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* Lock dashboard login to GitHub org members Add an org-membership gate to the dashboard OAuth callback. After resolving the GitHub login, enforce_org_login_gate(login) checks the existing ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS allowlist before issuing a session. - Reuses ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS (no new config knob) and is_user_active_org_member (installation-token check, so no extra OAuth scope and private memberships are visible). - Fail-open when unset/blank so existing deployments keep working; fail-closed on API errors. - Gate runs before the session cookie/token is persisted. Adds unit tests and documents the behavior in INSTALLATION.md. * docs: document Organization Members permission required for org login gate
251 lines
8.3 KiB
Python
251 lines
8.3 KiB
Python
"""GitHub App OAuth code-exchange and signed-JWT session cookie."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import logging
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import os
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import secrets
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import time
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from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
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from typing import Any
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from urllib.parse import urlparse
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import httpx
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import jwt
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from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
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from agent.utils.github_org_membership import is_user_active_org_member
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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COOKIE_NAME = "osw_session"
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STATE_COOKIE_NAME = "osw_oauth_state"
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SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
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STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 600
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JWT_ALG = "HS256"
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GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID = os.environ.get("GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID", "")
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GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET = os.environ.get("GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET", "")
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def _secret() -> str:
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s = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET", "")
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if not s:
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raise HTTPException(500, "DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET not configured")
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return s
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def _allowed_redirect_origins() -> set[str]:
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"""Origins permitted for the post-login redirect.
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Built from DASHBOARD_BASE_URL plus any DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entries
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so the dashboard itself and its preview deploys can all be redirect
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targets — but nothing else.
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"""
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origins: set[str] = set()
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base = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_BASE_URL", "").strip()
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if base:
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origins.add(_origin_of(base))
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for entry in os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", "").split(","):
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entry = entry.strip()
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if entry:
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origins.add(_origin_of(entry))
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origins.discard("")
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return origins
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def _origin_of(url: str) -> str:
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parsed = urlparse(url)
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if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc:
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return ""
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return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}"
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def sanitize_redirect_to(redirect_to: str | None) -> str:
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"""Return a safe post-login redirect URL.
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Falls back to DASHBOARD_BASE_URL when the supplied URL's origin isn't
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explicitly allowed. This blocks the open-redirect / phishing primitive
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where an attacker drops their own URL into `?redirect_to=`.
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"""
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fallback = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_BASE_URL", "").strip()
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if not redirect_to:
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return fallback
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candidate_origin = _origin_of(redirect_to)
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if not candidate_origin:
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return fallback
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if candidate_origin in _allowed_redirect_origins():
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return redirect_to
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logger.warning("Rejected redirect_to=%r — origin not in allowlist", redirect_to)
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return fallback
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def _allowed_login_orgs() -> frozenset[str]:
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"""Orgs whose members may log in to the dashboard.
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Reuses the webhook-side ``ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS`` allowlist so deployments
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configure a single org gate. When empty the dashboard login gate is
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disabled (fail-open) to preserve existing deployments.
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"""
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return frozenset(
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org.strip().lower()
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for org in os.environ.get("ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS", "").split(",")
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if org.strip()
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)
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async def enforce_org_login_gate(login: str) -> None:
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"""Reject dashboard login for users outside the allowed GitHub org(s).
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No-op when ``ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS`` is unset. Otherwise the user must be an
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active member of at least one configured org; membership is checked with
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the GitHub App installation token (fail-closed on any API error).
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"""
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orgs = _allowed_login_orgs()
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if not orgs:
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return
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for org in orgs:
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if await is_user_active_org_member(login, org):
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return
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logger.warning("Rejected dashboard login for %r — not in allowed org(s)", login)
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raise HTTPException(403, "your GitHub account is not a member of an authorized organization")
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def issue_session(*, login: str, email: str | None, avatar_url: str | None) -> str:
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now = int(time.time())
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payload = {
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"sub": login,
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"email": email,
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"avatar_url": avatar_url,
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"iat": now,
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"exp": now + SESSION_TTL_SECONDS,
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}
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return jwt.encode(payload, _secret(), algorithm=JWT_ALG)
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def decode_session(token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
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try:
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return jwt.decode(token, _secret(), algorithms=[JWT_ALG])
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except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
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raise HTTPException(401, f"invalid session: {e}") from e
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def new_state_nonce() -> str:
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"""A fresh random nonce used to bind state JWT ↔ browser cookie."""
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return secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
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def hash_state_nonce(nonce: str) -> str:
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"""HMAC the nonce so the value stored on the wire isn't reversible.
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We compare ``hash_state_nonce(cookie_nonce) == state.nonce_hash`` at
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callback time. Using HMAC over a constant-time digest also gives us
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timing-attack resistance via :func:`hmac.compare_digest` at the call
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site.
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"""
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return hmac.new(_secret().encode(), nonce.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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def issue_state(*, redirect_to: str, nonce_hash: str) -> str:
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now = int(time.time())
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payload = {
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"nonce_hash": nonce_hash,
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"redirect_to": redirect_to,
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"iat": now,
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"exp": now + STATE_TTL_SECONDS,
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}
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return jwt.encode(payload, _secret(), algorithm=JWT_ALG)
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def decode_state(state: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
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try:
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return jwt.decode(state, _secret(), algorithms=[JWT_ALG])
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except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
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raise HTTPException(400, f"invalid state: {e}") from e
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def require_session(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
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token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME)
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if not token:
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raise HTTPException(401, "not authenticated")
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return decode_session(token)
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def expires_at_from_github_response(data: dict[str, Any], *, field: str) -> str | None:
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"""Convert GitHub ``expires_in`` / ``refresh_token_expires_in`` to an ISO timestamp."""
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raw = data.get(field)
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if not isinstance(raw, int | float) or raw <= 0:
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return None
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return (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=int(raw))).isoformat()
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async def _request_github_tokens(body: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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if not GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID or not GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET:
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raise HTTPException(500, "GitHub App OAuth not configured")
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async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
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resp = await client.post(
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"https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token",
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headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
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data=body,
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)
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resp.raise_for_status()
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data = resp.json()
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if not isinstance(data, dict):
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raise HTTPException(502, "unexpected GitHub OAuth response")
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if data.get("error"):
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raise HTTPException(
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400, f"github oauth error: {data.get('error_description') or data['error']}"
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)
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return data
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async def exchange_code(code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Exchange an OAuth authorization code for user-to-server tokens."""
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data = await _request_github_tokens(
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{
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"client_id": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID,
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"client_secret": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
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"code": code,
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}
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)
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if not data.get("access_token"):
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raise HTTPException(400, f"oauth exchange failed: {data}")
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return data
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async def refresh_user_access_token(refresh_token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Rotate an expiring user access token using its refresh token."""
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data = await _request_github_tokens(
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{
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"client_id": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID,
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"client_secret": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET,
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"grant_type": "refresh_token",
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"refresh_token": refresh_token,
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}
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)
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if not data.get("access_token"):
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raise HTTPException(400, f"oauth refresh failed: {data}")
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return data
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async def fetch_github_user(access_token: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str | None]:
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"""Return ``(user, primary_email)`` for the authenticated user."""
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headers = {
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"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
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"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json",
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"X-GitHub-Api-Version": "2022-11-28",
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}
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async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
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u = await client.get("https://api.github.com/user", headers=headers)
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u.raise_for_status()
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user = u.json()
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email = user.get("email")
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if not email:
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e = await client.get("https://api.github.com/user/emails", headers=headers)
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if e.status_code == 200:
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primary = next((x for x in e.json() if x.get("primary")), None)
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if primary:
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email = primary.get("email")
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return user, email
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