orchestrator/docs/provisioning/P3-LIVE-FLIP-PLAN.md

# P3-LIVE-FLIP PLAN — agent-team build → verify → draft-PR

Formal phased plan to take the agent-team Plane-2 pipeline from **clarify+plan only**
to **producing reviewable draft PRs**, while keeping the always-on R720 box
read-only and the apply path zero-AWS. Status as of 2026-06-22: **NOT STARTED**
(P3 is built but inert). This plan is the input to `/sh-plan-review` before any build.

> **Prerequisite reading:** `docs/r720-agent-team-design.md` §3.3.2 (CI-as-verifier
> trust boundary, "B4"), `PROVISIONING-RUNBOOK.md` (the P3-live-flip section),
> and memory `project_r720_agent_team` (locked decisions).

---

## 1. Objective & current state

**Today (inert):** the pipeline runs `INTAKE → CLARIFIER → PLANNER → REVIEW`, but
`serve` passes `build_verify_wiring=None`, the Tier-3 fixer is `--dry-run` only, and
`agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` has its privileged steps disabled with
`if: ${{ false }}` and `pull-requests:write` / `environment:` commented out. So it
clarifies + plans but writes no code and opens no PR.

**After P3:** the pipeline can emit a diff, have **org CI** build/test/security-review
it in an untrusted sandbox, a pure-code gate confirm green from authenticated
Checks-API results, and a scoped **GitHub App** open a **draft PR** for human review.
The box never gains a write token.

## 2. Locked decisions (carried in — do not relitigate here)

- **D-OIDC:** apply path uses a **GitHub App `pull-requests:write` token**, **ZERO AWS, no OIDC**.
- **D2:** box stays **read-only / no standing write token**; **org CI does the applying**.
- **B4:** the LLM-proposed diff is **untrusted code**; the CI trust boundary (below) is mandatory.
- Output is **draft PRs only** — nothing auto-merges; human approval is the merge gate.
- (Separate, not part of this plan: `aws-posture` resident access via step-ca + IAM Roles
  Anywhere — that IAM is already cross-review-approved and is its own sub-task.)

## 3. Hard gates (must clear before the flip — these block everything)

| Gate | Why | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| `/sh-plan-review` on THIS plan | adversarial plan audit before build | me → GPT-4.1 |
| `/sh-security-review` on the apply/verify CI surface | auth + untrusted-input + CI trust boundary | me |
| GPT-4.1 cross-family review on the apply/verify CI + any permission change | mandatory for the trust-boundary / permissions surface | orchestrator |
| ~~`GH_TOKEN`→`GITHUB_TOKEN` resolved~~ ✅ DONE 2026-06-22 | transport reads `GITHUB_TOKEN`; box now has a `GITHUB_TOKEN` alias of `GH_TOKEN` in `~/secrev.env` | me |

The flip does NOT proceed until `/sh-security-review` AND the GPT-4.1 cross-review on
the CI surface both pass — **and these gates are re-run against the ACTUAL enabled
workflow (Phase 3), not only the inert version** (see Phase 3).

> **Plan-review disposition (GPT-4.1 cross-family, 2026-06-22 — REQUEST CHANGES).** Findings
> folded into §4 and Phases 1/1b: expanded denylist vectors, runner-trust, concrete
> diff-transport + threat model, gate-weakening detection, PR-metadata sanitization, ledger
> anti-tamper, recovery for a merged-privileged change, required-check-name discovery,
> deploy-before-merge enforcement, no-write-token audit, draft-PR rate monitoring + stale-PR
> cleanup. Several items the reviewer marked BLOCK are **already implemented in PR #17's CI**
> (canonicalization, egress, SHA-pin, empty-hash fail-closed, Checks-API) — Phase 1 verifies
> them rather than rebuilding. Open QUESTIONs to answer when building: how human reviewers are
> notified of new draft PRs, and how "every deployable repo has CI" is enforced for targets.

