PR#7 of the AWS migration. deploy/seahaven/: fetch-config.sh materializes a service-user-owned 0600 tmpfs .env from Secrets Manager + SSM (fail-fast); seed_store.sh reseeds the in-memory store; ROTATION.md. Incorporates T5 /sh-security-review fixes: - seed_store no longer bash-sources the .env (closes the SH-INJ-001 RCE); uses a non-eval reader, jq --arg JSON bodies, and a loopback-pinned BASE. - fetch-config: .env owned by the openswe service user (app no longer runs as root); DEFAULT_REPO_OWNER hard-pinned; key-identifier validation + flat-namespace collision detection; dropped SSM --recursive. shellcheck + bash -n clean.
6.4 KiB
Sea Haven — Open SWE secret & config rotation
How secrets and config reach the running app, and how to rotate either one.
How values flow at boot
AWS Secrets Manager open-swe-<env>/* ─┐
AWS SSM Param Store /open-swe-<env>/* ─┤── fetch-config.sh ──▶ tmpfs /run/open-swe/.env (root:root 0600)
│ (systemd ExecStartPre=+, EC2 role) │
▼ ▼
FAIL-FAST if a app symlink <APP_DIR>/.env
required var is empty python-dotenv reads at import
The app reads .env once, at import. There is no hot-reload of secrets.
Therefore the rotation contract is always the same two steps:
Rotation = (1) update the value in Secrets Manager / SSM, then (2) restart the service so
fetch-config.shre-materializes the.env.
# after updating a secret/param in AWS:
sudo systemctl restart open-swe.service
# ExecStartPre=+ -> fetch-config.sh re-pulls + rewrites the tmpfs .env (fail-fast)
# ExecStartPost -> seed_store.sh re-seeds the in-memory store (team_settings + user_mappings)
There is no zero-downtime path for most secrets on the stock in-memory
runtime — a restart is required and it also wipes the in-memory store (re-seeded
by seed_store.sh automatically). The one secret built for zero-downtime overlap
is TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY (see below), but even it needs the restart to load the
new key list.
Rotating a secret (Secrets Manager)
ENV=prod # or dev
NAME=DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET
aws secretsmanager put-secret-value \
--secret-id "open-swe-${ENV}/${NAME}" \
--secret-string 'NEW_VALUE' \
--region us-east-1
sudo systemctl restart open-swe.service # on the box
(update-secret/put-secret-value both create a new version; the boot hook
always reads AWSCURRENT.)
Rotating a config param (SSM)
aws ssm put-parameter --overwrite \
--name "/open-swe-${ENV}/DASHBOARD_BASE_URL" \
--type String --value 'https://openswe.seahaven.com' \
--region us-east-1
sudo systemctl restart open-swe.service
Per-secret rotation notes
| Secret | Rotation notes |
|---|---|
| TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY | Fernet key(s). Supports a comma/newline-separated list (agent/encryption.py) for zero-downtime key rotation: prepend the NEW key, keep the OLD key(s) in the list. New data is encrypted with the first key; old data still decrypts with the trailing keys. After all encrypted-at-rest tokens (per-user GitHub OAuth tokens in thread metadata) have been re-encrypted/expired, drop the old key. Store the list as one secret value; fetch-config.sh writes it verbatim. Never rotate to a single new key in one step or every existing encrypted token becomes undecryptable. |
| GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY | Multiline PEM. Generate a new private key in the GitHub App settings (you may have two active keys during overlap), put the new PEM into the secret, restart, verify install-token minting + a webhook delivery, then delete the old key in GitHub. fetch-config.sh writes the PEM as a double-quoted multiline value (python-dotenv-safe); paste the full -----BEGIN…-----END----- block including newlines. |
| GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET | Webhook HMAC. GitHub allows only one webhook secret per App, so this is a brief-break rotation: update the secret in AWS and the GitHub App webhook config, restart. Deliveries signed with the old secret during the gap will 401 (GitHub auto-redelivers). Required in prod (fail-fast). |
| SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET | Slack request-signature secret. Rotate in the Slack app config and AWS together, restart. Required in prod (fail-fast). A stale value silently 401s url_verification/events until restart (known gotcha). |
| LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET | Linear webhook signature. Required in prod only when the Linear integration is wired (LINEAR_API_KEY present). Rotate in Linear + AWS together, restart. |
| SLACK_CLIENT_SECRET / GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET | OAuth client secrets (dashboard login / Slack OAuth). Rotate in the provider console + AWS, restart. Existing dashboard sessions are JWT-signed by DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET, not these, so they survive. |
| DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET | Signs dashboard session cookies. Rotating invalidates all active sessions (users re-login). Hard-required (RuntimeError if empty). No overlap list — single value. |
Model provider keys (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY, GROQ_API_KEY, FIREWORKS_API_KEY) |
Standard API-key rotation: issue new key, update AWS, restart, revoke old. The active provider keys (whatever team_settings/default seeds — currently ANTHROPIC_API_KEY + OPENAI_API_KEY) are fail-fast-required; keep REQUIRED_PROVIDER_KEYS in sync if you change the seeded models. |
| LANGSMITH_API_KEY_PROD | LangSmith key powering the langsmith sandbox (the only provider with working in-sandbox git/gh auth). Required when SANDBOX_TYPE=langsmith (fail-fast). Rotate in LangSmith + AWS, restart; existing sandboxes keep their already-injected proxy token until recycled. |
| SLACK_BOT_TOKEN / LINEAR_API_KEY / GITHUB_PAT / EXA_API_KEY / DAYTONA_API_KEY / RUNLOOP_API_KEY / CORRIDOR_ / USER_ID_API_KEY_MAP / X_SERVICE_AUTH_JWT_SECRET* | Plain API-token rotation: update AWS, restart, revoke old at the provider. None support an overlap list. |
Fail-fast safety
fetch-config.sh refuses to write the .env (exit 1) if any required var is
empty after a rotation — so a botched rotation (e.g. an empty put-secret-value)
stops the service at ExecStartPre instead of starting it with a partial .env.
The missing variable names are printed to the journal (values never are):
sudo journalctl -u open-swe.service -b | grep fetch-config
Required set enforced: DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET, TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
GITHUB_APP_ID, GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY, GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID,
GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID, GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET, the active provider keys
(REQUIRED_PROVIDER_KEYS, default ANTHROPIC_API_KEY,OPENAI_API_KEY), the
sandbox key for SANDBOX_TYPE (langsmith ⇒ LANGSMITH_API_KEY_PROD +
DEFAULT_SANDBOX_SNAPSHOT_ID), and — in prod — GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET,
SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET (plus LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET when Linear is wired).