3d97139300
* feat(agent-team): read-only CI-result fetcher for P3 verify gate (opt-in, inert)
ci_fetcher.py: fail-closed CiResultFetcher reading the GitHub Actions run
conclusion via a read-only PAT (AGENT_TEAM_CI_READ_TOKEN→GITHUB_TOKEN), returns
{run_id,conclusion,diff_hash} or None on any error. Data-fetcher only — ci_gate
owns the verdict; never writes, no OIDC/AWS, never reads patch artifacts.
coordinator gains opt-in gated_build_verify_wiring() composing it via
bind_ci_result_fetcher; NOT wired into the default run-team.py path. 20 tests.
* harden(agent-team): P3 apply/verify workflow — GitHub App token, CWE-94, fail-closed
Decision-1 auth model: gate-and-pr uses a GitHub App installation token
(pull-requests:write) behind the agent-apply environment; ALL OIDC/id-token/AWS
removed. Hardening: task_id env-indirection (CWE-94 — GitHub expands ${{ }} into
the run shell before exec, so %s/quoting is insufficient); run-id pinning on both
download-artifact; post-build denied-path check (build-hook writes into denied
paths fail the job); empty-hash fail-closed in BOTH the embedded gate (fixed a
real ''=='' pass bug) and ci_gate.py. App-token + draft-PR steps stay if:${{ false }}
until provisioning (App + environment + branch protection). +17 tests.
* harden(agent-team): apply P3-live security-gate fixes (GPT-4.1 xreview + sh-security-review)
BLOCK-1/FIX-4: gate-and-pr re-comments pull-requests:write + environment:agent-apply
(provisioning-time uncomment) and gains needs.guard/build-test=='success' job guard —
zero privilege until provisioning. BLOCK-2/3+FIX-5: ci_fetcher validates run_id (^[0-9]{1,20}$),
owner/repo (^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$), and fetched_id (int) — fail closed, no SSRF/path
injection. FIX-1: conclusion allowlist. FIX-3: api_root removed from public builder (no
injectable endpoint). INJ-02: post-build denied-path check uses NUL-delimited git output +
explicit rename parsing, no backslash mangling, non-UTF8=violation. INJ-03: all three trust-
control denylists unified to one 22-entry union + drift-guard test. Q1: documented run_id/
diff_hash trust source (dispatcher/ledger only). 884 tests, ruff clean. Privileged steps stay
if:${{ false }} until provisioning.
* build(security-review): prune .claude worktrees from deterministic scanners
Agent worktrees under .claude/worktrees/ are full repo copies; the cfn-lint
find|xargs template scan overflowed ('command line cannot be assembled') and the
pre-push hook fail-closed to BLOCK whenever a worktree was present. Prune .claude
in the cfn-lint find + semgrep/checkov excludes, and gitignore .claude/ so it is
never scanned or committed. Unblocks main-tree pushes during parallel agent work.
184 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
184 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# agent-team/ci — split-job CI apply/verify workflow (Plane-2 leaf)
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Pre-deployment scaffolding for the R720 agent-team SDLC pipeline. This directory
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holds the **split-job CI apply/verify workflow** that turns a builder agent's
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**untrusted candidate diff** into a verified **draft PR** — the §3.3.2 trust
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boundary, Phase P3 (§7.1) of `../../docs/r720-agent-team-design.md`.
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> **STATUS: DEPLOY-GATED. NOT ENABLED, NOT PROVISIONED.** This is authored as
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> files only. Per the design (§3.3.2, §7.1 P3) the workflow must clear **BOTH
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> `/sh-security-review` AND the mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-review** before
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> deployment, because it is untrusted-input handling + a CI trust boundary. The
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> privileged draft-PR step is hard-disabled (`if: ${{ false }}`); the ONLY
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> remaining step to go live is the **provisioning flip** (create the GitHub App,
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> the `agent-apply` environment with a required reviewer, and branch protection,
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> then flip the step's `if:`). Nothing here is wired to a live org repo.
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>
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> **AUTH MODEL (LOCKED): GitHub App installation token — ZERO cloud credentials,
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> no token-federation.** The privileged `gate-and-pr` job authenticates with a
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> GitHub App installation token (`pull-requests: write`) minted at run time by
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> SHA-pinned `actions/create-github-app-token`. There is **no AWS and no
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> cloud-OIDC** anywhere in this workflow. The required human reviewer lives on
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> the `agent-apply` GitHub Environment (configured at provisioning, not in YAML).
