High-recall fan-out (injection/logic/iac+secrets) + proof-or-kill on the LIVE
apply path found 3 real issues the cross-review missed; all fixed:
- LOGIC-2 (HIGH, was a live hole): build-test ran `ruff check . || echo` /
`pytest -q || echo`, swallowing failures so the job was always 'success' and
the gate would open draft PRs on RED builds. ruff/pytest now run
authoritatively under set -e (pytest exit 5 'no tests' is the only non-fatal
case); the exit code IS the build-test conclusion the gate keys on.
- LOGIC-1 (verified!=shipped): the dispatcher used `git apply` + `git add -A`,
staging stray untracked content into the pushed PR head. Now `git apply
--index` stages exactly the diff, so the head tree is precisely base+diff —
bound to the bytes CI hash-verified.
- LOGIC-3 (§4.5 on the live path): gate-weakening was enforced only box-side;
added a gate-weakening check to the guard job so the live PR-opening path
rejects a diff that adds suppressions/skips, even on a green build.
Injection / secrets / least-privilege / flip-correctness / no-untrusted-checkout
all came back clean. 1044 tests, ruff clean, YAML valid.
- BLOCK: cap candidate diff at 40 KB in the dispatcher (the diff rides a base64
workflow_dispatch input; GitHub caps inputs at ~64 KB so an oversized diff
cannot dispatch at all) + a defense-in-depth decoded-size bound in materialize.
- FIX: harden the draft-PR HEAD_BRANCH guard to reject leading/trailing slash,
'..' segments, and '//' (CWE-88 git ref-traversal), not just bad charset.
- NIT: document the mandatory invariants on gate-and-pr (required-reviewer
environment must stay; runs-on must stay GitHub-hosted).
- QUESTION (lockfiles): answered in-code — the build-test sandbox is
credential-less + egress-blocked, so lockfile-postinstall RCE is contained.
Tests added for all guards. 1042 tests, ruff clean, YAML valid.
Completes the box->CI diff handoff and flips the apply/verify privileged job
live (gated behind the agent-apply environment's required reviewer).
Transport (§4.3): the read-only box (D2) emits a diff but holds no write token.
- New credential-less `materialize` job decodes the untrusted `diff_b64`
dispatch input via env (CWE-94), fail-closed re-hashes it against
`expected_diff_hash`, and uploads it as the named artifact so guard/build-test
download it same-run. guard now `needs: materialize`.
- New `dispatcher.py` (the trusted apply path, operator/Mac-side — never the
box): pushes the diff as a head branch then `gh workflow run`s the workflow.
Pure input-assembly (sha256 == sha256sum, b64 round-trip, head ref) is
unit-tested; git/gh are injected seams. Push-before-dispatch; fail-closed on
empty diff/scope, unsafe task_id/owner/repo.
Flip: gate-and-pr binds `environment: agent-apply` (required reviewer
amoussa1229) + grants exactly `pull-requests: write`; the App-token + draft-PR
steps run only on `steps.gate.outputs.gate == 'pass'` (no more if:false); the
draft PR opens with an explicit `--head`; task_id/head_branch charset-validated
(§4.6). Updated the hardening tests from inert-state to live-state assertions +
added transport tests. 1039 tests, ruff clean, workflow YAML valid.
NOTE: workflow only runs on manual workflow_dispatch and the privileged job is
held at the required-reviewer gate, so nothing privileged runs unapproved.
A diff that ADDS a lint/type/coverage/security suppression (noqa, type: ignore,
pragma: no cover, nosec, nosemgrep), a test skip/xfail, or a hook bypass
(--no-verify) could make CI pass falsely. The pure-code gate now flags these via
gate_weakening_violations() and BLOCKs in evaluate_ci_gate as a top-priority trust
violation (step 1b, alongside the denylist) — regardless of the authenticated CI
conclusion. A build cannot pass itself by disabling its own checks; flagged diffs
escalate to a human. Only ADDED lines are inspected (removing a suppression is fine).
1015 tests pass, ruff clean.
First controls of the P3-live-flip Phase-1 CI hardening (workflow stays INERT;
this only tightens the trust boundary). Whole Phase-1 surface is gated by
/sh-security-review + GPT-4.1 cross-review before any flip.
§4.2 — expand the trust-control denylist with direct code-execution / supply-chain
vectors, kept byte-identical across all three copies (ci_gate.DENYLIST_GLOBS + the
guard + post-build inline DENY_GLOBS), drift-guarded:
.gitmodules, .husky/**, .githooks/**, .gitattributes, .npmrc, and generated/build
artifacts (__generated__, *.generated.*, dist/**, build/**, *.min.js).
Deliberate: lockfiles are NOT wholesale denied — lockfile-postinstall RCE is already
contained by the credential-less egress-blocked build sandbox, and the Tier-3 dep-CVE
fixer rewrites lockfiles to produce its draft PRs; a blanket deny would make it
un-shippable. Flagged in-code for the security gate. Direct code-execution config
(hooks/filters/npmrc/submodules) is the actual §4.2 RCE surface.
§4.1 — runner-trust: assert no job (esp. the privileged gate-and-pr) can run on a
self-hosted/user-provided runner; all must be GitHub-hosted.
998 tests pass, ruff clean.