> **Plan-review disposition — ROUND 2 (GPT-4.1 cross-family, 2026-06-22 eve — REQUEST CHANGES).**
> Re-review after the durable-intake work merged (#32) and the coordinator went live. Six BLOCK
> items folded into the phases below: (B1) deploy-before-merge made a CONCRETE CI-enforced gate,
> not prose (Phase 1 + Phase 3); (B2) rollback added for a *prematurely-flipped privileged job that
> RUNS* — not only an accidental merge (Phase 1b); (B3) rollback for ALL privileged surfaces is a
> tested script, exercised, not one-time manual (Phase 1b); (B4) Phase 3 is explicitly gated on
> Phase 2 being fully provisioned + verified (Phase 3 precondition); (B5) `/sh-security-review` +
> GPT-4.1 cross-review are RE-RUN on the actual *enabled* workflow before the flip (Phase 3); (B6)
> docs/memory updated INCREMENTALLY at each privileged step, not deferred to Phase 6. FIX/NIT also
> folded: periodic review of gate-weakening patterns, a check-name-discovery test across targets,
> a memory update when denylist vectors change, snapshot retention in Phase 0, and the draft-PR
> notification QUESTION assigned in Phase 4. (Findings-to-verify, not gospel: the reviewer
> under-read §3 — cross-review IS already a hard gate; B5 is the genuine delta = re-run on the
> *enabled* file.)

## 4. The CI trust boundary (design B4 — what the workflow must enforce)

> **Already implemented in the merged P3-live CI hardening (PR #17) — Phase 1 VERIFIES, does not rebuild:**
> denylist path **canonicalization + symlink/rename/traversal resistance**, **egress
> restriction** on the untrusted job, **SHA-pinned** actions, **empty/missing-hash
> fail-closed**, and **authenticated Checks-API** result consumption. The GPT-4.1
> plan-review (2026-06-22) flagged these as "missing" because the *plan* under-restated
> them; confirm each against the actual `agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` +
> `ci_fetcher.py`/`ci_gate.py` rather than re-authoring.

1. **Split CI.** An **untrusted build/test job**: `contents: read` only, **no secrets / no
   OIDC / no write token**, **egress-restricted** (verify/audit the restriction, don't just
   assert it). A **separate privileged job** that **never checks out the patch code** (no
   `pull_request_target` + head checkout) opens the draft PR. **Privileged jobs MUST run only
   on GitHub-hosted runners — assert no self-hosted/user-provided runner can pick them up.**
2. **Denylist** (reject/escalate, never auto-build). Beyond `.github/workflows/**`,
   IAM/permission IaC, branch-protection / `CODEOWNERS` / Dependabot config, and
   out-of-scope files, the denylist MUST also cover these RCE/priv-esc vectors:
   `.gitmodules` / submodule changes, **git hooks** (`.git/hooks`, `core.hooksPath`,
   `.husky/**`), **`.gitattributes`** (filter/clean-smudge process), lockfiles +
   package-manager **postinstall/preinstall** hooks, and **generated/build-artifact** files
   (codegen output is not reviewable as source). Path matching is **canonicalized** (PR #17)
   so symlinks/renames/traversal can't slip a denied path past.
3. **Diff-transport integrity (concretely specified, threat-modeled).** The box records the
   diff **content hash** in its ledger; CI **verifies the hash before apply**. The diff
   reaches CI as a **content-addressed signed artifact** (HMAC/keyed digest the box and the
   privileged job share via an Actions secret) **OR** a short-lived, **branch-only** token
   scoped to a single ref — the box never holds a write token. Threat model the path:
   tamper-in-transit (defeated by hash+signature verify), replay of an old diff (defeated by
   per-task nonce + the `status='open'`/one-shot ledger state), and a hostile artifact name.
4. **Pure-code green gate.** Pass/fail is owned by a **pure-code gate** reading
   **authenticated Checks-API results** (run id + diff hash). The **LLM verifier may propose
   fixes but can never declare a build green**.
5. **Gate-weakening detection.** A diff that **lowers a gate** — adds `# noqa`, `# type: ignore`,
   test `skip`/`xfail`, coverage/lint **excludes**, `--no-verify`, or edits the gate config
   itself — is flagged and escalated (a build can't make itself pass by disabling the checks).
6. **PR-metadata sanitization.** The draft-PR **title / body / comments** are sanitized so a
   hostile diff or LLM output can't exfiltrate secrets/env or inject content into the PR text.
7. **Ledger anti-tamper.** The diff-hash ledger entry is integrity-protected (the existing
   atomic-write + integrity-check substrate; verify the hash row can't be silently rewritten
   between record and apply).
8. **Merge gate.** Draft PR + required checks + `/sh-security-review` + Claude Code App
   review + **human approval**.

