feat: stand up dev properly — assets bucket + artifact CD + baked AMI + on-box uv sync (T7+T19+T14) (#18)

* feat(infra): build + pin the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (T12 AMI / item 3) Packer-build the custom base image and repoint AppService off the AL2023 placeholder onto it. deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl — fix two bugs that blocked the first real `packer build` (the config had only ever been `packer validate`'d at T8): - the file provisioner failed uploading the templates dir ('scp: …: Is a directory') — a trailing-slash contents-upload needs the dest dir to exist; added a 'mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates' shell provisioner + dropped the dest trailing slash. - the shell provisioner's custom execute_command omitted {{ .Vars }}, so the environment_vars never reached provision.sh (which runs under set -u and aborted on CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL). Added {{ .Vars }}. infra: - ami-cache.ts: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID = ami-0545363bb147229ff (built 2026-06-26 from open-swe-base-arm64-20260626-201929) + bakedOpenSweArm64() pinning it by exact id via MachineImage.genericLinux (offline, deterministic). Dropped the now-dead AL2023 cachedInContext helper + context key; kept the EBS/replacement discipline docs. - app-service.ts: machineImage → bakedOpenSweArm64(). - open-swe-stack.ts: output BakedAmiId (was the AL2023 PinnedAmiId guard). - cdk.context.json → {} (AMI is a static id pin; no context lookups remain). - README: Baked AMI + EBS-replacement-discipline section. tsc + cdk synth(dev+prod) + jest(16) clean; template ImageId = the baked AMI. NOTE: held — do NOT merge until the open-swe-dev secret values are populated (put-config.sh). The infra CD is live, so merging this to dev auto-deploys OpenSweDevStack; without secrets the box boots but fetch-config fail-fasts → unhealthy ALB target on the shared prod ALB. Merge once secrets are set (T14). * fix(ami): ASCII-only AMI description + re-pin to ami-00080084502093021 Third packer bug: ami_description had an em-dash (non-ASCII); AWS rejects non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute, so packer registered then DEREGISTERED the first AMI (ami-0545…) on the ModifyImageAttribute error. Replaced with an ASCII '-'. Rebuilt clean → ami-00080084502093021 (available). Re-pinned BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID. * fix(deploy): GitHub App + Slack required for prod only, not dev Per the migration decision: do NOT create/duplicate a separate dev GitHub App or Slack app — only prod owns the single shared app. So fetch-config.sh no longer hard-requires the GitHub App quintet (ID/PRIVATE_KEY/INSTALLATION_ID/CLIENT_ID/ CLIENT_SECRET) + Slack/webhook secrets for dev; they move into the prod-only block alongside the existing GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET/SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET. Dev now boots with just DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET + TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY + the active provider key(s) + the langsmith sandbox keys. Dev is a deployment-validation env (boot/health/boundary) with no GitHub/Slack/webhook integration; prod parity is unchanged (prod still requires everything). * feat: stand up dev properly — S3 assets bucket + artifact CD + on-box uv sync (T7+T19) Make the dev/prod box deployable end-to-end: a real artifact pipeline and a re-runnable on-box deploy, so OpenSweDevStack can come up genuinely healthy. Infra (T7): - assets-bucket.ts: open-swe-<env>-assets S3 bucket — BLOCK_ALL public access, SSE-S3, enforceSSL (deny non-TLS), versioned, lifecycle (expire noncurrent + abort MPU), RETAIN. Wired into OpenSweStack + CfnOutput. - app-service.ts: open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM document that runs the baked /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh (tag-scoped roll-the-box). machineImage is the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (folds in the held #16). IAM (app deploy role — cross-review gated): - github-deploy-roles.ts: app role gains s3:PutObject/DeleteObject scoped to open-swe-<env>-assets/releases/* (CI uploads releases). Drops the generic AWS-RunShellScript grant now that the dedicated open-swe-<env>-deploy document is the only SendCommand path — closes the T4 BLOCK#3 arbitrary-shell timebox. Boot/deploy (T19): - deploy/ami/deploy.sh: single, re-runnable app-deploy procedure — pull app.tar.gz/spa.tar.gz from S3, `uv sync --frozen --no-dev` (native ARM64 venv at the real path, py3.12 pre-baked), restart open-swe.service + reload nginx. - user-data.sh: nginx starts BEFORE the app deploy (static /healthz -> the ALB target is healthy even before the first release); deploy.sh is base64-rendered by CDK into user-data (a normal reviewable repo file, not a heredoc) and the first-boot deploy is NON-FATAL (no release yet -> wait for the first SSM deploy). CI (T7+T19): - build-artifacts.yml (+ .github/scripts): build the SPA with bun (vite -> ui/.output/public -> spa.tar.gz), package the Python source via git archive (app.tar.gz, no ui/ no .venv), upload to releases/<sha>/ + releases/latest/ via the githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env> OIDC role, then fire open-swe-<env>-deploy. push dev -> dev (auto); push main -> prod (env "prod" approval gate). Local: ruff/shellcheck clean, tsc clean, jest 16/16, cdk synth offline OK, deploy.sh base64 round-trips exact. * harden(sec-review): tar extraction, deploy gating, least-privilege, secret guard Address the /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier pass. Only one confirmed-high surfaced and it is PRE-EXISTING and out-of-diff (OSWE-IAC-AUDIT-01, the account-wide CDK cfn-exec residual already documented in config.ts; recorded in .security-review/suppressions.json with justification + flagged for the per-env bootstrap-qualifier follow-up). The rest were verifier-downgraded to unverified; these are the cheap defense-in-depth fixes worth taking regardless: - deploy.sh: extract tarballs with --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions (root never honors an archive's uid/mode → no setuid/foreign-owned file can land); and treat "no release in S3 yet" as a benign exit 0, distinct from a real deploy failure (set -e stays loud once a release exists). - publish-and-deploy.sh: gate on the AGGREGATE SSM Command.Status (+ TargetCount), not CommandInvocations[0], so a partial failure across the brief 2-instance replacement window can't be reported as success. - instance-role.ts: scope the box's s3:GetObject to releases/* (mirrors the app role's write scope) instead of the whole bucket. - package-artifacts.sh: fail-closed