* feat(agent-team): read-only CI-result fetcher for P3 verify gate (opt-in, inert)
ci_fetcher.py: fail-closed CiResultFetcher reading the GitHub Actions run
conclusion via a read-only PAT (AGENT_TEAM_CI_READ_TOKEN→GITHUB_TOKEN), returns
{run_id,conclusion,diff_hash} or None on any error. Data-fetcher only — ci_gate
owns the verdict; never writes, no OIDC/AWS, never reads patch artifacts.
coordinator gains opt-in gated_build_verify_wiring() composing it via
bind_ci_result_fetcher; NOT wired into the default run-team.py path. 20 tests.
* harden(agent-team): P3 apply/verify workflow — GitHub App token, CWE-94, fail-closed
Decision-1 auth model: gate-and-pr uses a GitHub App installation token
(pull-requests:write) behind the agent-apply environment; ALL OIDC/id-token/AWS
removed. Hardening: task_id env-indirection (CWE-94 — GitHub expands ${{ }} into
the run shell before exec, so %s/quoting is insufficient); run-id pinning on both
download-artifact; post-build denied-path check (build-hook writes into denied
paths fail the job); empty-hash fail-closed in BOTH the embedded gate (fixed a
real ''=='' pass bug) and ci_gate.py. App-token + draft-PR steps stay if:${{ false }}
until provisioning (App + environment + branch protection). +17 tests.
* harden(agent-team): apply P3-live security-gate fixes (GPT-4.1 xreview + sh-security-review)
BLOCK-1/FIX-4: gate-and-pr re-comments pull-requests:write + environment:agent-apply
(provisioning-time uncomment) and gains needs.guard/build-test=='success' job guard —
zero privilege until provisioning. BLOCK-2/3+FIX-5: ci_fetcher validates run_id (^[0-9]{1,20}$),
owner/repo (^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$), and fetched_id (int) — fail closed, no SSRF/path
injection. FIX-1: conclusion allowlist. FIX-3: api_root removed from public builder (no
injectable endpoint). INJ-02: post-build denied-path check uses NUL-delimited git output +
explicit rename parsing, no backslash mangling, non-UTF8=violation. INJ-03: all three trust-
control denylists unified to one 22-entry union + drift-guard test. Q1: documented run_id/
diff_hash trust source (dispatcher/ledger only). 884 tests, ruff clean. Privileged steps stay
if:${{ false }} until provisioning.
* build(security-review): prune .claude worktrees from deterministic scanners
Agent worktrees under .claude/worktrees/ are full repo copies; the cfn-lint
find|xargs template scan overflowed ('command line cannot be assembled') and the
pre-push hook fail-closed to BLOCK whenever a worktree was present. Prune .claude
in the cfn-lint find + semgrep/checkov excludes, and gitignore .claude/ so it is
never scanned or committed. Unblocks main-tree pushes during parallel agent work.
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .github | ||
| agent-team | ||
| docs | ||
| scripts | ||
| security-review | ||
| tests | ||
| .env.example | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| agents.py | ||
| conftest.py | ||
| graph.py | ||
| models.py | ||
| README.md | ||
| requirements.txt | ||
| retriever.py | ||
| run.py | ||
| state.py | ||
| telemetry.py | ||
| tools.py | ||
orchestrator
Multi-model AI agent orchestration via LangGraph + Composio. Routes tasks to the best-fit model and connects to external services (Slack, Notion, GitHub, Google Drive). Memory-aware — each run is enriched with the top-3 most relevant notes from Adam's project/feedback/reference memory store.
Architecture
Claude Code ──► run.py ──► LangGraph StateGraph
│
▼
retriever ──► top-3 memories from
│ ~/.claude/projects/.../memory/
▼
router (Sonnet, structured output)
│
┌─────────────┼─────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ implementer │ │ connector │ │ unknown │
│ reviewer │ │ (Composio)│ │ (no fit) │
│ researcher │ └───────────┘ └──────────┘
│ cross_reviewer│ │
│ scanner │ ▼
│ fast_coder │ tool_executor ──► summarizer
└──────────────┘
The retriever embeds Adam's memory files once and caches vectors to .cache/embeddings.json (mtime-keyed; only changed files re-embed). Each run picks the top-3 most relevant memories and surfaces them in the CLI output before the route line.
The router uses Pydantic structured output (RouteDecision) and returns an explicit "unknown" route when no agent fits — no silent fallback. All LLM invocations are wrapped with retry-on-transient-error.
Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
run.py |
CLI entry point — python3 run.py "<task>" |
graph.py |
LangGraph graph: retriever, router, connector, summarizer, unknown nodes |
agents.py |
AGENTS registry (label → model_fn, prompt, description) + make_agent_node factory |
models.py |
LLM factories, model-ID constants, with_retries() helper |
state.py |
OrchestratorState TypedDict |
retriever.py |
Memory loader, embedder, cache, top-k retrieval |
tools.py |
Composio tool loading (Slack, Notion, GitHub, Google Drive) |
tests/test_routing_golden.py |
20-case golden-set regression test for the router |
Usage
# Full execution — retrieves memory, routes, and runs the task
python3 run.py "What is the LangGraph checkpoint API?"