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## Files
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| File | What it is |
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| `agent-team-apply-verify.yml` | The split-job workflow. Self-contained: the load-bearing gate logic (diff integrity, trust-control denylist, declared-scope check, pure-code pass/fail) is embedded inline as stdlib-only, type-hinted Python heredocs, so the workflow has **no external script dependency**. |
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| `README.md` | This file. |
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The filename is kebab-case per the handbook. Deployment target (later, after the
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gates): promote into `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github` as a reusable workflow
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(`engineering-handbook/cicd.md`); the trusted apply path (which owns the GitHub
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App write token) invokes it.
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## The trust boundary (design §3.3.2)
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The builder agents are semi-trusted: an LLM that read repo content can be wrong
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or prompt-injected, so **the candidate diff is treated as untrusted code.** The
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threat is that executing it in CI with org credentials lets a bad diff exfiltrate
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secrets, assume the deploy role, or tamper with other repos. The workflow
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implements all five boundaries:
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1. **Split CI — untrusted execution is credential-less.** The job that checks
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out and runs the diff (`build-test`) runs with `permissions: contents: read`,
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**no secrets, no App token, no write token**, and egress blocked
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(harden-runner). The patch executes only there, where there is nothing to
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steal and nothing to assume. Every privileged action (the GitHub App token
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mint, the draft-PR open) runs in a **separate `gate-and-pr` job that never
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checks out or executes patch-controlled code** — it consumes the build/test
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report as **data only**. There is **no `pull_request_target` + head-ref
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checkout** (the "pwn request" anti-pattern). The `build-test` job also runs a
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**post-build denied-path check**: after the build/test step, it diffs the
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working tree against the committed patched baseline and fails if a build hook
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(setup.py, conftest, postinstall, Makefile) wrote into the trust-control
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surface or out of declared scope — closing the build-hook write vector.
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2. **Trust-control-surface denylist (CI-side hard fail).** The `guard` job
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rejects any diff that touches `.github/workflows/**`, IAM/policy IaC
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(CDK/SAM/Terraform), branch-protection / `CODEOWNERS` / Dependabot config, or
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files **outside the task's declared scope**. The match is not naive: it
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**canonicalizes paths, rejects parent-directory traversal, and inspects
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`rename from/to` headers**, so a rename *into* a denied path — or path
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indirection — cannot bypass it. Such a diff is escalated to mandatory human +
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GPT cross-review, never auto-built.
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3. **Diff integrity, box → CI.** The builder records the candidate diff's sha256
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in the task ledger (foundation `agent_team.state_store` content-hash idiom).
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CI **re-hashes the diff and verifies it equals the recorded hash before
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applying** (in both `guard` and again pre-apply in `build-test`). Precisely:
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this is an **unkeyed** hash that binds *the bytes CI applies* to *the hash the
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dispatcher recorded* — it detects accidental corruption or substitution of the
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artifact **in transit** between the trusted dispatcher and CI. It does **not**
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prove the diff matches the approved plan, and it cannot defend a compromised
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box that generates both the diff and its hash (see "Threat-model honesty"
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below). A keyed/attested binding to the approval record is a later hardening.
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4. **Pure-code pass/fail gate over authenticated results.** Mirroring secrev's
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"one pure-code script owns the block decision," the `gate-and-pr` gate reads
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**only** the authenticated `needs.*.result` job conclusions (GitHub-controlled,
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patch-independent) keyed to the run id + diff hash. It **never trusts a
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success/failure file or artifact the patch could have written.** The verifier
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*agent* only reads failures to propose the next fix; it cannot declare
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success.
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5. **Branch protection is the final enforcement.** The draft PR targets a
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protected branch; the locked-down checks are required; merge needs them green
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**plus** the security-review, the Claude Code App review, and **human
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approval**. The agent never auto-merges (D2).
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**Threat-model honesty (§3.3.2).** The diff hash protects box → CI transit
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(tamper/substitution), **not** a box that is itself compromised — the box is in
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the trusted computing base for what it *proposes*. The real backstops against a
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bad box are the credential-less build job, the trust-control-surface denylist,
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and above all the **human review of the draft PR** plus required checks (nothing
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merges without Adam).
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## Job graph
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```
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workflow_dispatch (task_id, diff_artifact_name, expected_diff_hash, declared_scope)
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│
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▼
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guard contents:read, no secrets — validates the diff as DATA:
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(boundaries 2,3) re-hash + denylist + scope. Never applies it.
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│ (needs)
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▼
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build-test contents:read, no secrets, no App token, egress blocked —
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(boundary 1) the ONLY job that applies + runs the UNTRUSTED patch.