secret-shaped-file guard on app.tar.gz (defense in depth over .gitignore; scoped to data extensions so *_credentials.py source is not a false positive — verified against the real tree). Deferred as documented follow-ups (verifier: unverified, supply-chain-gated to the CI OIDC writer; bucket is BLOCK_ALL + enforceSSL + versioned): SHA-pinned immutable releases/<sha>/ pulls + signed checksum (vs mutable latest/), single-tarball release to remove the torn-read window, and app-aware ALB health (vs static nginx /healthz). shellcheck/tsc/jest(16) clean; both stacks synth offline. * fix(infra): ASCII-only EC2 SecurityGroup descriptions + synth-time guard The instance-SG GroupDescription + ingress/egress rule descriptions carried an em-dash / arrow (—, →). `tsc` and `cdk synth` accept them, but the EC2 API rejects non-ASCII in GroupDescription ("Character sets beyond ASCII are not supported"), so OpenSweDevStack's first deploy failed at the SG and rolled back. (Pre-existing from #14; same class as the AMI-description ASCII bug.) - app-service.ts: replace —/→ with ASCII (- / ->) in the SG GroupDescription, the ingress/egress rule descriptions, and the Route53 comment. - test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts: synth-time guard asserting EC2 SecurityGroup GroupDescription + rule descriptions are pure ASCII, so this fails the build instead of a deploy next time. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): SG rule descriptions use ASCII-charset-safe text (no `>`) The first ASCII fix replaced the arrow with `->`, but EC2 SecurityGroup *rule* descriptions allow a stricter set than ASCII — `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*`, which EXCLUDES `<`/`>`. So OpenSweDevStack's second deploy still failed at the ingress rule. Use "to" instead of "->", and tighten the guard test from "ASCII only" to the exact EC2 allowed charset so it catches `>` (and `<`) too. jest 18/18; tsc clean. * fix(infra): minify embedded deploy.sh so user-data fits EC2's 25.6 KB limit The base64 deploy.sh embedded in user-data pushed the encoded boot script to 27184 bytes, over EC2's 25600-byte cap, so OpenSweDevStack's instance failed with "Encoded User data is limited to 25600 bytes". Strip full-line comments + blank lines from deploy.sh before base64-embedding it (repo file keeps comments; only the on-box copy is minified; the script is opaque base64 so user-data heredocs are unaffected) -> rendered user-data drops to 16424 bytes (9 KB margin). Add a synth-time guard test asserting EC2 user-data stays under 25600 bytes encoded. jest 19/19; minified deploy.sh passes bash -n + shellcheck.
2026-09-30 06:53:14 +00:00 · 2026-06-26 18:49:09 -04:00 · 2026-06-26 18:49:09 -04:00 · 404b3f6f75
commit 404b3f6f75
parent 70319cac0d
18 changed files with 718 additions and 165 deletions
--- a/.github/scripts/package-artifacts.sh
+++ b/.github/scripts/package-artifacts.sh
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Package the two release artifacts (run from the repo root by build-artifacts.yml):
+#
+#   spa.tar.gz = CONTENTS of the built SPA dir (ui/.output/public/*), so it extracts
+#                straight into the nginx web root with _shell.html at the root.
+#   app.tar.gz = the Python source the box runs `uv sync` against. `git archive`
+#                gives a clean tree (no node_modules, no .venv, no local cruft);
+#                ui/ is intentionally excluded (it ships as spa.tar.gz).
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SPA_DIR="ui/.output/public"
+[ -f "${SPA_DIR}/_shell.html" ] || {
+  echo "ERROR: SPA build output missing ${SPA_DIR}/_shell.html (did 'bun run build' run?)" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+echo "==> spa.tar.gz from ${SPA_DIR}"
+tar -C "${SPA_DIR}" -czf spa.tar.gz .
+
+echo "==> app.tar.gz from source (git archive HEAD)"
+git archive --format=tar.gz -o app.tar.gz HEAD \
+  agent deploy langgraph.json pyproject.toml uv.lock README.md
+
+# Sanity: the box's `uv sync --frozen` needs pyproject.toml + uv.lock at the root,
+# and the package itself (agent/). Fail loudly here rather than on the box.
+for required in pyproject.toml uv.lock agent/server.py langgraph.json; do
+  tar -tzf app.tar.gz | grep -qx "${required}" || {
+    echo "ERROR: app.tar.gz is missing ${required}" >&2
+    exit 1
+  }
+done
+
+# Fail-closed secret guard: the source is git-archived wholesale, so reject the
+# release if a secret-shaped FILE slipped into the tracked tree (defense in depth
+# on top of .gitignore — the artifact lands on the box + in S3). Scoped to data
+# extensions so credential-handling *source* (e.g. team_credentials.py) is not a
+# false positive.
+SECRET_RE='(^|/)(\.env(\..+)?|id_rsa|.*\.(pem|key|p12|pfx)|.*(secret|credential|password|token)s?\.(json|ya?ml|txt|env|ini|cfg))$'
+if tar -tzf app.tar.gz | grep -qiE "${SECRET_RE}"; then
+  echo "ERROR: app.tar.gz contains a secret-shaped file — refusing to publish:" >&2
+  tar -tzf app.tar.gz | grep -iE "${SECRET_RE}" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "==> artifacts:"
+ls -la spa.tar.gz app.tar.gz
--- a/.github/scripts/publish-and-deploy.sh
+++ b/.github/scripts/publish-and-deploy.sh
@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Publish the packaged artifacts to the env's S3 bucket and roll the box to them.
+# Run by build-artifacts.yml AFTER aws creds are configured (env: ENV, BUCKET,
+# DEPLOY_DOC). Each release is stored immutably under releases/<sha>/ and mirrored
+# to releases/latest/ (what the box's deploy.sh pulls).
+#
+# The deploy is fired by TAG (project=open-swe,env=<env>), which is exactly what
+# the app deploy role's tag-scoped ssm:SendCommand allows — so this needs no
+# ec2:DescribeInstances and no instance id up front.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+: "${ENV:?}" "${BUCKET:?}" "${DEPLOY_DOC:?}"
+SHA="${GITHUB_SHA:?}"
+[ -f app.tar.gz ] && [ -f spa.tar.gz ] || { echo "ERROR: artifacts not built" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+echo "==> upload release ${SHA} to s3://${BUCKET}/releases/${SHA}/"
+for f in app.tar.gz spa.tar.gz; do
+  aws s3 cp "${f}" "s3://${BUCKET}/releases/${SHA}/${f}"
+done
+
+echo "==> mirror to releases/latest/ (server-side copy)"
+for f in app.tar.gz spa.tar.gz; do
+  aws s3 cp "s3://${BUCKET}/releases/${SHA}/${f}" "s3://${BUCKET}/releases/latest/${f}"
+done
+
+echo "==> fire ${DEPLOY_DOC} via SSM (tag-targeted: project=open-swe, env=${ENV})"
+CMD_ID="$(aws ssm send-command \
+  --document-name "${DEPLOY_DOC}" \
+  --targets "Key=tag:project,Values=open-swe" "Key=tag:env,Values=${ENV}" \
+  --comment "release ${SHA}" \
+  --query 'Command.CommandId' --output text)"
+echo "command: ${CMD_ID}"
+
+echo "==> wait for the deploy to finish"
+STATUS="Pending"
+IID=""