## 5. Phases

### Phase 0 — Plan review & pre-reqs  🤖/🧑
- [x] Run `/sh-plan-review` on this doc; fold BLOCK/FIX items in. (Round 1 + Round 2 done; this doc is the result.)
- [ ] Confirm a clean revert point (git tag main; Hyper-V snapshot of sh-secrev).
      **Snapshot retention:** keep the pre-P3 snapshot until P3 has run clean for one full
      cycle (Phase 4 DoD), then prune — recorded here so it is not an open-ended snapshot.
- [x] Resolve `GH_TOKEN`→`GITHUB_TOKEN` (box `~/secrev.env` now has a `GITHUB_TOKEN` alias).
- **Rollback:** none (no state changed).

### Phase 1 — Author/verify the split-CI apply/verify workflow  🤖 (review-gated)
- [ ] Reconcile `agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` with §4. **First confirm** the
      PR-#17 controls are present (canonicalized denylist, egress restriction, SHA-pins,
      empty-hash fail-closed, Checks-API consumption); only then add the new §4 items.
- [ ] **Add denylist vectors** (§4.2): submodules/`.gitmodules`, git hooks/`core.hooksPath`/`.husky`,
      `.gitattributes` filters, lockfile postinstall/preinstall, generated/build artifacts.
      Add a test suite proving canonicalization resists symlink/rename/traversal.
- [ ] **Runner-trust assertion** (§4.1): test that privileged jobs cannot run on a
      self-hosted/user-provided runner.
- [ ] **Concretize + threat-model the diff transport** (§4.3): pick content-addressed signed
      artifact (shared HMAC secret) or short-lived branch-only token; add per-task nonce
      anti-replay; document and test it.
- [ ] **Gate-weakening detector** (§4.5): CI step that fails on a diff adding
      `noqa`/`type: ignore`/skip/xfail/excludes/`--no-verify` or editing the gate config.
      The detector's pattern list is **reviewed/expanded each time a new bypass vector is
      found** (FIX) — record the list in code with a comment pointing here, and update it +
      memory when a vector is added (same discipline as the denylist below).
- [ ] **PR-metadata sanitization** (§4.6) and **ledger anti-tamper** (§4.7) implemented + tested.
- [ ] `agent_team/ci_fetcher.py` (read-only Checks-API fetcher; fails closed) +
      `ci_gate.py` (pure-code green). Add a mechanism for the gate to **discover the correct
      required check names per repo/branch** (avoid hardcoded check-name drift across repos),
      **with a test that exercises discovery against every intended target repo/branch** (FIX).
- [ ] **Memory/doc update when denylist vectors change** (FIX): adding a denylist vector (here
      or later) updates `project_r720_agent_team` memory + the Confluence host page in the SAME
      change — the denied set is operational/security-critical, not tribal knowledge.
- [ ] **Deploy-before-merge enforcement — CONCRETE, CI-enforced (B1). REQUIRED Phase-1
      deliverable; the flip does not proceed without it (no manual fallback).** "Deploy" of this
      change = the privileged path is *proven on the live box before the workflow PR merges*.
      Build, in this phase:
      - (a) the box exercises a **dispatch dry-run** of the apply/verify workflow (privileged steps
        still `if:${{ false }}`) that emits a signed "exercised-on-box" artifact/status. **Dry-run
        faithfulness (NIT):** it runs the SAME workflow file and the SAME untrusted build/verify +
        pure-code-gate jobs as the live path — ONLY the privileged `if:` differs — so the dry-run
        is a faithful proof of the path, not a separate mock.
      - (b) a **required status check** on the workflow-file PR consumes that proof, so the PR is
        un-mergeable until the box has run it.
      - (c) branch-protection set so the required checks **cannot be bypassed by admins** ("do not
        allow bypassing the above settings" / include-administrators) — **no `--admin` merge of the
        privileged flip**. Applied in Phase 2; **no ordering window** because the flip (Phase 3) is
        gated on Phase 2 completion (the B4 precondition), so admin-bypass is already disabled before
        any flip is possible. The Phase-1 required-status-check (a/b) and the Phase-2 branch-protection
        (c) together are the gate; the flip cannot happen until BOTH are in place.
      This is the gate; until it is built+green, the flip is blocked. (Owner: 🤖 build; verified in
      the Phase-1 `/sh-security-review` + cross-review hard stop. The check's implementation is itself
      a Phase-1 build task — that it is not yet physically built is expected for a pre-build plan; what
      matters is it is non-optional and flip-blocking, enforced at the Phase-1 hard stop.)
- [ ] **Concrete "no write token on the box" audit (B-QUESTION → a real check):** a
      test/script asserting the box env + coordinator config hold no `pull-requests:write` /
      contents-write token (grep the live env names + assert the App token is only an Actions
      secret), runnable on the box and in CI. Not a prose claim.
- [ ] `/sh-security-review` + GPT-4.1 cross-review on this surface. **Hard stop until both pass.**
      (NOTE: these are RE-RUN on the *enabled* workflow in Phase 3 — see B5 there.)
- **Rollback:** workflow file stays inert (`if: ${{ false }}` not yet flipped); delete the file.