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│ (needs) Emits a NON-authoritative report artifact.
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▼
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gate-and-pr privileged home, but NEVER checks out patch code. Pure-code
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(boundaries 1,4,5) gate over authenticated needs.*.result → DRAFT PR
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(hard-disabled until the review gates pass).
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```
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`permissions: {}` at the workflow level (least privilege); each job re-declares
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its own grant explicitly. The trigger is `workflow_dispatch` only — the patch
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never runs in a context carrying write or secret scope.
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## SHA-pinned actions (handbook Pinning Principle, §3.3.2)
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Every third-party action is pinned to a full commit SHA with the human-readable
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tag in a trailing comment:
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| Action | SHA | Tag |
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| `actions/checkout` | `11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683` | v4.2.2 |
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| `actions/download-artifact` | `fa0a91b85d4f404e444e00e005971372dc801d16` | v4.1.8 |
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| `actions/upload-artifact` | `b4b15b8c7c6ac21ea08fcf65892d2ee8f75cf882` | v4.4.3 |
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| `actions/setup-python` | `0b93645e9fea7318ecaed2b359559ac225c90a2b` | v5.3.0 |
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| `actions/create-github-app-token` | `5d869da34e18e7287c1daad50e0b8ea0f506ce69` | v1.11.0 |
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| `step-security/harden-runner` | `0080882f6c36860b6ba35c610c98ce87d4e2f26f` | v2.10.2 |
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## Relationship to the foundation
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This leaf **imports the committed Plane-2 foundation contracts verbatim** (it
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does not redefine them):
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- The diff-hash recorded in the ledger and re-checked in CI is the same
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content-hash idiom as `agent_team.state_store.compute_content_hash` (§6.7).
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- The task this workflow verifies is an `agent_team.task_model.TaskRecord`; its
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`candidate_diff` + `diff_hash` fields (§3.3) are exactly the
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`expected_diff_hash` this workflow consumes, and `ci_results` is what the
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verifier writes back from the authenticated gate (boundary 4).
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- The ledger that records provenance (diff hash, run id, gate decision) is the
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`agent_team.db` schema (`pending_questions` / `budget_ledger` live there;
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per-task CI provenance is recorded against the task thread).
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## Tests
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The workflow's embedded gate logic (diff integrity, the trust-control denylist
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with path-canonicalization + rename/copy/delete detection, the symlink-escape
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reject, and declared-scope enforcement) is **stdlib-only, type-hinted, and
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ruff-clean**, and is covered by a committed, runnable suite:
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`../tests/test_ci_gate_workflow.py` extracts the inline guard script from this
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YAML and executes it against good and adversarial diffs — clean in-scope,
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hash mismatch, workflow delete, copy-into-denied, symlink addition, non-UTF-8,
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out-of-scope, unscoped, and escaping-scope. Run it with the rest of the suite:
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`python3 -m pytest agent-team/tests/ -q` from the repo root. (The claim that the
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gate is "verified" is therefore backed by that test, not by authoring alone.)
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## Deploy gating (do NOT skip)
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Before this ships (§3.3.2, §7.1 P3):
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1. `/sh-security-review` over this workflow (untrusted-input handling + CI
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trust boundary).
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2. Mandatory **GPT-4.1 cross-review** of the workflow. (No IAM/cloud role is
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involved — the auth model is a GitHub App installation token, not OIDC/AWS.)
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3. **Provisioning** (the single remaining step to go live):
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- Create the GitHub App with a single permission (`pull-requests: write`),
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install it on the target repo, and store its id + private key as the
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`AGENT_APPLY_APP_ID` / `AGENT_APPLY_APP_PRIVATE_KEY` secrets.
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- Create the `agent-apply` GitHub Environment with a **required reviewer**
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(and optional wait timer) — this is the human gate, configured on the
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Environment, not in YAML.
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- Configure **branch protection** on the target branch (required checks +
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human approval).
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- Issue the **read-only** token for the CI-result fetcher
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(`AGENT_TEAM_CI_READ_TOKEN`, falling back to `GITHUB_TOKEN`).
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4. A documented, **exercised** rollback (uninstall the App, remove the
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environment, revert the workflow).
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5. Only then: flip the App-token + draft-PR steps' `if: ${{ false }}` to the
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live condition documented in the workflow
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(`always() && needs.guard.result=='success' &&
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needs.build-test.result=='success' && steps.gate.outputs.gate=='pass'`), and
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promote to `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github`. Draft PRs only; never auto-merge.
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