+for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
+  sleep 10
+  # CommandInvocations is empty until SSM registers the target invocation.
+  IID="$(aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "${CMD_ID}" \
+    --query 'CommandInvocations[0].InstanceId' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo None)"
+  [ -z "${IID}" ] || [ "${IID}" = "None" ] && continue
+  STATUS="$(aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "${CMD_ID}" \
+    --query 'CommandInvocations[0].Status' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo Pending)"
+  case "${STATUS}" in
+    Success | Failed | Cancelled | TimedOut) break ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+if [ -z "${IID}" ] || [ "${IID}" = "None" ]; then
+  echo "ERROR: no box picked up the deploy command (is a running open-swe ${ENV} box registered with SSM?)" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "==> deploy.sh output from ${IID}:"
+echo "----- stdout -----"
+aws ssm get-command-invocation --command-id "${CMD_ID}" --instance-id "${IID}" \
+  --query 'StandardOutputContent' --output text || true
+echo "----- stderr -----"
+aws ssm get-command-invocation --command-id "${CMD_ID}" --instance-id "${IID}" \
+  --query 'StandardErrorContent' --output text || true
+
+# Gate on the AGGREGATE command status (Success only if EVERY targeted invocation
+# succeeded), not CommandInvocations[0] — during a userDataCausesReplacement window
+# two instances can briefly share the project/env tags, and a partial failure on
+# the other instance must not be reported as success.
+TARGETS="$(aws ssm list-commands --command-id "${CMD_ID}" \
+  --query 'Commands[0].TargetCount' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo 1)"
+[ "${TARGETS}" = "1" ] || echo "WARNING: deploy fanned out to ${TARGETS} instances (expected 1)"
+AGG="$(aws ssm list-commands --command-id "${CMD_ID}" \
+  --query 'Commands[0].Status' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo Failed)"
+
+echo "==> aggregate deploy status: ${AGG} (across ${TARGETS} target(s))"
+[ "${AGG}" = "Success" ] || { echo "ERROR: deploy did not succeed (${AGG})" >&2; exit 1; }
+echo "==> ${ENV} rolled to release ${SHA}"
--- a/.github/workflows/build-artifacts.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/build-artifacts.yml
@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+name: Build & publish app artifacts
+
+# T7 + T19 — build the release (SPA + Python source) and publish it to the per-env
+# S3 artifact bucket, then roll the box to it.
+#
+#   push to dev  → publish to open-swe-dev-assets  → deploy dev box   (AUTO)
+#   push to main → publish to open-swe-prod-assets → deploy prod box  (manual approval: env "prod")
+#
+# Two artifacts (the box's deploy.sh pulls both from releases/latest/):
+#   spa.tar.gz = the built dashboard SPA (vite -> ui/.output/public). Built HERE
+#                (not on the box) — the build is memory-heavy and the box is small.
+#   app.tar.gz = the Python source tree (NO ui/, NO .venv). The box runs
+#                `uv sync` to build a native-ARM64 venv at the real runtime path.
+#
+# Each release is uploaded under releases/<sha>/ (immutable, auditable) AND mirrored
+# to releases/latest/ (what the box pulls). Then the open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM
+# document is fired (tag-scoped to project=open-swe,env=<env>) to roll the box.
+#
+# OIDC subject alignment (matches the per-env app-role trust in infra/lib/config.ts):
+#   - publish-dev  declares NO `environment:` → sub = repo:…:ref:refs/heads/dev
+#   - publish-prod declares `environment: prod` → sub = repo:…:environment:prod
+#     (also triggers the prod Environment's required-reviewer approval gate).
+#
+# Prerequisites:
+#   - repo variables AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_APP_DEV / AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_APP_PROD = the
+#     githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env> role ARNs (open-swe-iam CfnOutputs).
+#   - the open-swe-<env> stack deployed (creates the bucket + the SSM deploy doc).
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [dev, main]
+    paths:
+      - "agent/**"
+      - "ui/**"
+      - "deploy/**"
+      - "langgraph.json"
+      - "pyproject.toml"
+      - "uv.lock"
+      - ".github/workflows/build-artifacts.yml"
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+concurrency:
+  # one publish+deploy per branch at a time; never cancel an in-flight release.
+  group: build-artifacts-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: false
+
+jobs:
+  publish-dev:
+    name: Publish + deploy (dev)
+    if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    permissions:
+      id-token: write
+      contents: read
+    env:
+      ENV: dev
+      BUCKET: open-swe-dev-assets
+      DEPLOY_DOC: open-swe-dev-deploy
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@v2
+        with:
+          bun-version: latest
+      - name: Build SPA (vite -> ui/.output/public)
+        working-directory: ui
+        run: |
+          bun install --frozen-lockfile
+          bun run build
+      - name: Package artifacts
+        run: bash .github/scripts/package-artifacts.sh
+      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
+        with:
+          role-to-assume: ${{ vars.AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_APP_DEV }}
+          aws-region: us-east-1
+      - name: Publish to S3 + roll the box
+        run: bash .github/scripts/publish-and-deploy.sh
+
+  publish-prod:
+    name: Publish + deploy (prod)
+    if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    # Manual-approval gate: the "prod" Environment requires a reviewer (Adam). Also
+    # makes the OIDC sub …:environment:prod (matches the prod app-role trust).
+    environment: prod
+    permissions:
+      id-token: write
+      contents: read
+    env:
+      ENV: prod
+      BUCKET: open-swe-prod-assets
+      DEPLOY_DOC: open-swe-prod-deploy
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@v2
+        with:
+          bun-version: latest
+      - name: Build SPA (vite -> ui/.output/public)
+        working-directory: ui
+        run: |
+          bun install --frozen-lockfile
+          bun run build
+      - name: Package artifacts
+        run: bash .github/scripts/package-artifacts.sh
+      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
+        with:
+          role-to-assume: ${{ vars.AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_APP_PROD }}
+          aws-region: us-east-1
+      - name: Publish to S3 + roll the box
+        run: bash .github/scripts/publish-and-deploy.sh
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -68,4 +68,7 @@ __pycache__/
 *.egg-info/
 .eggs/

