docs/provisioning/P3-LIVE-FLIP-PLAN.md

@@ -45,21 +45,58 @@ The box never gains a write token.
 The flip does NOT proceed until `/sh-security-review` AND the GPT-4.1 cross-review on
 the CI surface both pass.
 
+> **Plan-review disposition (GPT-4.1 cross-family, 2026-06-22 — REQUEST CHANGES).** Findings
+> folded into §4 and Phases 1/1b: expanded denylist vectors, runner-trust, concrete
+> diff-transport + threat model, gate-weakening detection, PR-metadata sanitization, ledger
+> anti-tamper, recovery for a merged-privileged change, required-check-name discovery,
+> deploy-before-merge enforcement, no-write-token audit, draft-PR rate monitoring + stale-PR
+> cleanup. Several items the reviewer marked BLOCK are **already implemented in PR #17's CI**
+> (canonicalization, egress, SHA-pin, empty-hash fail-closed, Checks-API) — Phase 1 verifies
+> them rather than rebuilding. Open QUESTIONs to answer when building: how human reviewers are
+> notified of new draft PRs, and how "every deployable repo has CI" is enforced for targets.
+
 ## 4. The CI trust boundary (design B4 — what the workflow must enforce)
 
+> **Already implemented in the merged P3-live CI hardening (PR #17) — Phase 1 VERIFIES, does not rebuild:**
+> denylist path **canonicalization + symlink/rename/traversal resistance**, **egress
+> restriction** on the untrusted job, **SHA-pinned** actions, **empty/missing-hash
+> fail-closed**, and **authenticated Checks-API** result consumption. The GPT-4.1
+> plan-review (2026-06-22) flagged these as "missing" because the *plan* under-restated
+> them; confirm each against the actual `agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` +
+> `ci_fetcher.py`/`ci_gate.py` rather than re-authoring.
+
 1. **Split CI.** An **untrusted build/test job**: `contents: read` only, **no secrets / no
-   OIDC / no write token**, egress-restricted. A **separate privileged job** that **never
-   checks out the patch code** (no `pull_request_target` + head checkout) opens the draft PR.
-2. **Denylist.** A diff touching `.github/workflows/**`, IAM/permission IaC,
-   branch-protection / `CODEOWNERS` / Dependabot config, or out-of-scope files is
-   **rejected / escalated to a human — never auto-built**.
-3. **Diff-hash integrity.** The box records the diff hash in its ledger; CI verifies the
-   hash before apply. The diff reaches CI as a signed artifact / short-lived branch-only
-   token (the box has no write token).
+   OIDC / no write token**, **egress-restricted** (verify/audit the restriction, don't just
+   assert it). A **separate privileged job** that **never checks out the patch code** (no
+   `pull_request_target` + head checkout) opens the draft PR. **Privileged jobs MUST run only
+   on GitHub-hosted runners — assert no self-hosted/user-provided runner can pick them up.**
+2. **Denylist** (reject/escalate, never auto-build). Beyond `.github/workflows/**`,
+   IAM/permission IaC, branch-protection / `CODEOWNERS` / Dependabot config, and
+   out-of-scope files, the denylist MUST also cover these RCE/priv-esc vectors:
+   `.gitmodules` / submodule changes, **git hooks** (`.git/hooks`, `core.hooksPath`,
+   `.husky/**`), **`.gitattributes`** (filter/clean-smudge process), lockfiles +
+   package-manager **postinstall/preinstall** hooks, and **generated/build-artifact** files
+   (codegen output is not reviewable as source). Path matching is **canonicalized** (PR #17)
+   so symlinks/renames/traversal can't slip a denied path past.
+3. **Diff-transport integrity (concretely specified, threat-modeled).** The box records the
+   diff **content hash** in its ledger; CI **verifies the hash before apply**. The diff
+   reaches CI as a **content-addressed signed artifact** (HMAC/keyed digest the box and the
+   privileged job share via an Actions secret) **OR** a short-lived, **branch-only** token
+   scoped to a single ref — the box never holds a write token. Threat model the path:
+   tamper-in-transit (defeated by hash+signature verify), replay of an old diff (defeated by
+   per-task nonce + the `status='open'`/one-shot ledger state), and a hostile artifact name.
 4. **Pure-code green gate.** Pass/fail is owned by a **pure-code gate** reading
    **authenticated Checks-API results** (run id + diff hash). The **LLM verifier may propose
    fixes but can never declare a build green**.
-5. **Merge gate.** Draft PR + required checks + `/sh-security-review` + Claude Code App
+5. **Gate-weakening detection.** A diff that **lowers a gate** — adds `# noqa`, `# type: ignore`,
+   test `skip`/`xfail`, coverage/lint **excludes**, `--no-verify`, or edits the gate config
+   itself — is flagged and escalated (a build can't make itself pass by disabling the checks).
+6. **PR-metadata sanitization.** The draft-PR **title / body / comments** are sanitized so a
+   hostile diff or LLM output can't exfiltrate secrets/env or inject content into the PR text.
+7. **Ledger anti-tamper.** The diff-hash ledger entry is integrity-protected (the existing
+   atomic-write + integrity-check substrate; verify the hash row can't be silently rewritten
+   between record and apply).
+8. **Merge gate.** Draft PR + required checks + `/sh-security-review` + Claude Code App
    review + **human approval**.
 