# Route-only — retrieves memory and prints the agent that would handle the task
python3 run.py --route-only "Review this code for security issues"
Output shape:
[retrieved: project_seahaven_slack_bot, feedback_secrets_manager, reference_sea_haven_aws]
[reviewer]
<agent output>
From Claude Code (via CLAUDE.md hybrid delegation):
python3 ~/Documents/repositories/orchestrator/run.py "<task description>"
python3 ~/Documents/repositories/orchestrator/run.py --route-only "<task description>"
When Claude Code delegates vs. handles natively
Claude Code uses a hybrid model — it delegates to the orchestrator when a different model has a genuine advantage, and handles everything else natively:
| Delegate to orchestrator | Handle natively in Claude Code |
|---|---|
| Cross-family code review (GPT-4.1) | File editing, refactoring, bug fixes |
| Large codebase scanning (Gemini) | Git operations, PRs, merges |
| Quick bounded coding (DeepSeek) | AWS/SAM/CDK deployments |
| External service actions (Composio) | Shell commands, system admin |
| Interactive planning and conversation |
Agents
| Agent | Model | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| implementer | Claude Sonnet | Write code with a clear spec |
| reviewer | Claude Sonnet | Code review (BLOCK/FIX/NIT/QUESTION) |
| researcher | Claude Haiku | Doc lookups, API research |
| cross_reviewer | GPT-4.1 | Independent second-opinion review |
| scanner | Gemini 2.5 Pro | Large codebase analysis |
| fast_coder | DeepSeek Coder | Quick, bounded coding tasks |
| connector | Sonnet + Composio | Slack, Notion, GitHub, Google Drive |
The router can also return done (no agent needed) or unknown (no clear fit). Model IDs are centralized as constants in models.py.
Memory retrieval
The retriever reads ~/.claude/projects/-Users-adammoussa-Documents-repositories/memory/*.md (skipping the MEMORY.md index), embeds each file once with text-embedding-3-small, and caches the vectors to .cache/embeddings.json. On subsequent runs:
- Only files whose mtime changed are re-embedded.
- Top-3 memories by cosine similarity are injected as system context into both the router and the agent.
- Retrieved names are printed as the first line of every run so bad retrieval is visible.
- Retrieval is read-only. The orchestrator never writes back to the memory store.
If retrieval fails (network, missing key), the run continues with no memory context and logs the failure into the message trail.
Connectors (via Composio)
All connections authenticated under Composio user amoussa:
- Slack: send messages, read channels/threads, find users, add reactions
- Notion: search/read/create/update pages, add content
- GitHub: create issues, list issues, get repo info
- Google Drive: find files, get metadata
The connector node is restricted to one tool call per run — a load-bearing rule learned from a 1.9M-token incident with meta-tool routing.
Security Review
The security-review/ subsystem is a high-recall, anti-complacency security gate. It is separate from the router — it does not route through run.py or LangGraph. One pure-code script, review.sh, owns the block decision (confirmed critical/high → block); no agent decides.
- Path A — interactive: the
/sh-security-reviewClaude Code skill (Max-covered). Narrow fresh-context detector fan-out + a proof-or-kill verifier; emits the structured finding schema forreview.shto gate. - Path B — unattended: a nightly two-tier sweep on the
sh-secrevR720 VM. Tier 1 runs deterministic scanners (review.sh --scanners-only) over every Sea-Haven-Industries org repo; Tier 2 is a budget-bounded agentic pass (run_headless.py) on a round-robin rotation. Clean-clone auto-discovery via a read-only GitHub PAT; ALARM-only Slack (a clean night posts nothing). - Git hooks: global pre-commit / pre-push hooks (
install-hooks.sh --global) gate every local repo viareview.sh --scanners-only.
See security-review/README.md for full detail and security-review/DEPLOY-R720.md for the VM runbook.
Setup
- Install dependencies:
pip install -r requirements.txt - Copy
.env.exampleto.envand fill in API keys - Authenticate Composio integrations at app.composio.dev
Configuration
All API keys are stored in .env (gitignored):
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY— Claude models + routerOPENAI_API_KEY— GPT-4.1 cross-reviewer + text-embedding-3-smallGOOGLE_API_KEY— Gemini scannerDEEPSEEK_API_KEY— DeepSeek fast-coderCOMPOSIO_API_KEY— Composio connectorsLANGSMITH_API_KEY— LangSmith tracing
Tracing is enabled via LangSmith (project: orchestration).
Testing
pytest tests/test_routing_golden.py -v
20 labelled tasks → expected agent. Skipped cleanly if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or COMPOSIO_API_KEY are unset.