+# Local working docs (gitignored — survives upstream merges, never pushed)
+TODO.md
+
 # 
--- a/.security-review/suppressions.json
+++ b/.security-review/suppressions.json
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "suppressions": [
+    {
+      "id": "OSWE-IAC-AUDIT-01",
+      "title": "Dev-branch infra OIDC role can assume the account-wide CDK cfn-exec admin role (cdk-hnb659fds-*), a path to mutating prod",
+      "file": "infra/lib/constructs/github-deploy-roles.ts",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "confirmed",
+      "suppression_justification": "PRE-EXISTING and NOT introduced or worsened by the T7+T19 change (the assets bucket / app-role PutObject / SSM deploy doc). This is the known single-account-wide CDK cfn-exec residual already documented in infra/lib/config.ts:31-34 and the github-deploy-roles.ts construct comment, accepted at the T4 GPT-4.1 IAM cross-review and the v5 plan-review. WHO can assume each env's infra role is exact-subject scoped (StringEquals on the dev ref / prod environment); the residual is the shared account-wide cfn-exec-role that every env's infra role can reach. The tracked fix is per-env CDK bootstrap qualifiers so each env's infra role assumes its own env-scoped cfn-exec-role. Suppressed for THIS change's gate because it is out-of-diff and unchanged; surfaced to Adam for scheduling the per-env-bootstrap remediation.",
+      "owner": "adam@seahavenind.com",
+      "added": "2026-06-26"
+    }
+  ]
+}
--- a/deploy/ami/deploy.sh
+++ b/deploy/ami/deploy.sh
@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Open SWE app deploy — RE-RUNNABLE (first boot + every subsequent release).
+#
+# Pulls the current release from S3 (open-swe-<env>-assets), builds the venv
+# natively on the box, and restarts the service. This is the SINGLE source of the
+# app-deploy procedure; it runs in two places:
+#
+#   1. first boot     — user-data.sh decodes this script to /opt/open-swe/bin and
+#                       calls it ONCE (non-fatal: if no release is published yet,
+#                       nginx is already up and the box waits for the first deploy).
+#   2. every release  — the `open-swe-<env>-deploy` SSM document (CI fires it after
+#                       uploading app.tar.gz / spa.tar.gz) runs this same script.
+#
+# It deploys CODE + STATIC ASSETS only. Secrets/config are NOT fetched here: the
+# systemd unit's ExecStartPre=fetch-config.sh materializes the tmpfs .env on every
+# (re)start, fail-fast — so `systemctl restart` below is what reloads config too.
+#
+# Contract:
+#   app.tar.gz = the Python source tree (pyproject.toml + uv.lock + agent/ +
+#                deploy/ + langgraph.json + README.md, NO ui/, NO .venv). The venv
+#                is built HERE with `uv sync` so it is native ARM64 and lives at
+#                the real runtime path (no cross-built / non-relocatable venv).
+#   spa.tar.gz = the built dashboard SPA (vite output: _shell.html + assets),
+#                extracted to the nginx web root.
+set -euo pipefail
+exec > >(tee -a /var/log/open-swe/deploy.log) 2>&1
+echo "==> open-swe deploy start $(date -u +%FT%TZ)"
+
+# Non-secret pointers written by user-data.sh (env, region, bucket, artifact prefix).
+# shellcheck disable=SC1091
+. /etc/open-swe/boot.env
+export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="${AWS_REGION:?boot.env missing AWS_REGION}"
+: "${ASSETS_BUCKET:?boot.env missing ASSETS_BUCKET}"
+: "${ARTIFACT_PREFIX:?boot.env missing ARTIFACT_PREFIX}"
+
+# Fixed layout — must match provision.sh + user-data.sh + the templates.
+SERVICE_USER="openswe"
+APP_DIR="/opt/open-swe/app"
+WWW_ROOT="/var/www/open-swe"
+ENV_FILE="/run/open-swe/.env"
+UV_BIN="/usr/local/bin/uv"
+UV_PYTHON_INSTALL_DIR="/opt/uv/python"   # where provision.sh pre-installed py3.12
+SERVICE_HOME="/opt/open-swe"
+
+# Benign-vs-failure distinction: on a brand-new env no release is published yet.
+# Treat "app.tar.gz absent in S3" as a benign no-op (exit 0) so first boot is not a
+# scary failure; ONCE a release exists, any later step failing is loud (set -e).
+if ! aws s3 ls "s3://${ASSETS_BUCKET}/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}/app.tar.gz" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "==> no release published at s3://${ASSETS_BUCKET}/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}/ yet — nothing to deploy"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+echo "==> pull release from s3://${ASSETS_BUCKET}/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}/"
+tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT
+aws s3 cp "s3://${ASSETS_BUCKET}/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}/app.tar.gz" "${tmp}/app.tar.gz"
+aws s3 cp "s3://${ASSETS_BUCKET}/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}/spa.tar.gz" "${tmp}/spa.tar.gz"
+
+# Replace app source + SPA atomically-ish: clear the dirs (drops files removed in
+# this release) then extract. The venv is rebuilt below, so wiping .venv too is
+# fine — uv's cache (in the service home) makes the rebuild fast.
+#
+# Hardening: deploy.sh runs as root, so extract with --no-same-owner
+# --no-same-permissions — files take root:root + umask perms (NOT the archive's
+# uid/mode), so a tarball cannot land a setuid/setgid binary or a foreign-owned
+# file; the chown -R below then hands the tree to the service user. (GNU tar also
+# refuses `..`-escaping members by default.) Defense-in-depth: the only writer of
+# this bucket is the CI OIDC app role, but the box never trusts the archive's
+# ownership/mode regardless.
+echo "==> install app source -> ${APP_DIR}"
+install -d -o "$SERVICE_USER" -g "$SERVICE_USER" -m 0755 "$APP_DIR" "$WWW_ROOT"
+find "$APP_DIR" -mindepth 1 -delete
+find "$WWW_ROOT" -mindepth 1 -delete
+tar --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions -xzf "${tmp}/app.tar.gz" -C "$APP_DIR"
+tar --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions -xzf "${tmp}/spa.tar.gz" -C "$WWW_ROOT"
+# langgraph reads ./.env from WorkingDirectory; point it at the tmpfs file the
+# systemd ExecStartPre materializes.
+ln -sfn "$ENV_FILE" "${APP_DIR}/.env"
+chown -R "$SERVICE_USER":"$SERVICE_USER" "$APP_DIR" "$WWW_ROOT"
+
+echo "==> build venv natively (uv sync --frozen --no-dev)"
+# Run as the service user so the venv + uv cache are owned by it. Pin the
+# pre-baked interpreter dir so uv never reaches out to download Python at deploy.
+cd "$APP_DIR"
+sudo -u "$SERVICE_USER" env \
+  HOME="$SERVICE_HOME" \
+  UV_PYTHON_INSTALL_DIR="$UV_PYTHON_INSTALL_DIR" \
+  UV_CACHE_DIR="${SERVICE_HOME}/.cache/uv" \
+  "$UV_BIN" sync --frozen --no-dev
+
+echo "==> restart open-swe.service + reload nginx"
+# ExecStartPre=fetch-config.sh fails-fast if secrets/config are missing, so a
+# restart here surfaces a bad config as a failed unit (non-zero exit below).
+systemctl restart open-swe.service
+nginx -t && systemctl reload nginx
+
+if systemctl is-active --quiet open-swe.service; then
+  echo "==> open-swe deploy OK $(date -u +%FT%TZ)"
+else
+  echo "!! open-swe.service is not active after deploy (check fetch-config/secrets)"
+  exit 1
+fi
--- a/deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl
+++ b/deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl
@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ source "amazon-ebs" "open-swe" {
  ssh_username  = "ubuntu"