### Phase 1b — Recovery for an accidentally-merged/applied privileged change  🤖/🧑
- [ ] **Rollback as a TESTED SCRIPT covering ALL privileged surfaces (B3)** — not a one-time
      manual exercise. One scripted, re-runnable rollback that, per surface, restores from a
      recorded baseline: (1) the apply/verify **workflow** (revert the SHA → inert), (2) the
      **`agent-apply` environment** (required-reviewer + protection rules), (3) the **GitHub App
      permissions/installation** (rotate token, reduce/uninstall), (4) **branch protection**.
      The script asserts the post-restore state matches the baseline. Exercised in Phase 3
      rollback AND re-runnable on demand.
- [ ] **Premature-flip-that-RAN rollback (B2).** Distinct from an accidental *merge*: cover the
      case where `if:${{ false }}` is flipped early (or the environment gate is misconfigured) and
      the privileged job **actually runs** — incident steps: rotate the GitHub App token
      immediately, close/revert any draft PR (or branch) it opened, confirm via the Checks/PR
      audit trail exactly what ran in the window, restore the environment + branch protection from
      baseline, and file the incident. This is the "it executed" path, not just "it merged."
- [ ] Add light **monitoring on draft-PR creation rate** (runaway-volume alarm) and an
      **orphaned/stale draft-PR cleanup** step.

### Phase 2 — Provision the GitHub App + environment  🧑 OPERATOR (browser/admin)
- [ ] Create a dedicated **GitHub App** with **`pull-requests:write`** (+ minimal contents to
      open a branch/PR); install on the org. Token lives in **CI**, never on the box.
- [ ] Create the **`agent-apply` GitHub Actions Environment** with a **required reviewer**
      (Adam) + branch-protection so the privileged job cannot run unreviewed.
- [ ] Store the App credentials as repo/org **Actions secrets** (not on the box).
- **Rollback:** uninstall the App; delete the environment + secrets.

### Phase 3 — Bind the live wiring (still gated by the environment)  🤖
- [ ] **PRECONDITION (B4): Phase 2 fully complete + verified before ANY flip.** Do not proceed
      until the GitHub App exists with `pull-requests:write` (+ minimal contents) and is installed,
      the `agent-apply` environment exists with Adam as required reviewer + branch protection, and
      the App credentials are stored as Actions secrets (NOT on the box). Verify each before the
      next step; the flip is blocked otherwise.
- [ ] In the workflow: uncomment `permissions: pull-requests: write` and
      `environment: agent-apply`; flip the two `if: ${{ false }}` → enabled.
- [ ] **RE-RUN BOTH GATES ON THE ENABLED WORKFLOW (B5).** `/sh-security-review` + the GPT-4.1
      cross-family review are run again against the *actual enabled* `agent-team-apply-verify.yml`
      (permissions live, `if:` true) and the bound `gated_build_verify_wiring` — NOT only the inert
      Phase-1 version. **Hard stop until both pass on the enabled file.** (Permissions changed →
      the mandatory cross-family review is independently required here against the real diff.)
- [ ] Bind `agent_team.coordinator.gated_build_verify_wiring(...)` (real diff builder +
      read-only CI-result fetcher) so a leaf calls it only **after** the gate clears.
- [ ] Set the box-side apply env vars the live path reads (read-only CI-result token +
      dispatch target). Confirm **no** write token lands on the box (run the Phase-1 no-write-token audit).
- [ ] **Incremental docs (B6):** update `OPERATOR-RUNBOOK.md` + memory NOW that the flip is live
      (do not wait for Phase 6) — what the apply path can/can't do, the denylist, the rollback.
- **Rollback:** run the Phase-1b tested rollback script (re-set `if: ${{ false }}`, re-comment
      `environment:`, set `build_verify_wiring=None`, restart the coordinator). **Exercise it once
      here** to prove it works before relying on it.

