokenises comment- and quoted-string-aware (RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): CFWS comments `(...)` are stripped and clauses are split only on semicolons **outside** a quoted string, so a `;` inside a quoted `envelope-from=` value can never be torn into a forged `dkim=pass` clause. The DKIM signer domain is read from `header.d=` when present (falling back to `header.i=`, taking the domain after the AUID's last top-level `@` so a quoted local-part cannot smuggle an allowlisted domain). Two latent comment-parsing edge cases (early comment-close, no-separator-on-strip) are tracked as hardening follow-ups — see the SES-AR-01/02 issue; neither is reachable through SES's real header encoding today.
> **Risk acceptance — forwarder-domain binding (INFRA-107, accepted 2026-07-16):** for work orders this control authenticates the domain that *re-signs* the `apm@` forward (`seahaven.com`), not the Hexagon originator (`hxgnsmartcloud.com`, whose signature does not survive the forward). Its strength therefore rests on the `apm@` Google Group's posting policy being restricted to trusted internal senders — that restriction is the **load-bearing control** and is accepted as documented risk. **If the `apm@` group is ever opened to external posting, this finding escalates to HIGH** (anyone able to post to the group could inject a forged work order) and the correct fix is to bind acceptance to the originator via DMARC alignment rather than the forwarder's re-signature. The PO pipeline is unaffected — `amazon.coupahost.com` is an external domain an attacker cannot get SES to sign.
On any failure (env var unset, header missing/unparseable, verdict fail, unaligned domain) the processor logs a structured `sender_auth_rejected` warning with the reason and S3 key, skips the email, and returns normally — rejected mail never triggers Lambda retries or DLQ messages, but the `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` CloudWatch alarm (see [CloudWatch alarms ](#cloudwatch-alarms )) pages on a rejection spike so a drift-induced outage is not silent. Unit tests live in `tests/test_ses_auth.py` .
Add CloudWatch alarm coverage for po-ingest and workorder-ingest (#70)
* Add CloudWatch alarm coverage for po-ingest and workorder-ingest
Expands alarm coverage across both CDK stacks. All alarms are ALARM-only
(no OK action) to the shared site-alerts SNS topic, with TreatMissingData
NOT_BREACHING. The site-alerts topic is now imported once near the top of
each stack so every alarm reuses one Topic instance.
po-ingest (cdk/po_stack.py):
- Errors: po-ingest-site-extractor
- Throttles: po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- Duration (p99, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): po-email-processor (orphan adoption),
po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: purchase-orders, verified-sites,
pending-site-review
workorder-ingest (cdk/wo_stack.py):
- Throttles: workorder-email-processor
- Duration (p95, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): workorder-email-processor (orphan adoption)
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: WorkOrders, WorkOrderComments
DynamoDB ThrottledRequests/SystemErrors emit only at the TableName+Operation
dimension set, so each table alarm is a Sum math expression across operations
via the non-deprecated metric_*_for_operations helpers (metric_throttled_requests
is deprecated/invalid in aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0).
Refs INFRA-41 / audit H-8.
* Drop NEEDS ADAM SIGN-OFF wording from alarm comments
Duration alarm thresholds are owner-approved; remove the sign-off flag
from po_stack.py and wo_stack.py comments. Threshold values, eval config,
and orphan-delete notes are unchanged.
2026-06-17 14:46:03 -04:00
**Failure handling (INFRA-41):** Each email-processor is async-invoked (S3 → Lambda). Both have a CDK-managed SQS dead-letter queue (`dead_letter_queue=` , 14-day retention, SSL-enforced) so a failed parse is captured rather than silently dropped after Lambda's retries.
### CloudWatch alarms
Every alarm is **ALARM-only** (no OK action), sends to the shared `site-alerts` SNS topic (imported once per stack via `Topic.from_topic_arn` ), and uses `TreatMissingData.NOT_BREACHING` .
**Lambda alarms** (`AWS/Lambda` , `FunctionName` dimension):
| Alarm | Functions | Metric / config |
|---|---|---|
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
| `<fn>-errors` | `po-email-processor` , `po-ingest-site-extractor` , `workorder-email-processor` , `workorder-shoc-emitter` , `workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator` | `Errors` Sum, 5 min, `> 0` , eval 1 |
| `<fn>-throttles` | `po-email-processor` , `po-ingest-site-extractor` , `po-web-ui` , `workorder-email-processor` , `workorder-shoc-emitter` , `workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator` | `Throttles` Sum, 5 min, `> 0` , eval 1 |
| `<fn>-duration` | `po-email-processor` , `po-ingest-site-extractor` , `po-web-ui` , `workorder-shoc-emitter` , `workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator` (p99); `workorder-email-processor` (p95) | `Duration` percentile, 5 min, `>= 45000` ms (75% of the 60s timeout), eval 3 / datapoints 2 |
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
| `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` | `po-email-processor` , `workorder-email-processor` | Log-metric-filter count (namespace `Seahaven/ProcurementIngest` , `default_value=0` ) on `sender_auth_rejected` warnings, `Sum` 5 min, `>= 1` , eval 3 / datapoints 2 |
The `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` alarm closes the silent-drop gap in INFRA-107: a rejected email returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so without a log-metric filter a signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would discard 100% of legitimate mail while every other alarm stayed green. It counts `sender_auth_rejected` warnings per 5-minute period (`default_value=0` keeps the series continuous) and pages when 2 of the last 3 periods each see at least one rejection — a lone stray spoof probe to the internal ingest address self-clears, but a sustained false-reject storm pages within ~10– *very* sparse total-reject outage — see the SES-AR-01/02 hardening issue.)
Add CloudWatch alarm coverage for po-ingest and workorder-ingest (#70)
* Add CloudWatch alarm coverage for po-ingest and workorder-ingest
Expands alarm coverage across both CDK stacks. All alarms are ALARM-only
(no OK action) to the shared site-alerts SNS topic, with TreatMissingData
NOT_BREACHING. The site-alerts topic is now imported once near the top of
each stack so every alarm reuses one Topic instance.
po-ingest (cdk/po_stack.py):
- Errors: po-ingest-site-extractor
- Throttles: po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- Duration (p99, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): po-email-processor (orphan adoption),
po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: purchase-orders, verified-sites,
pending-site-review
workorder-ingest (cdk/wo_stack.py):
- Throttles: workorder-email-processor
- Duration (p95, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): workorder-email-processor (orphan adoption)
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: WorkOrders, WorkOrderComments
DynamoDB ThrottledRequests/SystemErrors emit only at the TableName+Operation
dimension set, so each table alarm is a Sum math expression across operations
via the non-deprecated metric_*_for_operations helpers (metric_throttled_requests
is deprecated/invalid in aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0).
Refs INFRA-41 / audit H-8.
* Drop NEEDS ADAM SIGN-OFF wording from alarm comments
Duration alarm thresholds are owner-approved; remove the sign-off flag
from po_stack.py and wo_stack.py comments. Threshold values, eval config,
and orphan-delete notes are unchanged.
2026-06-17 14:46:03 -04:00
The `<fn>-duration` and `<fn>-throttles` alarms for `po-email-processor` and `workorder-email-processor` supersede the orphaned, CLI-created `Lambda-Duration-*` / `Lambda-Throttles-*` alarms (deleted post-deploy).
Ops/recovery tooling + dependency hygiene (refactor phase 7) (#110)
* feat: ops/recovery tooling + dependency hygiene (refactor phase 7)
Generalize scripts/reprocess.py from a PO-only full-sweep script into a
pipeline-general recovery tool. Targeted replay (--key/--prefix/--since)
is now the default, and the full inbound/ sweep is demoted behind an
explicit --all that documents its five hazards (async concurrency does
not serialize, use RequestResponse if order matters, metric double-count,
Bedrock re-bill, out-of-order field regression). --pipeline po|wo resolves
the correct function + bucket; dry-run-by-default / --execute is preserved.
A new tests/test_reprocess_contract.py pins the synthetic S3 event shape
and asserts the raw list_objects_v2 key is emitted untransformed (the
handler is the single decode point; a pre-decoded key would corrupt keys
containing spaces or '+').
Add docs/runbook-dlq-recovery.md: the async on-failure DLQ has no console
redrive-to-source, so it documents the receive -> extract key -> targeted
reprocess --key -> verify -> purge procedure, the real recovery windows
(14-day DLQ breadcrumb, 90-day raw-email S3 that overrides the table
RETAIN policy and is the true replay floor), and that sender-auth and
ai_fallback_rejected drops are fail-closed skips that never reach the DLQ.
Linked from the README alarms and scripts sections.
Drop the vendored boto3 floor pin from both email-processor requirements
(the Lambda runtime provides boto3; lambda-template.md empty-with-comment
form). With nothing left to install, the email-processor bundling becomes
cp-only -- the whole pip step is removed, which is the only acceptable way
the manylinux2014_aarch64 pin disappears (removing the pin while keeping a
pip install caused the PR #34 x86-wheel outage). Exact-pin moto==5.2.2 and
add pinned po/web_ui + po/site_extractor manifests (excluded from their
bundles, so hash-neutral) so their new Dependabot entries have something
to act on; add Dependabot entries for /tests, /lambdas/po/web_ui, and
/lambdas/po/site_extractor.
cdk diff is confined to exactly the two email processors' asset hashes on
both stacks. The wo/web_ui dead-manifest reduction was deliberately left
out: that manifest already ships inside the plain (non-bundled) WebUI
asset on main, so reducing or excluding it would redeploy workorder-web-ui
for no functional change -- deferred to keep the blast radius to the two
intended targets.
The untracked 44 MB lambdas/po/email_processor/package/ dir was removed
from the filesystem (asset-hash-neutral given Phase 2's package/ exclude);
it is untracked, so there is nothing to commit for it.
* Reject --all combined with --prefix/--since in reprocess.py
--all is a distinct mode (the demoted full-prefix sweep), but the args.all
branch unconditionally set prefix=inbound/ and since=None, so passing it
alongside a narrower selector silently discarded that selector. `--all
--since 2026-07-01` swept the entire corpus instead of the bounded window,
triggering every documented --all hazard (Bedrock re-bill, metric double-
count, merged-field regression) on objects the operator never targeted --
contradicting the tool's safety goal. Add the missing mutual-exclusion
guard alongside the existing --key one, and pin --all+--prefix,
--all+--since, and all three together as argparse rejections.
2026-07-20 12:53:34 -04:00
**DLQ alarms** (`AWS/SQS` ): `po-email-processor-dlq-messages` and `workorder-email-processor-dlq-messages` fire when any message is visible on an email-processor DLQ (`ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible` Maximum, 5 min, `> 0` , eval 1) — a message there means an email was dropped after Lambda exhausted its async retries. Recovery from a DLQ message (no console redrive) is documented in the [DLQ recovery runbook ](docs/runbook-dlq-recovery.md ).
2026-07-15 19:00:43 -04:00
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
**SHOC emitter alarms** (bespoke — these don't fit the standard-Lambda-alarm helper's shape): `workorder-shoc-emitter-iterator-age` (`IteratorAge` Maximum, 5 min, `>= 600000` ms, eval 3 / datapoints 2) fires when the stream lags ≥ 10 minutes — SHOC is likely down and the shard is blocking on retries, which is exactly the ordered-backpressure design working, but an operator should know. `workorder-shoc-emitter-failures-messages` and `workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected-messages` (`ApproximateNumberOfMessagesVisible` Maximum, 5 min, `> 0` , eval 1) page the replay runbook: the `-failures` queue receives ESM failure **metadata** for retry-exhausted records, the `-rejected` queue receives the **full parked payloads** of non-retryable 4xx deliveries (see the [SHOC webhook feed ](#shoc-webhook-feed-workorder-shoc-emitter ) section and `scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py` ). All three: ALARM-only → `site-alerts` , `NOT_BREACHING` , per the house rules above.
fix: add fail-closed validation gate and XML-delimited prompt on ai_fallback path (#104)
* fix: add fail-closed validation gate and XML-delimited prompt on ai_fallback path
The ai_fallback parse path applied no validation gate to raw Bedrock/LLM
output before DynamoDB writes, and the extraction prompt concatenated the
untrusted email body directly with no instructions-vs-data delimiter. A
DKIM-passing attacker could prompt-inject arbitrary field values into the
work-order store.
Changes:
- wrap untrusted email in \<email\> XML block with prompt instructing the
model to treat its contents as data only
- add validate_ai_fallback() in template_parser that enforces the same
contract keys, enums, and patterns as the template path before any write
- call validate_ai_fallback() in handler() dispatch; emit an
ai_fallback_rejected EMF metric on failure and skip the record
- add 17 unit tests covering every gate rule and two end-to-end dispatch
tests (injected email_type, injected status)
Refs #101
* style: apply ruff formatting to fix CI check
* harden ai_fallback gate: review fixes + security-review findings
Review follow-up on the ai_fallback validation gate (PR #104), plus
findings from a fan-out /sh-security-review of the change surface.
Reviewer FIX items:
- Neutralize forged <email> delimiters in the untrusted body before
wrapping, so an in-body </email> cannot escape the data block.
- Fail closed on non-dict model output instead of crashing the handler
into async retries; count ai_fallback_rejected parses in the
fallback-rate alarm and add a dedicated rejected-parse alarm so a
gate-rejection drift outage is not silent.
- Return a distinct invalid_status reason (was malformed_site_code);
validate ISO-8601 dates; README + docstring updates.
Security-review findings (detector fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier):
- ReDoS (confirmed, medium): the tag neutralizer used two \s* around an
optional /, backtracking quadratically on "<" + a long whitespace run
(~32s at 100k chars -- one email could time out the Lambda). Collapse
to a single [\s/]* class: linear, same defanging.
- Unhashable-type crash (confirmed): a JSON list/dict for email_type or
status made `x in <set>` raise TypeError, escaping the gate into
retries. Guard with isinstance(str) before membership.
- Unicode/newline regex (confirmed): _WO_ID_RE/_SITE_CODE_RE used ^..$
with \d, admitting fullwidth digits ("１２３４５" as a lookalike
partition key) and trailing newlines. Switch to \A[0-9]+\Z (and the
handler's inline recheck to [0-9]) so neither passes.
- Alarm comment (confirmed, low): corrected the "slow trickle still
pages" wording -- rejections >~25-30 min apart page on neither alarm,
the same knowingly-accepted residual as sender-auth-rejected.
Refuted: residual free-text prompt injection is inherent to trusting
allowlisted senders, not a new primitive; no DynamoDB key-poisoning
bypass survives both gates ('#' can never enter work_order_id).
7 new regression tests. All 260 tests pass; ruff clean; cdk synth OK.
---------
Co-authored-by: amoussa1229 <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
2026-07-16 16:23:28 -04:00
**Parse-outcome metric + fallback-rate alarm (workorder-ingest):** the WO processor writes one CloudWatch **EMF** line per email to namespace `Seahaven/WorkorderIngest` , metric `ParseOutcome` (Unit Count, value 1), dimensioned by `ParseMethod` (`template` | `ai_fallback` | `ai_fallback_rejected` ) and `TemplateId` (`update_plaintext` | `assign_html` | `unknown` ). `ai_fallback_rejected` counts AI-fallback output that failed the fail-closed `validate_ai_fallback()` gate (schema/enum/date contract on raw Bedrock output — prompt-injection defence) and was dropped without a DynamoDB write. Non-dimension EMF properties `ReasonCode` and `work_order_id` are queryable in Logs Insights but not promoted to metrics (kept low-cardinality). EMF is used instead of `PutMetricData` so there is no extra sync call / latency / IAM grant on the async hot path (the role already has `logs:PutLogEvents` ). The alarm `workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate` fires when the AI-fallback share of parses — rejected fallback parses included, so a drift outage whose AI output also fails the gate cannot lower the observed rate while dropping mail — exceeds **15%** sustained (a `MathExpression` with `FILL(...,0)` and a ≥10-sample volume floor over 15-minute periods, eval 3 / datapoints 2) — catching Hexagon template-drift coverage collapse while the volume floor + `FILL` prevent low-volume false pages / `INSUFFICIENT_DATA` . ALARM-only `SnsAction` to `site-alerts` , no OK action, `NOT_BREACHING` . The 15-minute period is a deliberate deviation from the 5-minute house style to accumulate a stable denominator at the low ~760/day volume. A second alarm, `workorder-email-processor-ai-fallback-rejected` , pages on the rejected series itself (≥1 rejection per 5-min period, 2 of the last 6 periods — the sender-auth-rejected sparse-arrival idiom) because a gate rejection drops mail without error/retry/DLQ and would otherwise be silent.
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
**WO Bedrock transport-error metric (Phase 8).** A Bedrock-side transport error (throttling, malformed response, non-JSON model text) during the AI-fallback attempt previously emitted **zero** `ParseOutcome` datapoints — the only emit sites were post-gate. `handler.py` now wraps the `extract_with_bedrock` call in a try/except that emits exactly one `ParseMethod=ai_fallback` / `ReasonCode=bedrock_error` datapoint and then re-raises (the exception still propagates into the errors alarm / DLQ path unchanged). This is an except-and-reraise, not a reorder: a gate-rejected email (Bedrock *returns* successfully, `validate_ai_fallback()` then rejects it) still emits only the single `ai_fallback_rejected` datapoint and nothing else — the except branch never fires because Bedrock did not raise — so the `workorder-email-processor-ai-fallback-rejected` "a rejected email emits nothing else" alarm contract holds with no double-count.
**Parse-outcome metric + fallback-rate alarm (po-ingest):** the PO processor emits the same EMF shape to namespace `Seahaven/PoIngest` , metric `ParseOutcome` , dimensioned by `ParseMethod` (`template` | `ai_fallback` | `ai_fallback_rejected` ) and `TemplateId` (`coupa_new_po` | `coupa_cancellation` | `unknown` ), with `ReasonCode` (the fail-closed gate reason) and `po_number` as Logs-Insights ride-alongs. `ai_fallback_rejected` counts AI-fallback output that failed the fail-closed `validate_ai_fallback()` gate (nested key-set contract, `po_number` shape, `email_type` allow-list, `Decimal` money typing) and was dropped without a DynamoDB write. The `ai_fallback_rejected` emission's `po_number` ride-along is clamped to 64 chars (`handler.py:118` , pinned by the PO-DC-02 regression test) — `telemetry.py` 's `DerivedFieldAgreement` `PythonValue` /`LlmValue` properties clamp the same way.
PO ai-fallback fail-closed gate + prompt hardening (refactor phase 1) (#108)
* feat: PO ai-fallback fail-closed gate + prompt hardening, parity with #104 (refactor phase 1)
Ports WO's #104 AI-fallback security hardening to the PO email
processor, adapted for PO's nested contract instead of copying the
WO gate verbatim.
validate_ai_fallback() (template_parser.py) fail-closes raw Bedrock
output before it reaches enrich_parsed or any dispatch/save:
recursive key-set check with missing-key normalization (nested
contract: supplier{}, ship_to{}, line_items[]); po_number checked
against the same hardened prefix+hyphen+digits regex family that
guards the DynamoDB partition key the handler builds from it
(rejects fullwidth-digit and trailing-artifact injection); email_type
enforced against the {new_po, revision, cancellation} allow-list
before dispatch so a miss can never fall into the else -> save_new_po
branch; money fields accept Decimal/int/None only, matching PO's
parse_float=Decimal decode (a float-typed check would be wrong here).
A gate failure emits ParseMethod=ai_fallback_rejected and `continue`s
to the next record -- it never raises, so attacker-controlled input
can't churn the retry/DLQ path.
extract_with_claude() wraps the untrusted email in an <email> data
block and neutralizes forged <email>-tag lookalikes in the body with
the same linear-time regex approach as WO's _EMAIL_TAG_RE, and sets
temperature=0 on the Bedrock call.
Deliberate double-count: PO emits ParseMethod=ai_fallback before the
Bedrock call (so a Bedrock-side error still records the outcome), so
a rejected email always produces both an ai_fallback datapoint
(pre-call) and an ai_fallback_rejected datapoint (post-gate). This is
intentional, not a bug -- documented in handler.py, template_parser.py,
and the README.
cdk/po_stack.py: in-place property update to the existing
po-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm (same logical ID, no
rename/replacement) -- the fb/(fb+tmpl) expression is left
byte-identical to its pre-Phase-1 form and ai_fallback_rejected is
deliberately excluded from the numerator/denominator/volume floor,
since folding it in as WO does would double-count every rejection
(PO's pre-call emit already counts it once via fb). A net-new
EmailProcessorAiFallbackRejectedAlarm watches the rejected series on
its own, retuned for ~57 emails/day with the 6h/IF-floor/eval-4/
datapoints-2 idiom (not WO's 5-minute sparse idiom, which is
structurally dead at PO volume). Both alarms remain ALARM-only to
site-alerts, NOT_BREACHING, with no element-wise MAX in the math
(post-#102 rule).
* Block "Cancelled" po_status off the AI cancellation route
The AI-fallback gate type-checked po_status but let any string
through, unlike the template path which never emits "Cancelled" on a
new_po. Dispatch routes on email_type, so an AI-path new_po or revision
carrying po_status="Cancelled" would reach save_new_po/save_revision and
cancel a live PO via _merge_update's sticky-cancel write without ever
hitting save_cancellation. Reject the exact sticky marker on any
non-cancellation email_type so the AI path matches the template path's
guard; arbitrary non-marker status strings still pass.
email_type is already validated to the enum before this check, and a
cancellation reaches save_cancellation (which hardcodes the status), so
po_status stays irrelevant on that route.
2026-07-17 14:50:47 -04:00
**Deliberate double-count:** unlike WO, PO emits `ParseMethod=ai_fallback` *before* the Bedrock call (so a Bedrock-side error still records the outcome) — a rejected email therefore always emits **both** an `ai_fallback` datapoint (pre-call) and an `ai_fallback_rejected` datapoint (post-gate), never just the latter. This is intentional and load-bearing, not a bug; the fallback-rate math below treats `fb` as already inclusive of every rejection.
The alarm `po-email-processor-template-fallback-rate` is **deliberately retuned for PO volume — do NOT copy the WO numbers** : at ~57 emails/day a 15-minute period holds ~0.6 emails, so the WO ≥10-sample floor would never be met and the alarm would be structurally dead. Instead: **6-hour periods** (~14.25 expected emails each), an `IF((fb+tmpl)>=8, …)` volume floor (at the floor a single fallback email is 12.5% < the threshold , so one email can never breach a datapoint ; a breach needs ≥ 2 fallbacks in one window , or ≥ 3 at typical volume ), threshold ** > 20%** (expected baseline fallback ≈1%: comments 0.55% + multi-line 0.18% + non-USD 0), **eval 4 / datapoints 2** (a 24h span — isolated noise self-clears while total template drift at 100% fallback pages within ~12h). Sparse overnight/weekend windows below the floor evaluate to 0 (non-breaching by design; accepted trade: a Friday-evening drift may not page until weekend volume accrues). The `ai_fallback_rejected` series (`rej` ) is **deliberately excluded** from this expression's numerator, denominator, and volume floor: because the pre-call emit already counts every rejected email once inside `fb` , folding WO's `fb+rej` math in verbatim would double-count each rejection in both terms and inflate the observed rate toward 100% — `fb/(fb+tmpl)` alone is already exact for PO. Same idiom otherwise: ALARM-only `SnsAction` to `site-alerts` , `NOT_BREACHING` , and no element-wise `MAX` in the math expression (the post-#102 rule — the `IF` floor guarantees the non-zero denominator).
A second alarm, `po-email-processor-ai-fallback-rejected` , monitors the rejected series on its own — **retuned for ~57 emails/day, not WO's 5-minute sparse idiom** (which needs two rejections inside one 30-minute window and would be structurally dead at PO volume). It uses the same 6h/`IF` -floor/eval-4/datapoints-2 idiom as the fallback-rate alarm above, but as a plain count-floor on the rejected series itself (`IF(FILL(rej,0)>=1, …)` , no denominator so no divide guard is needed): threshold ≥1, over **6-hour periods** , **eval 4 / datapoints 2** — a lone stray rejection self-clears, while ≥2 rejections landing in ≥2 distinct 6h windows within 24h (sustained prompt-injection probing, or template drift whose AI output also fails the gate) pages within ~12– `SnsAction` to `site-alerts` , `NOT_BREACHING` . Accepted residual: a single isolated rejected email never pages this alarm by itself — it is still visible as an `ai_fallback_rejected` datapoint and in the `ReasonCode` log line, and it has already raised the fallback-rate numerator above via its pre-call `ai_fallback` emit.
feat: template-first PO parser with fail-closed gate and Bedrock fallback (#105)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* feature: Add PO template parser scaffold and design doc
Mirror WO PR #99's template-first approach for the Coupa PO processor. Two templates identified from a full 3,448-email triage:
- coupa_new_po (95.5%): scaffolded; fails closed to the LLM until extract_new_po lands.
- coupa_cancellation (2.9%): implemented.
Nested contract with recursive validation, Decimal money, and a fail-closed gate. Derived fields (site_code/trade/fiscal_year) are deferred to a shared post-stage. Comments, revisions, multi-line, and non-USD emails fall back to Bedrock. docs/po-template-parser.md records the investigation, decisions, and remaining work.
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
* Implement PO new_po extraction and value-level gate
Replace the extract_new_po scaffold stub with the full
section-windowed extractor (duplicate-label anchoring, sentinel
ship-to, label-keyed U+2022 bullet split, Decimal money from three
anchored contexts only) and add value-level gate rules V1-V13.
Both new_po_not_implemented scaffold guards are removed; rules 6-8
(unrecognized_status, multiline_unsupported, non_usd) go live.
The gate re-derives every byte proof from the email body so an
extractor bug cannot vouch for itself: amount re-serialization
with a digit/comma border check (the thousands-separator
truncation kill switch), sum(lines)==total against both Total
blocks, anchor/supplier identity proofs, USPS address shape on
the raw pre-enrichment zip, bullet label discipline, and
sentinel/artifact hygiene. Any failure falls closed to the LLM;
a validation failure is never a parsed result.