  ami_name        = "${var.ami_name_prefix}-${local.timestamp}"
-  ami_description = "Open SWE base — Ubuntu 24.04 arm64 + uv/py3.12 + nginx + CW agent (templates only, no secrets)"
+  # ASCII only — AWS rejects non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute.
+  ami_description = "Open SWE base - Ubuntu 24.04 arm64 + uv/py3.12 + nginx + CW agent (templates only, no secrets)"

  source_ami_filter {
    filters = {
@ -113,10 +114,17 @@ build {
  name    = "open-swe-base"
  sources = ["source.amazon-ebs.open-swe"]

-  # Stage the boot-time templates and helper scripts into the image.
+  # Stage the boot-time templates into the image. The destination dir must exist
+  # BEFORE a trailing-slash (contents-only) file upload — packer's file provisioner
+  # does not create it, and uploading the directory itself trips scp ("Is a
+  # directory"). So mkdir first, then upload the contents into it.
+  provisioner "shell" {
+    inline = ["mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates"]
+  }
+
  provisioner "file" {
    source      = "${path.root}/templates/"
-    destination = "/tmp/open-swe-templates/"
+    destination = "/tmp/open-swe-templates"
  }

  provisioner "shell" {
@ -127,7 +135,9 @@ build {
      "CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL=${var.cloudwatch_agent_deb_url}",
      "AWSCLI_ZIP_URL=${var.awscli_zip_url}",
    ]
-    execute_command = "chmod +x {{ .Path }}; sudo -E bash '{{ .Path }}'"
+    # {{ .Vars }} MUST be included or the environment_vars above never reach the
+    # script (provision.sh runs under `set -u` and fails on the first reference).
+    execute_command = "chmod +x {{ .Path }}; {{ .Vars }} sudo -E bash '{{ .Path }}'"
    script          = "${path.root}/scripts/provision.sh"
  }
 }
--- a/deploy/ami/user-data.sh
+++ b/deploy/ami/user-data.sh
@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ cat >/etc/open-swe/boot.env <<EOF
 OPENSWE_ENV=${OPENSWE_ENV}
 AWS_REGION=${AWS_REGION}
 ASSETS_BUCKET=${ASSETS_BUCKET}
+ARTIFACT_PREFIX=${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}
 ENV_FILE=${ENV_FILE}
 SECRETS_PREFIX=open-swe-${OPENSWE_ENV}
 SSM_PREFIX=/open-swe-${OPENSWE_ENV}
@ -65,21 +66,18 @@ mountpoint -q /run/open-swe || mount /run/open-swe || mount -t tmpfs \
  -o rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,mode=0700,uid=${SERVICE_USER},gid=${SERVICE_USER},size=8m \
  tmpfs /run/open-swe

-# --- pull the app artifact from S3 (instance role; no git auth on box) -------
-echo "==> fetch app artifact from s3://${ASSETS_BUCKET}/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}/"
-tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
-aws s3 cp "s3://${ASSETS_BUCKET}/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}/app.tar.gz" "${tmp}/app.tar.gz"
-aws s3 cp "s3://${ASSETS_BUCKET}/${ARTIFACT_PREFIX}/spa.tar.gz" "${tmp}/spa.tar.gz"
-
-install -d -o "$SERVICE_USER" -g "$SERVICE_USER" -m 0755 "$APP_DIR" "$WWW_ROOT"
-tar -xzf "${tmp}/app.tar.gz" -C "$APP_DIR"
-tar -xzf "${tmp}/spa.tar.gz" -C "$WWW_ROOT"
-chown -R "$SERVICE_USER":"$SERVICE_USER" "$APP_DIR" "$WWW_ROOT"
-rm -rf "$tmp"
-
-# The app reads ./.env from WorkingDirectory (langgraph.json "env": ".env").
-# Point it at the tmpfs file fetch-config.sh materializes.
-ln -sfn "$ENV_FILE" "${APP_DIR}/.env"
+# --- install the deploy script (single source of the app-deploy procedure) ---
+# deploy.sh (deploy/ami/deploy.sh) pulls the release from S3, builds the venv with
+# `uv sync`, and restarts the service. CDK base64-renders the file into the
+# @@DEPLOY_SH_B64@@ token below so it is a normal reviewable repo file, not an
+# inline heredoc. The `open-swe-<env>-deploy` SSM document runs this same script
+# for every subsequent release.
+echo "==> install /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh"
+install -d -o root -g root -m 0755 /opt/open-swe/bin
+base64 -d >/opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh <<'DEPLOY_SH_B64'
+@@DEPLOY_SH_B64@@
+DEPLOY_SH_B64
+chmod 0755 /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh

