High-recall /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier found two
confirmed HIGH; both now closed (verified empirically against the working tree):
- LOGIC-RACE-01 (HIGH, CWE-835): the build-loop budget was structurally dead
(verifier read a shared wiring-time VerifierConfig.build_loops, always 0, so
the max_build_loops park never fired -> a perpetually-failing task looped
BUILD->DISPATCH->VERIFY forever, force-pushing + firing a CI run each round).
Threaded build_loops through durable PipelineState/TaskRecord; verifier reads
state.get('build_loops',0), writes the incremented count back on each FAIL, and
PARKS at max_build_loops. Parks after exactly N failures, never unbounded.
- SEC-01 (HIGH, CWE-532) + SEC-02 (MED, CWE-214): p3_rollback.sh echoed the live
App JWT to stdout in default dry-run and passed it as a gh argv literal. Added
redact_secrets (Bearer/Authorization/ghX_/PEM masking) through run_or_plan; the
App uninstall now uses curl -H @<0600 tempfile> (JWT never on argv), shredded
after. Empirical: app/incident/all dry-runs leak 0 JWT occurrences.
- SEC-03 (MED, CWE-798): assert_no_write_token now applies the PEM regex + the
configured App-ID to env/config VALUES (not just files) — an App private key
under a benign env name is caught.
- SEC-04 (LOW) + P3-IAC-08 (LOW): tightened the box GITHUB_TOKEN fallback /
value-scan; staged-only WARN on the live workflow revert.
Suite: 1382 passed, ruff clean. Branch only; not merged/deployed.
NOTE: re-verifier flagged SEC-01 as open by grepping COMMITTED blobs (the fix was
uncommitted working-tree state); independently confirmed closed empirically.
* feat(agent-team): read-only CI-result fetcher for P3 verify gate (opt-in, inert)
ci_fetcher.py: fail-closed CiResultFetcher reading the GitHub Actions run
conclusion via a read-only PAT (AGENT_TEAM_CI_READ_TOKEN→GITHUB_TOKEN), returns
{run_id,conclusion,diff_hash} or None on any error. Data-fetcher only — ci_gate
owns the verdict; never writes, no OIDC/AWS, never reads patch artifacts.
coordinator gains opt-in gated_build_verify_wiring() composing it via
bind_ci_result_fetcher; NOT wired into the default run-team.py path. 20 tests.
* harden(agent-team): P3 apply/verify workflow — GitHub App token, CWE-94, fail-closed
Decision-1 auth model: gate-and-pr uses a GitHub App installation token
(pull-requests:write) behind the agent-apply environment; ALL OIDC/id-token/AWS
removed. Hardening: task_id env-indirection (CWE-94 — GitHub expands ${{ }} into
the run shell before exec, so %s/quoting is insufficient); run-id pinning on both
download-artifact; post-build denied-path check (build-hook writes into denied
paths fail the job); empty-hash fail-closed in BOTH the embedded gate (fixed a
real ''=='' pass bug) and ci_gate.py. App-token + draft-PR steps stay if:${{ false }}
until provisioning (App + environment + branch protection). +17 tests.
* harden(agent-team): apply P3-live security-gate fixes (GPT-4.1 xreview + sh-security-review)
BLOCK-1/FIX-4: gate-and-pr re-comments pull-requests:write + environment:agent-apply
(provisioning-time uncomment) and gains needs.guard/build-test=='success' job guard —
zero privilege until provisioning. BLOCK-2/3+FIX-5: ci_fetcher validates run_id (^[0-9]{1,20}$),
owner/repo (^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$), and fetched_id (int) — fail closed, no SSRF/path
injection. FIX-1: conclusion allowlist. FIX-3: api_root removed from public builder (no
injectable endpoint). INJ-02: post-build denied-path check uses NUL-delimited git output +
explicit rename parsing, no backslash mangling, non-UTF8=violation. INJ-03: all three trust-
control denylists unified to one 22-entry union + drift-guard test. Q1: documented run_id/
diff_hash trust source (dispatcher/ledger only). 884 tests, ruff clean. Privileged steps stay
if:${{ false }} until provisioning.
* build(security-review): prune .claude worktrees from deterministic scanners
Agent worktrees under .claude/worktrees/ are full repo copies; the cfn-lint
find|xargs template scan overflowed ('command line cannot be assembled') and the
pre-push hook fail-closed to BLOCK whenever a worktree was present. Prune .claude
in the cfn-lint find + semgrep/checkov excludes, and gitignore .claude/ so it is
never scanned or committed. Unblocks main-tree pushes during parallel agent work.
