* feat(secrev): plan-groomer Plane-1 Phase 4 planner (report-only)
Aggregates the OTHER Plane-1 checkers' latest reports (compliance-drift,
dependency-cve, doc-drift, confluence-doc) into one prioritized, deduped
"groomed weekly plan" written into the mode-600 report. REPORT-ONLY per
decision D3: posts NOTHING to Slack; auto-write to Notion/Jira is a later
toggle (inert --notify seam). Reuses lib/sweep_substrate.sh redact().
Offline --canary asserts the groomed-plan item count (5) against a fixture
report set, exercising latest-date selection, dedup, multi-source aggregation,
and no-data discipline (a missing source is noted, never invented as work).
shellcheck-clean (only the shared SC1091 substrate-source info, at parity with
compliance-drift/dependency-cve). PROVISIONING (auto-write toggle, systemd
wiring, coordinator registry) deferred — gated.
* feat(secrev): confluence-doc Plane-1 Phase 4 doc-gap detector (recommend-only)
Scheduled, read-only documentation gap detector. Diffs the org repo set + an
optional read-only AWS inventory + the IT page-ID map (project_confluence_
migration) against Confluence and REPORTS doc gaps / stale pages / missing
runbooks into the mode-600 report. RECOMMEND-ONLY per D3/D7: NEVER auto-writes
Confluence; the on-demand SSH-invoked write path (incl. Mermaid edits via
~/.claude/scripts/confluence_mermaid.py) is a separate, gated provisioning path.
LIVE Confluence API reads need the gated confluence-bot service-account token
(D6); when creds are absent OR --no-api/--canary, the API checks are SKIPPED and
noted, NEVER reported as a gap on missing data (mirrors compliance-drift's
status-code-aware API-skip pattern: 200 parse, 404 real gap, else skip).
Offline --canary asserts the doc-gap count (3) against a fixture (repo list +
mock page-map + mock AWS inventory): a repo with no IT page, an AWS resource not
in the map, and a missing required runbook page; precision non-gaps (matched
repos/resources, doc-exempt repo, present required pages, skipped API) must not
inflate the count. shellcheck-clean (only the shared SC1091 substrate-source
info). PROVISIONING (confluence-bot account + 90-day rotation, page-1540098 live
dry-run expecting 16 weweave macros, systemd wiring, coordinator registry)
documented in the footer, deferred — gated.
* fix(secrev): commit compliance-drift secret fixture as dotenv.fixture (canary broke on fresh clone)
The compliance-drift canary's planted tracked-secret fixture was BadName_repo/.env,
but the repo root .gitignore lists '.env' — so it was never committed. On a fresh
clone of main the file is absent, the secrets-committed check stops firing, and the
canary FAILS (expected 6, got 5). It only passed where a gitignored, untracked
'.env' happened to exist locally. Verified the failure reproduces in a clean clone
of origin/main (
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .github | ||
| agent-team | ||
| docs | ||
| scripts | ||
| security-review | ||
| tests | ||
| .env.example | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| agents.py | ||
| conftest.py | ||
| graph.py | ||
| models.py | ||
| README.md | ||
| requirements.txt | ||
| retriever.py | ||
| run.py | ||
| state.py | ||
| telemetry.py | ||
| tools.py | ||
orchestrator
Multi-model AI agent orchestration via LangGraph + Composio. Routes tasks to the best-fit model and connects to external services (Slack, Notion, GitHub, Google Drive). Memory-aware — each run is enriched with the top-3 most relevant notes from Adam's project/feedback/reference memory store.
Architecture
Claude Code ──► run.py ──► LangGraph StateGraph
│
▼
retriever ──► top-3 memories from
│ ~/.claude/projects/.../memory/
▼
router (Sonnet, structured output)
│
┌─────────────┼─────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ implementer │ │ connector │ │ unknown │
│ reviewer │ │ (Composio)│ │ (no fit) │
│ researcher │ └───────────┘ └──────────┘
│ cross_reviewer│ │
│ scanner │ ▼
│ fast_coder │ tool_executor ──► summarizer
└──────────────┘
The retriever embeds Adam's memory files once and caches vectors to .cache/embeddings.json (mtime-keyed; only changed files re-embed). Each run picks the top-3 most relevant memories and surfaces them in the CLI output before the route line.
The router uses Pydantic structured output (RouteDecision) and returns an explicit "unknown" route when no agent fits — no silent fallback. All LLM invocations are wrapped with retry-on-transient-error.
Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
run.py |
CLI entry point — python3 run.py "<task>" |
graph.py |
LangGraph graph: retriever, router, connector, summarizer, unknown nodes |
agents.py |
AGENTS registry (label → model_fn, prompt, description) + make_agent_node factory |
models.py |
LLM factories, model-ID constants, with_retries() helper |
state.py |
OrchestratorState TypedDict |
retriever.py |
Memory loader, embedder, cache, top-k retrieval |
tools.py |
Composio tool loading (Slack, Notion, GitHub, Google Drive) |
tests/test_routing_golden.py |
20-case golden-set regression test for the router |
Usage
# Full execution — retrieves memory, routes, and runs the task
python3 run.py "What is the LangGraph checkpoint API?"