 # --- render + install the systemd unit ---------------------------------------
 echo "==> install systemd unit"
@ -115,14 +113,29 @@ sed -e "s|@@OPENSWE_ENV@@|${OPENSWE_ENV}|g" \
  -a fetch-config -m ec2 -s \
  -c file:/opt/aws/amazon-cloudwatch-agent/etc/open-swe-cw.json

-# --- start services ----------------------------------------------------------
+# --- start nginx FIRST (the security boundary + health surface) --------------
 # NOTE: intentionally NO swapfile here. The 8 GB-swapfile OOM hack existed only
 # for the on-box Nitro SPA build, which now runs in GitHub Actions -> S3.
-echo "==> start nginx + open-swe.service"
+# nginx is brought up BEFORE the app is deployed so the ALB target-group health
+# check (static `/healthz` -> 200) passes and the box is a healthy target even on
+# the very first boot, before any release is published. open-swe.service is
+# enabled (boot persistence) but STARTED by deploy.sh once the app is on disk.
+echo "==> start nginx"
 systemctl enable --now nginx
 systemctl reload nginx
-# open-swe.service ExecStartPre=fetch-config.sh fails-fast if config is missing,
-# so a bad secrets/SSM setup surfaces as a failed unit (not a half-up box).
-systemctl enable --now open-swe.service
+systemctl enable open-swe.service
+
+# --- deploy the app (NON-FATAL on first boot) --------------------------------
+# deploy.sh pulls the release, builds the venv, and starts open-swe.service. On a
+# brand-new env no release exists yet, so this is allowed to fail WITHOUT aborting
+# user-data: nginx is already up (healthy target), and the first `build-artifacts`
+# run + `open-swe-<env>-deploy` SSM command will bring the app up. A failure here
+# is logged, not fatal.
+echo "==> initial app deploy (non-fatal if no release is published yet)"
+if /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh; then
+  echo "==> initial app deploy succeeded"
+else
+  echo "==> no release yet (or deploy failed): open-swe.service deferred to the next SSM deploy"
+fi

 echo "==> open-swe user-data done $(date -u +%FT%TZ)"
--- a/deploy/seahaven/fetch-config.sh
+++ b/deploy/seahaven/fetch-config.sh
@ -190,12 +190,12 @@ VARS[DEFAULT_REPO_OWNER]="$SH_REPO_OWNER"
 required=(
  DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET            # RuntimeError on startup if missing (oauth.py)
  TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY           # Fernet key(s); decrypts per-user GitHub tokens
-  GITHUB_APP_ID                  # GitHub App trio (installation-token minting) ...
-  GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY         # ... multiline PEM ...
-  GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID     # ... used by utils/github_app.py
-  GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID           # dashboard OAuth login (prod parity)
-  GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET       # dashboard OAuth login (prod parity)
 )
+# NOTE: the GitHub App is NOT created/duplicated for dev — only prod owns the
+# (single, shared) GitHub App + Slack app. So the GitHub App quintet + Slack +
+# webhook-signing secrets are required for PROD only (see the prod block below).
+# Dev boots without them: it has no GitHub-App/Slack/webhook integration — it is a
+# deployment-validation env (boot/health/boundary), not a live-triggered agent.

 # Active model-provider key(s): model selection is store-driven (team_settings),
 # so fetch-config cannot infer it from .env. Default to the seeded cross-family
@ -216,10 +216,19 @@ case "$sandbox_type" in
  *) log "WARNING: unknown SANDBOX_TYPE='${sandbox_type}' — not enforcing a sandbox key" ;;
 esac

-# Prod parity: webhook-signing secrets default empty in code but are required in
-# prod. Linear's is required only when the Linear integration is wired.
+# Prod-only: the GitHub App (installation-token minting + dashboard OAuth) and the
+# webhook-signing secrets. Dev has no GitHub/Slack app, so none of these are
+# required there; prod owns the single shared app and must have all of them.
 if [ "$ENV" = "prod" ]; then
-  required+=(GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET)
+  required+=(
+    GITHUB_APP_ID                 # GitHub App trio (installation-token minting) ...
+    GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY        # ... multiline PEM ...
+    GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID    # ... used by utils/github_app.py
+    GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID          # dashboard OAuth login
+    GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET      # dashboard OAuth login
+    GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET         # webhook signature verification
+    SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET          # Slack webhook signature verification
+  )
  if [ -n "${VARS[LINEAR_API_KEY]:-}" ] && [ "${OPENSWE_REQUIRE_LINEAR:-1}" = "1" ]; then
    required+=(LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET)
  fi
--- a/infra/README.md
+++ b/infra/README.md
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ infra/
 │       ├── instance-role.ts         # open-swe-<env>-instance-role (least-privilege)
 │       ├── config-store.ts          # Secrets Manager + SSM Parameter Store shells (T11)
 │       ├── app-service.ts           # EC2 box + imported-ALB ingress + Route53 + logs (T12)
-│       └── ami-cache.ts             # cached ARM64 AL2023 helper + EBS/AMI discipline docs
+│       └── ami-cache.ts             # baked open-swe AMI pin (by id) + EBS/replacement docs
 ├── test/
 │   └── kebab-naming-aspect.test.ts  # jest: Aspect passes conforming names, flags bad ones
 ├── cdk.json
-├── cdk.context.json                 # COMMITTED — pins the AMI (see AMI cache discipline)
+├── cdk.context.json                 # COMMITTED — {} (AMI is a static id pin; no lookups)
 ├── package.json                     # aws-cdk-lib pinned EXACT (2.260.0)
 ├── tsconfig.json
 ├── jest.config.js
@ -197,17 +197,21 @@ hooks hostname is scoped to `/webhooks/*` only (OSWE-T12-02 hygiene). An
 X-Forwarded-For spoof candidate was **killed** — no code trusts the leftmost XFF.
 No confirmed critical/high; no block.