Refs: #99
* Wire template-first parse into PO handler with EMF metric
Run try_deterministic_parse ahead of the Bedrock extractor and
fall back only on a miss/invalid (fail-closed) result. The shared
enrich_parsed post-stage and the save_cancellation/save_revision/
save_new_po routing are untouched, so both paths write identical
DynamoDB shapes and the po-ingest-site-extractor stream contract
is preserved.
Each record emits one ParseMethod EMF line (Seahaven/PoIngest/
ParseOutcome, dimension sets [ParseMethod] and
[ParseMethod,TemplateId], ReasonCode/po_number ride-alongs)
mirroring the WO idiom. The metric fires before the Bedrock call
so a Bedrock-side error still records the ai_fallback outcome.
Refs: #99
* Add PO fallback-rate alarm retuned for ~57 emails/day
The WO alarm's 15-min period and >=10-sample floor assume
~760/day and would be structurally dead at PO volume (a 15-min
period holds ~0.6 emails, so the floor is never met). Retune:
6-hour periods (~14.25 expected emails), IF((fb+tmpl)>=8,...)
volume floor so a single email can never breach a datapoint
(1/8 = 12.5% < 20%), threshold >20% against a ~1% expected
baseline, eval 4 / datapoints 2 (24h span) so noise self-clears
while total template drift pages within ~12h. No element-wise
MAX in the math expression (post-#102 rule); ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, NOT_BREACHING. Gated with
'npx cdk synth po-ingest'.
Also add template_parser.py to the bundling cp list -- without it
every deployed invocation would ImportError (unit tests cannot
catch an asset-bundling omission).
Refs: #99, #102
* Add offline PO parser suite with scrubbed fixture corpus
132 tests: golden-file comparison for all 25 positive fixtures
(17 single-line new-PO + 8 cancellations, Decimal-exact via
parse_float=Decimal), every fail-closed gate reason code covered
(body-level triggers via 17 synthetic adversarial .eml mutations,
candidate-level via direct validate() unit tests), real multi-line
and comment/non-Coupa fallback fixtures, dual line-ending parse
identity, two-path enrich/save parity (site-extractor stream
guard), V10 URL-id corpus sweep, fixture hygiene (ses_auth pass +
scrub-marker leak sweep), and Bedrock dispatch/EMF assertions.
The suite loads handler/template_parser via importlib under
unique module names and binds the handler's bare sibling imports
around exec (tests/conftest.py load_handler gets the same
treatment) -- the WO suite caches bare 'handler'/'template_parser'
names in sys.modules, and bare imports here would silently bind
to the wrong pipeline. moto is imported before the handler so its
botocore stubber hook precedes boto3 session creation (the PO
conftest chain now loads at pytest session start).
Fixtures are scrubbed real S3 samples: transport/auth header
values replaced with same-shape placeholders (structure kept so
ses_auth still passes), per-file digit ciphers, amounts remapped
with sum==total re-established. The .gitignore exception is
scoped to the PO fixtures path only.
Refs: #99
* Document PO template-first parser and retuned alarm
README: PO flow is now template-first with Bedrock fallback;
parser/gate section mirroring the WO writeup; Seahaven/PoIngest
ParseOutcome namespace and the fallback-rate alarm numbers with
their volume justification (deliberately not WO's settings);
test-suite and repo-layout updates.
Design doc: mark PR #1 complete in progress/checklist sections;
document the six value-level gate reason codes and the scaffold
guard removal; correct the stale data-access note (default CLI
session is 328440206208) and note the ~90-day S3 lifecycle aging
of the corpus; record the 2.3 layout addendum (leading Supplier
bullet segment, EA evidence lines, summary unit-price tokens,
decode-path line endings), the fixture-build pins (address join
convention, quantity/unit/price source), the V10 sweep outcome,
and resolutions for open questions Q3/Q6. Cross-family review and
the Confluence architecture-map update are flagged outstanding
for merge.
Refs: #99
* Record cross-family review outcome for handler wiring
GPT-4.1 cross_review.py run against the real handler diff
returned no BLOCK and no security findings; both FIX items
verified as no-change-needed (fallback logging already correct;
non-dict AI output is the pre-existing issue #101 pattern this
PR deliberately does not touch).
Refs: #99
* Pin line-item currency to USD in the PO gate
The non_usd rule only checked the Total-block top-level currency, so a
new_po whose line item read 'for 55,206.00 CAD' under a USD Total block
still template-parsed as ok -- a fail-open hole in the fail-closed
gate. Every line item's captured currency and its re-derived body token
must now byte-equal the proven-USD top-level currency; covered by a
line-level CAD adversarial fixture (the existing adv-non-usd only
exercised the Total-block variant) and a candidate-mutation unit test.
* Scrub residual transport tokens from PO fixtures
The first-pass harvest scrub sanitized only the primary SES/DKIM
header blocks, leaving the real SES Feedback-ID sender-identity hash
in 49 committed fixtures and, on the two non-Coupa fixtures, an
embedded second SES block's X-Ses-Receipt, the Exchange cross-tenant
UPN ciphertext, and Gmail ARC fh= / X-Gm-* tokens -- exactly the
token classes the PR #99 fixture lesson requires placeholdered.
Replace each with a same-shape ScrubbedFixture value (byte-safe,
CRLF and folding preserved) so header structure and ses_auth
behavior are unchanged.
* Converge quantity/price to Decimal on both paths
EXTRACTION_PROMPT declares quantity and price as JSON strings, so a
prompt-obedient Bedrock response stores DynamoDB Strings where the
template parser stores Numbers -- divergent attribute types for the
same email on the purchase-orders stream. Coerce numeric strings to
Decimal in the shared enrich_parsed post-stage (thousands-separator
safe; non-numeric strings kept verbatim) so both paths converge;
prompt rewording itself remains PR #2 scope.
The two-path parity test was circular -- it replayed the parser-
derived golden as 'the LLM output', so it could never see the type
divergence. It now feeds a prompt-shaped payload (string quantity/
price, LLM-filled site_code) through enrich_parsed and save_new_po,
and the fixture-hygiene test now asserts the scrubbed transport-token
header classes so fixture regressions are caught.
* Coerce bare-int quantity/price to Decimal in enrich_parsed
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the final PR diff (no BLOCK) flagged
residual type drift: parse_float=Decimal rules out floats on the LLM
path, but a bare JSON int survived as Python int. Coerce it so both
parse paths emit one canonical Decimal type.
* Scrub fixture-body PII and harden cancellation gate (sec review)
/sh-security-review of PR #105 (5 fresh-context detectors + proof-or-kill
verifier) confirmed two diff-introduced findings; both fixed here.
F3 (medium, real PII in new fixtures): the harvest scrub replaced header
tokens but left real third-party PII in message BODIES -- an Amazon
contact's name/phone/personal email in non-coupa-02.eml and an internal
t.corp.amazon.com ticket URL in comment-02.eml, plus real submitter/attn
names recurring across the new_po corpus. Replaced every personal name,
phone, personal email, and internal URL with synthetic placeholders
(QP-soft-wrap aware) across both .eml bodies and expected goldens.
Extended test_fixture_hygiene to scan BODIES (phone shapes, corp URLs,
the leaked tokens), closing the header-only gap that let this through.
F1 (medium, cancellation gate): _CANCELLATION_SUBJECT was unanchored and
matched with .search(), unlike the anchored new_po pattern -- a subject
merely ending with the cancellation phrase could be routed to the sticky-
Cancelled write. Fully anchored it and switched to .match, and added a
body-corroboration gate (the real Coupa body independently restates
'Purchase Order #<po> ... has been cancelled'); a near-miss/misrouted
subject whose body does not corroborate now fails closed to the LLM
(new reason code cancellation_body_unconfirmed).
Pre-existing (advisory, not this PR): the LLM-fallback else->save_new_po
dispatch and undelimited extraction prompt (issue #101 family) are
byte-identical to main and unchanged here.
401 tests pass; ruff/format clean; cdk synth po-ingest clean.
---------
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-16 17:50:59 -04:00
Add CloudWatch alarm coverage for po-ingest and workorder-ingest (#70)
* Add CloudWatch alarm coverage for po-ingest and workorder-ingest
Expands alarm coverage across both CDK stacks. All alarms are ALARM-only
(no OK action) to the shared site-alerts SNS topic, with TreatMissingData
NOT_BREACHING. The site-alerts topic is now imported once near the top of
each stack so every alarm reuses one Topic instance.
po-ingest (cdk/po_stack.py):
- Errors: po-ingest-site-extractor
- Throttles: po-email-processor, po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- Duration (p99, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): po-email-processor (orphan adoption),
po-ingest-site-extractor, po-web-ui
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: purchase-orders, verified-sites,
pending-site-review
workorder-ingest (cdk/wo_stack.py):
- Throttles: workorder-email-processor
- Duration (p95, >=45000ms, eval3/dp2): workorder-email-processor (orphan adoption)
- DynamoDB throttle + system-error: WorkOrders, WorkOrderComments
DynamoDB ThrottledRequests/SystemErrors emit only at the TableName+Operation
dimension set, so each table alarm is a Sum math expression across operations
via the non-deprecated metric_*_for_operations helpers (metric_throttled_requests
is deprecated/invalid in aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0).
Refs INFRA-41 / audit H-8.
* Drop NEEDS ADAM SIGN-OFF wording from alarm comments
Duration alarm thresholds are owner-approved; remove the sign-off flag
from po_stack.py and wo_stack.py comments. Threshold values, eval config,
and orphan-delete notes are unchanged.
2026-06-17 14:46:03 -04:00
**DynamoDB alarms** (`AWS/DynamoDB` ): each owned table gets `<table>-throttles` (`ThrottledRequests` ) and `<table>-system-errors` (`SystemErrors` ). These metrics emit only at the `TableName` + `Operation` dimension set, so each alarm is a `Sum` math expression across the operations the table uses (Get/BatchGet/Query/Scan/Put/Update/Delete/BatchWrite). Tables covered: `purchase-orders` , `verified-sites` , `pending-site-review` (po-ingest); `WorkOrders` , `WorkOrderComments` (workorder-ingest).
Reconcile IaC with out-of-band DLQ + Function URL changes (INFRA-74, INFRA-41) (#50)
Make CDK the source of truth for two sets of changes applied out-of-band
via CLI to the po-ingest and WorkorderIngestStack stacks.
INFRA-74 (audit C-5): remove the public FunctionUrlAuthType.NONE Function
URL construct (and its auto-generated Principal:* invoke permission +
output) from both po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui. The URLs were already
deleted live via CLI; CFN's delete is idempotent.
INFRA-41 (audit H-8): add a CDK-managed SQS dead-letter queue
(dead_letter_queue=, 14d retention, SSL-enforced, CDK-generated name) and
an ALARM-only Errors alarm (Sum, threshold>0, site-alerts topic) for both
po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor, mirroring the
apm-wo-analysis-classifier DLQ and payments-payroll-batch alarm patterns.
Interim CLI resources (per-fn -dlq queues, -errors alarms, dlq-send inline
policies, OnFailure event-invoke-configs) removed post-deploy.
2026-06-08 16:02:29 -04:00
feat: deploy-pipeline guards — healthcheck, smoke gate, bundle glob + AST test (refactor phase 0) (#107)
* feat: deploy-pipeline guards — healthcheck, smoke gate, bundle glob + AST test (refactor phase 0)
Deploys of po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor had no
verification step, so an init-time ImportError in the bundled zip
could ship silently and only surface on the next real S3 event. This
adds a synchronous post-deploy smoke gate wired into the deploy
workflow: both Lambdas are invoked with {"healthcheck": true} and the
FunctionError field is checked, since an Unhandled init error still
returns HTTP 200 on RequestResponse invokes and would false-pass a
plain exit-code check.
The healthcheck branch is the first statement in each handler, before
any boto3/S3 use or ses_auth, and only fires on a top-level direct
invoke ("healthcheck" is not a key AWS ever sets on a real S3
ObjectCreated event, so mail content can't reach this path). It emits
no EMF metrics and no log text that could match the
sender-auth-rejected metric filter, so two deploys in one window
won't trip the alarm.
Separately, the PO stack's asset bundling copied a hand-maintained
four-file allowlist into the zip, so every new sibling module
handler.py imports had to be added by hand or the deploy shipped a
Lambda that ImportErrors at cold start (bit us for template_parser in
PR #105 and nearly for derived_fields in PR #2). Replaced it with a
non-recursive ./*.py glob so top-level source files ship
automatically while tests/ and the stale package/ dir still cannot,
and added an AST-based bundle-consistency test that parses each
handler's first-party imports and fails CI if the bundling command
would omit any of them (a revert to an incomplete allowlist, or code
moved into a subdirectory the glob doesn't cover).
Includes the refactor-evaluation report that scoped this phase.
* fix: review nits — unambiguous bundling-command extraction, smoke payload-parse message, dead asserts
- tests/test_bundle_consistency.py: _extract_bundling_command now collects
all command=[...] matches and demands exactly one per stack file, instead
of silently returning whichever ast.walk visits first if a second bundled
function is ever added.
- scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh: distinguish an unparseable response payload
from a payload mismatch so the failure message says what actually happened
(the previous "could not parse" branch was unreachable — the inline python
always exited 0).
- test_po_healthcheck.py: drop the substring assertions on stdout that were
dead behind the stricter `captured.out == ""` assertion; keep the stderr
filter-pattern check.
Review follow-up on PR #107; no behavior change to any shipped code path.
2026-07-17 13:18:45 -04:00
## Deploy-Pipeline Guards (Phase 0)
**Goal:** a broken Lambda bundle fails the deploy job, not Monday's first email.
**Healthcheck direct-invoke contract.** Both `po-email-processor` and `workorder-email-processor` recognize a top-level direct-invoke probe payload `{"healthcheck": true}` . In each `handler(event, context)` , the **very first statements** — before any S3 fetch, before `ses_auth` , before iterating `event["Records"]` — are:
```python
if isinstance(event, dict) and event.get("healthcheck") is True:
return {"healthcheck": "ok"}
```
This placement is deliberate, not incidental: real mail always arrives as an S3 `ObjectCreated` event whose top-level keys (`Records` ) AWS controls, so email content can never set a top-level `healthcheck` key — the branch creates no accept path for forged mail. It also emits **no EMF metric and no log line** , so it can never match the `sender_auth_rejected` log-metric-filter pattern that feeds the `<fn>-sender-auth-rejected` alarm (see [CloudWatch alarms ](#cloudwatch-alarms )) — that alarm pages at ≥1 match in its window, so repeated healthcheck invokes across deploys (two deploys in ~30 min is routine) must never contribute to it. Unit coverage: `lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/test_po_healthcheck.py` and `lambdas/wo/email_processor/tests/test_healthcheck.py` .
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
**Post-deploy smoke gate.** `scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh` is wired into the CD workflow as `cd-cdk.yaml` 's `post-deploy-script` input (see [CI/CD ](#cicd )) and runs synchronously after every deploy, before the workflow is considered green. It invokes `po-email-processor` , `workorder-email-processor` , and `procurement-api` with `aws lambda invoke --invocation-type RequestResponse --payload '{"healthcheck": true}'` (region `us-east-1` ) and asserts, per function:
feat: deploy-pipeline guards — healthcheck, smoke gate, bundle glob + AST test (refactor phase 0) (#107)
* feat: deploy-pipeline guards — healthcheck, smoke gate, bundle glob + AST test (refactor phase 0)
Deploys of po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor had no
verification step, so an init-time ImportError in the bundled zip
could ship silently and only surface on the next real S3 event. This
adds a synchronous post-deploy smoke gate wired into the deploy
workflow: both Lambdas are invoked with {"healthcheck": true} and the
FunctionError field is checked, since an Unhandled init error still
returns HTTP 200 on RequestResponse invokes and would false-pass a
plain exit-code check.
The healthcheck branch is the first statement in each handler, before
any boto3/S3 use or ses_auth, and only fires on a top-level direct
invoke ("healthcheck" is not a key AWS ever sets on a real S3
ObjectCreated event, so mail content can't reach this path). It emits
no EMF metrics and no log text that could match the
sender-auth-rejected metric filter, so two deploys in one window
won't trip the alarm.
Separately, the PO stack's asset bundling copied a hand-maintained
four-file allowlist into the zip, so every new sibling module
handler.py imports had to be added by hand or the deploy shipped a
Lambda that ImportErrors at cold start (bit us for template_parser in
PR #105 and nearly for derived_fields in PR #2). Replaced it with a
non-recursive ./*.py glob so top-level source files ship
automatically while tests/ and the stale package/ dir still cannot,
and added an AST-based bundle-consistency test that parses each
handler's first-party imports and fails CI if the bundling command
would omit any of them (a revert to an incomplete allowlist, or code
moved into a subdirectory the glob doesn't cover).
Includes the refactor-evaluation report that scoped this phase.
* fix: review nits — unambiguous bundling-command extraction, smoke payload-parse message, dead asserts
- tests/test_bundle_consistency.py: _extract_bundling_command now collects
all command=[...] matches and demands exactly one per stack file, instead
of silently returning whichever ast.walk visits first if a second bundled
function is ever added.
- scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh: distinguish an unparseable response payload
from a payload mismatch so the failure message says what actually happened
(the previous "could not parse" branch was unreachable — the inline python
always exited 0).
- test_po_healthcheck.py: drop the substring assertions on stdout that were
dead behind the stricter `captured.out == ""` assertion; keep the stderr
filter-pattern check.
Review follow-up on PR #107; no behavior change to any shipped code path.
2026-07-17 13:18:45 -04:00
1. The invoke response's ** `FunctionError` field is absent** — this is the load-bearing check. A broken bundle (e.g. an `ImportError` at module init from a missing sibling module) still returns HTTP 200 from the Lambda Invoke API with `FunctionError=Unhandled` ; a bare exit-code check on `aws lambda invoke` would false-pass on exactly the failure this gate exists to catch.
2. The returned payload is **exactly** `{"healthcheck": "ok"}` .
The script runs `set -euo pipefail` and exits non-zero on any invoke failure, any `FunctionError` , or a payload mismatch on either function, failing the deploy job.
feat: widen email-processor asset roots to lambdas/ with scoped globs + excludes (refactor phase 2) (#109)
Both email-processor Code.from_asset calls now bundle from lambdas/
instead of their per-function subdirectory, so Phase 3's shared/
module is reachable from the asset root once it lands. The bundling
commands were rewritten for the new cwd (pip install -r <po|wo>/
email_processor/requirements.txt -t /asset-output && cp <po|wo>/
email_processor/*.py /asset-output/), preserving the ARM64
--platform manylinux2014_aarch64 --only-binary=:all: pin exactly —
its removal shipped x86 wheels into the ARM64 function and caused a
100% outage (PR #34).
All five from_asset calls (both email processors, po web_ui, po
site_extractor, wo web_ui) now exclude **/__pycache__/**; the two
widened ones also exclude **/tests/** and **/package/**. Without the
package/ exclude, the stale untracked 44 MB
lambdas/po/email_processor/package/ dir (local-only, never present
in CI) would diverge local vs CI asset hashes and force spurious
redeploys — from_asset doesn't honor .gitignore. That dir is left in
place; deleting it is Adam's call.
WO's prod zip shrinks as deliberate cleanup, not a byte-identical
match to PO: the old `cp -r .` shipped tests/ (real scrubbed .eml
fixtures), __pycache__/, and requirements.txt into production. The
acceptance bar for WO is runtime-imported module set unchanged +
smoke, not a byte-identical zip; PO keeps the byte-identical
first-party file set guarantee. tests/test_bundle_consistency.py is
updated in the same change to recognize the scoped
`cp po/email_processor/*.py` (resp. wo) glob as the new
unconditionally-safe shape, without loosening the allowlist-revert
detection, the detection-logic mutation test, or the
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES exact-set pin.
No code moved under lambdas/ in this change (git diff main...HEAD --
lambdas/ is empty); only CDK asset wiring and its tests changed.
2026-07-17 15:47:01 -04:00
**PO bundling: glob replaces the hand-maintained allowlist.** `cdk/po_stack.py` 's asset bundling command ships PO's Lambda source with a non-recursive glob instead of a hand-maintained list of filenames (`cp handler.py ses_auth.py template_parser.py derived_fields.py /asset-output/` ). The glob is functionally identical for today's file set — non-recursive, so `tests/` and other subdirectories are still excluded — but structurally eliminates the failure mode that shipped a broken bundle twice (PR #105 omitted `template_parser.py` ; PR #2 nearly omitted `derived_fields.py` ): a new sibling module the handler imports now ships automatically instead of requiring someone to remember to add it to the list.
feat: deploy-pipeline guards — healthcheck, smoke gate, bundle glob + AST test (refactor phase 0) (#107)
* feat: deploy-pipeline guards — healthcheck, smoke gate, bundle glob + AST test (refactor phase 0)
Deploys of po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor had no
verification step, so an init-time ImportError in the bundled zip
could ship silently and only surface on the next real S3 event. This
adds a synchronous post-deploy smoke gate wired into the deploy
workflow: both Lambdas are invoked with {"healthcheck": true} and the
FunctionError field is checked, since an Unhandled init error still
returns HTTP 200 on RequestResponse invokes and would false-pass a
plain exit-code check.
The healthcheck branch is the first statement in each handler, before
any boto3/S3 use or ses_auth, and only fires on a top-level direct
invoke ("healthcheck" is not a key AWS ever sets on a real S3
ObjectCreated event, so mail content can't reach this path). It emits
no EMF metrics and no log text that could match the
sender-auth-rejected metric filter, so two deploys in one window
won't trip the alarm.
Separately, the PO stack's asset bundling copied a hand-maintained
four-file allowlist into the zip, so every new sibling module
handler.py imports had to be added by hand or the deploy shipped a
Lambda that ImportErrors at cold start (bit us for template_parser in
PR #105 and nearly for derived_fields in PR #2). Replaced it with a
non-recursive ./*.py glob so top-level source files ship
automatically while tests/ and the stale package/ dir still cannot,
and added an AST-based bundle-consistency test that parses each
handler's first-party imports and fails CI if the bundling command
would omit any of them (a revert to an incomplete allowlist, or code
moved into a subdirectory the glob doesn't cover).
Includes the refactor-evaluation report that scoped this phase.
* fix: review nits — unambiguous bundling-command extraction, smoke payload-parse message, dead asserts
- tests/test_bundle_consistency.py: _extract_bundling_command now collects
all command=[...] matches and demands exactly one per stack file, instead
of silently returning whichever ast.walk visits first if a second bundled
function is ever added.
- scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh: distinguish an unparseable response payload
from a payload mismatch so the failure message says what actually happened
(the previous "could not parse" branch was unreachable — the inline python
always exited 0).
- test_po_healthcheck.py: drop the substring assertions on stdout that were
dead behind the stricter `captured.out == ""` assertion; keep the stderr
filter-pattern check.
Review follow-up on PR #107; no behavior change to any shipped code path.
2026-07-17 13:18:45 -04:00
feat: widen email-processor asset roots to lambdas/ with scoped globs + excludes (refactor phase 2) (#109)
Both email-processor Code.from_asset calls now bundle from lambdas/
instead of their per-function subdirectory, so Phase 3's shared/
module is reachable from the asset root once it lands. The bundling
commands were rewritten for the new cwd (pip install -r <po|wo>/
email_processor/requirements.txt -t /asset-output && cp <po|wo>/
email_processor/*.py /asset-output/), preserving the ARM64
--platform manylinux2014_aarch64 --only-binary=:all: pin exactly —
its removal shipped x86 wheels into the ARM64 function and caused a
100% outage (PR #34).
All five from_asset calls (both email processors, po web_ui, po
site_extractor, wo web_ui) now exclude **/__pycache__/**; the two
widened ones also exclude **/tests/** and **/package/**. Without the
package/ exclude, the stale untracked 44 MB
lambdas/po/email_processor/package/ dir (local-only, never present
in CI) would diverge local vs CI asset hashes and force spurious
redeploys — from_asset doesn't honor .gitignore. That dir is left in
place; deleting it is Adam's call.
WO's prod zip shrinks as deliberate cleanup, not a byte-identical
match to PO: the old `cp -r .` shipped tests/ (real scrubbed .eml
fixtures), __pycache__/, and requirements.txt into production. The
acceptance bar for WO is runtime-imported module set unchanged +
smoke, not a byte-identical zip; PO keeps the byte-identical
first-party file set guarantee. tests/test_bundle_consistency.py is
updated in the same change to recognize the scoped
`cp po/email_processor/*.py` (resp. wo) glob as the new
unconditionally-safe shape, without loosening the allowlist-revert
detection, the detection-logic mutation test, or the
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES exact-set pin.
No code moved under lambdas/ in this change (git diff main...HEAD --
lambdas/ is empty); only CDK asset wiring and its tests changed.
2026-07-17 15:47:01 -04:00
**Phase 2: widened asset root, both processors on the glob.** Both `cdk/po_stack.py` and `cdk/wo_stack.py` widen their bundled email-processor's `Code.from_asset` root from the per-pipeline dir (`../lambdas/po/email_processor` , `../lambdas/wo/email_processor` ) to the shared parent, `../lambdas` — the prerequisite for the Phase 3 `lambdas/shared/` extraction, which needs a bundling root able to reach a sibling `shared/` package outside either pipeline's own dir (this move ships **zero handler code changes** — `git diff -- lambdas/` is empty for this PR). With bundling present, CDK mounts the asset root as the container's working directory, so both the `pip install -r` path and the `cp` source operand became repo-relative to `lambdas/` : `-r po/email_processor/requirements.txt` (resp. `wo/email_processor/requirements.txt` ) and `cp po/email_processor/*.py /asset-output/` (resp. `cp wo/email_processor/*.py /asset-output/` ). The pip `--platform manylinux2014_aarch64 --only-binary=:all:` pin — removing it once shipped x86 wheels into the ARM64 function and caused a total outage (PR #34 ) — is preserved byte-for-byte on both.