 ## 5. Phases
@@ -70,15 +107,39 @@ the CI surface both pass.
 - [ ] Resolve `GH_TOKEN`→`GITHUB_TOKEN` (transport accepts both / box env updated).
 - **Rollback:** none (no state changed).
 
-### Phase 1 — Author the split-CI apply/verify workflow  🤖 (review-gated)
-- [ ] Write `agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` per §4: split jobs, denylist,
-      diff-hash verification, pure-code gate reading Checks-API. **SHA-pin all actions.**
-- [ ] Implement/confirm `agent_team/ci_fetcher.py` (read-only Checks-API result fetcher;
-      fails closed: missing token / 404 / auth fail → `None` → gate BLOCKs, task parks)
-      and `agent_team/ci_gate.py` (pure-code green decision).
+### Phase 1 — Author/verify the split-CI apply/verify workflow  🤖 (review-gated)
+- [ ] Reconcile `agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` with §4. **First confirm** the
+      PR-#17 controls are present (canonicalized denylist, egress restriction, SHA-pins,
+      empty-hash fail-closed, Checks-API consumption); only then add the new §4 items.
+- [ ] **Add denylist vectors** (§4.2): submodules/`.gitmodules`, git hooks/`core.hooksPath`/`.husky`,
+      `.gitattributes` filters, lockfile postinstall/preinstall, generated/build artifacts.
+      Add a test suite proving canonicalization resists symlink/rename/traversal.
+- [ ] **Runner-trust assertion** (§4.1): test that privileged jobs cannot run on a
+      self-hosted/user-provided runner.
+- [ ] **Concretize + threat-model the diff transport** (§4.3): pick content-addressed signed
+      artifact (shared HMAC secret) or short-lived branch-only token; add per-task nonce
+      anti-replay; document and test it.
+- [ ] **Gate-weakening detector** (§4.5): CI step that fails on a diff adding
+      `noqa`/`type: ignore`/skip/xfail/excludes/`--no-verify` or editing the gate config.
+- [ ] **PR-metadata sanitization** (§4.6) and **ledger anti-tamper** (§4.7) implemented + tested.
+- [ ] `agent_team/ci_fetcher.py` (read-only Checks-API fetcher; fails closed) +
+      `ci_gate.py` (pure-code green). Add a mechanism for the gate to **discover the correct
+      required check names per repo/branch** (avoid hardcoded check-name drift across repos).
+- [ ] **Deploy-before-merge enforcement:** a documented/CI gate ensuring the privileged flip
+      is exercised on the box before the workflow change is merged (Sea Haven deploy-then-merge).
+- [ ] **Concrete "no write token on the box" audit** (a test/script, not just a claim).
 - [ ] `/sh-security-review` + GPT-4.1 cross-review on this surface. **Hard stop until both pass.**
 - **Rollback:** workflow file stays inert (`if: ${{ false }}` not yet flipped); delete the file.
 
+### Phase 1b — Recovery for an accidentally-merged/applied privileged change  🤖/🧑
+- [ ] Document + **exercise once** a rollback for the case where a privileged change (the
+      apply/verify workflow, the `agent-apply` environment, the GitHub App perms, or
+      branch-protection) is merged or applied in error: revert the SHA, rotate the GitHub App
+      token, restore branch-protection/environment from a recorded baseline, and confirm no
+      draft-PR apply ran in the window. (The plan previously only covered reverting inert files.)
+- [ ] Add light **monitoring on draft-PR creation rate** (runaway-volume alarm) and an
+      **orphaned/stale draft-PR cleanup** step.
+
 ### Phase 2 — Provision the GitHub App + environment  🧑 OPERATOR (browser/admin)
 - [ ] Create a dedicated **GitHub App** with **`pull-requests:write`** (+ minimal contents to
       open a branch/PR); install on the org. Token lives in **CI**, never on the box.