-## AMI cache discipline (EBS-fix plumbing — consumed by T12 `AppService`)
+## Baked AMI + EBS-replacement discipline

-`cachedArm64AmazonLinux2023()` (in `lib/constructs/ami-cache.ts`) returns an
-ARM64 Amazon Linux 2023 image with `cachedInContext: true`, so the resolved AMI
-id is pinned in the committed `cdk.context.json`. Without the pin, every deploy
-could pick up a newer AL2023 release → AMI change → **EC2 instance replacement**
-(the file-share data-loss root cause — memory `feedback_inline_ebs_volumes`).
+`bakedOpenSweArm64()` (in `lib/constructs/ami-cache.ts`) pins the custom
+**open-swe-base-arm64** image by EXACT id (`BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID`) via
+`MachineImage.genericLinux({ "us-east-1": "<ami-id>" })` — no SSM lookup, so synth
+and deploy are fully offline/deterministic. The image is built by
+`deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl` (ARM64 Ubuntu 24.04 + uv/py3.12 + nginx + CW
+agent + boot templates, **no secrets**); the box's `user-data.sh` assumes that
+baked layout (`/opt/open-swe`, `openswe` user, nginx, CW agent).

-Design intent (now consumed by `AppService`):
+Pinning by exact id (vs a `most_recent` name filter) is what prevents a routine
+deploy from silently swapping the AMI → **EC2 instance replacement** (the
+file-share data-loss root cause — memory `feedback_inline_ebs_volumes`).

- `userDataCausesReplacement: true` is the **deliberate** choice — user-data is
+- `userDataCausesReplacement: true` is **deliberate** — user-data is
  provisioning-only and carries no durable state.
 - **No durable state on the box → no RETAIN volume.** The in-memory langgraph
  store is rebuilt on every boot from S3 + Secrets Manager / SSM, so there is
@ -217,18 +221,16 @@ Design intent (now consumed by `AppService`):
  deploy snapshot the root volume and wait `state=completed`, and re-verify "no
  local-only durable state" first.

-Refresh the AMI pin deliberately:
+Refresh the AMI deliberately:

 ```bash
-cdk context --reset 'ssm:account=328440206208:parameterName=/aws/service/ami-amazon-linux-latest/al2023-ami-kernel-default-arm64:region=us-east-1'
-cdk synth   # review the diff — it WILL show "requires replacement"
+cd deploy/ami && packer build open-swe-base.pkr.hcl   # prints the new ami-… id
+# update BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID in infra/lib/constructs/ami-cache.ts
+cd infra && npx cdk diff OpenSweDevStack               # WILL show "requires replacement"
 ```

-> The committed `cdk.context.json` ships a dummy-but-valid-shaped AMI id
-> (`ami-00000000000000000`) so `cdk synth` resolves the cache locally without any
-> live AWS call. **Before the first real deploy**, repoint `AppService` to the
-> baked `open-swe-base-arm64` AMI and pin its real id — the placeholder is
-> intentionally un-bootable on stock AL2023.
+> `cdk.context.json` is `{}` — nothing is resolved via context anymore (the AMI is
+> a static id pin), so synth makes no live AWS call.

 ## Commands

--- a/infra/cdk.context.json
+++ b/infra/cdk.context.json
@ -1,3 +1 @@
-{
-  "ssm:account=328440206208:parameterName=/aws/service/ami-amazon-linux-latest/al2023-ami-kernel-6.1-arm64:region=us-east-1": "ami-00000000000000000"
-}
+{}
--- a/infra/lib/constructs/ami-cache.ts
+++ b/infra/lib/constructs/ami-cache.ts
@ -1,62 +1,35 @@
 import * as ec2 from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-ec2";
+import { REGION } from "../config";

 /**
- * cdk.context.json key for the cached AL2023 ARM64 AMI. `latestAmazonLinux2023`
- * + ARM_64 in the pinned aws-cdk-lib resolves the public SSM parameter below
- * (the default-kernel alias for this CDK version is the `kernel-6.1` line); with
- * `cachedInContext: true` CDK stores the resolved id under this exact key.
- * Exported so the env stack can check "is the AMI already pinned?" and skip the
- * resolve at synth when it is not — guaranteeing T3 synth makes no live AWS call.
+ * The baked open-swe base AMI (ARM64 Ubuntu 24.04 + uv/py3.12 + nginx + CW agent
+ * + boot templates — NO secrets), produced by `deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl`.
+ * Pinned by EXACT id (not a name filter) so synth/deploy is fully offline and
+ * deterministic.
 *
- * If an aws-cdk-lib bump changes the default kernel alias, `cdk synth` will write
- * a new key into cdk.context.json — update this constant + the committed pin to
- * match (the AMI cache naturally tracks the CDK version).
+ * Built 2026-06-26 from open-swe-base-arm64-20260626-203433.
+ *
+ * ── EBS / AMI replacement discipline (memory feedback_inline_ebs_volumes) ──
+ *
+ * Refresh DELIBERATELY: `cd deploy/ami && packer build open-swe-base.pkr.hcl`,
+ * then update this id. A new id → EC2 instance REPLACEMENT. Pinning by exact id
+ * (vs a `most_recent` name filter) is what prevents a routine deploy from silently
+ * swapping the AMI — the root cause of the file-share data-loss incidents
+ * (5/15, 5/27, 6/5).
+ *
+ * `userDataCausesReplacement: true` (AppService) is likewise DELIBERATE: user-data
+ * is provisioning-only and the box holds NO durable state (the langgraph store is
+ * in-memory, rebuilt every boot from S3 + Secrets Manager / SSM), so there is
+ * intentionally no standalone `ec2.Volume` + `removalPolicy.RETAIN`. The design
+ * goal is replacement-TOLERANCE, not avoidance.
+ *
+ * Operational guard before ANY replacing deploy (AMI / userData / instance-type):
+ * snapshot the root volume AND wait `state=completed`, re-verify "no local-only
+ * durable state", and review the `cdk diff` replacement at PR time.
 */
-export const AL2023_ARM64_SSM_CONTEXT_KEY =
-  "ssm:account=328440206208:parameterName=/aws/service/ami-amazon-linux-latest/al2023-ami-kernel-6.1-arm64:region=us-east-1";
+export const BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID = "ami-00080084502093021";