### Phase 4 — Smoke test to a first draft PR  🧑/🤖
- [ ] Drive one trivial, in-scope task end-to-end → confirm: untrusted job builds/tests with
      no secrets, denylist rejects an out-of-scope diff, pure-code gate gates on real Checks
      results, privileged job opens a **draft PR** with required checks attached, **nothing merged**.
- [ ] Flip the **Tier-3 fixer** off `--dry-run` only after the smoke test passes; verify a
      dependency-CVE bump produces a draft PR.
- [ ] **Draft-PR reviewer notification (QUESTION resolved/assigned):** decide + wire how a new
      draft PR pings the human reviewer — default = the existing Slack ALARM path posts a
      `#agent-team` notice with the PR link (Adam owns this decision; recorded so it is not left open).
- **Rollback:** close the draft PR; Phase-3 rollback.

### Phase 5 — Enable the cross-plane loop  🤖
- [ ] Allow confirmed Plane-1 checker findings (`intake-checker`) to flow into pipeline tasks
      that end in draft-PR fixes (start conservative: highest-severity, one at a time).
- [ ] **Conservative-rollout controls (QUESTION resolved):** enforce "one at a time, highest
      severity" concretely — a cap on concurrently-open cross-plane draft PRs (start = 1) read by
      the intake-checker leaf, the severity floor in config, and a `#agent-team` log line per
      promotion so the rate is observable. Not just prose.
- **Rollback:** revert intake-checker wiring to report-only.

### Phase 6 — Final docs & memory consolidation  🤖
> **B6: docs/memory are updated INCREMENTALLY at each privileged step above** (Phase 3 runbook+memory
> on flip; denylist/gate-weakening changes update memory in the same change). Phase 6 is the FINAL
> reconciliation pass, not the first time docs are touched.
- [ ] Reconcile `OPERATOR-RUNBOOK.md`, the Confluence host page (20054017) + runbook (22609921),
      and `project_r720_agent_team` memory: P3 is LIVE, what the apply path can/can't do, the
      denylist, the merge gate, the rollback — confirming the incremental updates are complete + consistent.

## 6. What changes (and what does NOT)

**Changes:**
- The pipeline produces **draft PRs** for well-scoped work (dep bumps, small fixes, docs,
  checker-surfaced issues). Your role shifts from author → reviewer/approver for that class.
- Tier-3 fixer goes live (dep-CVE bumps → draft PRs).
- Plane-1 findings can become draft-PR fixes (cross-plane loop).

**Does NOT change:**
- Box stays read-only; **CI applies, not the box**. No AWS / no OIDC in the apply path.
- **Denylisted, high-blast-radius changes** (workflows, IAM, branch protection, CODEOWNERS,
  Dependabot) are **never auto-built** — always escalated.
- Human gates stay: the clarifier question-set AND the PR approval are both yours.
- **Drafts, not merges** — you remain the merge authority.

## 7. Risks & mitigations

| Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Untrusted diff exfiltrates secrets / escalates in CI | split CI: build job has no secrets/OIDC/write, egress-restricted; privileged job never checks out patch code |
| Malicious diff edits CI/IAM/branch-protection to self-escalate | denylist → reject/escalate, never auto-build |
| LLM "declares" a broken build green | pure-code gate reads authenticated Checks-API only; LLM can't set status |
| Diff tampered between box and CI | diff-hash recorded in ledger, verified before apply |
| Standing write capability on the always-on box | there is none — App token lives in CI; box holds only a read-only CI-result token |
| Runaway PR volume | start with Tier-3 only + one finding at a time; required-reviewer environment gates each |

## 8. Definition of done
- [ ] `/sh-plan-review`, `/sh-security-review`, and GPT-4.1 cross-review on the CI surface all passed.
- [ ] Phase-4 smoke test produced a draft PR; nothing auto-merged; rollback exercised once.
- [ ] No write token on the box (verified); apply path is zero-AWS.
- [ ] Docs + Confluence + memory updated.
- [ ] Snapshot retained until P3 runs clean for one cycle, then pruned.