Both bundled `from_asset` calls also gain `exclude=['**/__pycache__/**', '**/tests/**', '**/package/**']` . This is load-bearing, not cosmetic: `Code.from_asset` does not honor `.gitignore` , and widening the root to `../lambdas` means the untracked, 44 MB `lambdas/po/email_processor/package/` dir (a stale vendored dependency tree; deletion is a separate, deliberate call — not part of this change) would otherwise be staged into the *source fingerprint* `from_asset` hashes to decide whether to re-bundle. Because CI never has that local-only directory, an un-excluded root would diverge the local vs. CI asset hash on every synth/deploy and force spurious redeploys; the `**/tests/**` and `__pycache__` excludes keep the hash stable for the same reason. Note the exclude does **not** decouple the two pipelines' asset hashes: `from_asset` hashes with its default `AssetHashType.SOURCE` , so the fingerprint is computed over *all* of `../lambdas` minus only the excluded `__pycache__` /`tests` /`package` paths — PO's and WO's first-party source (both `email_processor` trees, plus the two `web_ui` s and the `site_extractor` ) therefore both feed **both** email-processors' hash. Editing any non-excluded file under `lambdas/` changes both email-processors' source fingerprint and redeploys both functions with byte-identical bundles. That coupling is an accepted cost of the shared-root design (the bundling `cp` glob still copies only each pipeline's own `*.py` into the zip); the excludes exist solely to strip local-only/irrelevant cruft that would diverge local vs. CI, not to isolate PO's tree from WO's — which `SOURCE` hashing cannot do here.
**WO bundling: glob replaces the whole-dir copy — deliberate prod-zip shrinkage.** WO's bundling command changes from a recursive `cp -r . /asset-output/` (the entire `wo/email_processor/` source dir, copied into the deployed zip) to the same scoped, non-recursive glob PO uses: `cp wo/email_processor/*.py /asset-output/` . This intentionally drops from the production zip:
- `requirements.txt` — needed only at bundle time (`pip install -r ...` ), never at runtime;
- the entire `tests/` tree (`lambdas/wo/email_processor/tests/` ) — real scrubbed `.eml` fixtures, golden JSON, and test modules;
- any first-party `__pycache__/*.pyc` a local `cp -r .` would have picked up (the currently-deployed zip carries none, but the exclude keeps future local builds equally clean).
This is cleanup, not a regression: none of those file classes are imported at runtime by `handler.handler` , so the acceptance bar for this change on WO is "the runtime-imported module set is unchanged, plus a post-deploy smoke pass" — not a byte-identical zip diff (that stricter bar applies to PO only, whose deployed zip was already this tight before this change). All four first-party top-level `.py` files WO's handler needs — `__init__.py` , `handler.py` , `ses_auth.py` , `template_parser.py` — are still shipped; the glob retains `__init__.py` because it is itself a top-level `.py` file, not a special case requiring a separate copy rule.
**Plain (non-bundled) `from_asset` calls gain `exclude` too.** The three non-bundled Lambda assets — `po-web-ui` , `po-ingest-site-extractor` , `workorder-web-ui` — each add `exclude=['**/__pycache__/**']` . Nothing else about these three changes: each keeps its own scoped asset path (`../lambdas/po/web_ui` , etc.) rather than widening to `../lambdas` , and none gains bundling. Without the exclude, a developer's local `__pycache__` — again invisible to `from_asset` 's `.gitignore` -blind staging — makes that function's asset hash nondeterministic across machines and forces spurious redeploys.
`tests/test_bundle_consistency.py` guards all of the above with a pure-AST check (no synth, no boto3, no handler import): it parses each handler.py's top-level first-party sibling imports, extracts the bundling `command=[...]` string from the corresponding CDK stack file, and asserts every required sibling module is guaranteed to ship. It recognizes both the scoped glob (`cp po/email_processor/*.py` / `cp wo/email_processor/*.py` , with or without a path prefix) and a whole-dir recursive copy (`cp -r . /asset-output/` ) as unconditionally-safe shapes, and falls back to literal filename matching for any other (allowlist-style) shape. It pins each stack's command to the scoped-glob form specifically — a future revert to a narrowed single-file copy, a commented-out glob, or a filename allowlist missing a sibling all fail CI loudly instead of silently shipping a broken bundle. Runs in the existing pytest step, before synth.
feat: deploy-pipeline guards — healthcheck, smoke gate, bundle glob + AST test (refactor phase 0) (#107)
* feat: deploy-pipeline guards — healthcheck, smoke gate, bundle glob + AST test (refactor phase 0)
Deploys of po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor had no
verification step, so an init-time ImportError in the bundled zip
could ship silently and only surface on the next real S3 event. This
adds a synchronous post-deploy smoke gate wired into the deploy
workflow: both Lambdas are invoked with {"healthcheck": true} and the
FunctionError field is checked, since an Unhandled init error still
returns HTTP 200 on RequestResponse invokes and would false-pass a
plain exit-code check.
The healthcheck branch is the first statement in each handler, before
any boto3/S3 use or ses_auth, and only fires on a top-level direct
invoke ("healthcheck" is not a key AWS ever sets on a real S3
ObjectCreated event, so mail content can't reach this path). It emits
no EMF metrics and no log text that could match the
sender-auth-rejected metric filter, so two deploys in one window
won't trip the alarm.
Separately, the PO stack's asset bundling copied a hand-maintained
four-file allowlist into the zip, so every new sibling module
handler.py imports had to be added by hand or the deploy shipped a
Lambda that ImportErrors at cold start (bit us for template_parser in
PR #105 and nearly for derived_fields in PR #2). Replaced it with a
non-recursive ./*.py glob so top-level source files ship
automatically while tests/ and the stale package/ dir still cannot,
and added an AST-based bundle-consistency test that parses each
handler's first-party imports and fails CI if the bundling command
would omit any of them (a revert to an incomplete allowlist, or code
moved into a subdirectory the glob doesn't cover).
Includes the refactor-evaluation report that scoped this phase.
* fix: review nits — unambiguous bundling-command extraction, smoke payload-parse message, dead asserts
- tests/test_bundle_consistency.py: _extract_bundling_command now collects
all command=[...] matches and demands exactly one per stack file, instead
of silently returning whichever ast.walk visits first if a second bundled
function is ever added.
- scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh: distinguish an unparseable response payload
from a payload mismatch so the failure message says what actually happened
(the previous "could not parse" branch was unreachable — the inline python
always exited 0).
- test_po_healthcheck.py: drop the substring assertions on stdout that were
dead behind the stricter `captured.out == ""` assertion; keep the stderr
filter-pattern check.
Review follow-up on PR #107; no behavior change to any shipped code path.
2026-07-17 13:18:45 -04:00
feat: extract lambdas/shared/ — single-source ses_auth, web_ui auth, email parsing, EMF emitter (refactor phase 3) (#111)
Four modules move into the handbook-mandated lambdas/shared/ location,
collapsing duplicated logic that had to be kept in sync by hand across
the PO and WO pipelines:
- ses_auth.py: the PO and WO copies were verified sha256-identical
against the feature/phase-7-ops-recovery baseline before the move
(no drift since the last audit). shared/ses_auth.py is the exact
bytes of that one copy; both originals are git rm'd (the PO copy
via rename, the WO copy as a straight delete). Bundling lands the
module flat in /asset-output for both email processors, so the
handlers keep `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email`
unchanged — zero handler diff for this move, which is what keeps
fail-closed auth byte-identical through the change.
- web_ui_auth.py: extracts the byte-identical _get_auth_token /
_header / is_authenticated block plus the four token-cache globals
out of both web_ui handlers. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay
in each handler as-is (deliberately drifted wording, stack-specific)
rather than being unified into the shared module. Fail-closed
semantics (unset ARN or Secrets Manager exception -> deny) are
unchanged.
- email_parsing.py: parse_raw_email ships as the superset version that
returns cc unconditionally. WO's output is bit-identical to before;
PO simply ignores the cc field rather than being "cleaned up" to
consume it. No second variant is kept.
- emf.py: a generic emitter parameterized by namespace, dimension
sets, and properties. Every call site's emitted EMF envelope is
unchanged, including the load-bearing
[["ParseMethod"],["ParseMethod","TemplateId"]] dimension-set shape
the alarms and metric filters depend on. Emission ordering is
untouched: PO still emits ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, WO
still emits its mutually-exclusive ai_fallback/ai_fallback_rejected
after its gate. The deliberate-double-count comments survive.
_emit_derived_agreement_metric was found living inside
derived_fields.py, so per the DERIVED-FIELDS exception it is left
as a third, unconverted copy (derived_fields.py and the shadow
DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stay untouchable while that bake
runs) — a comment there points at shared/emf.py for the eventual
follow-up.
Bundling: both email-processor cdk bundling commands gain a trailing
`cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` (they were already cp-only post-Phase
7, so no pip step or manylinux pin is reintroduced). Both web_ui
functions gain the same widened-root staging so web_ui_auth.py ships
beside their handler; site_extractor's from_asset is untouched.
Tests: PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES gains the shared modules that now
ship, the AST sibling-import check resolves imports whose source now
lives under shared/, and the new shared cp line has its own
revert/mutation detection. _SIBLING_MODULES resolution and
_po_parser_support.py now load ses_auth/email_parsing/emf from
shared/; the two-copy ses_auth byte-identity fixture-hygiene test is
retired as obsolete now that there is one copy, and the ses_auth
fixture parameterization over two identical copies is dropped. The
sys.modules save/restore dance for template_parser (still duplicated
per-pipeline) is left in place.
2026-07-20 13:38:23 -04:00
### Phase 3: shared module extraction (`lambdas/shared/`)
Four first-party modules that were previously duplicated per pipeline (or inlined in each handler) are now **single-sourced** under `lambdas/shared/` , following the handbook's `lambdas/shared/` convention:
| Module | What it is | Imported by |
|---|---|---|
| `ses_auth.py` | fail-closed SES sender-authentication (INFRA-107) | both email processors |
| `web_ui_auth.py` | fail-closed `X-Auth-Token` gate + token cache (INFRA-74) | both web_ui handlers |
| `email_parsing.py` | `parse_raw_email` (the WO superset that returns `cc` unconditionally; PO simply ignores `cc` ) | both email processors |
| `emf.py` | generic CloudWatch EMF emitter (`emit_metric` , `emit_parse_outcome` ) parameterized by namespace / dimension-sets / properties | both email processors (PO also uses `emit_metric` for `DerivedFieldAgreement` ) |
**Flat-landing import rule.** The shared dir has **no `__init__.py`** — the modules are consumed by bare name (`from ses_auth import ...` , `from emf import emit_parse_outcome` ), exactly as when they were siblings. This works because the bundling `cp` lands them **flat in `/asset-output/`** beside `handler.py` , so at runtime each shared module sits on the function's own `sys.path` under its bare name — the handler import lines are unchanged, which is what keeps the byte-identical fail-closed `ses_auth` behavior through the move. The load-bearing `emf` dimension-set list `[["ParseMethod"], ["ParseMethod", "TemplateId"]]` is now pinned **once** in `emf.py` (one-sided dimension drift between the two pipelines becomes structurally impossible), while the deliberate per-pipeline **emission-ordering** differences stay in the handlers (PO emits `ai_fallback` *before* the Bedrock call with an intentional double-count; WO emits mutually-exclusive `ai_fallback` /`ai_fallback_rejected` after its gate).
**Bundling — email processors.** Both email-processor commands append a second glob, `cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` , after their own `cp <pipeline>/email_processor/*.py` . This ships all four shared modules flat into each email-processor zip. `web_ui_auth.py` therefore rides along into both email-processor bundles even though the email handlers never import it — a harmless, deliberate consequence of the all-of-`shared/` glob (`PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES` and the bundle-parity expectations account for it). The base is cp-only (Phase 7 removed the pip install / `manylinux` pin from both email-processor commands, and this phase moves only pure first-party modules with no new dependencies, so it **stays** cp-only — no pip step is reintroduced).
**Bundling — web UIs.** Both `po-web-ui` and `workorder-web-ui` gain the same widened-root Docker bundling mechanism: their `Code.from_asset` root widens to `../lambdas` and their command copies the function's own dir contents plus **only** `shared/web_ui_auth.py` (`cp shared/web_ui_auth.py` , *not* `cp shared/*.py` ) — the web UIs need only the auth module, and shipping the email-processor-only modules would break the "deployed set + `web_ui_auth` , nothing else" parity. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay in each handler (their wording is deliberately pipeline-specific and is not unified). `site_extractor` 's asset is untouched.
`tests/test_bundle_consistency.py` is updated in lockstep without losing teeth: `_first_party_sibling_imports` resolves shared-sourced imports under `lambdas/shared/` ; the command extractor selects the email-processor command now that each stack has two bundled functions; `_bundling_ships_all` accumulates shipped module stems across **both** globs; `PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES` gains the four shared modules; and a new pin + mutation test require the `cp shared/*.py` line to be actually executed (a commented-out or removed shared `cp` fails CI).
feat: decompose email-processor handlers into flat siblings + lazy boto3 clients (refactor phase 5) (#113)
Both email-processor God-handlers split along the seams that already
work in the flat-sibling pattern established by lambdas/shared/, so
bare-name imports keep working under the existing bundling glob.
PO (5-way split): handler.py keeps only the event loop, fail-closed
auth, and email_type routing. extraction.py holds extract_with_claude
and _EMAIL_TAG_RE, importing EXTRACTION_PROMPT from prompts.py and
parse_raw_email from shared/email_parsing.py rather than recreating a
PO-local copy. enrichment.py is a pure code move of enrich_parsed and
pad_zip (PO-only; WO has no enrichment stage) with zero behavior
change. telemetry.py holds the EMF ParseMethod emit wrappers.
persistence.py holds _write_fields/_merge_update/save_*, collapsing
the byte-identical save_new_po/save_revision bodies into one
_save_merge helper that both now call through, preserving the sticky
Cancelled ConditionExpression guard for both callers; save_cancellation
stays separate.
WO (5 concerns, no enrichment stage): the handler loop keeps
validate_ai_fallback and the re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", work_order_id)
key guard ahead of both save_work_order and save_event, since the
guard protects the DynamoDB partition key and the '#'-delimited
comment_id range-key segment. _header_date_iso and comment_id
determinism stay colocated with persistence.py's save_event for the
retry-idempotent event_id key.
EXTRACTION_PROMPT (PO) moves to prompts.py with cross-reference
headers to derived_fields.py's authoritative trade/site/fiscal rule
tables; handler.py re-exports it (from prompts import
EXTRACTION_PROMPT) since four tests dereference handler.EXTRACTION_
PROMPT directly. WO's prompt moves the same way.
I/O modules (extraction.py's bedrock client, persistence.py's
dynamodb resource, handler.py's s3 client) get lazy cached boto3
accessors; pure modules (enrichment.py, prompts.py, telemetry.py)
import no boto3. Test monkeypatch surfaces move to the module that
now owns the client (e.g. persistence.dynamodb) everywhere tests
patch it, and the moto-before-handler-import ordering in
_po_parser_support.py is preserved so the moto-backed suites don't
hit real AWS.
Behavior-preservation pins, verified with tests: PO still emits
ParseMethod=ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, with
ai_fallback_rejected as the additive second datapoint on rejection.
WO still emits after its gate with mutually-exclusive ai_fallback /
ai_fallback_rejected. Shadow DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stays
ai_fallback-only. derived_fields.py is untouched (diff against
feature/phase-3-shared-extraction is empty). handler(event, context)
signatures and the save_* public contract are unchanged on both
pipelines; goldens unchanged.
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES and its WO equivalent in
tests/test_bundle_consistency.py are updated for the new sibling
modules so the AST bundle-consistency test still fails on an
unshipped or uncommented-out sibling.
2026-07-20 15:34:53 -04:00
### Phase 5: handler decomposition + lazy boto3 clients
Both email-processor God-handlers are decomposed along the seams that already work into **flat sibling modules** in the same directory (bare-name imports, exactly like the `ses_auth` /`template_parser` /`derived_fields` pattern), so the Phase 0/2/3 `cp <pipeline>/email_processor/*.py` glob ships every new sibling automatically — no bundling change beyond the exact-set pin. Every move is a pure delete-here/add-there; `derived_fields.py` , both `template_parser.py` , the `validate_ai_fallback` gates, `lambdas/shared/` , and `cdk/` are byte-untouched.
**PO** (`handler.py` → 5 siblings + `prompts.py` ): `handler.py` keeps the event loop, fail-closed SES auth, and `email_type` routing; `extraction.py` owns `extract_with_claude` + `_EMAIL_TAG_RE` ; `enrichment.py` owns `enrich_parsed` + `pad_zip` (PO-only — WO has no enrichment stage) as a byte-identical move including the derived-field shadow block; `telemetry.py` owns the EMF `ParseMethod` /`DerivedFieldAgreement` emit wrappers; `persistence.py` owns `_write_fields` /`_merge_update` /`save_*` — with the two byte-identical `save_new_po` /`save_revision` **collapsed into one `_save_merge`** plus two thin wrappers differing only in the log verb (behavior-identical to both originals, sticky-cancel `ConditionExpression` guard intact; `save_cancellation` stays its own function). **WO** splits into ~5 concerns (no `enrichment` ), keeping `validate_ai_fallback` **and** the `re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", work_order_id)` key guard in the handler loop AHEAD of both `save_work_order` and `save_event` (it protects the partition key and the `#` -delimited `comment_id` range-key segment), and keeps `_header_date_iso` /`comment_id` determinism together with `save_event` in `persistence.py` .
`EXTRACTION_PROMPT` (the ~181-line prompt) moves to `prompts.py` with a cross-reference header to the second authoritative copy of the trade/site/fiscal rule tables in `derived_fields.py` ; `handler.py` keeps a `from prompts import EXTRACTION_PROMPT` re-export so `handler.EXTRACTION_PROMPT` still resolves for the tests that dereference it.
**Lazy cached boto3 clients.** Each I/O module initializes its client cache to `None` and populates it through a private `_get_<client>()` accessor on first call (`extraction.bedrock` , `persistence.dynamodb` , `handler.s3` ); pure modules (`enrichment` , `telemetry` , `prompts` ) import no boto3. The cache attribute keeps its original public name, so a test patches the same attribute — only the owning **module** moved (e.g. `setattr(persistence, "dynamodb", fake)` ). Building the client at first *call* (deep inside a test) rather than at import also strengthens the moto-before-handler invariant.
**Behavior preserved (pinned by new tests).** PO emits `ParseMethod=ai_fallback` **before** the Bedrock call (a throttle that raises still leaves the pre-call datapoint), and a gate rejection is an additive second `ai_fallback_rejected` datapoint (PO's deliberate double-count); WO emits **after** its gate, mutually exclusive; the `DerivedFieldAgreement` shadow telemetry stays `ai_fallback` -only; `_save_merge` issues byte-identical `update_item` calls for both `new_po` and `revision` ; and the WO key guard fires before either save.
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
## Security
**Web UI auth (defense-in-depth).** The `po-web-ui` / `workorder-web-ui` handlers refuse unauthenticated requests even though their public Function URLs were removed (INFRA-74). Each requires a shared secret in the `X-Auth-Token` header (or `Authorization: Bearer <token>` ), compared in constant time against the configured token. The handler **fails closed** if the token is unset or unreadable (denies all). The token lives in the Secrets Manager secret `procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token` ; only its ARN is passed to the Lambda (`WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN` ), and the value is fetched at runtime — never embedded in the CloudFormation template or Lambda env vars. The fetched value is cached in the warm container with a short TTL (5 min) so a rotated secret propagates without waiting for the execution environment to recycle. This is a defense-in-depth floor for a detached URL, not primary auth.
**Output escaping.** All caller-influenced values (including prompt-injectable strings Claude may return for `total_amount` /line-item amounts) are HTML-escaped before interpolation to prevent stored XSS.
2026-06-05 17:26:22 -04:00
## Shared Resources
### `purchase-orders` table (owned here)
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
The `purchase-orders` DynamoDB table is **owned by this repo's `po-ingest` stack** (defined in `cdk/po_stack.py` with `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN` , `StreamViewType.NEW_IMAGE` , and SSE-KMS encryption with the shared customer-managed CMK `alias/seahaven-dynamodb` , INFRA-95 / M-3). The `po-email-processor` Lambda is the authoritative writer — it performs the merge inserts, field-level revision merges, and cancellation updates described above.
2026-06-05 17:26:22 -04:00
**Consumers (read-only):**
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
| Consumer | How it reads | Purpose |
2026-06-05 17:26:22 -04:00
|---|---|---|
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
| `procurement-api` (this repo) | `Table.from_table_name` + `grant_read_data` | REST reads (`GET /purchase-orders*` ) |
2026-06-05 17:26:22 -04:00
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
`seahaven-slack-bot` , the former external consumer, was decommissioned 2026-07-23 and its cross-account grants removed. External consumers now read through the `procurement-api` REST contract (`lambdas/api/openapi.json` ), never by importing the table directly.
2026-06-05 17:26:22 -04:00
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
**Schema-coordination rule:** Any change to the `purchase-orders` schema (partition key, item shape, attribute names, streams view type) must be reflected in the API's OpenAPI schemas in the same PR (the spec-drift test pins paths, not item shapes — the schema fields are maintained by hand). Treat schema changes as a contract migration, not a local edit.
2026-06-05 17:26:22 -04:00
**Known exception (INFRA-51):** `amazon-po-parser` currently writes directly to `purchase-orders` outside this stack (backfill/enrichment scripts). This second writer is being folded into the `po-ingest` pipeline so this stack is the sole writer; until INFRA-51 closes, coordinate any schema change with `amazon-po-parser` as well.
2026-07-08 16:22:38 -04:00
### `WorkOrders` and `WorkOrderComments` tables (owned here)
2026-07-15 19:00:43 -04:00
Both tables are **owned by this repo's `WorkorderIngestStack`** (`cdk/wo_stack.py` , `RemovalPolicy.RETAIN` ):
2026-07-08 16:22:38 -04:00
- `WorkOrders` — PK `work_order_id` (S).
- `WorkOrderComments` — PK `work_order_id` (S), SK `comment_id` (S).
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
> **`comment_id` format change (issue #23).** The `WorkOrderComments` range key is now
> `work_order_id#<comment_time|nocomment>#<sha256(s3_object_key)[:12]>`
> (e.g. `11144580730#2026-04-27T23:51:48#a1b2c3d4e5f6`, or `…#nocomment#…` when the source
> email carries no comment time). Previously it was `work_order_id#<timestamp>`, where two
> emails on the same WO with an identical/absent comment time collided and overwrote each other.
> The 12-hex suffix is derived from the **S3 object key alone** — deterministic, so a Lambda
> async **retry** of the same object produces a byte-identical key (idempotent, no duplicate row),
> while two distinct emails on the same WO get distinct keys. Wall-clock `now()` is kept **out** of
> the key. Consumers that split on `#` and read index `[0]`/`[1]` are unaffected; anything that
> treated "everything after the first `#`" as a bare timestamp now also captures the hash segment.
> **Timestamp format shift.** All stored ISO timestamps (`created_at`, `updated_at`, `ingested_at`
> on WO; `processed_at`, `cancelled_at` on PO) moved from naive `datetime.utcnow().isoformat()`
> to timezone-aware `datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()`, so they now carry a `+00:00` suffix
> (e.g. `2026-07-15T12:00:00+00:00`). Downstream parsers that assumed a naive/no-offset string
> must accept the offset.
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
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Both currently use default DynamoDB encryption — they are **not** yet on the shared customer-managed CMK (`alias/seahaven-dynamodb` , INFRA-95 / M-3); that migration is tracked in INFRA-6. The `workorder-email-processor` role no longer holds a pre-emptive encrypt/decrypt grant on that CMK (removed in the 2026-06-17 security sweep — it was unused while the tables are unencrypted and extended the role's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting `purchase-orders` ). Re-add the grant as part of the INFRA-6 migration, at which point `grant_read_write_data` on the then-encrypted tables propagates the needed key permissions automatically.
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2026-07-30 12:03:02 -04:00
**Consumers (read-only) — data contract:** `seahaven-slack-bot` (the former external reader) was decommissioned 2026-07-23; its grants are gone. Current consumers: the `procurement-api` Lambda (this repo, `Table.from_table_name` + `grant_read_data` , serving `GET /work-orders*` ), and the `workorder-shoc-emitter` stream consumer (this repo) — both tables now stream `NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES` , and the emitter is an active consumer of those streams (ESMs enabled 2026-07-30). External readers (SHOC) consume through the REST contract (`lambdas/api/openapi.json` ) and the webhook contract (`docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md` ); both documents' field lists mirror `lambdas/wo/email_processor/persistence.py` . Any change to table name, key schema, attribute names, or encryption configuration (e.g. the INFRA-6 CMK migration) must update those two contracts in the same PR — the tables are imported by name, so there is no compile-time link and breakage surfaces at runtime.
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test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
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**Stream field contract (`site_code` ).** Three definitions of "is this a valid site code" have existed in this repo at once. The canonical shape is `derived_fields._STRICT_CODE_RE` (`[A-Z][A-Z0-9]{2,4}` , `fullmatch` ) plus its skip-list semantics (a code-shaped token is only a real site code if it is *not* skip-listed, e.g. `LLC` /`INC` /`CORP` /`LTD` /`ATTN` ), used by `derive_site_code()` (the `enrich_parsed()` classifier, see the **Derived fields** note in the Purchase Orders flow above). Honestly noted, not papered over: `lambdas/po/site_extractor/handler.py` 's own `SITE_CODE_PATTERN` (`[A-Z]{2,4}\d{1,2}` , prefix-anchored `.match` , digit-requiring) still diverges from the canonical shape as of this phase — it rejects valid all-letter codes like `KLAL` (which surface as permanent `pending-site-review` rows) and accepts overlong junk like `DLI6X` /`SNY55` that the canonical `fullmatch` would not. Reconciling `po-ingest-site-extractor` 's direct-field validation onto the canonical `derived_fields` shape is Phase 6 scope, tracked separately — this paragraph will be updated when it lands.
