docs/provisioning/P3-LIVE-FLIP-PLAN.md

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+# P3-LIVE-FLIP PLAN — agent-team build → verify → draft-PR
+
+Formal phased plan to take the agent-team Plane-2 pipeline from **clarify+plan only**
+to **producing reviewable draft PRs**, while keeping the always-on R720 box
+read-only and the apply path zero-AWS. Status as of 2026-06-22: **NOT STARTED**
+(P3 is built but inert). This plan is the input to `/sh-plan-review` before any build.
+
+> **Prerequisite reading:** `docs/r720-agent-team-design.md` §3.3.2 (CI-as-verifier
+> trust boundary, "B4"), `PROVISIONING-RUNBOOK.md` (the P3-live-flip section),
+> and memory `project_r720_agent_team` (locked decisions).
+
+---
+
+## 1. Objective & current state
+
+**Today (inert):** the pipeline runs `INTAKE → CLARIFIER → PLANNER → REVIEW`, but
+`serve` passes `build_verify_wiring=None`, the Tier-3 fixer is `--dry-run` only, and
+`agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` has its privileged steps disabled with
+`if: ${{ false }}` and `pull-requests:write` / `environment:` commented out. So it
+clarifies + plans but writes no code and opens no PR.
+
+**After P3:** the pipeline can emit a diff, have **org CI** build/test/security-review
+it in an untrusted sandbox, a pure-code gate confirm green from authenticated
+Checks-API results, and a scoped **GitHub App** open a **draft PR** for human review.
+The box never gains a write token.
+
+## 2. Locked decisions (carried in — do not relitigate here)
+
+- **D-OIDC:** apply path uses a **GitHub App `pull-requests:write` token**, **ZERO AWS, no OIDC**.
+- **D2:** box stays **read-only / no standing write token**; **org CI does the applying**.
+- **B4:** the LLM-proposed diff is **untrusted code**; the CI trust boundary (below) is mandatory.
+- Output is **draft PRs only** — nothing auto-merges; human approval is the merge gate.
+- (Separate, not part of this plan: `aws-posture` resident access via step-ca + IAM Roles
+  Anywhere — that IAM is already cross-review-approved and is its own sub-task.)
+
+## 3. Hard gates (must clear before the flip — these block everything)
+
+| Gate | Why | Owner |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/sh-plan-review` on THIS plan | adversarial plan audit before build | me → GPT-4.1 |
+| `/sh-security-review` on the apply/verify CI surface | auth + untrusted-input + CI trust boundary | me |
+| GPT-4.1 cross-family review on the apply/verify CI + any permission change | mandatory for the trust-boundary / permissions surface | orchestrator |
+| `GH_TOKEN`→`GITHUB_TOKEN` resolved | the GitHub transport reads `GITHUB_TOKEN`; box has `GH_TOKEN` | me (folded in here) |
+
+The flip does NOT proceed until `/sh-security-review` AND the GPT-4.1 cross-review on
+the CI surface both pass.
+
+## 4. The CI trust boundary (design B4 — what the workflow must enforce)
+
+1. **Split CI.** An **untrusted build/test job**: `contents: read` only, **no secrets / no
+   OIDC / no write token**, egress-restricted. A **separate privileged job** that **never
+   checks out the patch code** (no `pull_request_target` + head checkout) opens the draft PR.
+2. **Denylist.** A diff touching `.github/workflows/**`, IAM/permission IaC,
+   branch-protection / `CODEOWNERS` / Dependabot config, or out-of-scope files is
+   **rejected / escalated to a human — never auto-built**.
+3. **Diff-hash integrity.** The box records the diff hash in its ledger; CI verifies the
+   hash before apply. The diff reaches CI as a signed artifact / short-lived branch-only
+   token (the box has no write token).
+4. **Pure-code green gate.** Pass/fail is owned by a **pure-code gate** reading
+   **authenticated Checks-API results** (run id + diff hash). The **LLM verifier may propose
+   fixes but can never declare a build green**.
+5. **Merge gate.** Draft PR + required checks + `/sh-security-review` + Claude Code App
+   review + **human approval**.
+
+## 5. Phases
+
+### Phase 0 — Plan review & pre-reqs  🤖/🧑
+- [ ] Run `/sh-plan-review` on this doc; fold BLOCK/FIX items in.
+- [ ] Confirm a clean revert point (git tag main; Hyper-V snapshot of sh-secrev).
+- [ ] Resolve `GH_TOKEN`→`GITHUB_TOKEN` (transport accepts both / box env updated).
+- **Rollback:** none (no state changed).
+
+### Phase 1 — Author the split-CI apply/verify workflow  🤖 (review-gated)
+- [ ] Write `agent-team/ci/agent-team-apply-verify.yml` per §4: split jobs, denylist,
+      diff-hash verification, pure-code gate reading Checks-API. **SHA-pin all actions.**
+- [ ] Implement/confirm `agent_team/ci_fetcher.py` (read-only Checks-API result fetcher;
+      fails closed: missing token / 404 / auth fail → `None` → gate BLOCKs, task parks)
+      and `agent_team/ci_gate.py` (pure-code green decision).
