"""GitHub App OAuth code-exchange and signed-JWT session cookie.""" from __future__ import annotations import hashlib import hmac import logging import os import secrets import time from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta from typing import Any from urllib.parse import urlparse import httpx import jwt from fastapi import HTTPException, Request from agent.utils.github_org_membership import is_user_active_org_member logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) COOKIE_NAME = "osw_session" STATE_COOKIE_NAME = "osw_oauth_state" SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 600 JWT_ALG = "HS256" GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID = os.environ.get("GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID", "") GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET = os.environ.get("GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET", "") def _secret() -> str: s = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET", "") if not s: raise HTTPException(500, "DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET not configured") return s def _allowed_redirect_origins() -> set[str]: """Origins permitted for the post-login redirect. Built from DASHBOARD_BASE_URL plus any DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entries so the dashboard itself and its preview deploys can all be redirect targets — but nothing else. """ origins: set[str] = set() base = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_BASE_URL", "").strip() if base: origins.add(_origin_of(base)) for entry in os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", "").split(","): entry = entry.strip() if entry: origins.add(_origin_of(entry)) origins.discard("") return origins def _origin_of(url: str) -> str: parsed = urlparse(url) if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc: return "" return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}" def sanitize_redirect_to(redirect_to: str | None) -> str: """Return a safe post-login redirect URL. Falls back to DASHBOARD_BASE_URL when the supplied URL's origin isn't explicitly allowed. This blocks the open-redirect / phishing primitive where an attacker drops their own URL into `?redirect_to=`. """ fallback = os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_BASE_URL", "").strip() if not redirect_to: return fallback candidate_origin = _origin_of(redirect_to) if not candidate_origin: return fallback if candidate_origin in _allowed_redirect_origins(): return redirect_to logger.warning("Rejected redirect_to=%r — origin not in allowlist", redirect_to) return fallback def _allowed_login_orgs() -> frozenset[str]: """Orgs whose members may log in to the dashboard. Reuses the webhook-side ``ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS`` allowlist so deployments configure a single org gate. When empty the dashboard login gate is disabled (fail-open) to preserve existing deployments. """ return frozenset( org.strip().lower() for org in os.environ.get("ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS", "").split(",") if org.strip() ) async def enforce_org_login_gate(login: str) -> None: """Reject dashboard login for users outside the allowed GitHub org(s). No-op when ``ALLOWED_GITHUB_ORGS`` is unset. Otherwise the user must be an active member of at least one configured org; membership is checked with the GitHub App installation token (fail-closed on any API error). """ orgs = _allowed_login_orgs() if not orgs: return for org in orgs: if await is_user_active_org_member(login, org): return logger.warning("Rejected dashboard login for %r — not in allowed org(s)", login) raise HTTPException(403, "your GitHub account is not a member of an authorized organization") def issue_session(*, login: str, email: str | None, avatar_url: str | None) -> str: now = int(time.time()) payload = { "sub": login, "email": email, "avatar_url": avatar_url, "iat": now, "exp": now + SESSION_TTL_SECONDS, } return jwt.encode(payload, _secret(), algorithm=JWT_ALG) def decode_session(token: str) -> dict[str, Any]: try: return jwt.decode(token, _secret(), algorithms=[JWT_ALG]) except jwt.PyJWTError as e: raise HTTPException(401, f"invalid session: {e}") from e def new_state_nonce() -> str: """A fresh random nonce used to bind state JWT ↔ browser cookie.""" return secrets.token_urlsafe(32) def hash_state_nonce(nonce: str) -> str: """HMAC the nonce so the value stored on the wire isn't reversible. We compare ``hash_state_nonce(cookie_nonce) == state.nonce_hash`` at callback time. Using HMAC over a constant-time digest also gives us timing-attack resistance via :func:`hmac.compare_digest` at the call site. """ return hmac.new(_secret().encode(), nonce.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() def issue_state(*, redirect_to: str, nonce_hash: str) -> str: now = int(time.time()) payload = { "nonce_hash": nonce_hash, "redirect_to": redirect_to, "iat": now, "exp": now + STATE_TTL_SECONDS, } return jwt.encode(payload, _secret(), algorithm=JWT_ALG) def decode_state(state: str) -> dict[str, Any]: try: return jwt.decode(state, _secret(), algorithms=[JWT_ALG]) except jwt.PyJWTError as e: raise HTTPException(400, f"invalid state: {e}") from e def require_session(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]: token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME) if not token: raise HTTPException(401, "not authenticated") return decode_session(token) def expires_at_from_github_response(data: dict[str, Any], *, field: str) -> str | None: """Convert GitHub ``expires_in`` / ``refresh_token_expires_in`` to an ISO timestamp.""" raw = data.get(field) if not isinstance(raw, int | float) or raw <= 0: return None return (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=int(raw))).isoformat() async def _request_github_tokens(body: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]: if not GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID or not GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET: raise HTTPException(500, "GitHub App OAuth not configured") async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client: resp = await client.post( "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token", headers={"Accept": "application/json"}, data=body, ) resp.raise_for_status() data = resp.json() if not isinstance(data, dict): raise HTTPException(502, "unexpected GitHub OAuth response") if data.get("error"): raise HTTPException( 400, f"github oauth error: {data.get('error_description') or data['error']}" ) return data async def exchange_code(code: str) -> dict[str, Any]: """Exchange an OAuth authorization code for user-to-server tokens.""" data = await _request_github_tokens( { "client_id": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID, "client_secret": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET, "code": code, } ) if not data.get("access_token"): raise HTTPException(400, f"oauth exchange failed: {data}") return data async def refresh_user_access_token(refresh_token: str) -> dict[str, Any]: """Rotate an expiring user access token using its refresh token.""" data = await _request_github_tokens( { "client_id": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID, "client_secret": GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET, "grant_type": "refresh_token", "refresh_token": refresh_token, } ) if not data.get("access_token"): raise HTTPException(400, f"oauth refresh failed: {data}") return data async def fetch_github_user(access_token: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str | None]: """Return ``(user, primary_email)`` for the authenticated user.""" headers = { "Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}", "Accept": "application/vnd.github+json", "X-GitHub-Api-Version": "2022-11-28", } async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client: u = await client.get("https://api.github.com/user", headers=headers) u.raise_for_status() user = u.json() email = user.get("email") if not email: e = await client.get("https://api.github.com/user/emails", headers=headers) if e.status_code == 200: primary = next((x for x in e.json() if x.get("primary")), None) if primary: email = primary.get("email") return user, email