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### `verified-sites` table (owned here)
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Owned by this repo's `po-ingest` stack (`cdk/po_stack.py` ). PK `siteCode` (S); default DynamoDB encryption (NOT the shared CMK).
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feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
**Consumer (read-only) — data contract:** `seahaven-slack-bot` (former reader, incl. the INFRA-138/INFRA-180 `by-state` GSI drift saga) was decommissioned 2026-07-23 — the GSI-drift issue died with it. Current consumer: the `procurement-api` Lambda (`GET /verified-sites*` ). The API's `VerifiedSite` schema deliberately promises only pipeline-written fields (`siteCode` , `address` , `city` , `state` , `zip` , `fullAddress` , `locationCode` , `poCount` , `sourcePOs` ) — `latitude` /`longitude` /`notes` were manually curated legacy attributes the extractor never writes, and are not part of the contract.
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## Documentation
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The canonical map of Sea Haven's AWS infrastructure lives in Confluence. This project's `po-ingest` and `WorkorderIngestStack` stacks are represented there as Mermaid subgraphs.
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- **[AWS Architecture Map ](https://seahaven.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IT/pages/1540098 )** (Confluence, IT space, page 1540098)
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## CI/CD
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> **PLAT-86 (in progress):** CDK CD is soft-frozen (`deploy.yaml` disabled on GitHub) while ownership moves to HCP Terraform workspace `procurement-ingest-prod`. Terraform lives under `terraform/`; import map under `docs/plat-86/`. HCP becomes the sole mutate path after import + green Manual apply; then `deploy.yaml` / `cd-cdk.yaml` are retired. Post-apply smoke still targets `po-email-processor`, `workorder-email-processor`, and `procurement-api` via `scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh`.
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GitHub Actions with reusable workflows from `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github` (all pinned to a commit SHA of `main` ):
feat: widen email-processor asset roots to lambdas/ with scoped globs + excludes (refactor phase 2) (#109)
Both email-processor Code.from_asset calls now bundle from lambdas/
instead of their per-function subdirectory, so Phase 3's shared/
module is reachable from the asset root once it lands. The bundling
commands were rewritten for the new cwd (pip install -r <po|wo>/
email_processor/requirements.txt -t /asset-output && cp <po|wo>/
email_processor/*.py /asset-output/), preserving the ARM64
--platform manylinux2014_aarch64 --only-binary=:all: pin exactly —
its removal shipped x86 wheels into the ARM64 function and caused a
100% outage (PR #34).
All five from_asset calls (both email processors, po web_ui, po
site_extractor, wo web_ui) now exclude **/__pycache__/**; the two
widened ones also exclude **/tests/** and **/package/**. Without the
package/ exclude, the stale untracked 44 MB
lambdas/po/email_processor/package/ dir (local-only, never present
in CI) would diverge local vs CI asset hashes and force spurious
redeploys — from_asset doesn't honor .gitignore. That dir is left in
place; deleting it is Adam's call.
WO's prod zip shrinks as deliberate cleanup, not a byte-identical
match to PO: the old `cp -r .` shipped tests/ (real scrubbed .eml
fixtures), __pycache__/, and requirements.txt into production. The
acceptance bar for WO is runtime-imported module set unchanged +
smoke, not a byte-identical zip; PO keeps the byte-identical
first-party file set guarantee. tests/test_bundle_consistency.py is
updated in the same change to recognize the scoped
`cp po/email_processor/*.py` (resp. wo) glob as the new
unconditionally-safe shape, without loosening the allowlist-revert
detection, the detection-logic mutation test, or the
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES exact-set pin.
No code moved under lambdas/ in this change (git diff main...HEAD --
lambdas/ is empty); only CDK asset wiring and its tests changed.
2026-07-17 15:47:01 -04:00
- **CI** (`ci.yaml` , PR to `main` ): linting + `cdk synth` via `ci-python-sam.yaml` . `cdk synth` 's Docker-bundled asset build for `po-email-processor` and `workorder-email-processor` mounts the widened `../lambdas` asset root (Phase 2, see [Deploy-Pipeline Guards ](#deploy-pipeline-guards-phase-0 )) as build context, not just each function's own subdirectory — the `exclude` list on both `from_asset` calls strips local-only `__pycache__` /`package/` (and `tests/` ) cruft from that wider mount's source fingerprint, so CI's asset hash matches a clean local checkout, and each function's scoped `cp` glob copies only its own pipeline's `*.py` into the zip. (The exclude does not, and under `SOURCE` hashing cannot, keep the *other* pipeline's tracked source out of the fingerprint (see the PO bundling note above on `SOURCE` hashing) — but that source is identical in CI and local, so it does not cause hash divergence.)
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- **Terraform CI** (`ci-terraform.yaml` , PR to `main` when `terraform/**` changes): `fmt -check` , `init -backend=false` , `validate` .
- **CD** (`deploy.yaml` , push to `main` ): CDK deploy via `cd-cdk.yaml` (OIDC auth), followed by the synchronous `post-deploy-script: scripts/post-deploy-smoke.sh` healthcheck gate (see [Deploy-Pipeline Guards ](#deploy-pipeline-guards-phase-0 )) — `cd-cdk.yaml` 's `stack-name` input only accepts one stack, so the smoke script itself enumerates `po-email-processor` , `workorder-email-processor` , and `procurement-api` . **Soft-frozen for PLAT-86** (workflow disabled until HCP cutover seals).
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- Plus dependency review and PR labeler workflows on every PR
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Branch protection on `main` — all changes through PR.
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## Setup
Migrate to seahaven-prod: deploy role, backfill tooling, account-portability fixes (#125)
* feat(migration): prepare stacks and tooling for the seahaven-prod account move
Phase 1 of the mgmt (328440206208) -> seahaven-prod (011934824531)
migration. No behavior change in-account; everything here is additive or
account-portability hygiene:
- infra/deploy-role/: reviewed OIDC deploy-role artifacts for prod
(trust main-only, cdk-hnb659fds-* AssumeRole, smoke-invoke-lambda scoped
to exactly the two email-processor fn ARNs). Codifies the previously
out-of-band smoke-invoke grant.
- Table resource policies: make_slack_bot_read_policy in cdk/common.py,
applied to purchase-orders, verified-sites, WorkOrders,
WorkOrderComments (NOT pending-site-review; no bot consumer). Grants the
mgmt-resident seahaven-slack-bot roles read-only cross-account access
post-move (bot-side identity grants land in the slack-bot repo).
- scripts/migrate_tables.py: dry-run-default backfill tool implementing
the plan's per-table semantics (superset overwrite, ingested_at cutoff
for WorkOrderComments, backup-gated truncate-and-load for the two
site tables) plus a verify subcommand (count parity, spot checks,
sticky-Cancelled drift check).
- tests/test_resource_policy_helper.py: statement-shape unit tests +
static pins that exactly the four bot-read tables carry the policy.
- Account-literal fixes: account-agnostic fixture bucket in
test_reprocess_contract; runbook/README/po-template-parser account
references updated to prod with historical mgmt notes; README gains the
account-prerequisites list (imported-by-name dependencies).
deploy.yaml is deliberately unchanged (push-to-main auto-deploy kept).
Merge is held until migration Phase 0 completes; flipping the
AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_ARN repo secret and merging this PR IS the first prod
deploy.
* fix(migration): verify backup AVAILABLE pre-truncate; document wildcard risk acceptance (cross-review FIX/NIT)
* refactor(migration): drop cross-account read grants (slack-bot decommissioned); harden backfill + deploy role
seahaven-slack-bot was decommissioned 2026-07-23 (stack DELETE_IN_PROGRESS,
consumer Lambdas gone); its successor sh-mcp is undeployed and uses
same-account DynamoDB access. So no live consumer reads these tables
cross-account. Per Adam's call, drop the cross-account grants entirely and
re-add correctly-scoped ones if/when sh-mcp deploys to a different account.
- Remove the four table resource policies + make_slack_bot_read_policy helper
+ its constants (cdk/common.py, po_stack.py, wo_stack.py) and the helper's
unit test. Both stacks synth with zero table ResourcePolicy.
- scripts/migrate_tables.py hardening (fixes from the sh-security-review
fan-out on the destructive backfill tool):
* validate --cutoff strictly (parse ISO-8601, require aware UTC, re-emit
canonical second-precision form) so a malformed cutoff can't silently
copy dual-window rows or drop history;
* reject `copy --all` up front (must run tables individually, in order,
with the stream-drain wait) instead of writing three tables then erroring;
* truncate backup gate now also checks recency (<1h) and TableId, not just
status+name;
* verify requires --cutoff whenever a cutoff table is in scope (else it
false-flags dual-window rows as MISSING);
* sticky-cancel is now PREVENTED copy-side (a non-Cancelled source item
never overwrites a dest-Cancelled PO), and the verify comment no longer
overstates what its source-side scan covers;
* spot-check all modes (truncate_load keys are verbatim, so key-existence
is sound there too).
- Deploy role: scope cloudformation:DescribeStacks to this repo's stacks +
CDKToolkit (was Resource:*, disclosed all tenant stacks in the shared prod
account); add a drift check warning on unexpected role policies and drop the
dead SMOKE_POLICY_NAME var; document the shared-account bootstrap-role
accepted risk in the deploy-role README.
* docs(deploy-role): fold in cross-review NITs (DescribeStacks maintenance note, warn-only drift rationale)
* ci: update workflow to use new workflow tag (ruff versioning fix)
* fix(migration): address Open SWE review findings on migrate_tables.py
- Validate the truncate backup on dry-run as well as --execute so a
missing/stale/wrong-incarnation --backup-arn surfaces on the rehearsal
run (finding f_24a48b8900).
- Assert configured keys match the live key schema of both tables before
any key projection, turning config/schema drift into a descriptive
abort instead of a mid-backfill KeyError (finding f_cb6b5a6c59).
- Clarify why key-existence spot-checks are sound for WorkOrderComments:
the copy Puts source items verbatim and the sample uses the same
cutoff filter, so per-account comment_id divergence never enters the
check (finding f_390b7d6c3b is a false positive; comment hardened).
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**Account prerequisites** — the stacks import four dependencies by name, so all
of these must exist in the target account BEFORE the first deploy (in
seahaven-prod they are provisioned by the seahaven-org-baseline repo and the
migration Phase 0 runbook):
- SES receipt rule set `INBOUND_MAIL` (may be inactive; the stacks attach
their receipt rules to it) + a verified `int.seahaven.com` domain identity
- SNS topic `site-alerts` (with the `alias/seahaven-alarm-topics` CMK)
- SSM param `/seahaven/dynamodb/cmk-arn` -> KMS `alias/seahaven-dynamodb`
- Secrets Manager secret `procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token` (step 3)
- OIDC deploy role `githubdeploy-procurement-ingest` (see `infra/deploy-role/` )
with the `smoke-invoke-lambda` policy, or the post-deploy smoke gate fails
closed
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1. Bootstrap CDK: `cdk bootstrap aws://{AccountId}/us-east-1`
2026-08-04 19:12:42 -04:00
2. Bedrock model access (account first-use). The Bedrock **Model access** console page is retired; serverless foundation models enable on first invoke. Anthropic models may still require a one-time use-case form (`PutUseCaseForModelAccess` ) before agreement APIs succeed — that is already done for Sea Haven. Marketplace-served models (including Claude Haiku 4.5) additionally need one account-wide Marketplace subscription: an admin principal with `aws-marketplace:ViewSubscriptions` / `Subscribe` must call `CreateFoundationModelAgreement` (or successfully `InvokeModel` once) for `anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0` in `us-east-1` . After the agreement reaches `AVAILABLE` (often ~2 minutes), processor Lambdas can `InvokeModel` with only their existing `bedrock:InvokeModel` grants — do **not** put `aws-marketplace:*` on `po-email-processor` / `workorder-email-processor` unless that first-use path still AccessDenies after the account agreement is `AVAILABLE` . The CDK grants already cover the `us.*` inference profile plus cross-region foundation-model ARNs (`us-east-1` / `us-east-2` / `us-west-2` ). No API key or secret to set — the processors authenticate to Bedrock via their IAM roles.
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
3. Create the web UI auth-gate shared secret. This secret is **imported by name**
(`Secret.from_secret_name_v2` ), not CDK-managed, so it must exist before deploy
or the web-ui Lambdas fail closed:
Land safe fixes from 2026-06-17 security sweep (#97)
* Remove gratuitous KMS grant on shared DynamoDB CMK
wo-email-processor held grant_encrypt_decrypt on the shared
seahaven-dynamodb CMK, but the WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments tables
are not encrypted with that CMK. The grant was dead weight that
extended the WO processor's decrypt reach to the CMK protecting the
purchase-orders table (cross-stack decrypt). Drop it to restore
least privilege; re-add as part of the table CMK migration (INFRA-6).
Refs: INFRA-6
* Require Secrets Manager key for Anthropic client
Remove the silent fallback to a plaintext ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var
in both email processors; require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN and
raise if absent so a misconfigured deploy fails loudly instead of
using an unmanaged key.
Adapted from f175323 on security/sweep-2026-06-17. The From-header
sender-domain allowlist from that commit is intentionally dropped:
the From header is spoofable (INFRA-107, confirmed critical) and
sender authentication is being reworked in a separate PR.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Merge PO revisions and handle out-of-order events
save_revision did a full put_item overwrite, so a revision omitting
line_items/supplier permanently deleted them. save_new_po used a
conditional put that silently dropped the PO when an out-of-order
cancellation had already created a skeleton row.
Switch both to field-level merge update_items: a revision now SETs
only the fields it carries, and a new_po backfills data into a
pre-existing Cancelled skeleton while preserving the Cancelled
status. No email can now delete data established by an earlier one.
* Gate web UIs behind auth and escape currency XSS
The po-web-ui and workorder-web-ui handlers had no auth: any
invocation path returned the full PO/WO DB. Add a fail-closed
shared-secret gate (X-Auth-Token / Bearer, constant-time compared to
WEB_UI_AUTH_TOKEN) so a future re-attached Function URL cannot
re-expose the data (URLs removed under INFRA-74). Wire the token from
the SSM String param /procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token.
Also fix stored XSS in po-web-ui fmt_currency: the non-numeric
fallback returned str(val) unescaped, so a prompt-injected email
could make Claude emit total_amount as <script>. Escape it.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Document sweep security fixes and merge semantics
Update the README for the 2026-06-17 security sweep: required
Secrets Manager key (no plaintext env fallback), web UI auth gate +
SSM token setup step, output-escaping note, and the new PO
revision/cancellation merge behavior.
Adapted from d91f45e on security/sweep-2026-06-17; the sender
allowlist documentation is dropped along with the allowlist itself
(deferred to the INFRA-107 sender-authentication rework).
Refs: INFRA-107
* fix: resolve web UI auth token from Secrets Manager at runtime
Replace the plaintext SSM String parameter with a Secrets Manager secret
referenced by ARN only. The token is fetched and cached at module level on
first invocation, keeping shared secrets out of CloudFormation templates and
Lambda environment variables.
Refs: PR-97
* Add TTL to web UI auth token cache for rotation
The web-ui handlers cached the Secrets Manager auth token at module
level with no expiry, so a rotated secret was only picked up when the
warm container recycled — an emergency rotation could take hours to
take effect. Cache the fetched value for a 5-minute TTL instead, so a
rotated token propagates within the TTL while still avoiding a Secrets
Manager call on every request. Still fails closed when the secret is
unset or unreadable.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Log Secrets Manager failures in web UI auth token fetch
The web UI auth gate correctly fails closed when the shared token
cannot be read, but _get_auth_token() swallowed every exception
silently. A Secrets Manager permission or config error then made
every request 401 with no operational signal, leaving an outage
indistinguishable from ordinary unauthenticated traffic.
Add a module-level logger to both web_ui handlers and log the
fetch failure with logger.exception() in the except block before
returning None. Behavior is unchanged (still fails closed); the
failure is now visible in CloudWatch. The secret value is never
logged. The two handlers stay byte-consistent in the mirrored
_get_auth_token() region.
The companion finding on the CDK import of the shared
procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token secret was evaluated and left
as-is: the token is a single secret shared by both the PO and WO
stacks, so from_secret_name_v2 (which scopes grant_read via the
standard 6-char suffix wildcard) is correct; making it a CDK-managed
Secret in both stacks would collide the two stacks on the same
explicit secret name at deploy time.
Refs: INFRA-74
* Make Cancelled PO status sticky via atomic write
The PO merge path read status with a get_item (_is_cancelled) and then
wrote with an unconditional update_item. Two defects followed from this:
- Race (Issue A): a cancellation landing between the read and the write
was silently un-cancelled by a revision carrying a non-cancelled
po_status — a TOCTOU on a table with concurrent email processing.
- Over-broad strip (Issue B): save_revision dropped po_status whenever
the PO was Cancelled, so legitimate status updates on non-cancelled
POs and status-less revisions were affected rather than only the true
un-cancel transition.
Enforce the invariant server-side instead. "Cancelled" is a sticky,
authoritative status: once set, later new_po/revision emails may enrich
other fields but must never move it to a non-cancelled status. When the
payload carries a non-cancelled po_status, _merge_update issues the
update_item guarded by ConditionExpression "attribute_not_exists(po_status)
OR po_status <> :marker", evaluated atomically at write time, so a
cancellation that lands first always wins. On ConditionalCheckFailedException
the same fields are re-written without po_status/cancelled_at, enriching the
record while Cancelled sticks. Payloads with no status change, or an already
-Cancelled status, take a plain merge — the status is only ever suppressed on
a real un-cancel. This removes the non-atomic get_item from the write path;
_is_cancelled is deleted. Key schema and attribute names are unchanged, so the
cross-stack purchase-orders contract (read-only by seahaven-slack-bot) holds.
Add moto-backed tests covering un-cancel suppression with field enrichment,
status-less merge onto a Cancelled PO, legitimate status updates on
non-cancelled POs, new_po backfill of a Cancelled skeleton, fresh
create/merge, and authoritative save_cancellation.
Refs: #97
2026-07-15 20:17:46 -04:00
```bash
aws secretsmanager create-secret --name procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token --secret-string "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
```
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
4. Deploy both stacks:
2026-04-20 19:31:22 -04:00
```bash
cd cdk
pip install -r requirements.txt
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
cdk deploy --all
2026-04-20 19:31:22 -04:00
```
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
5. **Post-deploy cleanup (one-time):** the retired `RETAIN` -policy secrets `po-ingest/anthropic-api-key` and `workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key` are orphaned by this deploy, not deleted. Remove them and revoke the keys at the provider:
2026-07-15 19:00:43 -04:00
```bash
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
aws secretsmanager delete-secret --secret-id po-ingest/anthropic-api-key --force-delete-without-recovery
aws secretsmanager delete-secret --secret-id workorder-ingest/anthropic-api-key --force-delete-without-recovery
2026-07-15 19:00:43 -04:00
```
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
6. Dashboards: `po-web-ui` and `workorder-web-ui` have no public endpoint (the Function URLs were removed 2026-06-08, INFRA-74). A bare `aws lambda invoke --function-name po-web-ui /tmp/out.json` with no headers in the event is guaranteed a `401` — the handler fails closed (see [Web UI auth ](#security )). Fetch the token and forward it in the event's `headers` :
```bash
TOKEN=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id procurement-ingest/web-ui-auth-token --query SecretString --output text)
aws lambda invoke --function-name po-web-ui --payload "{\"headers\":{\"x-auth-token\":\"$TOKEN\"}}" /tmp/out.json
```
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
## Tests
Offline unit tests (no AWS, no network) run via pytest from the repo root:
```bash
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
pip install -r tests/requirements.txt
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
pytest
```
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
**Test-root consolidation (Phase 8).** Both test roots are kept (`tests/` for genuinely cross-pipeline suites, plus each pipeline's own `lambdas/*/email_processor/tests/` ), but loading is now single-sourced. A new repo-root `conftest.py` — not `tests/conftest.py` , which is never an ancestor of the pipeline test roots and so cannot load for a standalone `pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run — sets the dummy AWS env, imports `moto` before any handler import (registers moto's botocore stubber hook so boto3 sessions created afterwards are stubbable), and exposes the one `load_lambda_module(pipeline, name)` loader (implemented in `tests/support/loader.py` ) that every handler exec in the suite goes through, including its `sys.modules` save/restore dance for the per-pipeline duplicated bare names (`template_parser` , `persistence` , etc. — `derived_fields` /`prompts` /`telemetry` /`extraction` /`enrichment` too). `tests/support/` is a small shared package (`FakeTable` , `FakeDynamoResource` , `FakeS3` , `load_email` , `load_golden` ) used by both pipelines' `_po_parser_support.py` /`_wo_parser_support.py` shims — `load_golden` decodes JSON money with `parse_float=Decimal` unconditionally (load-bearing for PO's exact-money goldens; proven safe for WO, whose 55 golden fixtures contain zero float-typed JSON numbers). `test_local.py` (a root-level manual script that imported a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate, and globbed a nonexistent `samples/` dir) is deleted — the golden suites cover its role.
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
Coverage:
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
- `tests/` — shared handler + cross-pipeline tests: `parse_raw_email` (`test_parse_raw_email.py` ), the fail-closed sender-authentication parser (`test_ses_auth.py` , INFRA-107), the Phase 0 CDK-bundling/handler-import AST consistency check (`test_bundle_consistency.py` — see [Deploy-Pipeline Guards ](#deploy-pipeline-guards-phase-0 )), the `scripts/reprocess.py` synthetic S3-event-shape contract (`test_reprocess_contract.py` , Phase 7), and, new in Phase 8: the handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline (`test_handler_auth_seam.py` — no auth monkeypatch + an empty `ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS` must yield zero Bedrock calls, zero writes, no raise), and both web_ui functions' first coverage — fail-closed auth (`test_web_ui_auth.py` ) and the handlers themselves, including a 401-without-a-table-scan assertion and a hostile-field escaping regression lock (`test_web_ui_handlers.py` ).
- `lambdas/wo/email_processor/tests/` — the deterministic WO parser suite: golden-file tests over 55 real scrubbed `.eml` fixtures (`test_parser.py` ), fail-closed validation-gate rules and adversarial/injection cases (`test_validation_gate.py` ), the issue #23 `comment_id` idempotency invariants (`test_comment_id.py` ), the Bedrock-fallback dispatch/EMF-metric behavior with a mocked `invoke_model` (`test_bedrock_fallback.py` , which also carries the Phase 5 behavior pins — WO's mutually-exclusive emit and the `[0-9]+` key guard ahead of both saves), and the Phase 0 direct-invoke healthcheck contract (`test_healthcheck.py` ). Golden JSON lives under `tests/fixtures/expected/` . New in Phase 8: `test_wo_bedrock_transport.py` (transport errors — throttle, missing `content` , empty content, non-JSON model text — plus the hand-computed no-double-count pin for the `handler.py` except-and-reraise metric wrap, and the multi-record failure-isolation pin) and `test_wo_merge.py` (a moto-backed mirror of `test_po_merge.py` against the `WorkOrders` table — null-status never clobbers `wo_status` , `created_at` immutable, `status` →`wo_status` mapping, `None` fields absent from `SET` , `record_type` only-when-present). After Phase 5 the suite patches accessors on the owning siblings (`extraction.bedrock` , `persistence.dynamodb` , `persistence.datetime` , `persistence.save_*` ) rather than on `handler` .
- `lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/` — the deterministic PO parser suite: golden-file tests over real scrubbed `.eml` fixtures (17 single-line new-PO + 8 cancellations, exact `Decimal` -aware golden comparison via `parse_float=Decimal` ), fail-closed validation-gate coverage for **every** gate reason code (fixture-driven for body-level triggers under `fixtures/adversarial/` , direct `validate()` unit tests for candidate-level mutations), real multi-line and comment/non-Coupa fallback fixtures under `fixtures/ai-fallback/` , dual line-ending (CRLF/LF) parse-identity, two-path `enrich_parsed` /`save_new_po` parity (the site-extractor stream-contract guard), fixture hygiene (`ses_auth` pass + scrub-marker leak sweep), the Bedrock-fallback dispatch/EMF-metric behavior plus the Phase 5 behavior pins (`test_po_bedrock_fallback.py` — the pre-Bedrock `ai_fallback` emit and the additive rejected double-count), the `_save_merge` collapse parity to both `save_new_po` /`save_revision` (`test_po_save_merge_parity.py` ), the `ai_fallback` -only shadow telemetry after the `enrich_parsed` move (`test_po_derived_wiring.py` , which gains the PO-DC-02 64-char `po_number` clamp regression pin in Phase 8), and the Phase 0 direct-invoke healthcheck contract (`test_po_healthcheck.py` ). New in Phase 8: `test_po_bedrock_transport.py` (the same four transport-error cases as WO, asserting the pre-call `ai_fallback` metric survives and no partial write occurs, plus the multi-record failure-isolation pin) and, moved here from `tests/` : `test_po_merge.py` (#97 , moto-backed merge-write semantics) and `test_pad_zip.py` (zip-code padding). After Phase 5 the suite patches accessors/constants on the owning siblings (`po_extraction.bedrock` /`.BEDROCK_MODEL_ID` /`._EMAIL_TAG_RE` , `po_persistence.dynamodb` /`.PO_TABLE` , `po_enrichment.derive_all` /`.pad_zip` , `po_telemetry.DERIVED_METRIC_NAME` ) rather than on `po_handler` ; re-exported names it calls (`save_*` , `extract_with_claude` , `enrich_parsed` , `_emit_parse_method_metric` , `EXTRACTION_PROMPT` ) stay on `po_handler` .
feat: template-first WO parser + Bedrock fallback, PO Bedrock switch (#99)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* Fix WO parser advisories A1-A3 (PR #99 follow-ups)
A1 — AI-fallback comment_id nondeterminism: parsed comment_time is model
output and not stable across Lambda async retries, so on the ai_fallback
path the comment_id range-key time segment now derives from the email Date
header (deterministic per S3 object) instead of the model's comment_time.
