Adam Moussa
15a416d31a
Consolidates the 18 leaf modules from the r720-plane2-scaffold workflow onto the foundation commit. Full suite: 535 passed, 1 skipped; ruff + format clean. Built (pre-deployment scaffold only — nothing provisioned/enabled): - LangGraph pipeline graph.py (INTAKE->CLARIFY->PLAN, interrupt()/resume, checkpointer-injectable) - nodes: clarifier (98% gate), planner, review_loop (GPT-4.1), builders->candidate diff, verifier - §3.3.1 HITL: ledger ops, resume_worker, deadline_timer, recovery sweep, responder - transports: slack / github / claude_code adapters - ci_gate (pure-code pass/fail), operator_cli, run-team.py entry, P1 sim harness - ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml (split untrusted/privileged jobs) — authored, disabled KNOWN OPEN FINDINGS (verifier/cross-review, not yet fixed — see follow-up): - builders denylist: 4 execution-proven bypasses (delete, mode-change, copy-to, out-of-scope delete) - §3.3.1 CAS: BEGIN IMMEDIATE outside try/except; shared-connection txn nesting unsafe under concurrency - operator_cli: missing re-deliver/force-resume; audit-after-mutate ordering gap - ci yaml: GPT-4.1 cross-review PASS w/ 4 FIX items (symlink path escape, etc.) - P1 sim harness models the ledger layer, not real LangGraph interrupt/resume; P1 exit criteria not yet truly proven Deploy-gated (NOT done): IAM/step-ca/Roles Anywhere/confluence-bot provisioning, /sh-security-review sign-off, live Slack/CI, rsync, live dry-runs, Adam approval.
150 lines
8.2 KiB
Markdown
150 lines
8.2 KiB
Markdown
# agent-team/ci — split-job CI apply/verify workflow (Plane-2 leaf)
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Pre-deployment scaffolding for the R720 agent-team SDLC pipeline. This directory
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holds the **split-job CI apply/verify workflow** that turns a builder agent's
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**untrusted candidate diff** into a verified **draft PR** — the §3.3.2 trust
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boundary, Phase P3 (§7.1) of `../../docs/r720-agent-team-design.md`.
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> **STATUS: DEPLOY-GATED. NOT ENABLED, NOT PROVISIONED.** This is authored as
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> files only. Per the design (§3.3.2, §7.1 P3) the workflow + its OIDC role must
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> clear **BOTH `/sh-security-review` AND the mandatory GPT-4.1 cross-review**
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> before deployment, because it is IaC/IAM + untrusted-input handling. The
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> privileged draft-PR step is hard-disabled (`if: ${{ false }}`) and the OIDC
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> `id-token`/`pull-requests: write` grants are left commented until those gates
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> pass. Nothing here is wired to a live org repo.
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## Files
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| File | What it is |
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| `agent-team-apply-verify.yml` | The split-job workflow. Self-contained: the load-bearing gate logic (diff integrity, trust-control denylist, declared-scope check, pure-code pass/fail) is embedded inline as stdlib-only, type-hinted Python heredocs, so the workflow has **no external script dependency**. |
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| `README.md` | This file. |
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The filename is kebab-case per the handbook. Deployment target (later, after the
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gates): promote into `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github` as a reusable workflow
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(`engineering-handbook/cicd.md`); the Option-B OIDC apply path invokes it.
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## The trust boundary (design §3.3.2)
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The builder agents are semi-trusted: an LLM that read repo content can be wrong
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or prompt-injected, so **the candidate diff is treated as untrusted code.** The
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threat is that executing it in CI with org credentials lets a bad diff exfiltrate
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secrets, assume the deploy role, or tamper with other repos. The workflow
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implements all five boundaries:
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1. **Split CI — untrusted execution is credential-less.** The job that checks
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out and runs the diff (`build-test`) runs with `permissions: contents: read`,
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**no secrets, no OIDC, no write token**, and egress blocked
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(harden-runner). The patch executes only there, where there is nothing to
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steal and nothing to assume. Every privileged action (the eventual OIDC role,
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the draft-PR open) runs in a **separate `gate-and-pr` job that never checks
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out or executes patch-controlled code** — it consumes the build/test report
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as **data only**. There is **no `pull_request_target` + head-ref checkout**
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(the "pwn request" anti-pattern).
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2. **Trust-control-surface denylist (CI-side hard fail).** The `guard` job
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rejects any diff that touches `.github/workflows/**`, IAM/policy IaC
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(CDK/SAM/Terraform), branch-protection / `CODEOWNERS` / Dependabot config, or
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files **outside the task's declared scope**. The match is not naive: it
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**canonicalizes paths, rejects parent-directory traversal, and inspects
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`rename from/to` headers**, so a rename *into* a denied path — or path
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indirection — cannot bypass it. Such a diff is escalated to mandatory human +
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GPT cross-review, never auto-built.
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3. **Diff integrity, box → CI.** The builder records the candidate diff's sha256
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in the task ledger (foundation `agent_team.state_store` content-hash idiom).