+- [ ] `/sh-security-review` + GPT-4.1 cross-review on this surface. **Hard stop until both pass.**
+- **Rollback:** workflow file stays inert (`if: ${{ false }}` not yet flipped); delete the file.
+
+### Phase 2 — Provision the GitHub App + environment  🧑 OPERATOR (browser/admin)
+- [ ] Create a dedicated **GitHub App** with **`pull-requests:write`** (+ minimal contents to
+      open a branch/PR); install on the org. Token lives in **CI**, never on the box.
+- [ ] Create the **`agent-apply` GitHub Actions Environment** with a **required reviewer**
+      (Adam) + branch-protection so the privileged job cannot run unreviewed.
+- [ ] Store the App credentials as repo/org **Actions secrets** (not on the box).
+- **Rollback:** uninstall the App; delete the environment + secrets.
+
+### Phase 3 — Bind the live wiring (still gated by the environment)  🤖
+- [ ] In the workflow: uncomment `permissions: pull-requests: write` and
+      `environment: agent-apply`; flip the two `if: ${{ false }}` → enabled.
+- [ ] Bind `agent_team.coordinator.gated_build_verify_wiring(...)` (real diff builder +
+      read-only CI-result fetcher) so a leaf calls it only **after** the gate clears.
+- [ ] Set the box-side apply env vars the live path reads (read-only CI-result token +
+      dispatch target). Confirm **no** write token lands on the box.
+- **Rollback:** re-set `if: ${{ false }}`, re-comment `environment:`, set
+      `build_verify_wiring=None`; restart the coordinator. (Exercise this rollback once.)
+
+### Phase 4 — Smoke test to a first draft PR  🧑/🤖
+- [ ] Drive one trivial, in-scope task end-to-end → confirm: untrusted job builds/tests with
+      no secrets, denylist rejects an out-of-scope diff, pure-code gate gates on real Checks
+      results, privileged job opens a **draft PR** with required checks attached, **nothing merged**.
+- [ ] Flip the **Tier-3 fixer** off `--dry-run` only after the smoke test passes; verify a
+      dependency-CVE bump produces a draft PR.
+- **Rollback:** close the draft PR; Phase-3 rollback.
+
+### Phase 5 — Enable the cross-plane loop  🤖
+- [ ] Allow confirmed Plane-1 checker findings (`intake-checker`) to flow into pipeline tasks
+      that end in draft-PR fixes (start conservative: highest-severity, one at a time).
+- **Rollback:** revert intake-checker wiring to report-only.
+
+### Phase 6 — Docs & memory  🤖
+- [ ] Update `OPERATOR-RUNBOOK.md`, the Confluence host page, and memory: P3 is LIVE,
+      what the apply path can/can't do, the denylist, the merge gate, the rollback.
+
+## 6. What changes (and what does NOT)
+
+**Changes:**
+- The pipeline produces **draft PRs** for well-scoped work (dep bumps, small fixes, docs,
+  checker-surfaced issues). Your role shifts from author → reviewer/approver for that class.
+- Tier-3 fixer goes live (dep-CVE bumps → draft PRs).
+- Plane-1 findings can become draft-PR fixes (cross-plane loop).
+
+**Does NOT change:**
+- Box stays read-only; **CI applies, not the box**. No AWS / no OIDC in the apply path.
+- **Denylisted, high-blast-radius changes** (workflows, IAM, branch protection, CODEOWNERS,
+  Dependabot) are **never auto-built** — always escalated.
+- Human gates stay: the clarifier question-set AND the PR approval are both yours.
+- **Drafts, not merges** — you remain the merge authority.
+
+## 7. Risks & mitigations
+
+| Risk | Mitigation |
+|---|---|
+| Untrusted diff exfiltrates secrets / escalates in CI | split CI: build job has no secrets/OIDC/write, egress-restricted; privileged job never checks out patch code |
+| Malicious diff edits CI/IAM/branch-protection to self-escalate | denylist → reject/escalate, never auto-build |
+| LLM "declares" a broken build green | pure-code gate reads authenticated Checks-API only; LLM can't set status |
+| Diff tampered between box and CI | diff-hash recorded in ledger, verified before apply |
+| Standing write capability on the always-on box | there is none — App token lives in CI; box holds only a read-only CI-result token |
+| Runaway PR volume | start with Tier-3 only + one finding at a time; required-reviewer environment gates each |
+
+## 8. Definition of done
+- [ ] `/sh-plan-review`, `/sh-security-review`, and GPT-4.1 cross-review on the CI surface all passed.
+- [ ] Phase-4 smoke test produced a draft PR; nothing auto-merged; rollback exercised once.
+- [ ] No write token on the box (verified); apply path is zero-AWS.
+- [ ] Docs + Confluence + memory updated.
+- [ ] Snapshot retained until P3 runs clean for one cycle, then pruned.