The template path is unchanged (its comment_time is a pure function of the
raw email). Bedrock invoke pins temperature 0 so retries reproduce the same
extraction. Closes the #23 reopening on the AI path.
A2 — EMF record now carries the spec-required _aws.Timestamp (epoch ms) so
CloudWatch reliably extracts the ParseOutcome datapoint that the
fallback-rate alarm depends on.
A3 — T1 New Comment capture no longer truncates at the first blank line;
multi-paragraph comments are captured through internal blanks and terminate
at the next label/separator. 17 golden files regenerated from the real
fixtures accordingly.
Hardening from the sh-security-review pass on this diff:
- _header_date_iso is total: OverflowError/OSError from an extreme Date
header fall back to 'nocomment' instead of failing the invocation.
- _capture_block trims blanks in O(n) (no pop(0)) — removes a quadratic
path on a crafted large blank run.
- work_order_id is enforced digits-only on BOTH parse paths before it is
used as a DynamoDB key, so prompt-injected AI output cannot forge '#'
range-key segments or land on an arbitrary WO.
2026-07-16 12:45:11 -04:00
feat: template-first PO parser with fail-closed gate and Bedrock fallback (#105)
* Add deterministic template parser for WO emails
The workorder-email-processor sends every one of ~22.9k emails/month to
an LLM, but ~93.6% are the plain-text "AMAZON UPDATE WO DETAILS" comment
template and ~6.4% the HTML "AMAZON assign Work Order" template. Parse
those two shapes deterministically, offline, so the AI call is reserved
for the long tail.
The module is pure (no boto3, no network). try_deterministic_parse
classifies by subject, extracts the shared contract fields, and returns
a result ONLY when it passes a strict fail-closed validation gate: exact
contract-key set, subject/id agreement, the literal "Work Order: <id>"
double space, per-type required fields, site-code shape, and a
label-bleed guard so a value that over-ran into the next field fails.
Any miss, drift, or extractor exception yields None so the caller falls
back to the AI extractor -- data is never corrupted, only the fallback
rate rises.
Refs: #23
* Migrate WO processor to Bedrock and fix comment_id collision
Switch the AI path from the Anthropic SDK to bedrock-runtime InvokeModel
on the inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
(BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so parsing no longer needs a provider API key or
Secrets Manager secret. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT and JSON contract are kept
byte-identical, so the AI-fallback output is unchanged. Try the new
deterministic template parser first and only call Bedrock on a
miss/invalid result.
Fix issue #23: the WorkOrderComments range key was
work_order_id#<comment_time>, so two emails on one WO with an identical
or absent comment time collided and overwrote each other. Derive a
12-hex suffix from the S3 object key alone -- deterministic, so an async
retry of the same object is byte-identical (idempotent) while distinct
emails get distinct keys -- and keep wall-clock now() out of the key
(literal 'nocomment' segment when comment_time is absent).
Also emit one CloudWatch EMF line per record (Seahaven/WorkorderIngest
ParseOutcome, dimensioned by ParseMethod/TemplateId) for parse-outcome
observability, replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc), and drop the anthropic dependency.
Refs: #23
* Migrate PO processor to Bedrock
Switch the PO email processor's AI extraction from the Anthropic SDK to
bedrock-runtime InvokeModel on the inference profile
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0 (BEDROCK_MODEL_ID env), so
it no longer needs a provider API key or Secrets Manager secret. PO
parsing stays fully AI -- only the provider changes. The EXTRACTION_PROMPT
is kept byte-identical and the Bedrock text output is still decoded with
json.loads(..., parse_float=Decimal), which DynamoDB requires (it rejects
floats). Replace the deprecated datetime.utcnow() with
datetime.now(timezone.utc) and drop the anthropic dependency.
* Grant Bedrock IAM, drop Anthropic secrets, add fallback alarm
Both stacks moved their processors from the Anthropic API to the Bedrock
inference profile us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0. Grant each
processor role bedrock:InvokeModel + bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream
on BOTH the inference-profile ARN AND the per-region foundation-model
ARNs for us-east-1/us-east-2/us-west-2 (empty-account) -- the us.* profile
routes cross-region, so a profile-only grant AccessDenies at runtime.
Remove both anthropic-api-key Secret constructs, their grant_read, and
the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_SECRET_ARN env; add BEDROCK_MODEL_ID. The secrets
had RemovalPolicy.RETAIN so they are orphaned, not deleted -- flagged in
the README for manual post-deploy deletion and key revocation.
Add the workorder-email-processor-template-fallback-rate alarm: a
FILL(0) + >=10-sample volume-floor MathExpression over the EMF
ParseOutcome metric (15-min periods) that pages when the AI-fallback
share exceeds 15% sustained, catching Hexagon template drift. ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, no OK action, NOT_BREACHING, matching the
existing stack idiom.
* Add offline WO parser test suite
Cover the deterministic parser with golden-file tests over 55 real
scrubbed .eml fixtures (both comment sub-shapes, username Submitted-By,
address present/absent, br+CRLF assign addresses), fail-closed
validation-gate rules, adversarial and prompt-injection cases that must
route to ai_fallback or parse without corrupting other fields, the issue
#23 comment_id idempotency invariants, and the Bedrock-fallback dispatch
plus EMF-metric emission with a mocked invoke_model.
Extend pytest.ini testpaths to discover the co-located suite, and update
tests/conftest.load_handler to put a handler's own directory on sys.path
so the WO handler's new `from template_parser import ...` resolves under
the existing shared handler tests. Point test_local.py at the new
template-first + Bedrock flow.
Refs: #23
* Document Bedrock migration and WO parse flow in README
Record the provider switch to the Bedrock inference profile (no Anthropic
API key or Secrets Manager secret, with the retired secrets flagged for
manual deletion), the WO deterministic-template-first + AI-fallback flow,
the new ParseOutcome EMF metric and template-fallback-rate alarm, the
issue #23 comment_id format change, the +00:00 aware-UTC timestamp shift,
and offline test instructions.
Refs: #23
* Fix f-string lint and formatting in backfill scripts
Drop the f prefix from two f-strings that carry no placeholders
(F541) and apply ruff format, so `ruff check` / `ruff format --check`
pass in CI.
* Emit ParseMethod-only EMF set so fallback alarm can fire
The fallback-rate alarm queries the ParseOutcome series keyed on
ParseMethod alone, but the emitter published only the joint
(ParseMethod, TemplateId) dimension set. CloudWatch materializes
exactly the listed dimension sets and does not auto-aggregate, so the
alarm's series never received data: it evaluated a constant 0 and
could never page on template-drift coverage collapse.
Publish both ["ParseMethod"] and ["ParseMethod","TemplateId"] and
update the EMF regression test to assert both sets are present.
* Commit WO parser .eml fixtures for executable coverage
The parser test suite globbed for input .eml fixtures that the repo's
`*.eml` ignore rule kept uncommitted, so every parametrized golden and
fail-closed test collected zero cases and CI could not exercise the
deterministic parser that handles 100% of WO email volume.
Add a fixtures-only negation to .gitignore and commit the 55 scrubbed
positive samples (50 update-plaintext, 5 assign-html) plus 14
ai-fallback and 3 adversarial fixtures. The ai-fallback set covers each
fail-closed reason code (subject_no_match, single_space_work_order,
malformed_site_code, label_bleed, creation_time_unparseable,
wo_id_mismatch, missing_required_field) and the adversarial set proves
the parser is total and confines prompt-injection payloads to
comment_text without steering the structured fields.
* feature: Add PO template parser scaffold and design doc
Mirror WO PR #99's template-first approach for the Coupa PO processor. Two templates identified from a full 3,448-email triage:
- coupa_new_po (95.5%): scaffolded; fails closed to the LLM until extract_new_po lands.
- coupa_cancellation (2.9%): implemented.
Nested contract with recursive validation, Decimal money, and a fail-closed gate. Derived fields (site_code/trade/fiscal_year) are deferred to a shared post-stage. Comments, revisions, multi-line, and non-USD emails fall back to Bedrock. docs/po-template-parser.md records the investigation, decisions, and remaining work.
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
* Implement PO new_po extraction and value-level gate
Replace the extract_new_po scaffold stub with the full
section-windowed extractor (duplicate-label anchoring, sentinel
ship-to, label-keyed U+2022 bullet split, Decimal money from three
anchored contexts only) and add value-level gate rules V1-V13.
Both new_po_not_implemented scaffold guards are removed; rules 6-8
(unrecognized_status, multiline_unsupported, non_usd) go live.
The gate re-derives every byte proof from the email body so an
extractor bug cannot vouch for itself: amount re-serialization
with a digit/comma border check (the thousands-separator
truncation kill switch), sum(lines)==total against both Total
blocks, anchor/supplier identity proofs, USPS address shape on
the raw pre-enrichment zip, bullet label discipline, and
sentinel/artifact hygiene. Any failure falls closed to the LLM;
a validation failure is never a parsed result.
Refs: #99
* Wire template-first parse into PO handler with EMF metric
Run try_deterministic_parse ahead of the Bedrock extractor and
fall back only on a miss/invalid (fail-closed) result. The shared
enrich_parsed post-stage and the save_cancellation/save_revision/
save_new_po routing are untouched, so both paths write identical
DynamoDB shapes and the po-ingest-site-extractor stream contract
is preserved.
Each record emits one ParseMethod EMF line (Seahaven/PoIngest/
ParseOutcome, dimension sets [ParseMethod] and
[ParseMethod,TemplateId], ReasonCode/po_number ride-alongs)
mirroring the WO idiom. The metric fires before the Bedrock call
so a Bedrock-side error still records the ai_fallback outcome.
Refs: #99
* Add PO fallback-rate alarm retuned for ~57 emails/day
The WO alarm's 15-min period and >=10-sample floor assume
~760/day and would be structurally dead at PO volume (a 15-min
period holds ~0.6 emails, so the floor is never met). Retune:
6-hour periods (~14.25 expected emails), IF((fb+tmpl)>=8,...)
volume floor so a single email can never breach a datapoint
(1/8 = 12.5% < 20%), threshold >20% against a ~1% expected
baseline, eval 4 / datapoints 2 (24h span) so noise self-clears
while total template drift pages within ~12h. No element-wise
MAX in the math expression (post-#102 rule); ALARM-only
SnsAction to site-alerts, NOT_BREACHING. Gated with
'npx cdk synth po-ingest'.
Also add template_parser.py to the bundling cp list -- without it
every deployed invocation would ImportError (unit tests cannot
catch an asset-bundling omission).
Refs: #99, #102
* Add offline PO parser suite with scrubbed fixture corpus
132 tests: golden-file comparison for all 25 positive fixtures
(17 single-line new-PO + 8 cancellations, Decimal-exact via
parse_float=Decimal), every fail-closed gate reason code covered
(body-level triggers via 17 synthetic adversarial .eml mutations,
candidate-level via direct validate() unit tests), real multi-line
and comment/non-Coupa fallback fixtures, dual line-ending parse
identity, two-path enrich/save parity (site-extractor stream
guard), V10 URL-id corpus sweep, fixture hygiene (ses_auth pass +
scrub-marker leak sweep), and Bedrock dispatch/EMF assertions.
The suite loads handler/template_parser via importlib under
unique module names and binds the handler's bare sibling imports
around exec (tests/conftest.py load_handler gets the same
treatment) -- the WO suite caches bare 'handler'/'template_parser'
names in sys.modules, and bare imports here would silently bind
to the wrong pipeline. moto is imported before the handler so its
botocore stubber hook precedes boto3 session creation (the PO
conftest chain now loads at pytest session start).
Fixtures are scrubbed real S3 samples: transport/auth header
values replaced with same-shape placeholders (structure kept so
ses_auth still passes), per-file digit ciphers, amounts remapped
with sum==total re-established. The .gitignore exception is
scoped to the PO fixtures path only.
Refs: #99
* Document PO template-first parser and retuned alarm
README: PO flow is now template-first with Bedrock fallback;
parser/gate section mirroring the WO writeup; Seahaven/PoIngest
ParseOutcome namespace and the fallback-rate alarm numbers with
their volume justification (deliberately not WO's settings);
test-suite and repo-layout updates.
Design doc: mark PR #1 complete in progress/checklist sections;
document the six value-level gate reason codes and the scaffold
guard removal; correct the stale data-access note (default CLI
session is 328440206208) and note the ~90-day S3 lifecycle aging
of the corpus; record the 2.3 layout addendum (leading Supplier
bullet segment, EA evidence lines, summary unit-price tokens,
decode-path line endings), the fixture-build pins (address join
convention, quantity/unit/price source), the V10 sweep outcome,
and resolutions for open questions Q3/Q6. Cross-family review and
the Confluence architecture-map update are flagged outstanding
for merge.
Refs: #99
* Record cross-family review outcome for handler wiring
GPT-4.1 cross_review.py run against the real handler diff
returned no BLOCK and no security findings; both FIX items
verified as no-change-needed (fallback logging already correct;
non-dict AI output is the pre-existing issue #101 pattern this
PR deliberately does not touch).
Refs: #99
* Pin line-item currency to USD in the PO gate
The non_usd rule only checked the Total-block top-level currency, so a
new_po whose line item read 'for 55,206.00 CAD' under a USD Total block
still template-parsed as ok -- a fail-open hole in the fail-closed
gate. Every line item's captured currency and its re-derived body token
must now byte-equal the proven-USD top-level currency; covered by a
line-level CAD adversarial fixture (the existing adv-non-usd only
exercised the Total-block variant) and a candidate-mutation unit test.
* Scrub residual transport tokens from PO fixtures
The first-pass harvest scrub sanitized only the primary SES/DKIM
header blocks, leaving the real SES Feedback-ID sender-identity hash
in 49 committed fixtures and, on the two non-Coupa fixtures, an
embedded second SES block's X-Ses-Receipt, the Exchange cross-tenant
UPN ciphertext, and Gmail ARC fh= / X-Gm-* tokens -- exactly the
token classes the PR #99 fixture lesson requires placeholdered.
Replace each with a same-shape ScrubbedFixture value (byte-safe,
CRLF and folding preserved) so header structure and ses_auth
behavior are unchanged.
* Converge quantity/price to Decimal on both paths
EXTRACTION_PROMPT declares quantity and price as JSON strings, so a
prompt-obedient Bedrock response stores DynamoDB Strings where the
template parser stores Numbers -- divergent attribute types for the
same email on the purchase-orders stream. Coerce numeric strings to
Decimal in the shared enrich_parsed post-stage (thousands-separator
safe; non-numeric strings kept verbatim) so both paths converge;
prompt rewording itself remains PR #2 scope.
The two-path parity test was circular -- it replayed the parser-
derived golden as 'the LLM output', so it could never see the type
divergence. It now feeds a prompt-shaped payload (string quantity/
price, LLM-filled site_code) through enrich_parsed and save_new_po,
and the fixture-hygiene test now asserts the scrubbed transport-token
header classes so fixture regressions are caught.
* Coerce bare-int quantity/price to Decimal in enrich_parsed
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the final PR diff (no BLOCK) flagged
residual type drift: parse_float=Decimal rules out floats on the LLM
path, but a bare JSON int survived as Python int. Coerce it so both
parse paths emit one canonical Decimal type.
* Scrub fixture-body PII and harden cancellation gate (sec review)
/sh-security-review of PR #105 (5 fresh-context detectors + proof-or-kill
verifier) confirmed two diff-introduced findings; both fixed here.
F3 (medium, real PII in new fixtures): the harvest scrub replaced header
tokens but left real third-party PII in message BODIES -- an Amazon
contact's name/phone/personal email in non-coupa-02.eml and an internal
t.corp.amazon.com ticket URL in comment-02.eml, plus real submitter/attn
names recurring across the new_po corpus. Replaced every personal name,
phone, personal email, and internal URL with synthetic placeholders
(QP-soft-wrap aware) across both .eml bodies and expected goldens.
Extended test_fixture_hygiene to scan BODIES (phone shapes, corp URLs,
the leaked tokens), closing the header-only gap that let this through.
F1 (medium, cancellation gate): _CANCELLATION_SUBJECT was unanchored and
matched with .search(), unlike the anchored new_po pattern -- a subject
merely ending with the cancellation phrase could be routed to the sticky-
Cancelled write. Fully anchored it and switched to .match, and added a
body-corroboration gate (the real Coupa body independently restates
'Purchase Order #<po> ... has been cancelled'); a near-miss/misrouted
subject whose body does not corroborate now fails closed to the LLM
(new reason code cancellation_body_unconfirmed).
Pre-existing (advisory, not this PR): the LLM-fallback else->save_new_po
dispatch and undelimited extraction prompt (issue #101 family) are
byte-identical to main and unchanged here.
401 tests pass; ruff/format clean; cdk synth po-ingest clean.
---------
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <166072409+amoussa1229@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-16 17:50:59 -04:00
All three roots are discovered by `pytest.ini` (`testpaths` ).
2026-04-20 19:31:22 -04:00
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
**Coverage floor (Phase 8).** `pytest.ini` 's `addopts` runs `pytest-cov` with an explicit `--cov` path per first-party package (`lambdas/po/email_processor` , `lambdas/wo/email_processor` , `lambdas/po/web_ui` , `lambdas/wo/web_ui` , `lambdas/po/site_extractor` , `lambdas/shared` ) rather than relying on an `__init__.py` package marker — none of these dirs have one, and adding one would perturb the CDK bundling asset-hash fingerprint for zero runtime benefit; `pytest-cov` 's path form measures by source file regardless of package markers. `site_extractor` is deliberately included even though it measures 0% until Phase 6 lands — coverage honesty, not a silent skip. `.coveragerc` omits `*/tests/*` and `*/cdk.out/*` so the pipeline test dirs (which sit inside their own `--cov` path) don't dilute the number. `--cov-fail-under` is the new permanent CI floor (constraint 10 — never ratcheted down).
**Ruff C901/PLR floor (Phase 8).** `ruff.toml` adds `extend-select = ["C901", "PLR"]` with `max-complexity = 12` , making the tree's pre-existing `# noqa: PLR09xx` suppressions load-bearing instead of inert (no config previously enabled the rules they suppressed). `scripts/` is in the lint scope. Findings that could not be split or were out of this phase's file-ownership were resolved with a per-file `[lint.per-file-ignores]` entry carrying a written justification — most notably `derived_fields.py` (shadow-bake freeze: even an in-file `noqa` comment is a barred edit) and the other Phase 3/5/6/7 frozen modules (`enrichment.py` , WO `template_parser.py` , both `ses_auth.py` /`emf.py` , `site_extractor/handler.py` , `scripts/reprocess.py` ). PO's `template_parser.py` — this phase's one in-scope split target — clears the ceiling by decomposing `extract_new_po` and `_validate_new_po_values` into per-rule helpers instead of an ignore.
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
## Scripts
2026-04-20 19:31:22 -04:00
Ops/recovery tooling + dependency hygiene (refactor phase 7) (#110)
* feat: ops/recovery tooling + dependency hygiene (refactor phase 7)
Generalize scripts/reprocess.py from a PO-only full-sweep script into a
pipeline-general recovery tool. Targeted replay (--key/--prefix/--since)
is now the default, and the full inbound/ sweep is demoted behind an
explicit --all that documents its five hazards (async concurrency does
not serialize, use RequestResponse if order matters, metric double-count,
Bedrock re-bill, out-of-order field regression). --pipeline po|wo resolves
the correct function + bucket; dry-run-by-default / --execute is preserved.
A new tests/test_reprocess_contract.py pins the synthetic S3 event shape
and asserts the raw list_objects_v2 key is emitted untransformed (the
handler is the single decode point; a pre-decoded key would corrupt keys
containing spaces or '+').
Add docs/runbook-dlq-recovery.md: the async on-failure DLQ has no console
redrive-to-source, so it documents the receive -> extract key -> targeted
reprocess --key -> verify -> purge procedure, the real recovery windows
(14-day DLQ breadcrumb, 90-day raw-email S3 that overrides the table
RETAIN policy and is the true replay floor), and that sender-auth and
ai_fallback_rejected drops are fail-closed skips that never reach the DLQ.
Linked from the README alarms and scripts sections.
Drop the vendored boto3 floor pin from both email-processor requirements
(the Lambda runtime provides boto3; lambda-template.md empty-with-comment
form). With nothing left to install, the email-processor bundling becomes
cp-only -- the whole pip step is removed, which is the only acceptable way
the manylinux2014_aarch64 pin disappears (removing the pin while keeping a
pip install caused the PR #34 x86-wheel outage). Exact-pin moto==5.2.2 and
add pinned po/web_ui + po/site_extractor manifests (excluded from their
bundles, so hash-neutral) so their new Dependabot entries have something
to act on; add Dependabot entries for /tests, /lambdas/po/web_ui, and
/lambdas/po/site_extractor.
cdk diff is confined to exactly the two email processors' asset hashes on
both stacks. The wo/web_ui dead-manifest reduction was deliberately left
out: that manifest already ships inside the plain (non-bundled) WebUI
asset on main, so reducing or excluding it would redeploy workorder-web-ui
for no functional change -- deferred to keep the blast radius to the two
intended targets.
The untracked 44 MB lambdas/po/email_processor/package/ dir was removed
from the filesystem (asset-hash-neutral given Phase 2's package/ exclude);
it is untracked, so there is nothing to commit for it.
* Reject --all combined with --prefix/--since in reprocess.py
--all is a distinct mode (the demoted full-prefix sweep), but the args.all
branch unconditionally set prefix=inbound/ and since=None, so passing it
alongside a narrower selector silently discarded that selector. `--all
--since 2026-07-01` swept the entire corpus instead of the bounded window,
triggering every documented --all hazard (Bedrock re-bill, metric double-
count, merged-field regression) on objects the operator never targeted --
contradicting the tool's safety goal. Add the missing mutual-exclusion
guard alongside the existing --key one, and pin --all+--prefix,
--all+--since, and all three together as argparse rejections.
2026-07-20 12:53:34 -04:00
**Reprocess emails** (re-invoke an email-processor with a synthetic S3 event). `reprocess.py` is now **pipeline-general** : `--pipeline po|wo` selects the function + raw-email bucket. **Targeted replay** (`--key` one object, `--prefix` , or `--since` a `LastModified` timestamp) is the default, preferred mode; the full-prefix sweep is demoted behind an explicit `--all` . Every mode is dry-run unless `--execute` . See the [DLQ recovery runbook ](docs/runbook-dlq-recovery.md ) for the targeted single-key re-invoke flow.
2026-04-20 19:31:22 -04:00
```bash
Ops/recovery tooling + dependency hygiene (refactor phase 7) (#110)
* feat: ops/recovery tooling + dependency hygiene (refactor phase 7)
Generalize scripts/reprocess.py from a PO-only full-sweep script into a
pipeline-general recovery tool. Targeted replay (--key/--prefix/--since)
is now the default, and the full inbound/ sweep is demoted behind an
explicit --all that documents its five hazards (async concurrency does
not serialize, use RequestResponse if order matters, metric double-count,
Bedrock re-bill, out-of-order field regression). --pipeline po|wo resolves
the correct function + bucket; dry-run-by-default / --execute is preserved.
A new tests/test_reprocess_contract.py pins the synthetic S3 event shape
and asserts the raw list_objects_v2 key is emitted untransformed (the
handler is the single decode point; a pre-decoded key would corrupt keys
containing spaces or '+').
Add docs/runbook-dlq-recovery.md: the async on-failure DLQ has no console
redrive-to-source, so it documents the receive -> extract key -> targeted
reprocess --key -> verify -> purge procedure, the real recovery windows
(14-day DLQ breadcrumb, 90-day raw-email S3 that overrides the table
RETAIN policy and is the true replay floor), and that sender-auth and
ai_fallback_rejected drops are fail-closed skips that never reach the DLQ.
Linked from the README alarms and scripts sections.
Drop the vendored boto3 floor pin from both email-processor requirements
(the Lambda runtime provides boto3; lambda-template.md empty-with-comment
form). With nothing left to install, the email-processor bundling becomes
cp-only -- the whole pip step is removed, which is the only acceptable way
the manylinux2014_aarch64 pin disappears (removing the pin while keeping a
pip install caused the PR #34 x86-wheel outage). Exact-pin moto==5.2.2 and
add pinned po/web_ui + po/site_extractor manifests (excluded from their
bundles, so hash-neutral) so their new Dependabot entries have something
to act on; add Dependabot entries for /tests, /lambdas/po/web_ui, and
/lambdas/po/site_extractor.
cdk diff is confined to exactly the two email processors' asset hashes on
both stacks. The wo/web_ui dead-manifest reduction was deliberately left
out: that manifest already ships inside the plain (non-bundled) WebUI
asset on main, so reducing or excluding it would redeploy workorder-web-ui
for no functional change -- deferred to keep the blast radius to the two
intended targets.
The untracked 44 MB lambdas/po/email_processor/package/ dir was removed
from the filesystem (asset-hash-neutral given Phase 2's package/ exclude);
it is untracked, so there is nothing to commit for it.
* Reject --all combined with --prefix/--since in reprocess.py
--all is a distinct mode (the demoted full-prefix sweep), but the args.all
branch unconditionally set prefix=inbound/ and since=None, so passing it
alongside a narrower selector silently discarded that selector. `--all
--since 2026-07-01` swept the entire corpus instead of the bounded window,
triggering every documented --all hazard (Bedrock re-bill, metric double-
count, merged-field regression) on objects the operator never targeted --
contradicting the tool's safety goal. Add the missing mutual-exclusion
guard alongside the existing --key one, and pin --all+--prefix,
--all+--since, and all three together as argparse rejections.