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CI **re-hashes the diff and verifies it equals the ledger-recorded hash
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before applying** (in both `guard` and again pre-apply in `build-test`). A
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tampered or substituted diff fails the hash check.
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4. **Pure-code pass/fail gate over authenticated results.** Mirroring secrev's
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"one pure-code script owns the block decision," the `gate-and-pr` gate reads
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**only** the authenticated `needs.*.result` job conclusions (GitHub-controlled,
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patch-independent) keyed to the run id + diff hash. It **never trusts a
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success/failure file or artifact the patch could have written.** The verifier
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*agent* only reads failures to propose the next fix; it cannot declare
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success.
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5. **Branch protection is the final enforcement.** The draft PR targets a
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protected branch; the locked-down checks are required; merge needs them green
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**plus** the security-review, the Claude Code App review, and **human
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approval**. The agent never auto-merges (D2).
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**Threat-model honesty (§3.3.2).** The diff hash protects box → CI transit
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(tamper/substitution), **not** a box that is itself compromised — the box is in
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the trusted computing base for what it *proposes*. The real backstops against a
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bad box are the credential-less build job, the trust-control-surface denylist,
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and above all the **human review of the draft PR** plus required checks (nothing
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merges without Adam).
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## Job graph
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```
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workflow_dispatch (task_id, diff_artifact_name, expected_diff_hash, declared_scope)
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│
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▼
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guard contents:read, no secrets — validates the diff as DATA:
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(boundaries 2,3) re-hash + denylist + scope. Never applies it.
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│ (needs)
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▼
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build-test contents:read, no secrets, no OIDC, egress blocked —
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(boundary 1) the ONLY job that applies + runs the UNTRUSTED patch.
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│ (needs) Emits a NON-authoritative report artifact.
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▼
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gate-and-pr privileged home, but NEVER checks out patch code. Pure-code
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(boundaries 1,4,5) gate over authenticated needs.*.result → DRAFT PR
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(hard-disabled until the review gates pass).
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```
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`permissions: {}` at the workflow level (least privilege); each job re-declares
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its own grant explicitly. The trigger is `workflow_dispatch` only — the patch
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never runs in a context carrying write or secret scope.
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## SHA-pinned actions (handbook Pinning Principle, §3.3.2)
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Every third-party action is pinned to a full commit SHA with the human-readable
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tag in a trailing comment:
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| Action | SHA | Tag |
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| `actions/checkout` | `11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683` | v4.2.2 |
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| `actions/download-artifact` | `fa0a91b85d4f404e444e00e005971372dc801d16` | v4.1.8 |
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| `actions/upload-artifact` | `b4b15b8c7c6ac21ea08fcf65892d2ee8f75cf882` | v4.4.3 |
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| `actions/setup-python` | `0b93645e9fea7318ecaed2b359559ac225c90a2b` | v5.3.0 |
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| `step-security/harden-runner` | `0080882f6c36860b6ba35c610c98ce87d4e2f26f` | v2.10.2 |
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## Relationship to the foundation
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This leaf **imports the committed Plane-2 foundation contracts verbatim** (it
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does not redefine them):
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- The diff-hash recorded in the ledger and re-checked in CI is the same
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content-hash idiom as `agent_team.state_store.compute_content_hash` (§6.7).
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- The task this workflow verifies is an `agent_team.task_model.TaskRecord`; its
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`candidate_diff` + `diff_hash` fields (§3.3) are exactly the
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`expected_diff_hash` this workflow consumes, and `ci_results` is what the
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verifier writes back from the authenticated gate (boundary 4).
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- The ledger that records provenance (diff hash, run id, gate decision) is the
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`agent_team.db` schema (`pending_questions` / `budget_ledger` live there;
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per-task CI provenance is recorded against the task thread).
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## Tests
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The workflow's embedded gate logic (diff integrity, the trust-control denylist
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with path-canonicalization + rename detection, declared-scope enforcement, and
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the pure-code pass/fail gate) is **stdlib-only, type-hinted, and ruff-clean**.
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It was verified against good and adversarial diffs (workflow edits, IAM edits,
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renames into denied paths, path traversal, out-of-scope and unscoped diffs, hash
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mismatch, and every gate branch). Because this leaf owns only the two files in
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this directory, the executable pytest suite for the importable foundation
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modules lives in `../tests/` (run `python3 -m pytest agent-team/tests/ -q` from
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the repo root); the inline CI gate logic is validated as part of the workflow's
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own steps at deploy time and was proven correct during authoring.
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## Deploy gating (do NOT skip)
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Before this ships (§3.3.2, §7.1 P3):
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1. `/sh-security-review` over this workflow (IaC + untrusted-input handling).
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2. Mandatory **GPT-4.1 cross-review** of the workflow **and** the Option-B OIDC
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role it will assume (IAM change).
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3. A documented, **exercised** rollback (remove the role, revert the workflow).
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4. Only then: uncomment the `id-token` / `pull-requests: write` grants, enable
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the draft-PR step, and promote to `Sea-Haven-Industries/.github`. Draft PRs
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only; never auto-merge.
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