# Route-only — retrieves memory and prints the agent that would handle the task
python3 run.py --route-only "Review this code for security issues"
Output shape:
[retrieved: project_seahaven_slack_bot, feedback_secrets_manager, reference_sea_haven_aws]
[reviewer]
<agent output>
From Claude Code (via CLAUDE.md hybrid delegation):
python3 ~/Documents/repositories/orchestrator/run.py "<task description>"
python3 ~/Documents/repositories/orchestrator/run.py --route-only "<task description>"
When Claude Code delegates vs. handles natively
Claude Code uses a hybrid model — it delegates to the orchestrator when a different model has a genuine advantage, and handles everything else natively:
| Delegate to orchestrator | Handle natively in Claude Code |
|---|---|
| Cross-family code review (GPT-4.1) | File editing, refactoring, bug fixes |
| Large codebase scanning (Gemini) | Git operations, PRs, merges |
| Quick bounded coding (DeepSeek) | AWS/SAM/CDK deployments |
| External service actions (Composio) | Shell commands, system admin |
| Interactive planning and conversation |
Agents
| Agent | Model | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| implementer | Claude Sonnet | Write code with a clear spec |
| reviewer | Claude Sonnet | Code review (BLOCK/FIX/NIT/QUESTION) |
| researcher | Claude Haiku | Doc lookups, API research |
| cross_reviewer | GPT-4.1 | Independent second-opinion review |
| scanner | Gemini 2.5 Pro | Large codebase analysis |
| fast_coder | DeepSeek Coder | Quick, bounded coding tasks |
| connector | Sonnet + Composio | Slack, Notion, GitHub, Google Drive |
The router can also return done (no agent needed) or unknown (no clear fit). Model IDs are centralized as constants in models.py.
Memory retrieval
The retriever reads ~/.claude/projects/-Users-adammoussa-Documents-repositories/memory/*.md (skipping the MEMORY.md index), embeds each file once with text-embedding-3-small, and caches the vectors to .cache/embeddings.json. On subsequent runs:
- Only files whose mtime changed are re-embedded.
- Top-3 memories by cosine similarity are injected as system context into both the router and the agent.
- Retrieved names are printed as the first line of every run so bad retrieval is visible.
- Retrieval is read-only. The orchestrator never writes back to the memory store.
If retrieval fails (network, missing key), the run continues with no memory context and logs the failure into the message trail.
Connectors (via Composio)
All connections authenticated under Composio user amoussa:
- Slack: send messages, read channels/threads, find users, add reactions
- Notion: search/read/create/update pages, add content
- GitHub: create issues, list issues, get repo info
- Google Drive: find files, get metadata
The connector node is restricted to one tool call per run — a load-bearing rule learned from a 1.9M-token incident with meta-tool routing.
Security Review
The security-review/ subsystem is a high-recall, anti-complacency security gate. It is separate from the router — it does not route through run.py or LangGraph. One pure-code script, review.sh, owns the block decision (confirmed critical/high → block); no agent decides.
- Path A — interactive: the
/sh-security-reviewClaude Code skill (Max-covered). Narrow fresh-context detector fan-out + a proof-or-kill verifier; emits the structured finding schema forreview.shto gate. - Path B — unattended: a nightly two-tier sweep on the
sh-secrevR720 VM. Tier 1 runs deterministic scanners (review.sh --scanners-only) over every Sea-Haven-Industries org repo; Tier 2 is a budget-bounded agentic pass (run_headless.py) on a round-robin rotation. Clean-clone auto-discovery via a read-only GitHub PAT; ALARM-only Slack (a clean night posts nothing). - Git hooks: global pre-commit / pre-push hooks (
install-hooks.sh --global) gate every local repo viareview.sh --scanners-only.
See security-review/README.md for full detail and security-review/DEPLOY-R720.md for the VM runbook.
Setup
- Install dependencies:
pip install -r requirements.txt - Copy
.env.exampleto.envand fill in API keys - Authenticate Composio integrations at app.composio.dev
Configuration
All API keys are stored in .env (gitignored):
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY— Claude models + routerOPENAI_API_KEY— GPT-4.1 cross-reviewer + text-embedding-3-smallGOOGLE_API_KEY— Gemini scannerDEEPSEEK_API_KEY— DeepSeek fast-coderCOMPOSIO_API_KEY— Composio connectorsLANGSMITH_API_KEY— LangSmith tracing
Tracing is enabled via LangSmith (project: orchestration).
Testing
pytest tests/test_routing_golden.py -v
20 labelled tasks → expected agent. Skipped cleanly if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or COMPOSIO_API_KEY are unset.