2026-07-20 12:53:34 -04:00
python scripts/reprocess.py --pipeline po --key inbound/2026/msg.eml # targeted, dry-run
python scripts/reprocess.py --pipeline po --key inbound/2026/msg.eml --execute # targeted, re-invoke one
python scripts/reprocess.py --pipeline wo --all --execute # demoted full-prefix sweep (see --all caveats)
2026-04-20 19:31:22 -04:00
```
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
**Backfill verified sites** (one-time scan of historical POs):
2026-04-30 14:30:54 -04:00
```bash
python scripts/backfill_sites.py
```
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
**Replay SHOC webhooks** (rebuild work-order webhook events from DynamoDB and re-POST them, marked `"replay": true` ). `replay_shoc_webhooks.py` is the operator runbook for the `workorder-shoc-emitter-failures` / `-rejected` alarms: when deliveries were parked (SHOC down past the 24h retry window, or a contract-bug 4xx), replay re-sends the affected work orders from **current table state** — receivers dedupe on the deterministic `delivery_id` , so overlapping or repeated runs are harmless. Selection is exactly one of `--work-order-id` (repeatable, targeted) or `--since` (a full table Scan — a count banner prints per table); `--events` narrows to state rows, comments, or both. `--url` is required with no default — replay must be a deliberate act against a known receiver. Every mode is dry-run unless `--execute` .
```bash
python scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py --url https://... --work-order-id 11144580730 # targeted, dry-run first
python scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py --url https://... --work-order-id 11144580730 --execute # then re-POST
python scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py --url https://... --since 2026-07-24T02:00:00Z --execute # everything touched since (full Scan)
```
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
## Directory Structure
```
cdk/
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
app.py # Three stacks: po-ingest + WorkorderIngestStack + procurement-api (region-only env)
feat: collapse duplicated CDK into cdk/common.py plain helpers (refactor phase 4) (#112)
The ~379 lines po_stack.py and wo_stack.py defined identically (DynamoDB
alarms, the sender-auth-rejected metric filter + alarm, the standard
per-Lambda alarm set, the Bedrock InvokeModel grant, the raw-email
bucket, the async DLQ, the template-fallback-rate math alarm) move into
cdk/common.py.
Every helper is a PLAIN function taking (scope, id, ...), called with each
stack's own Stack as scope and the exact literal construct ids used inline
before, so every synthesized logical ID is byte-stable. A Construct
subclass would reparent the tree and make CloudFormation attempt to
replace the RETAIN-protected purchase-orders/WorkOrders tables and named
buckets -- data loss -- so it is forbidden. Per-function alarm variance
(PO p99 vs WO p95 duration, po-web-ui throttles+duration only,
site-extractor no DLQ alarm, workorder-web-ui zero alarms) is preserved
through call-site arguments, not baked into the helpers.
make_bedrock_invoke_statement derives the inference-profile and us-east-1
foundation-model ARNs from Stack.of(scope).account/.region instead of the
hardcoded 328440206208/us-east-1 literals. The environment stays
account-agnostic (region-only), so the account resolves to the
AWS::AccountId pseudo-parameter: the derived ARN resolves at deploy to the
same ARN the literal named in-account (a benign in-place IAM policy
update, never a replacement) and is account-portable rather than pinned to
the frozen management account.
The account= pin evaluated for cdk.Environment was deliberately NOT added:
resolving every account-derived value (bucket names, Lambda::Permission
source account, SNS action ARN) to literals makes CloudFormation flag the
RETAIN email buckets as requiring replacement against the deployed
account-agnostic templates -- a data-loss risk that outranks the pin, which
buys nothing (the resolved values are unchanged).
Also: net-new CfnOutputs for the five Lambda function ARNs and the
owned/consumed table names, exact-pin constructs==10.6.0, and fix the
stale aws-cdk-lib 2.259.0 -> 2.261.0 version comment.
The common.py extraction is zero-cdk-diff on both stacks (byte-stable
logical IDs, no asset/property change); the only deltas versus deployed
are the intended benign Bedrock IAM in-place update and the additive
CfnOutputs. Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review ran on the Bedrock IAM
move; its BLOCK was a verified false positive (it read AWS::AccountId as a
wildcard -- it is a deploy-time-resolved concrete value naming one account
and one inference-profile, region is pinned us-east-1, and the grant is
strictly more least-privilege-correct than the hardcoded literal).
2026-07-20 14:14:57 -04:00
common.py # Phase 4: shared plain-function CDK helpers (alarms, Bedrock grant,
# email bucket, processor DLQ, fallback-rate alarm) -- called with
# each stack's own scope + literal construct ids, logical-ID-safe
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
po_stack.py # Purchase order pipeline resources
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
wo_stack.py # Work order pipeline resources + the SHOC webhook feed (secret/CMK,
# rotator, emitter, disabled ESMs, queues, alarms)
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
procurement_api_stack.py # REST API (IAM SigV4 + resource policy) over both pipelines' tables + token-gated /docs
feat: widen email-processor asset roots to lambdas/ with scoped globs + excludes (refactor phase 2) (#109)
Both email-processor Code.from_asset calls now bundle from lambdas/
instead of their per-function subdirectory, so Phase 3's shared/
module is reachable from the asset root once it lands. The bundling
commands were rewritten for the new cwd (pip install -r <po|wo>/
email_processor/requirements.txt -t /asset-output && cp <po|wo>/
email_processor/*.py /asset-output/), preserving the ARM64
--platform manylinux2014_aarch64 --only-binary=:all: pin exactly —
its removal shipped x86 wheels into the ARM64 function and caused a
100% outage (PR #34).
All five from_asset calls (both email processors, po web_ui, po
site_extractor, wo web_ui) now exclude **/__pycache__/**; the two
widened ones also exclude **/tests/** and **/package/**. Without the
package/ exclude, the stale untracked 44 MB
lambdas/po/email_processor/package/ dir (local-only, never present
in CI) would diverge local vs CI asset hashes and force spurious
redeploys — from_asset doesn't honor .gitignore. That dir is left in
place; deleting it is Adam's call.
WO's prod zip shrinks as deliberate cleanup, not a byte-identical
match to PO: the old `cp -r .` shipped tests/ (real scrubbed .eml
fixtures), __pycache__/, and requirements.txt into production. The
acceptance bar for WO is runtime-imported module set unchanged +
smoke, not a byte-identical zip; PO keeps the byte-identical
first-party file set guarantee. tests/test_bundle_consistency.py is
updated in the same change to recognize the scoped
`cp po/email_processor/*.py` (resp. wo) glob as the new
unconditionally-safe shape, without loosening the allowlist-revert
detection, the detection-logic mutation test, or the
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES exact-set pin.
No code moved under lambdas/ in this change (git diff main...HEAD --
lambdas/ is empty); only CDK asset wiring and its tests changed.
2026-07-17 15:47:01 -04:00
lambdas/ # Phase 2: shared Code.from_asset("../lambdas") bundling root for
feat: extract lambdas/shared/ — single-source ses_auth, web_ui auth, email parsing, EMF emitter (refactor phase 3) (#111)
Four modules move into the handbook-mandated lambdas/shared/ location,
collapsing duplicated logic that had to be kept in sync by hand across
the PO and WO pipelines:
- ses_auth.py: the PO and WO copies were verified sha256-identical
against the feature/phase-7-ops-recovery baseline before the move
(no drift since the last audit). shared/ses_auth.py is the exact
bytes of that one copy; both originals are git rm'd (the PO copy
via rename, the WO copy as a straight delete). Bundling lands the
module flat in /asset-output for both email processors, so the
handlers keep `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email`
unchanged — zero handler diff for this move, which is what keeps
fail-closed auth byte-identical through the change.
- web_ui_auth.py: extracts the byte-identical _get_auth_token /
_header / is_authenticated block plus the four token-cache globals
out of both web_ui handlers. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay
in each handler as-is (deliberately drifted wording, stack-specific)
rather than being unified into the shared module. Fail-closed
semantics (unset ARN or Secrets Manager exception -> deny) are
unchanged.
- email_parsing.py: parse_raw_email ships as the superset version that
returns cc unconditionally. WO's output is bit-identical to before;
PO simply ignores the cc field rather than being "cleaned up" to
consume it. No second variant is kept.
- emf.py: a generic emitter parameterized by namespace, dimension
sets, and properties. Every call site's emitted EMF envelope is
unchanged, including the load-bearing
[["ParseMethod"],["ParseMethod","TemplateId"]] dimension-set shape
the alarms and metric filters depend on. Emission ordering is
untouched: PO still emits ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, WO
still emits its mutually-exclusive ai_fallback/ai_fallback_rejected
after its gate. The deliberate-double-count comments survive.
_emit_derived_agreement_metric was found living inside
derived_fields.py, so per the DERIVED-FIELDS exception it is left
as a third, unconverted copy (derived_fields.py and the shadow
DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stay untouchable while that bake
runs) — a comment there points at shared/emf.py for the eventual
follow-up.
Bundling: both email-processor cdk bundling commands gain a trailing
`cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` (they were already cp-only post-Phase
7, so no pip step or manylinux pin is reintroduced). Both web_ui
functions gain the same widened-root staging so web_ui_auth.py ships
beside their handler; site_extractor's from_asset is untouched.
Tests: PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES gains the shared modules that now
ship, the AST sibling-import check resolves imports whose source now
lives under shared/, and the new shared cp line has its own
revert/mutation detection. _SIBLING_MODULES resolution and
_po_parser_support.py now load ses_auth/email_parsing/emf from
shared/; the two-copy ses_auth byte-identity fixture-hygiene test is
retired as obsolete now that there is one copy, and the ses_auth
fixture parameterization over two identical copies is dropped. The
sys.modules save/restore dance for template_parser (still duplicated
per-pipeline) is left in place.
2026-07-20 13:38:23 -04:00
# BOTH po-email-processor and workorder-email-processor (and, since
# Phase 3, both web_ui functions) -- each email-processor command
# `cp` s its own po/email_processor/*.py (or wo/...) subset PLUS
# `cp shared/*.py` ; each web_ui command `cp` s its own dir PLUS only
# `shared/web_ui_auth.py` ; site_extractor keeps its narrower, non-
# bundled asset root
shared/ # Phase 3: single-sourced first-party modules, landed FLAT (no
# __init__ .py -- bare-name imports) into each bundle by the cp above
ses_auth.py # fail-closed SES sender-auth (INFRA-107) -- one copy, one fix
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
web_ui_auth.py # fail-closed X-Auth-Token gate + token cache (INFRA-74; also gates the API /docs routes)
feat: extract lambdas/shared/ — single-source ses_auth, web_ui auth, email parsing, EMF emitter (refactor phase 3) (#111)
Four modules move into the handbook-mandated lambdas/shared/ location,
collapsing duplicated logic that had to be kept in sync by hand across
the PO and WO pipelines:
- ses_auth.py: the PO and WO copies were verified sha256-identical
against the feature/phase-7-ops-recovery baseline before the move
(no drift since the last audit). shared/ses_auth.py is the exact
bytes of that one copy; both originals are git rm'd (the PO copy
via rename, the WO copy as a straight delete). Bundling lands the
module flat in /asset-output for both email processors, so the
handlers keep `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email`
unchanged — zero handler diff for this move, which is what keeps
fail-closed auth byte-identical through the change.
- web_ui_auth.py: extracts the byte-identical _get_auth_token /
_header / is_authenticated block plus the four token-cache globals
out of both web_ui handlers. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay
in each handler as-is (deliberately drifted wording, stack-specific)
rather than being unified into the shared module. Fail-closed
semantics (unset ARN or Secrets Manager exception -> deny) are
unchanged.
- email_parsing.py: parse_raw_email ships as the superset version that
returns cc unconditionally. WO's output is bit-identical to before;
PO simply ignores the cc field rather than being "cleaned up" to
consume it. No second variant is kept.
- emf.py: a generic emitter parameterized by namespace, dimension
sets, and properties. Every call site's emitted EMF envelope is
unchanged, including the load-bearing
[["ParseMethod"],["ParseMethod","TemplateId"]] dimension-set shape
the alarms and metric filters depend on. Emission ordering is
untouched: PO still emits ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, WO
still emits its mutually-exclusive ai_fallback/ai_fallback_rejected
after its gate. The deliberate-double-count comments survive.
_emit_derived_agreement_metric was found living inside
derived_fields.py, so per the DERIVED-FIELDS exception it is left
as a third, unconverted copy (derived_fields.py and the shadow
DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stay untouchable while that bake
runs) — a comment there points at shared/emf.py for the eventual
follow-up.
Bundling: both email-processor cdk bundling commands gain a trailing
`cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` (they were already cp-only post-Phase
7, so no pip step or manylinux pin is reintroduced). Both web_ui
functions gain the same widened-root staging so web_ui_auth.py ships
beside their handler; site_extractor's from_asset is untouched.
Tests: PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES gains the shared modules that now
ship, the AST sibling-import check resolves imports whose source now
lives under shared/, and the new shared cp line has its own
revert/mutation detection. _SIBLING_MODULES resolution and
_po_parser_support.py now load ses_auth/email_parsing/emf from
shared/; the two-copy ses_auth byte-identity fixture-hygiene test is
retired as obsolete now that there is one copy, and the ses_auth
fixture parameterization over two identical copies is dropped. The
sys.modules save/restore dance for template_parser (still duplicated
per-pipeline) is left in place.
2026-07-20 13:38:23 -04:00
email_parsing.py # parse_raw_email (WO superset; returns cc unconditionally)
emf.py # generic CloudWatch EMF emitter (dimension-sets pinned once)
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
api/ # procurement-api Lambda (REST reads over both pipelines' tables)
handler.py # healthcheck early-return + docs-token gate + route dispatch + error mapping
router.py # single route table (spec-drift test pins it to openapi.json)
pagination.py # opaque base64(LastEvaluatedKey) cursor encode/validate (hostile cursor -> 400)
serialization.py # Decimal-safe JSON responses
wo_repo.py # WorkOrders/WorkOrderComments reads (paginated Scan / PK Query)
po_repo.py # purchase-orders/verified-sites reads (no VendorReplies -- dead table)
openapi.json # OpenAPI 3.1 source of truth (paths + outbound `webhooks` section)
feat(api): Redocly lint gate + SHOC-themed /docs (Redoc theming, topbar, collapsible samples) (#130)
* feat(api): Add @redocly/cli as a dev dependency
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
* feat(api): Add Redocly configuration file with custom rules
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
* chore(api): Redocly lint config + bring openapi.json into compliance
redocly.yaml from the Redocly guidelines builder, with three generated
rules corrected: response-contains-property had the status codes as the
required body fields (intent was the Error schema's top-level 'error';
403 exempt since API Gateway emits AWS's {message} shape, 501 not 503);
operation-4xx-problem-details-rfc7807 off (adopting RFC 7807 would be a
runtime + SHOC-contract change, decided against); the two inert casing
rules (parameter names, schema properties) removed because both name
sets are contract-pinned (gateway resource paths, DynamoDB items).
Spec changes, no runtime impact: operationIds renamed to method-prefixed
kebab-case (get-work-orders, post-work-order-comment, ...); tags added to
all 15 operations + root tags object (groups the Redoc sidebar); examples
on all six parameters; license field; server description punctuation; two
descriptions reworded to start capitalized. Real linter catches fixed:
the two x-planned ops were missing their {workOrderId} path parameter
and any 4xx response (403 added - true today, gateway rejects unsigned).
.redocly.lint-ignore.yaml pins the six deliberate exceptions: webhook
keys are the shipped SHOC contract event names (not renameable), and the
x-planned ops answer only 501 (no 2xx to document).
package.json: npm run lint:api. Verified: lint 0 errors, 675 pytest,
headless-Chrome render of the tagged docs page.
* feat(api): SHOC design-system theme for /docs (vendored fonts)
Themes the Redoc page with the canonical SHOC token set: Montserrat 600
headings / DM Sans body / JetBrains Mono code, primary #1c75bc, navy
#262262 sidebar text + right panel, #f9fafb background, 244px sidebar.
sortRequiredPropsFirst on; 200 responses pre-expanded.
Fonts ship as lambdas/api/fonts.css (latin woff2 subsets from
@fontsource 5.3.0, embedded as data URIs, ~90KB) and inline via a new
__FONTS_CSS__ placeholder with the same </style breakout guard --
the offline single-response invariant holds, nothing fetches Google
Fonts (test-pinned). Bundling cp + bundle-consistency pin + spec-drift
asset checks extended.
Verified: headless-Chrome render (theme + fonts applied), ruff, 675
pytest, cdk synth + staged-asset check.
* feat(api): SHOC gradient topbar on /docs
64px fixed header with the SHOC shell gradient token (#1b1f52 ->
#1c4f8f -> #1c75bc), Sea Haven wordmark in Montserrat 600, page name
right-aligned in DM Sans. Redoc's scrollYOffset: 64 keeps the sticky
sidebar and anchor scrolling clear of the fixed bar. Verified via
headless-Chrome render.
* style(api): normalize /docs header and right-panel blues
The right panel's #262262 is a purple-leaning navy that clashed with
the cyan-leaning gradient, and the bar's brightest point sat directly
over the dark panel. Right panel now uses #1b1f52 (the gradient's own
dark endpoint) and the gradient runs bright-to-dark so its dark end
lands flush on the panel -- no seam, one blue family. Verified via
headless-Chrome render.
* style(api): right-panel gradient on /docs via bundle-pinned override
Redoc's theme only takes solid colors (it derives shades from
rightPanel.backgroundColor), so the gradient (#1b3d79 -> #1b3068 ->
#1b1f52, continuing the topbar blend) rides as a CSS override on the
styled-components classes of the per-section right-panel divs
(.sc-iGgWBj.sc-gsFSXq + the .sc-dExYaf stub). Those names are
deterministic for the vendored 2.5.3 bundle (verified across loads) but
change on any Redoc bump: re-derive via headless probe (find elements
whose computed background equals the rightPanel color). If they stop
matching, the panel falls back to the solid #1b1f52 theme color --
cosmetic only. Verified via headless-Chrome render.
* feat(api): collapsible samples column on /docs
Redoc CE has no built-in panel toggle, so the topbar gains a Hide/Show
samples button that flips .samples-collapsed on <html>: the right-panel
divs hide (same bundle-pinned styled-components classes as the gradient
override) and each section's content half takes the full width. Choice
persists in localStorage; aria-pressed tracks state. If the pinned
classes stop matching after a Redoc bump the toggle goes inert --
cosmetic only. Both states verified via headless-Chrome render.
* ci(api): spec-lint CI gate + npm Dependabot coverage
New spec-lint job mirrors the local npm run lint:api so openapi.json
cannot drift from redocly.yaml with green CI. Dependabot gains the npm
ecosystem (package.json is new; nothing watched @redocly/cli).
* feat(api): docs finishing touches - x-tagGroups, favicon, docs:preview
x-tagGroups sections the Redoc sidebar (Read API / Meta / SHOC Feed);
inline data-URI SVG favicon (SHOC blue) stops the browser's follow-up
/favicon.ico request 403ing at the gateway; npm run docs:preview wraps
the real-handler local render (scripts/preview_docs.py); README gains a
docs-page architecture section covering the inline pattern, theme,
pinned-selector caveat, and tooling. Lint 0 errors, 675 pytest,
headless render verified.
---------
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
2026-07-24 14:04:30 -04:00
docs.html # Redoc shell, SHOC design-system theme; handler inlines bundle/fonts/spec at request time (single token-gated request, no CDN)
feat(api): swap /docs from Swagger UI to Redoc (vendored offline) (#129)
Redoc 2.5.3 standalone bundle (MIT) replaces the three swagger-ui-dist
assets: one ~1.05MB JS file instead of ~1.8MB of JS+CSS+preset, and the
layout traps (StandaloneLayout/BaseLayout) go away. Redoc is read-only by
design, which matches the existing posture: try-it-out was already
disabled since data routes need SigV4 (Postman for live calls).
Unchanged: single token-gated response, offline vendoring (no CDN),
per-request server-URL injection, script-breakout guards, cached shell
with per-request spec splice. Bundle self-containment verified: the
search worker is an inlined Blob, and the only new Worker(filename) path
is Prism's async mode, which Redoc never invokes.
Verified via headless-Chrome render of the real handler output: all
routes, the OpenAPI 3.1 webhooks section, and planned-route markers
render; no placeholder leakage.
2026-07-24 12:00:22 -04:00
redoc.standalone.js # vendored Redoc bundle (redoc 2.5.3, MIT), inlined into /docs; read-only docs, no try-it-out
feat(api): Redocly lint gate + SHOC-themed /docs (Redoc theming, topbar, collapsible samples) (#130)
* feat(api): Add @redocly/cli as a dev dependency
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
* feat(api): Add Redocly configuration file with custom rules
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
* chore(api): Redocly lint config + bring openapi.json into compliance
redocly.yaml from the Redocly guidelines builder, with three generated
rules corrected: response-contains-property had the status codes as the
required body fields (intent was the Error schema's top-level 'error';
403 exempt since API Gateway emits AWS's {message} shape, 501 not 503);
operation-4xx-problem-details-rfc7807 off (adopting RFC 7807 would be a
runtime + SHOC-contract change, decided against); the two inert casing
rules (parameter names, schema properties) removed because both name
sets are contract-pinned (gateway resource paths, DynamoDB items).
Spec changes, no runtime impact: operationIds renamed to method-prefixed
kebab-case (get-work-orders, post-work-order-comment, ...); tags added to
all 15 operations + root tags object (groups the Redoc sidebar); examples
on all six parameters; license field; server description punctuation; two
descriptions reworded to start capitalized. Real linter catches fixed:
the two x-planned ops were missing their {workOrderId} path parameter
and any 4xx response (403 added - true today, gateway rejects unsigned).
.redocly.lint-ignore.yaml pins the six deliberate exceptions: webhook
keys are the shipped SHOC contract event names (not renameable), and the
x-planned ops answer only 501 (no 2xx to document).
package.json: npm run lint:api. Verified: lint 0 errors, 675 pytest,
headless-Chrome render of the tagged docs page.
* feat(api): SHOC design-system theme for /docs (vendored fonts)
Themes the Redoc page with the canonical SHOC token set: Montserrat 600
headings / DM Sans body / JetBrains Mono code, primary #1c75bc, navy
#262262 sidebar text + right panel, #f9fafb background, 244px sidebar.
sortRequiredPropsFirst on; 200 responses pre-expanded.
Fonts ship as lambdas/api/fonts.css (latin woff2 subsets from
@fontsource 5.3.0, embedded as data URIs, ~90KB) and inline via a new
__FONTS_CSS__ placeholder with the same </style breakout guard --
the offline single-response invariant holds, nothing fetches Google
Fonts (test-pinned). Bundling cp + bundle-consistency pin + spec-drift
asset checks extended.
Verified: headless-Chrome render (theme + fonts applied), ruff, 675
pytest, cdk synth + staged-asset check.
* feat(api): SHOC gradient topbar on /docs
64px fixed header with the SHOC shell gradient token (#1b1f52 ->
#1c4f8f -> #1c75bc), Sea Haven wordmark in Montserrat 600, page name
right-aligned in DM Sans. Redoc's scrollYOffset: 64 keeps the sticky
sidebar and anchor scrolling clear of the fixed bar. Verified via
headless-Chrome render.
* style(api): normalize /docs header and right-panel blues
The right panel's #262262 is a purple-leaning navy that clashed with
the cyan-leaning gradient, and the bar's brightest point sat directly
over the dark panel. Right panel now uses #1b1f52 (the gradient's own
dark endpoint) and the gradient runs bright-to-dark so its dark end
lands flush on the panel -- no seam, one blue family. Verified via
headless-Chrome render.
* style(api): right-panel gradient on /docs via bundle-pinned override
Redoc's theme only takes solid colors (it derives shades from
rightPanel.backgroundColor), so the gradient (#1b3d79 -> #1b3068 ->
#1b1f52, continuing the topbar blend) rides as a CSS override on the
styled-components classes of the per-section right-panel divs
(.sc-iGgWBj.sc-gsFSXq + the .sc-dExYaf stub). Those names are
deterministic for the vendored 2.5.3 bundle (verified across loads) but
change on any Redoc bump: re-derive via headless probe (find elements
whose computed background equals the rightPanel color). If they stop
matching, the panel falls back to the solid #1b1f52 theme color --
cosmetic only. Verified via headless-Chrome render.
* feat(api): collapsible samples column on /docs
Redoc CE has no built-in panel toggle, so the topbar gains a Hide/Show
samples button that flips .samples-collapsed on <html>: the right-panel
divs hide (same bundle-pinned styled-components classes as the gradient
override) and each section's content half takes the full width. Choice
persists in localStorage; aria-pressed tracks state. If the pinned
classes stop matching after a Redoc bump the toggle goes inert --
cosmetic only. Both states verified via headless-Chrome render.
* ci(api): spec-lint CI gate + npm Dependabot coverage
New spec-lint job mirrors the local npm run lint:api so openapi.json
cannot drift from redocly.yaml with green CI. Dependabot gains the npm
ecosystem (package.json is new; nothing watched @redocly/cli).
* feat(api): docs finishing touches - x-tagGroups, favicon, docs:preview
x-tagGroups sections the Redoc sidebar (Read API / Meta / SHOC Feed);
inline data-URI SVG favicon (SHOC blue) stops the browser's follow-up
/favicon.ico request 403ing at the gateway; npm run docs:preview wraps
the real-handler local render (scripts/preview_docs.py); README gains a
docs-page architecture section covering the inline pattern, theme,
pinned-selector caveat, and tooling. Lint 0 errors, 675 pytest,
headless render verified.
