* feat(agent-team): durable GitHub-issue intake de-dup (schema v2)
The intake poller de-duped ingested issues in an in-memory set that does
not survive a process restart. A scheduled/cron intake (each run a fresh
process) would therefore re-ingest every still-open labeled issue on every
run and spawn duplicate pipeline tasks. Since the box is read-only (no write
token to remove the intake label), durable de-dup is the only correct guard.
- schema v2: new ingested_issues(source, issue_id, ingested_at) table +
issue_already_ingested / record_issue_ingested helpers; migrate() adds the
table to a legacy v1 DB and restamps; init_db creates it.
- github_intake: pluggable IngestStore seam (in-memory default preserved for
tests/one-off; durable build_ledger_ingest_store for production). Record is
after start_task succeeds, so a failed intake stays retryable.
- run-team.py intake-github wires the ledger store keyed by github:owner/repo,
making a scheduled timer idempotent across runs.
978 tests pass (ruff clean).
* fix(agent-team): harden github intake per /sh-security-review (CWE-918, idempotency)
Fixes from the high-recall detector fan-out on the durable-dedup change:
- INTAKE-LOGIC-01 (idempotency): switch the IngestStore seam from
check-then-record (seen/mark) to claim-then-do (claim/release). The id is
now reserved BEFORE the non-idempotent start_task side effect, so a crash in
that window cannot re-spawn a duplicate task on the next run; a raising
start_task releases the claim so transient failures stay retryable. Adds
delete_issue_ingested to the schema layer for the release path.
- INTAKE-SSRF-001 / INTAKE-PATHSPLICE-002 (CWE-918) in build_default_issue_client:
drop the caller-overridable api_root (hardcode GITHUB_API_ROOT) and validate
owner/repo against an anchored charset before splicing them into the
token-bearing API URL — mirrors the sibling ci_fetcher BLOCK-3/FIX-3 fixes.
Tests cover cross-process duplicate prevention, release-on-failure retry, and
the owner/repo + api_root rejection. 982 tests pass, ruff clean.
Follow-up (pre-existing, not introduced here): the label-only intake has no
author allowlist (cf. AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_OWNER_IDS on the Slack listener); the
Slack answer gate bounds the blast radius. Track as separate hardening.
Three robustness/hardening fixes surfaced by /sh-security-review on the
agent-team listener/coordinator surface. None alter AUTHZ-01 allowlist
behavior or the first-answer-wins compare-and-set semantics.
1. Respawn close() leak (CWE-772). The watchdog _supervise_slack_listener
respawned the inbound Slack listener without tearing down the dead one,
leaking a Socket Mode WebSocket / SDK thread set per flap. Now the dead
listener is closed before respawn (new _close_dead_listener, idempotent),
AND _run_listener has a finally that always closes the listener so a
crashed serve() releases its socket. SlackListener.close() is idempotent,
so the belt-and-braces close stays a safe no-op.
2. Broadened exception guard in handle_event (CWE-248). The submit block
only caught ValueError; the accept path (submit_answer ->
_question_turn/_question_thread) can raise KeyError on a concurrently
mutated row, and the CAS can raise sqlite3.Error. An uncaught exception
would escape into the Bolt dispatch. Added a separate `except Exception`
that logs at WARNING (not silent, not debug) and returns None. The
existing ValueError-as-debug behavior is unchanged; authorization still
runs first, so the trust boundary is not widened.
3. channel_ref partial-unique index (defense-in-depth). Added
uq_pending_questions_open_channel_ref — a PARTIAL UNIQUE index on
(channel_ref) WHERE channel_ref IS NOT NULL AND status='open' — so two
OPEN rows can never share a non-null channel_ref (a thread_ts can never
map to two open questions). Installed in init_db AND unconditionally in
migrate (idempotent IF NOT EXISTS) so existing v1 DBs gain it. NULLs and
closed rows are excluded; mirrored verbatim into schema.sql.
Tests: +8 (was 960, now 968). New: schema partial-unique reject/null/closed/
migrate cases; handle_event KeyError + sqlite3.Error swallow cases;
coordinator close-before-respawn + run_listener-closes-on-crash. Fixed the
operator-cli test fixture to use a per-question channel_ref (it previously
inserted multiple open rows sharing one ref, which the new index correctly
rejects).
* fix(agent-team): handle real slack_bolt event envelope + map thread replies to open questions
The Socket Mode inbound listener was unit-tested against a SYNTHETIC payload
shape that does not match what slack_bolt actually delivers, so the suite was
green while a real Slack thread reply was silently dropped (the clarifier
question stayed `open`). Real slack_bolt delivers an Events API message /
app_mention as `{"type":"event_callback","event":{"type":"message",...}}` and
a free-text thread reply carries NO callback_id/question_id/metadata.
Three breaks fixed (all on the free-text reply path):
1. Type gate — handle_event gated on the OUTER `type`, which is
"event_callback" for a real message/app_mention, so the event fell outside
_ANSWER_BEARING_TYPES and was dropped. Now collapsed to the discriminating
INNER `event.type` via _discriminating_type / _inner_event.
2. question_id recovery — a real reply has no callback_id/question_id/metadata
(the bot's metadata is on the QUESTION message, not the reply). When explicit
id recovery fails, the listener now resolves the question by the inner
event's `thread_ts` against the OPEN ledger row whose `channel_ref` equals it
(new schema helper find_open_question_by_channel_ref, constrained to
status='open' as anti-replay). Explicit id recovery still takes precedence.
3. answer extraction — a real message event carries its text at `event.text`,
not a top-level `answer`/`text`. The thread-reply path now takes the inner
`event.text` (stripped) as the answer value.
AUTHZ-01 is unchanged and still runs FIRST: authorization gates on the sender's
Slack user id (`event.user` for the Events API shape) and fails closed on an
empty/unknown allowlist or unrecoverable sender. The new mapping only resolves
WHICH question is answered, never WHO may answer. Answers stay opaque DATA
(parameterized SQL + json.dumps; never eval/exec/interpolate).
Tests: replaced the synthetic events-API fixtures with REAL Bolt envelopes and
added regression coverage — real thread reply maps via channel_ref and is
accepted, text is stripped, non-owner reply rejected (row stays open), thread_ts
matching no open row is a no-op, reply to an already-answered row is a no-op
(anti-replay), and app_mention is normalized identically. block_actions /
slash_command paths retained.
* fix(agent-team): bind subscription invoker in the start CLI
`run-team.py start` runs the clarifier graph to the first human gate IN the CLI
process, and the clarifier calls Claude (assess_confidence). The invoker is a
process-local binding that only `serve` set, so `start` failed with
"claude_invoke has no invoker bound". Bind the real subscription invoker here,
mirroring Coordinator.serve(). Found during the live R720 P1 bring-up.
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
