CI lacks slack_sdk, so the deferred-import-missing error fired before the no-token check and masked it. Stub slack_sdk into sys.modules so the token branch is deterministically exercised in both environments.
P1c deploy artifacts: DEPLOY-R720.md (snapshot-first, rsync, venv deps, ~/secrev.env tokens incl. AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_OWNER_IDS, init-db, systemd, the 4-criteria live demo, rollback) and the long-running coordinator service unit.
build_graph gains injected live_plan_node/review_node/route_review: P1 = plan->END, P2 = clarify->plan->review->{build|loop-back|parked}. Coordinator composes clarifier->graph->ResumeWorker, wraps planner fail-safe, binds the GPT-4.1 review loop; run-team start/serve opt production into P2. Re-delivery uses a guarded CAS so a concurrently-answered row is never clobbered (closes RACE-REDELIVER).
slack_live: real slack_sdk poster. slack_listener: Socket Mode inbound; trust boundary = app-token auth + an explicit owner allowlist on the sender (fail-closed, rejects all if AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_OWNER_IDS unset) + the open-status CAS as anti-replay. Closes the AUTHZ-01 missing-sender-authz finding from the security review.
review_loop_llm -> GPT-4.1 cross_reviewer (orchestrator run.py); builders_llm -> DeepSeek fast_coder (INERT, proposes diff text only); verifier_llm -> ci_gate is sole PASS authority, Claude is fix-proposer only. Hardens review_loop.parse_verdict to word-boundary matching, adds a fail-closed subprocess timeout, and bind_review_node (single-arg, no LangGraph config injection). All fail safe on untrusted model output.
Adds the billing-seam invoker (claude_agent_sdk subscription-OAuth, deferred import, API/Bedrock paths) and the Claude-backed clarifier callables (ConfidenceAssessor/QuestionGenerator, one call/turn memoized on (thread_id,len,content-hash), fail-safe to 0.0 so garbage never clears the 98% human gate).