---------
Signed-off-by: Adam Moussa <adam@seahavenind.com>
2026-07-24 14:04:30 -04:00
fonts.css # SHOC fonts (DM Sans/Montserrat/JetBrains Mono, @fontsource latin subsets) as data URIs, inlined into /docs
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
po/ # PO pipeline Lambdas
feat: decompose email-processor handlers into flat siblings + lazy boto3 clients (refactor phase 5) (#113)
Both email-processor God-handlers split along the seams that already
work in the flat-sibling pattern established by lambdas/shared/, so
bare-name imports keep working under the existing bundling glob.
PO (5-way split): handler.py keeps only the event loop, fail-closed
auth, and email_type routing. extraction.py holds extract_with_claude
and _EMAIL_TAG_RE, importing EXTRACTION_PROMPT from prompts.py and
parse_raw_email from shared/email_parsing.py rather than recreating a
PO-local copy. enrichment.py is a pure code move of enrich_parsed and
pad_zip (PO-only; WO has no enrichment stage) with zero behavior
change. telemetry.py holds the EMF ParseMethod emit wrappers.
persistence.py holds _write_fields/_merge_update/save_*, collapsing
the byte-identical save_new_po/save_revision bodies into one
_save_merge helper that both now call through, preserving the sticky
Cancelled ConditionExpression guard for both callers; save_cancellation
stays separate.
WO (5 concerns, no enrichment stage): the handler loop keeps
validate_ai_fallback and the re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", work_order_id)
key guard ahead of both save_work_order and save_event, since the
guard protects the DynamoDB partition key and the '#'-delimited
comment_id range-key segment. _header_date_iso and comment_id
determinism stay colocated with persistence.py's save_event for the
retry-idempotent event_id key.
EXTRACTION_PROMPT (PO) moves to prompts.py with cross-reference
headers to derived_fields.py's authoritative trade/site/fiscal rule
tables; handler.py re-exports it (from prompts import
EXTRACTION_PROMPT) since four tests dereference handler.EXTRACTION_
PROMPT directly. WO's prompt moves the same way.
I/O modules (extraction.py's bedrock client, persistence.py's
dynamodb resource, handler.py's s3 client) get lazy cached boto3
accessors; pure modules (enrichment.py, prompts.py, telemetry.py)
import no boto3. Test monkeypatch surfaces move to the module that
now owns the client (e.g. persistence.dynamodb) everywhere tests
patch it, and the moto-before-handler-import ordering in
_po_parser_support.py is preserved so the moto-backed suites don't
hit real AWS.
Behavior-preservation pins, verified with tests: PO still emits
ParseMethod=ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, with
ai_fallback_rejected as the additive second datapoint on rejection.
WO still emits after its gate with mutually-exclusive ai_fallback /
ai_fallback_rejected. Shadow DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stays
ai_fallback-only. derived_fields.py is untouched (diff against
feature/phase-3-shared-extraction is empty). handler(event, context)
signatures and the save_* public contract are unchanged on both
pipelines; goldens unchanged.
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES and its WO equivalent in
tests/test_bundle_consistency.py are updated for the new sibling
modules so the AST bundle-consistency test still fails on an
unshipped or uncommented-out sibling.
2026-07-20 15:34:53 -04:00
email_processor/ # Phase 5: God-handler decomposed into flat siblings (bare-name
# imports; the Phase 0/2/3 `cp <pipeline>/email_processor/*.py`
# glob ships every new sibling automatically)
handler.py # event loop + fail-closed SES auth + email_type routing + {"healthcheck": true} early-return; lazy s3 accessor; re-exports EXTRACTION_PROMPT (4 tests deref handler.EXTRACTION_PROMPT)
extraction.py # extract_with_claude + _EMAIL_TAG_RE + EXTRACTION_PROMPT import; lazy bedrock accessor
enrichment.py # enrich_parsed + pad_zip (PO-only; no boto3); derived-field shadow block
telemetry.py # EMF ParseMethod + DerivedFieldAgreement emit wrappers (stdout EMF; no boto3)
persistence.py # _write_fields/_merge_update + save_cancellation; save_new_po/save_revision collapsed into one behavior-identical _save_merge (sticky-cancel guard intact); lazy dynamodb accessor
prompts.py # EXTRACTION_PROMPT (~181 lines); cross-ref header to derived_fields' rule tables
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
template_parser.py # pure deterministic Coupa parser + fail-closed validation gate; Phase 8:
# extract_new_po/_validate_new_po_values split into C901/PLR-clean per-rule
# helpers (behavior byte-identical; see the ruff C901/PLR floor below)
derived_fields.py # deterministic site_code/trade/fiscal_year classifier (untouched by Phase 3/5/8 -- shadow-bake freeze; ruff per-file-ignore instead of an in-file noqa)
feat: decompose email-processor handlers into flat siblings + lazy boto3 clients (refactor phase 5) (#113)
Both email-processor God-handlers split along the seams that already
work in the flat-sibling pattern established by lambdas/shared/, so
bare-name imports keep working under the existing bundling glob.
PO (5-way split): handler.py keeps only the event loop, fail-closed
auth, and email_type routing. extraction.py holds extract_with_claude
and _EMAIL_TAG_RE, importing EXTRACTION_PROMPT from prompts.py and
parse_raw_email from shared/email_parsing.py rather than recreating a
PO-local copy. enrichment.py is a pure code move of enrich_parsed and
pad_zip (PO-only; WO has no enrichment stage) with zero behavior
change. telemetry.py holds the EMF ParseMethod emit wrappers.
persistence.py holds _write_fields/_merge_update/save_*, collapsing
the byte-identical save_new_po/save_revision bodies into one
_save_merge helper that both now call through, preserving the sticky
Cancelled ConditionExpression guard for both callers; save_cancellation
stays separate.
WO (5 concerns, no enrichment stage): the handler loop keeps
validate_ai_fallback and the re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", work_order_id)
key guard ahead of both save_work_order and save_event, since the
guard protects the DynamoDB partition key and the '#'-delimited
comment_id range-key segment. _header_date_iso and comment_id
determinism stay colocated with persistence.py's save_event for the
retry-idempotent event_id key.
EXTRACTION_PROMPT (PO) moves to prompts.py with cross-reference
headers to derived_fields.py's authoritative trade/site/fiscal rule
tables; handler.py re-exports it (from prompts import
EXTRACTION_PROMPT) since four tests dereference handler.EXTRACTION_
PROMPT directly. WO's prompt moves the same way.
I/O modules (extraction.py's bedrock client, persistence.py's
dynamodb resource, handler.py's s3 client) get lazy cached boto3
accessors; pure modules (enrichment.py, prompts.py, telemetry.py)
import no boto3. Test monkeypatch surfaces move to the module that
now owns the client (e.g. persistence.dynamodb) everywhere tests
patch it, and the moto-before-handler-import ordering in
_po_parser_support.py is preserved so the moto-backed suites don't
hit real AWS.
Behavior-preservation pins, verified with tests: PO still emits
ParseMethod=ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, with
ai_fallback_rejected as the additive second datapoint on rejection.
WO still emits after its gate with mutually-exclusive ai_fallback /
ai_fallback_rejected. Shadow DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stays
ai_fallback-only. derived_fields.py is untouched (diff against
feature/phase-3-shared-extraction is empty). handler(event, context)
signatures and the save_* public contract are unchanged on both
pipelines; goldens unchanged.
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES and its WO equivalent in
tests/test_bundle_consistency.py are updated for the new sibling
modules so the AST bundle-consistency test still fails on an
unshipped or uncommented-out sibling.
2026-07-20 15:34:53 -04:00
tests/ # golden-file + validation-gate + fallback-dispatch + healthcheck + save-merge-parity + behavior-pin tests + fixtures
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
conftest.py # fake_dynamo fixture, patches persistence.dynamodb
_po_parser_support.py # Phase 8: thin shim -- re-exports tests.support fakes/loader; PO module handles (template_parser, prompts, telemetry, extraction, enrichment, persistence)
test_po_derived_fields.py # derived_fields.derive_all() unit tests
test_po_derived_wiring.py # ai_fallback-only shadow-telemetry wiring; Phase 8 gains the PO-DC-02 64-char po_number clamp regression pin
test_po_bedrock_transport.py # Phase 8: Bedrock transport errors (throttle/missing-content/empty-content/non-JSON) + pre-call metric survival + multi-record failure-isolation pin
test_po_merge.py # Phase 8: moved from tests/ -- PO merge-write semantics tests (#97 ), moto-backed
test_pad_zip.py # Phase 8: moved from tests/ -- PO zip-code padding tests
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
site_extractor/
feat: extract lambdas/shared/ — single-source ses_auth, web_ui auth, email parsing, EMF emitter (refactor phase 3) (#111)
Four modules move into the handbook-mandated lambdas/shared/ location,
collapsing duplicated logic that had to be kept in sync by hand across
the PO and WO pipelines:
- ses_auth.py: the PO and WO copies were verified sha256-identical
against the feature/phase-7-ops-recovery baseline before the move
(no drift since the last audit). shared/ses_auth.py is the exact
bytes of that one copy; both originals are git rm'd (the PO copy
via rename, the WO copy as a straight delete). Bundling lands the
module flat in /asset-output for both email processors, so the
handlers keep `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email`
unchanged — zero handler diff for this move, which is what keeps
fail-closed auth byte-identical through the change.
- web_ui_auth.py: extracts the byte-identical _get_auth_token /
_header / is_authenticated block plus the four token-cache globals
out of both web_ui handlers. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay
in each handler as-is (deliberately drifted wording, stack-specific)
rather than being unified into the shared module. Fail-closed
semantics (unset ARN or Secrets Manager exception -> deny) are
unchanged.
- email_parsing.py: parse_raw_email ships as the superset version that
returns cc unconditionally. WO's output is bit-identical to before;
PO simply ignores the cc field rather than being "cleaned up" to
consume it. No second variant is kept.
- emf.py: a generic emitter parameterized by namespace, dimension
sets, and properties. Every call site's emitted EMF envelope is
unchanged, including the load-bearing
[["ParseMethod"],["ParseMethod","TemplateId"]] dimension-set shape
the alarms and metric filters depend on. Emission ordering is
untouched: PO still emits ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, WO
still emits its mutually-exclusive ai_fallback/ai_fallback_rejected
after its gate. The deliberate-double-count comments survive.
_emit_derived_agreement_metric was found living inside
derived_fields.py, so per the DERIVED-FIELDS exception it is left
as a third, unconverted copy (derived_fields.py and the shadow
DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stay untouchable while that bake
runs) — a comment there points at shared/emf.py for the eventual
follow-up.
Bundling: both email-processor cdk bundling commands gain a trailing
`cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` (they were already cp-only post-Phase
7, so no pip step or manylinux pin is reintroduced). Both web_ui
functions gain the same widened-root staging so web_ui_auth.py ships
beside their handler; site_extractor's from_asset is untouched.
Tests: PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES gains the shared modules that now
ship, the AST sibling-import check resolves imports whose source now
lives under shared/, and the new shared cp line has its own
revert/mutation detection. _SIBLING_MODULES resolution and
_po_parser_support.py now load ses_auth/email_parsing/emf from
shared/; the two-copy ses_auth byte-identity fixture-hygiene test is
retired as obsolete now that there is one copy, and the ses_auth
fixture parameterization over two identical copies is dropped. The
sys.modules save/restore dance for template_parser (still duplicated
per-pipeline) is left in place.
2026-07-20 13:38:23 -04:00
web_ui/ # handler.py imports `from web_ui_auth import is_authenticated` (shared)
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
wo/ # WO pipeline Lambdas
feat: decompose email-processor handlers into flat siblings + lazy boto3 clients (refactor phase 5) (#113)
Both email-processor God-handlers split along the seams that already
work in the flat-sibling pattern established by lambdas/shared/, so
bare-name imports keep working under the existing bundling glob.
PO (5-way split): handler.py keeps only the event loop, fail-closed
auth, and email_type routing. extraction.py holds extract_with_claude
and _EMAIL_TAG_RE, importing EXTRACTION_PROMPT from prompts.py and
parse_raw_email from shared/email_parsing.py rather than recreating a
PO-local copy. enrichment.py is a pure code move of enrich_parsed and
pad_zip (PO-only; WO has no enrichment stage) with zero behavior
change. telemetry.py holds the EMF ParseMethod emit wrappers.
persistence.py holds _write_fields/_merge_update/save_*, collapsing
the byte-identical save_new_po/save_revision bodies into one
_save_merge helper that both now call through, preserving the sticky
Cancelled ConditionExpression guard for both callers; save_cancellation
stays separate.
WO (5 concerns, no enrichment stage): the handler loop keeps
validate_ai_fallback and the re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", work_order_id)
key guard ahead of both save_work_order and save_event, since the
guard protects the DynamoDB partition key and the '#'-delimited
comment_id range-key segment. _header_date_iso and comment_id
determinism stay colocated with persistence.py's save_event for the
retry-idempotent event_id key.
EXTRACTION_PROMPT (PO) moves to prompts.py with cross-reference
headers to derived_fields.py's authoritative trade/site/fiscal rule
tables; handler.py re-exports it (from prompts import
EXTRACTION_PROMPT) since four tests dereference handler.EXTRACTION_
PROMPT directly. WO's prompt moves the same way.
I/O modules (extraction.py's bedrock client, persistence.py's
dynamodb resource, handler.py's s3 client) get lazy cached boto3
accessors; pure modules (enrichment.py, prompts.py, telemetry.py)
import no boto3. Test monkeypatch surfaces move to the module that
now owns the client (e.g. persistence.dynamodb) everywhere tests
patch it, and the moto-before-handler-import ordering in
_po_parser_support.py is preserved so the moto-backed suites don't
hit real AWS.
Behavior-preservation pins, verified with tests: PO still emits
ParseMethod=ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, with
ai_fallback_rejected as the additive second datapoint on rejection.
WO still emits after its gate with mutually-exclusive ai_fallback /
ai_fallback_rejected. Shadow DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stays
ai_fallback-only. derived_fields.py is untouched (diff against
feature/phase-3-shared-extraction is empty). handler(event, context)
signatures and the save_* public contract are unchanged on both
pipelines; goldens unchanged.
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES and its WO equivalent in
tests/test_bundle_consistency.py are updated for the new sibling
modules so the AST bundle-consistency test still fails on an
unshipped or uncommented-out sibling.
2026-07-20 15:34:53 -04:00
email_processor/ # Phase 5: decomposed into ~5 flat siblings (no enrichment stage);
# validate_ai_fallback + the [0-9]+ work_order_id key guard stay in
# the handler loop AHEAD of both saves
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
handler.py # event loop + fail-closed SES auth + [0-9]+ work_order_id key guard + {"healthcheck": true} early-return; lazy s3 accessor; re-exports EXTRACTION_PROMPT; Phase 8: the Bedrock call is wrapped in try/except so a transport error emits one ai_fallback/bedrock_error datapoint then re-raises (a gate rejection still emits only ai_fallback_rejected -- no double-count)
feat: decompose email-processor handlers into flat siblings + lazy boto3 clients (refactor phase 5) (#113)
Both email-processor God-handlers split along the seams that already
work in the flat-sibling pattern established by lambdas/shared/, so
bare-name imports keep working under the existing bundling glob.
PO (5-way split): handler.py keeps only the event loop, fail-closed
auth, and email_type routing. extraction.py holds extract_with_claude
and _EMAIL_TAG_RE, importing EXTRACTION_PROMPT from prompts.py and
parse_raw_email from shared/email_parsing.py rather than recreating a
PO-local copy. enrichment.py is a pure code move of enrich_parsed and
pad_zip (PO-only; WO has no enrichment stage) with zero behavior
change. telemetry.py holds the EMF ParseMethod emit wrappers.
persistence.py holds _write_fields/_merge_update/save_*, collapsing
the byte-identical save_new_po/save_revision bodies into one
_save_merge helper that both now call through, preserving the sticky
Cancelled ConditionExpression guard for both callers; save_cancellation
stays separate.
WO (5 concerns, no enrichment stage): the handler loop keeps
validate_ai_fallback and the re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", work_order_id)
key guard ahead of both save_work_order and save_event, since the
guard protects the DynamoDB partition key and the '#'-delimited
comment_id range-key segment. _header_date_iso and comment_id
determinism stay colocated with persistence.py's save_event for the
retry-idempotent event_id key.
EXTRACTION_PROMPT (PO) moves to prompts.py with cross-reference
headers to derived_fields.py's authoritative trade/site/fiscal rule
tables; handler.py re-exports it (from prompts import
EXTRACTION_PROMPT) since four tests dereference handler.EXTRACTION_
PROMPT directly. WO's prompt moves the same way.
I/O modules (extraction.py's bedrock client, persistence.py's
dynamodb resource, handler.py's s3 client) get lazy cached boto3
accessors; pure modules (enrichment.py, prompts.py, telemetry.py)
import no boto3. Test monkeypatch surfaces move to the module that
now owns the client (e.g. persistence.dynamodb) everywhere tests
patch it, and the moto-before-handler-import ordering in
_po_parser_support.py is preserved so the moto-backed suites don't
hit real AWS.
Behavior-preservation pins, verified with tests: PO still emits
ParseMethod=ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, with
ai_fallback_rejected as the additive second datapoint on rejection.
WO still emits after its gate with mutually-exclusive ai_fallback /
ai_fallback_rejected. Shadow DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stays
ai_fallback-only. derived_fields.py is untouched (diff against
feature/phase-3-shared-extraction is empty). handler(event, context)
signatures and the save_* public contract are unchanged on both
pipelines; goldens unchanged.
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES and its WO equivalent in
tests/test_bundle_consistency.py are updated for the new sibling
modules so the AST bundle-consistency test still fails on an
unshipped or uncommented-out sibling.
2026-07-20 15:34:53 -04:00
extraction.py # extract_with_bedrock + _EMAIL_TAG_RE + EXTRACTION_PROMPT import; lazy bedrock accessor
telemetry.py # emit_parse_metric EMF wrapper (stdout EMF; no boto3)
persistence.py # save_work_order + _header_date_iso + save_event (#23 comment_id determinism kept WITH persistence); lazy dynamodb accessor
prompts.py # EXTRACTION_PROMPT; cross-ref header to template_parser.CONTRACT_KEYS
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
template_parser.py # pure deterministic parser + fail-closed validation gate; Phase 8: the
# template-path bad-status branch now returns "invalid_status" (was a
# copy-paste "malformed_site_code") -- matches validate_ai_fallback's code
# for the identical condition
feat: decompose email-processor handlers into flat siblings + lazy boto3 clients (refactor phase 5) (#113)
Both email-processor God-handlers split along the seams that already
work in the flat-sibling pattern established by lambdas/shared/, so
bare-name imports keep working under the existing bundling glob.
PO (5-way split): handler.py keeps only the event loop, fail-closed
auth, and email_type routing. extraction.py holds extract_with_claude
and _EMAIL_TAG_RE, importing EXTRACTION_PROMPT from prompts.py and
parse_raw_email from shared/email_parsing.py rather than recreating a
PO-local copy. enrichment.py is a pure code move of enrich_parsed and
pad_zip (PO-only; WO has no enrichment stage) with zero behavior
change. telemetry.py holds the EMF ParseMethod emit wrappers.
persistence.py holds _write_fields/_merge_update/save_*, collapsing
the byte-identical save_new_po/save_revision bodies into one
_save_merge helper that both now call through, preserving the sticky
Cancelled ConditionExpression guard for both callers; save_cancellation
stays separate.
WO (5 concerns, no enrichment stage): the handler loop keeps
validate_ai_fallback and the re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+", work_order_id)
key guard ahead of both save_work_order and save_event, since the
guard protects the DynamoDB partition key and the '#'-delimited
comment_id range-key segment. _header_date_iso and comment_id
determinism stay colocated with persistence.py's save_event for the
retry-idempotent event_id key.
EXTRACTION_PROMPT (PO) moves to prompts.py with cross-reference
headers to derived_fields.py's authoritative trade/site/fiscal rule
tables; handler.py re-exports it (from prompts import
EXTRACTION_PROMPT) since four tests dereference handler.EXTRACTION_
PROMPT directly. WO's prompt moves the same way.
I/O modules (extraction.py's bedrock client, persistence.py's
dynamodb resource, handler.py's s3 client) get lazy cached boto3
accessors; pure modules (enrichment.py, prompts.py, telemetry.py)
import no boto3. Test monkeypatch surfaces move to the module that
now owns the client (e.g. persistence.dynamodb) everywhere tests
patch it, and the moto-before-handler-import ordering in
_po_parser_support.py is preserved so the moto-backed suites don't
hit real AWS.
Behavior-preservation pins, verified with tests: PO still emits
ParseMethod=ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, with
ai_fallback_rejected as the additive second datapoint on rejection.
WO still emits after its gate with mutually-exclusive ai_fallback /
ai_fallback_rejected. Shadow DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stays
ai_fallback-only. derived_fields.py is untouched (diff against
feature/phase-3-shared-extraction is empty). handler(event, context)
signatures and the save_* public contract are unchanged on both
pipelines; goldens unchanged.
PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES and its WO equivalent in
tests/test_bundle_consistency.py are updated for the new sibling
modules so the AST bundle-consistency test still fails on an
unshipped or uncommented-out sibling.
2026-07-20 15:34:53 -04:00
tests/ # golden-file + validation-gate + comment_id + fallback + healthcheck + behavior-pin tests
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
conftest.py # fake_dynamo fixture, patches persistence.dynamodb (module-top `from _wo_parser_support import wo_persistence` , Phase 8)
_wo_parser_support.py # Phase 8: rewritten OFF the bare `import handler` strategy -- re-exports tests.support fakes/loader; WO module handles (template_parser, persistence, extraction, telemetry)
test_wo_merge.py # Phase 8: moto-backed WorkOrders save_work_order merge-semantics mirror of test_po_merge (null-status never clobbers wo_status, created_at immutable, status->wo_status mapping, None fields absent, record_type only-when-present)
test_wo_bedrock_transport.py # Phase 8: Bedrock transport errors + the hand-computed emitted-series no-double-count pin for the handler.py except-and-reraise wrap + multi-record failure-isolation pin
fixtures/
ses-stamped/
auth-pass-01.eml # Phase 8: the one new fixture allowed this phase -- a synthesized Authentication-Results header block (from WO_SES_HEADER in test_ses_auth.py), not scraped mail
feat: extract lambdas/shared/ — single-source ses_auth, web_ui auth, email parsing, EMF emitter (refactor phase 3) (#111)
Four modules move into the handbook-mandated lambdas/shared/ location,
collapsing duplicated logic that had to be kept in sync by hand across
the PO and WO pipelines:
- ses_auth.py: the PO and WO copies were verified sha256-identical
against the feature/phase-7-ops-recovery baseline before the move
(no drift since the last audit). shared/ses_auth.py is the exact
bytes of that one copy; both originals are git rm'd (the PO copy
via rename, the WO copy as a straight delete). Bundling lands the
module flat in /asset-output for both email processors, so the
handlers keep `from ses_auth import authenticate_inbound_email`
unchanged — zero handler diff for this move, which is what keeps
fail-closed auth byte-identical through the change.
- web_ui_auth.py: extracts the byte-identical _get_auth_token /
_header / is_authenticated block plus the four token-cache globals
out of both web_ui handlers. The per-stack INFRA-74 comments stay
in each handler as-is (deliberately drifted wording, stack-specific)
rather than being unified into the shared module. Fail-closed
semantics (unset ARN or Secrets Manager exception -> deny) are
unchanged.
- email_parsing.py: parse_raw_email ships as the superset version that
returns cc unconditionally. WO's output is bit-identical to before;
PO simply ignores the cc field rather than being "cleaned up" to
consume it. No second variant is kept.
- emf.py: a generic emitter parameterized by namespace, dimension
sets, and properties. Every call site's emitted EMF envelope is
unchanged, including the load-bearing
[["ParseMethod"],["ParseMethod","TemplateId"]] dimension-set shape
the alarms and metric filters depend on. Emission ordering is
untouched: PO still emits ai_fallback before the Bedrock call, WO
still emits its mutually-exclusive ai_fallback/ai_fallback_rejected
after its gate. The deliberate-double-count comments survive.
_emit_derived_agreement_metric was found living inside
derived_fields.py, so per the DERIVED-FIELDS exception it is left
as a third, unconverted copy (derived_fields.py and the shadow
DerivedFieldAgreement telemetry stay untouchable while that bake
runs) — a comment there points at shared/emf.py for the eventual
follow-up.
Bundling: both email-processor cdk bundling commands gain a trailing
`cp shared/*.py /asset-output/` (they were already cp-only post-Phase
7, so no pip step or manylinux pin is reintroduced). Both web_ui
functions gain the same widened-root staging so web_ui_auth.py ships
beside their handler; site_extractor's from_asset is untouched.
Tests: PO_EXPECTED_TOP_LEVEL_MODULES gains the shared modules that now
ship, the AST sibling-import check resolves imports whose source now
lives under shared/, and the new shared cp line has its own
revert/mutation detection. _SIBLING_MODULES resolution and
_po_parser_support.py now load ses_auth/email_parsing/emf from
shared/; the two-copy ses_auth byte-identity fixture-hygiene test is
retired as obsolete now that there is one copy, and the ses_auth
fixture parameterization over two identical copies is dropped. The
sys.modules save/restore dance for template_parser (still duplicated
per-pipeline) is left in place.
2026-07-20 13:38:23 -04:00
web_ui/ # handler.py imports `from web_ui_auth import is_authenticated` (shared)
2026-07-30 12:03:02 -04:00
shoc_emitter/ # SHOC webhook emitter (ACTIVE since 2026-07-30; see the SHOC
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
# webhook feed section). Flat siblings, bare-name imports
handler.py # thin per-record event loop + partial-batch failure report + rejected-queue parking
envelope.py # pure stream-record -> envelope mapping + event classification (incl. echo guard)
delivery.py # TTL-cached secret fetch + HMAC signing (sign_body) + POST + response classification
shoc_hmac_rotator/
handler.py # 30-day Secrets Manager rotation (single-user: createSecret/finishSecret;
# dual-key overlap, kid YYYY-MM-DDTHH)
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
scripts/
reprocess.py
backfill_sites.py
feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter - dark-ship streams + HMAC secret/rotation (PR-2) (#137)
* docs(webhook): revise SHOC webhook contract and plan for post-migration reality
Branch re-cut on main 2026-07-23 (old base carried stale PR #99 commits).
