build_verify_subgraph: BUILD->VERIFY nodes + route_after_verify. build_graph gains an opt-in build_verify param that repoints the review 'build' route at the subgraph (BUILD->VERIFY->{approved->END | loop->PLAN | parked->END}); default unchanged (P2). Coordinator build_verify_wiring composes it INERT (no ci_result -> ci_gate BLOCK -> PARKED; LLM is fix-proposer only, never declares green). NOT enabled in production: the live CI apply/verify + OIDC stays held for its /sh-security-review + GPT-4.1 cross-review gate. Also escapes untrusted intake text in logs (log-injection hygiene).
Live github (issue-comment poster) and claude_code (file-drop) transports, plus GithubIntake (labeled issue -> coordinator.start_task, de-duped). run-team _build_transport now wires github/claude_code live (was SystemExit) + adds the intake-github subcommand. claude_code drop-path also neutralizes backslash (defense-in-depth).
build_graph gains injected live_plan_node/review_node/route_review: P1 = plan->END, P2 = clarify->plan->review->{build|loop-back|parked}. Coordinator composes clarifier->graph->ResumeWorker, wraps planner fail-safe, binds the GPT-4.1 review loop; run-team start/serve opt production into P2. Re-delivery uses a guarded CAS so a concurrently-answered row is never clobbered (closes RACE-REDELIVER).
slack_live: real slack_sdk poster. slack_listener: Socket Mode inbound; trust boundary = app-token auth + an explicit owner allowlist on the sender (fail-closed, rejects all if AGENT_TEAM_SLACK_OWNER_IDS unset) + the open-status CAS as anti-replay. Closes the AUTHZ-01 missing-sender-authz finding from the security review.
review_loop_llm -> GPT-4.1 cross_reviewer (orchestrator run.py); builders_llm -> DeepSeek fast_coder (INERT, proposes diff text only); verifier_llm -> ci_gate is sole PASS authority, Claude is fix-proposer only. Hardens review_loop.parse_verdict to word-boundary matching, adds a fail-closed subprocess timeout, and bind_review_node (single-arg, no LangGraph config injection). All fail safe on untrusted model output.
Adds the billing-seam invoker (claude_agent_sdk subscription-OAuth, deferred import, API/Bedrock paths) and the Claude-backed clarifier callables (ConfidenceAssessor/QuestionGenerator, one call/turn memoized on (thread_id,len,content-hash), fail-safe to 0.0 so garbage never clears the 98% human gate).
Addresses the confirmed findings from /sh-security-review + the GPT-4.1
cross-review of the Plane-2 scaffold. Full suite: 589 passed; ruff clean.
FIXED (proven-exploitable):
- CI-guard denylist bypass (HIGH): Python fnmatch '**/' is non-recursive, so
root-level template.yaml/*.tf/cdk.json/*.pem/*.key/*-stack.* evaded the
trust-control surface. Replaced fnmatch with a recursive, case-insensitive
glob->regex matcher. (verified: fnmatch('template.yaml','**/template.yaml')==False)
- CI-guard scope bypass (HIGH): a '**' declared_scope made every path in-scope.
Scope is now concrete-prefix confinement (reduces a glob to its leading
metacharacter-free segments; '**' -> empty -> dropped -> unscoped reject).
- Box-side vs CI denylist divergence (MED): builders.py _DENY_PATTERNS now covers
Terraform, *.pem/*.key, CDK stack files, .github/actions, *iam*, bare policy*.json
(case-insensitive), matching the CI surface.
- force-resume was backwards (MED): it superseded the answered row recovery
resumes from, making a stuck task permanently un-resumable while printing
success. Now re-opens an EXPIRED (parked) question via a new reopen_question
CAS helper; never supersedes an answered row; honest exit codes.
- operator attribution (MED): run-team.py --operator defaulted to "" -> now the
OS login, so destructive actions are always attributable.
- audit-log append race (MED): replaced read-modify-rewrite (lost records under
concurrent operators) with an O_APPEND single-line write, mode 600 enforced.
- lstrip("ab/") path-mangling in the symlink error path -> regex prefix strip.
Regression tests added across test_ci_gate_workflow / test_builders / test_run_team
/ test_schema. Design-level findings (resume-worker durability, egress breadth,
answered_at ordering, DB-swap TOCTOU, diff-hash threat-model) are pre-deployment
/ P1-build-proper and recorded with written justification in
agent-team/.security-review/suppressions.json; CI README diff-hash wording made
honest.
Reworks the P1 sim so the four §7.1 exit criteria are demonstrated against the
ACTUAL mechanic, not a model (resolves the verifier's "sim models the ledger,
not the LangGraph integration" finding).
- New tests/sim/test_p1_graph_integration.py drives the real agent_team.graph
StateGraph (interrupt/Command(resume)) + the real langgraph SqliteSaver
checkpointer + the committed pending_questions compare-and-set, proving:
(a) suspend survives a simulated restart (drop saver/conn, rebuild over the
same checkpoint DB) and resumes; (b) duplicate answer loses the CAS and the
graph never double-advances; (c) a post-deadline answer loses to expire and
the task is not resumed; (d) two concurrent tasks resume to the correct
thread, with a turn-guarded no-double-apply check.
- graph.py: derive a STABLE question_id from uuid5(thread_id, turn). The
clarifier node replays on resume, so the prior fresh-uuid id changed between
the delivered/ledgered question and the qa_history entry — breaking the
§3.3.1 identity contract. Now the delivered id == ledger key == history entry
(unit-tested in test_graph.py).
- harness._connect() now uses the committed schema.connect() (WAL + busy_timeout)
instead of a raw sqlite3.connect, so concurrent responders genuinely serialize;
the criterion-(d) concurrency test no longer swallows OperationalError (it
asserts zero errors + exactly one CAS winner).
- requirements.txt: pin langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite==3.1.0 (design D9 durable
checkpointer), now exercised by the integration test.
Full suite: 564 passed; ruff + format clean.
Resolves three execution-proven verifier findings from the scaffold review.
Full suite: 548 passed, 1 skipped (stable across repeated runs); ruff clean.
builders denylist (§3.3.2 #2): scan was +++-only and missed header-only
sections. Now section-driven off `diff --git a/<src> b/<dest>`, catching the 4
proven bypasses — delete of a denied path, mode-change-only, `copy to` a denied
path, out-of-scope delete (regression tests for each).
§3.3.1 compare-and-set concurrency: BEGIN IMMEDIATE moved inside guarded retry;
each CAS now runs on its own connection (shared sqlite3.Connection cannot hold
two transactions, and is unsafe for concurrent use even for reads). connect()
stashes the db path on a Connection subclass so the path is derived by a
thread-safe attribute read, not a PRAGMA on the shared conn; busy_timeout set
before the WAL pragma. Added shared-connection concurrent regression tests
(distinct + same question) — previously raised "transaction within a
transaction".
operator CLI (run-team.py): added the design-named re-deliver and force-resume
verbs (were missing); audit now records the attempt BEFORE the mutation and the
outcome after, so a ledger mutation can never land without a trail; main()
catches OSError instead of leaving an uncaught traceback on audit-write failure.