Contract Rev 2026-07-23:
- Producer account corrected: seahaven-prod (011934824531); mgmt frozen
- Reconciliation backstop is the new procurement read API, not SyncController
- wo_status "unknown" is real; SHOC must map it (checklist item added)
- write_origin forward-compat note for phase-2 write-back echo suppression
- SyncVendorReplies retirement flagged (dead table, no vendor_reply event)
Plan updates:
- Account gate: seahaven-prod only; never enable streams on mgmt tables
- Emitter ships DARK (ESMs enabled=False); activation is a deliberate flip
after the SHOC receiver passes shared HMAC vectors
- Post-refactor conventions: common.py helpers, bundle-consistency AST pins,
pytest.ini --cov additions, consolidated test roots
- Dedicated-CMK rationale, secret-ARN handooff step, consumer audit refreshed
(slack-bot decommissioned), enum golden test, write_origin skip-branch test
* feat(webhook): SHOC WO webhook emitter — dark-ship streams, HMAC secret + rotation
Implements docs/shoc-webhook-plan.md Phases 1-5 (PR-2 of the SHOC
call-and-be-called effort). Everything ships DARK: both DynamoDB event
source mappings deploy enabled=False; activation is a deliberate
one-line follow-up PR gated on the SHOC receiver passing the shared
HMAC test vectors.
- Streams: NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES on WorkOrders + WorkOrderComments
(in-place update, RETAIN + logical IDs untouched; no existing
consumers — verified live, neither table had a stream).
- workorder-shoc-emitter (Py3.12/ARM64): stream -> envelope ->
HMAC-signed POST per docs/shoc-webhook-contract.md; strict per-shard
ordering (parallelization 1, bisect off, retry until 24h age,
ReportBatchItemFailures); 429/5xx/timeout block the shard in order,
other 4xx park to workorder-shoc-emitter-rejected; ESM failures ->
workorder-shoc-emitter-failures (metadata; replay rebuilds from
DynamoDB). Echo guard skips write_origin=shoc-write-api.
- Secret workorder-ingest/shoc-webhook-hmac on a dedicated CMK
(alias workorder-ingest-shoc-webhook-kms); cross-account
GetSecretValue/DescribeSecret + kms:Decrypt granted to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev. RemovalPolicy
DESTROY deliberately (machine-generated material; avoids the
fixed-name RETAIN-orphan deadlock).
- workorder-shoc-hmac-rotator: 30-day rotation, dual-key overlap,
64-hex keys, kid = UTC %Y-%m-%dT%H.
- Alarms (ALARM-only -> site-alerts): emitter errors/throttles/
duration + iterator-age (>=10 min) + failures/rejected queue
depth; rotator standard trio.
- scripts/replay_shoc_webhooks.py: dry-run-default operator replay
(rebuilds from tables, replay:true envelopes).
- Tests: 742 passing, 85.56% aggregate; golden HMAC vectors shared
with SHOC in docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json (emitter + replay
signing pinned to identical vectors); bundle-consistency AST pins
for both new bundles.
- README: WO stack + webhook feed section, alarm table, runbooks;
removed stale seahaven-slack-bot consumer references.
* fix(webhook): kms:ViaService pins, https-only delivery, cross-account principal CI pin
GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the policy surface (no BLOCK): FIX applied
to the cross-account shoc-backend-dev Decrypt statement and both Lambda
role KMS grants (the key is only ever used via Secrets Manager); its
invariant-enforcement QUESTION answered durably with
tests/test_cross_account_principal_pin.py (any new foreign IAM principal
in cdk/ fails CI). Scanner mediums fixed: delivery.py and the replay
script now refuse non-https URLs (urllib follows file:// and http://).
SQS metadata-action and dynamodb:ListStreams NITs skipped: standard CDK
grant shapes; ListStreams has no resource-level scoping. The 4 gitleaks
HIGHs on docs/shoc-webhook-test-vectors.json are deliberate non-secrets
(shared receiver-verification vectors) suppressed machine-level with
justification.
* harden(webhook): resolve /sh-security-review findings (1 confirmed medium + cheap fixes)
High-recall detector fan-out (injection/authz/secrets-crypto/iac-iam/logic)
+ proof-or-kill verifier. Gate PASSES: 1 confirmed medium, 0 confirmed
critical/high. Confirmed finding fixed; several unverified-but-cheap
hardenings applied since the emitter ships dark and activation is weeks out.
- CONFIRMED medium (confused deputy): the rotation Lambda's generated
invoke permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com carried no
SourceAccount/SourceArn, so any account's Secrets Manager could invoke
the rotator. Patched the generated CfnPermission in place (a second
permission would be additive, not restrictive) to pin account + this
secret ARN.
- delivery + replay: refuse to follow receiver 3xx redirects (no-redirect
opener) so live X-SH-* auth headers can't be forwarded to a
receiver-chosen Location and an http:// Location can't slip past the
https guard. Fixed the "unfollowed 3xx" comment that was factually wrong.
- delivery: classify 401/403 as retryable (invalidate key cache + retry in
order) instead of parking -- transient auth failures (rotation outran the
TTL cache, clock skew) are availability events, not contract bugs.
- envelope: build_event now genuinely total (guarded eventID /
ApproximateCreationDateTime subscripts) per its own never-raise contract.
- handler: catch-all so an unexpected per-record error (e.g. SQS park
failure) reports only that record instead of failing the whole batch
(which would re-deliver every earlier success for 24h); per-invocation
emit/skip batch summary so a systemic silent drop is queryable/alarmable.
- rotator: narrow the AWSCURRENT-read except to ResourceNotFound/JSONDecode
(transient SM/KMS errors re-raise so the overlap key isn't silently
dropped); kid uniqueness checked against ALL retained kids with a random
suffix on collision (never reissue a kid for a different secret).
- contract: skeleton-upsert required on ANY unknown work_order_id (not just
comment-before-create) + monotonicity guard (ignore older updated_at), so
a parked created or an out-of-order replay can't corrupt receiver state.
Unverified/refuted findings left as-is with rationale: the two "high" logic
claims (whole-batch crash triggers, ordering violation) were refuted on
reachability (real stream records carry required fields; persistence writes
strings only; full-state idempotent upsert absorbs the ordering gap). Signed
kid/version binding (AUTHZ-002) declined: coordinated contract change, not
cheap, no exploit with one algorithm/key.
* fix(webhook): drop kid from rotator test_ok log (CodeQL clear-text-logging FP)
GHAS CodeQL flagged py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data (high) at
_test_secret's success log because head["kid"] is subscripted from the
same parsed-secret dict that holds head["secret"] — the taint tracker
can't tell the non-secret key id from the secret. The secret value is
never logged. Rather than dismiss the alert (fragile; re-alerts on line
moves), remove the flow: kid is already logged at stage time in
_create_secret and version_id correlates the steps, so the test_ok log
keeps only event + version_id. Also hardens against a future edit that
swaps the logged field.
2026-07-24 18:12:20 -04:00
replay_shoc_webhooks.py # rebuild + re-POST webhook events ("replay": true) -- the
# -failures/-rejected alarm runbook; dry-run unless --execute
feat(api): procurement-api read stack + OpenAPI docs (SHOC reconciliation path) (#127)
* feat(api): add procurement-api stack - read API + OpenAPI docs page
Third CDK stack: API Gateway REST API (IAM SigV4) over both pipelines'
tables, replacing SHOC's retired SyncController cross-account DynamoDB
scan as the reconciliation/backfill path.
- lambdas/api/: handler (healthcheck + docs-token gate + router dispatch),
router (single route table), pagination (opaque cursor, hostile -> 400),
Decimal-safe serialization, wo_repo/po_repo reads. No VendorReplies.
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec as source of truth incl. top-level webhooks section
documenting the outbound SHOC feed; phase-2 write endpoints x-planned
(router answers 501). Self-contained /docs page, no CDN.
- Auth: AWS_IAM on data routes + resource policy scoped to exactly
arn:aws:iam::396287094661:role/shoc-backend-dev on GET/*; /docs and
/openapi.json carve-out is token-gated in the Lambda via shared
web_ui_auth (fail-closed, INFRA-74 posture).
- KMS: explicit Decrypt/DescribeKey on the DynamoDB CMK from SSM
(name-imported table drops the key association - INFRA-104 class).
- Alarms: errors/throttles/duration(p99>=22.5s) + gateway 5xx, ALARM-only
to site-alerts. No access logging in v1 (docs ?token= shim stays out of
logs); cloud_watch_role=False.
- Tests: handler auth-seam + routing + Decimal round-trip; moto cursor
pagination incl. hostile cursors; spec<->router drift gate; bundle
AST pins for the api command; pytest.ini --cov + loader siblings.
- Deploy role: third stack DescribeStacks ARN + procurement-api smoke
invoke ARN (re-run create-deploy-role.sh before merge).
* harden(api): apply sh-security-review findings to procurement-api
Fan-out (6 detectors) + review findings resolved:
Correctness / DoS:
- pagination: require EXACT key-set match (was subset) so a partial/foreign
composite cursor can't reach DynamoDB as an inconsistent ExclusiveStartKey
-> ValidationException -> 500; comments Query now pins the cursor's
work_order_id to the path entity.
- handler: map botocore ValidationException to 400 (defense in depth) so a
crafted cursor can't drive the zero-threshold 5xx alarm.
- web_ui_auth: compare tokens as bytes; a non-ASCII presented token now fails
closed (401) instead of crashing hmac.compare_digest into a 500. Resolves the
pre-existing xfail(strict) follow-up test; hardens the web UIs too.
Docs page:
- typeStr() now escapes the one spec-derived string that reached innerHTML.
- spec inlined into the docs <script> block escapes "<" -> < (</script>
breakout guard); /openapi.json still served byte-faithful.
- Cache-Control: no-store + Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on docs responses so
the ?token= URL stays out of caches/Referer.
- spec-drift test asserts the committed spec carries no "</" / "<!--".
IAM / IaC:
- resource policy enumerates the 7 data GET resources instead of GET/* so a
future GET route can't silently inherit SHOC cross-account reach.
- kms:Decrypt grant gains a kms:ViaService=dynamodb condition.
- stage throttling (50 rps / 100 burst) bounds the unauthenticated /docs blast
radius below the 10k account default.
- corrected the PATCH/POST comment (same-account callers aren't blocked by the
resource policy; 501 handler + absent write grant are the gate).
- documented the RETAIN log-group first-deploy rollback trap and the
resource-policy-needs-redeploy gotcha in-stack.
Mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-family review of the full policy surface: no BLOCK/FIX.
675 tests pass, ruff clean, cdk synth green.
2026-07-23 19:32:20 -04:00
post-deploy-smoke.sh # CD gate: synchronous healthcheck invoke of the three smoke-gated functions, checks FunctionError
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
conftest.py # Phase 8: THE repo-root session-invariant conftest. rootdir is pinned by
# pytest.ini at repo root, so this loads for every pytest invocation shape --
# including a standalone `pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` -- before
# any collection import. Sets the dummy AWS env, imports moto BEFORE any
# handler import (registers moto's botocore stubber hook so boto3 sessions
# created afterwards are stubbable), and re-exports
# `tests.support.loader.load_lambda_module` . Owns the session fixtures
# (po_handler, wo_handler, email_handler, ses_auth, po_persistence,
# po_enrichment, wo_persistence). Supersedes the old tests/conftest.py
# (deleted -- it was never an ancestor of the pipeline test roots, so it
# could not carry these invariants for a standalone pipeline-root run).
Add fail-closed SES sender authentication (INFRA-107) (#98)
* Add fail-closed SES sender authentication
The From header and any raw-MIME Authentication-Results copies are
attacker-forgeable, so a forged email to apm@int.seahaven.com or
amazon_po@int.seahaven.com could create or mutate a WO/PO (INFRA-107,
CRITICAL). Both S3-triggered email processors now authenticate the
sender against the Authentication-Results header SES itself prepends
at delivery: only the topmost header is consulted, its authserv-id
must be amazonses.com, and it must carry dkim=pass for a domain in
the per-pipeline ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS env var (comma-separated, set
in CDK so ops can adjust without code changes).
Allowlists come from live traffic observed 2026-07-15 on both ingest
buckets: WO mail arrives via the apm@ Google Groups forward, which
re-signs as seahaven.com (the hxgnsmartcloud.com signature does not
survive the forward); PO mail passes for amazon.coupahost.com.
amazonses.com also passes on PO mail but is deliberately excluded --
every SES customer's outbound mail passes for it.
Every failure path (env var unset, header missing or unparseable,
verdict fail, unaligned domain) rejects the email: a structured
warning with the reason and S3 key is logged and the record skipped
without erroring the invocation, so rejected mail causes no Lambda
retries or DLQ messages. Handler signatures and event sources are
unchanged.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parser per cross-family review
Cross-family (GPT-4.1) review findings: terminate the dkim result
token at end-of-clause, whitespace, or a comment so a value like
"dkim=pass-fake" can never be read as a pass; normalize trailing
dots off allowlist entries so "seahaven.com." matches; make the
compat32 parser policy explicit. Adds tests for result-token
boundaries, comments after the result, quoted domain values, and
folding inside a dkim clause.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Harden AR parsing and alarm on sender-auth rejects
The SES-stamped Authentication-Results value echoes attacker-controlled
SMTP-session tokens (envelope-from, helo, header.from) as their own
semicolon-delimited property clauses. A naive split(";") tore an RFC 5321
quoted-local-part MAIL FROM apart and manufactured a forged dkim=pass
clause, so a fully spoofed email was accepted on the genuinely
SES-stamped topmost header. Tokenise comment- and quoted-string-aware
(RFC 8601 / RFC 5322): strip CFWS comments, split clauses only on
semicolons outside a quoted-string, and fail closed on unbalanced
quotes/comments so a ';' inside a quoted pvalue can never start a clause.
Rejected mail returns normally (no error, no retry, no DLQ message), so a
signing-domain drift or a wrong allowlist would silently discard 100% of
legitimate mail while every alarm stayed green. Add a CloudWatch Logs
metric filter + alarm on the sender_auth_rejected warning to both stacks
so a false-reject storm pages instead of vanishing. This is also the
safety net for the WO seahaven.com allowlist assumption, which must be
validated against a live SES-stamped header (a plain Gmail auto-forward
re-signs under the sending Workspace domain, not seahaven.com).
Refs: INFRA-107
* chore: retrigger CI (no run recorded for 7c74ac1)
* Fix quoted-AUID DKIM domain spoof in sender auth
Resolve three confirmed /sh-security-review findings on the fail-closed
SES sender-authentication control.
HIGH: header.i/header.d domain extraction was not quoted-string aware.
An attacker with a valid DKIM key for their own domain could set an
RFC 6376-legal AUID such as i="@seahaven.com"@attacker.com; the naive
extractor stopped at the closing quote and returned seahaven.com,
accepting forged mail. Extraction now tokenises the clause with the same
quoted-string discipline already used for clause splitting: header.d
(the plain signing domain) is authoritative when present, otherwise the
header.i domain is the part after the AUID's LAST top-level "@", so a "@"
inside a quoted local-part is treated as signer-controlled label text and
yields the true signer (attacker.com), not seahaven.com.
LOW: the topmost-header parse ran outside evaluate_sender_authentication's
try/except, so an unexpected parser exception on crafted input could
propagate into the handler and Lambda async retries/DLQ. The parse now
fails CLOSED with an authentication_results_unparseable reason.
MEDIUM: the sender_auth_rejected alarm used Sum>=3 over 15 min, blind to
a low-volume total-reject outage (a trickle that never sums to 3). Both
stacks now alarm on >=1 reject per 5-min period with evaluation_periods=3
/ datapoints_to_alarm=2, so a sustained reject condition pages even at one
reject per period while a lone stray probe self-clears.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Load Lambda function dir on sys.path in tests
Rebasing INFRA-107 onto main folded #95's pytest suite into this
branch's tests. The unified conftest loads the PO/WO handlers by file
path, and handler.py now does `from ses_auth import
authenticate_inbound_email` -- a bare sibling import that resolves in
the Lambda only because the runtime puts each function's own directory
on sys.path. The shared load_handler now adds that directory so the
handler tests import correctly alongside the sender-auth tests.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Note #97 test files in README directory tree
The rebase onto main brought in #97's tests/requirements.txt and
tests/test_po_merge.py. List both in the directory tree so it matches
the tree on disk.
Refs: INFRA-107
* Document INFRA-107 forwarder-binding risk acceptance
Record the accepted risk that WO sender auth binds to the apm@ forward's
re-signing domain (seahaven.com) rather than the Hexagon originator; the
apm@ Google Group's restricted posting policy is the load-bearing control
(escalates to HIGH if the group is opened to external posting). Also
correct the sender-auth-rejected alarm docs to match the shipped config
(>=1 per 5-min, 2-of-3 datapoints, not the superseded >=3/15min) and
note the SES-AR-01/02 parser hardening follow-ups.
Refs: INFRA-107
2026-07-15 20:58:47 -04:00
tests/
test: consolidate test roots — one loader, shared support, enforced CI floor (phase 8) (#118)
* test: consolidate test roots — one repo-root loader, shared support package, missing-scenario suites, enforced ruff/coverage floor (refactor phase 8)
tests/conftest.py only loads for the tests/ root, not a standalone
`pytest lambdas/po/email_processor/tests` run, so it could never carry
session invariants like the dummy AWS env or the moto stubber
registration. Add a single repo-root conftest.py (pytest.ini pins
rootdir there, so it loads for every invocation) that sets the dummy
AWS credentials/region, imports moto BEFORE any handler module so
boto3 sessions pick up its stubber hook (carrying the explanatory
comment verbatim from the old _po_parser_support.py), and exposes one
load_lambda_module(pipeline, name) — the sys.modules save/restore
dance stays, since template_parser is still a duplicated bare name
across pipelines needing per-exec sibling binding.
Add tests/support/ as the shared package both pipelines' local
_*_parser_support.py modules delegate to: a superset FakeTable (PO's
update_item recording + WO's put_item and keyed single-row store),
FakeDynamoResource, load_email, and load_golden with parse_float=Decimal
kept (load-bearing for exact money comparison at PO magnitudes — WO's
prior load_golden had no parse_float and must not regress PO by losing
it). Rewrite _wo_parser_support.py off the bare `import handler` /
`from handler import parse_raw_email` strategy that was the source of
the bare-name sys.modules collision the other two loaders defend
against.
Move test_po_merge.py and test_pad_zip.py into
lambdas/po/email_processor/tests/ (PO-specific, belongs beside the
code) via git mv so history follows; test_parse_raw_email.py and
test_ses_auth.py stay at the repo root since they're genuinely
cross-pipeline, parameterized over both handlers. Delete
tests/test_local.py: it globs a nonexistent samples/ dir, is WO-only,
and imports a handler at collection time, bypassing the loader gate
entirely — the golden suites already cover its role. Its pytest.ini
exclusion comment goes with it.
New scenario coverage, all built on the single loader + support
package:
- PO+WO Bedrock transport errors (ThrottlingException, missing
'content' key, empty content list, non-JSON model text), asserting
PO's pre-call ai_fallback metric survives with no partial write and
the exception propagates; WO's no-datapoint-on-throttle behavior is
pinned with a documenting test rather than "fixed" by reordering.
- Handler-level SES-auth reject seam per pipeline: no auth
monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS asserts zero Bedrock calls,
zero writes, no raise — closing the hole where deleting the gate
line today still passes every test.
- web_ui coverage for both PO and WO (0% before this): fail-closed on
unset ARN and on a Secrets Manager exception, TTL cache refresh,
Bearer/X-Auth-Token/header-case-insensitivity, wrong-token 401 with
no table scan, non-ASCII token, and a hostile-field-escaping
regression lock. PO web_ui has no __init__.py, so these go through
the loader rather than package imports.
- A moto-backed mirror of test_po_merge for WO merge semantics
(table 'WorkOrders'): null-status never clobbers wo_status,
created_at immutable via if_not_exists, status->wo_status mapping,
None fields absent from SET, record_type only-when-present.
- Small pins: the PO-DC-02 64-char EMF clamp regression and
per-pipeline multi-record failure-isolation (all-or-retry contract).
The reprocess.py synthetic-event-shape contract test already landed
in Phase 7, so it isn't duplicated here.
Two WO product-code fixes ride along, since this is the phase that
exercises them: (a) the invalid_status reason-code fix in
template_parser.py's status check, which previously returned
malformed_site_code for the same failure validate_ai_fallback already
labels invalid_status, making one failure surface two codes depending
on path (grepped the dashboards/metric filters for
malformed_site_code first — no external references found, safe to
diverge the two codes); (b) wrapping the WO Bedrock call in
handler.py so a transport failure emits ai_fallback/bedrock_error in
an except-and-reraise. This is deliberately not a naive reorder: the
emit sits in the except block, not pre-call, so a gate-rejected email
still emits only ai_fallback_rejected and wo_stack's "a rejected
email emits nothing else" alarm contract doesn't double-count. A test
computes the emitted series by hand to pin the no-double-count
behavior. Neither change touches the handler event/return contract.
_validate_new_po_values in the PO template_parser.py is split into
per-rule helpers, and the V4 anchor-frame dataclass now carries
summary_matches/price so V13 can consume them; extract_new_po
(C901=35) is included in the split. Add ruff.toml enabling C901/PLR
so the mccabe/complexity suppressions scattered through the tree stop
being decorative; derived_fields.py is under the shadow-bake freeze
so its violations are silenced via a per-file ignore with a
justification comment instead of an in-file edit, and the handful of
other pre-existing violations surfaced by turning the config on get
the same per-file-ignore treatment with a reason, or a fix where the
file isn't frozen. scripts/ is added to the CI lint scope.
CI gains an explicit --cov module list (lambdas/po and wo
email_processor + web_ui, po/site_extractor, lambdas/shared) plus
--cov-fail-under=80, since web_ui and site_extractor lack __init__.py
markers and a bare --cov=lambdas silently skips them for the missing
package marker; .coveragerc omits the test dirs themselves from the
count. The Phase 0 AST bundle-consistency test stays in the standard
pytest run. .gitignore picks up the resulting .coverage data file.
docs/po-template-parser.md gets a small correction: the EXTRACTION_PROMPT
declares quantity/price as "number or null", not JSON strings, so
parse_float=Decimal already handles a conforming Bedrock response —
the doc previously implied the coercion path was the primary
mechanism rather than a defensive net for non-conforming responses.
* test: lock attribute-context quote escaping in web_ui hostile-field test
The escaping regression lock asserted only the element-context vector
(raw <script> absent, <script> present) while its docstring claimed
quotes were covered -- the payload's " and ' were never asserted on, so
a quote-escaping regression on the onclick row-link sink (attribute
breakout -> event-handler injection) would have passed green.
/sh-security-review finding WC-01 (confirmed medium, test-integrity).
Add assertions that the onclick sink's JSON string renders its opening
quote as " (raw " after window.location= fails), that the
payload's quote characters appear only entity-escaped, and that the
raw payload never appears anywhere in the body. Mutation-verified: the
test now fails when the sink's quote-escaping is dropped.
* test: address Open SWE review — xfail the web_ui non-ASCII auth pin, document subset coverage-floor override
- tests/test_web_ui_auth.py: replace the TypeError characterization pin with an
xfail(strict, raises=TypeError) asserting the DESIRED fail-closed (False)
behavior. Documents the intended fix and auto-fails (xpass) once web_ui_auth is
corrected, instead of requiring a passing test to be knowingly deleted. The
module stays frozen this phase; the underlying hmac.compare_digest ASCII-only
defect is tracked as a follow-up.
- pytest.ini: document that the aggregate 80% floor (enforced in CI via the
reusable workflow's bare pytest) red-exits local subset runs by design, with the
--cov-fail-under=0 override for iteration. Floor stays in addopts because the
centralized ci-python-sam workflow exposes no per-run test command.
2026-07-20 16:19:15 -04:00
requirements.txt # Test-only deps (moto, pytest-cov)
support/ # Phase 8: shared test package (tests/ itself has no __init__ .py --
# PEP-420 namespace resolution via the root conftest's sys.path insert)
__init__ .py # load_lambda_module + REPO_ROOT re-export, FIXTURE_DIRS, stems/
# load_raw/load_email/load_golden (parse_float=Decimal, pinned safe
# for both pipelines), and the superset FakeTable/FakeDynamoResource/FakeS3
loader.py # the ONE load_lambda_module + sys.modules save/restore dance
# (dependency-topological sibling tuple + web_ui_auth); every
# pipeline handler exec in the suite goes through this
test_parse_raw_email.py # MIME parsing tests (PO + WO handlers) -- stays at root, cross-pipeline
test_ses_auth.py # Sender-authentication parser tests (INFRA-107) -- stays at root, cross-pipeline
test_handler_auth_seam.py # Phase 8: handler-level SES-auth reject seam, per pipeline -- no auth
# monkeypatch + empty ALLOWED_DKIM_DOMAINS -> zero Bedrock calls, zero
# writes, no raise (closes the "delete the gate line, tests still pass" hole)
test_web_ui_auth.py # Phase 8: shared/web_ui_auth.py -- fail-closed on unset ARN / Secrets
# Manager exception, TTL cache refresh, header-matrix case-insensitivity,
# non-ASCII-token documenting pin
test_web_ui_handlers.py # Phase 8: both web_ui handlers (0% coverage before this phase) -- 401
# without a table scan, authenticated render path, hostile-field escaping
# regression lock
test_bundle_consistency.py # AST check: bundling command ships every handler.py sibling import
test_reprocess_contract.py # reprocess.py synthetic S3-event-shape contract (Phase 7)
2026-05-12 15:21:06 -04:00
```