-/**
- * Cached ARM64 Amazon Linux 2023 machine image.
- *
- * ── EBS / AMI cache discipline (see memory feedback_inline_ebs_volumes) ──
- *
- * `cachedInContext: true` PINS the resolved AMI id into the committed
- * cdk.context.json. Without it, `latestAmazonLinux2023()` resolves the NEWEST
- * AL2023 release on every synth/deploy, so a routine deploy can swap the AMI →
- * EC2 instance REPLACEMENT whenever AWS ships a release. That was the root cause
- * of the file-share data-loss incidents (5/15, 5/27, 6/5). Refresh the pin
- * DELIBERATELY:
- *
- *     cdk context --reset '<AL2023_ARM64_SSM_CONTEXT_KEY>' && cdk synth
- *
- * then review the `cdk diff` (it WILL report "requires replacement") before
- * deploying.
- *
- * ── userDataCausesReplacement intent (consumed at T12) ──
- *
- * open-swe user-data is provisioning-only: install the langgraph runtime, pull
- * config from Secrets Manager / SSM, pull the build artifact from S3, start the
- * service. It holds NO durable state. T12 sets `userDataCausesReplacement: true`
- * DELIBERATELY so a config/bootstrap change rolls a fresh, known-good box.
- *
- * ── "No durable state on box → no RETAIN volume" assertion ──
- *
- * The langgraph store is in-memory and is reconstructed on every boot from S3
- * (artifact) + Secrets Manager / SSM (config). Nothing of record lives only on
- * the instance's disk. Therefore there is intentionally NO standalone
- * `ec2.Volume` + `removalPolicy.RETAIN` here: the design goal is replacement-
- * TOLERANCE, not replacement-avoidance.
- *
- * ── Operational guard still applies at T12 (feedback_inline_ebs_volumes) ──
- *
- * Before ANY replacing deploy (AMI / userData / instance-type change): snapshot
- * the root volume AND wait for `state=completed`, re-verify "no local-only
- * durable state" first, and ensure cdk-diff-on-PR surfaces the replacement at
- * review time.
- */
-export function cachedArm64AmazonLinux2023(): ec2.IMachineImage {
-  return ec2.MachineImage.latestAmazonLinux2023({
-    cpuType: ec2.AmazonLinuxCpuType.ARM_64,
-    cachedInContext: true,
-  });
+/** The baked open-swe base image, pinned by id (offline, deterministic). */
+export function bakedOpenSweArm64(): ec2.IMachineImage {
+  return ec2.MachineImage.genericLinux({ [REGION]: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID });
 }
--- a/infra/lib/constructs/app-service.ts
+++ b/infra/lib/constructs/app-service.ts
@ -7,15 +7,16 @@ import * as elbTargets from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-elasticloadbalancingv2-targets";
 import * as logs from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-logs";
 import * as route53 from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-route53";
 import * as iam from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-iam";
+import * as ssm from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-ssm";
 import { Construct } from "constructs";
 import { EnvName, prefix } from "../config";
-import { cachedArm64AmazonLinux2023 } from "./ami-cache";
+import { bakedOpenSweArm64 } from "./ami-cache";

 /**
 * Shared seahaven-vpc + internet-facing ALB facts (read-only recon 2026-06-26;
 * scratchpad/T12-infra-facts.md). A SINGLE VPC and a SINGLE shared ALB front
 * both the on-prem `seahaven-site` stack and open-swe. We IMPORT every one of
- * these and NEVER own them — open-swe only ADDS its own instance SG, a standalone
+ * these and NEVER own them - open-swe only ADDS its own instance SG, a standalone
 * ALB-egress rule, listener rules, a target group, and DNS records.
 *
 * ── Cross-stack coordination on the SHARED listener + ALB SG (T13 review) ──
@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ import { cachedArm64AmazonLinux2023 } from "./ami-cache";
 *
 * The ONE shared namespace that REQUIRES coordination is listener-rule PRIORITY
 * (globally unique per listener; a collision is a fail-SAFE deploy error, not
- * silent drift). Ownership map — keep these disjoint when editing either stack:
+ * silent drift). Ownership map - keep these disjoint when editing either stack:
 *   - seahaven-site (on-prem): priorities 4-7 + default.
 *   - open-swe:                priorities 2, 3 (webhooks) and 10, 11 (site).
 * open-swe's webhook rules are HOST-scoped to its own *.seahaven.com hosts, so
@ -102,10 +103,10 @@ export interface AppServiceProps {
 * The open-swe compute + ingress wiring for one env (T12):
 *  - one ARM64 EC2 box in private1 (1a), replacement-tolerant (no RETAIN volume),
 *  - a standalone instance SG reachable ONLY from the shared ALB SG on :80,
- *  - a target group → instance:80 (nginx is the sole ingress; :2024 stays loopback),
+ *  - a target group -> instance:80 (nginx is the sole ingress; :2024 stays loopback),
 *  - two listener rules on the imported :443 listener (webhooks below the on-prem
- *    path rule; site catch-all above it), both → the same TG,
- *  - Route53 alias records for both hostnames → the shared ALB,
+ *    path rule; site catch-all above it), both -> the same TG,
+ *  - Route53 alias records for both hostnames -> the shared ALB,
 *  - IaC-owned CloudWatch log groups at 30-day retention.
 *
 * Everything ALB/VPC/zone-side is IMPORTED. Synth is offline: the AMI is the
@ -115,6 +116,8 @@ export interface AppServiceProps {
 export class AppService extends Construct {
  public readonly instance: ec2.Instance;
  public readonly targetGroup: elbv2.ApplicationTargetGroup;
+  /** Name of the SSM document CI fires to roll the box to the latest release. */
+  public readonly deployDocumentName: string;

  constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props: AppServiceProps) {
    super(scope, id);
@ -123,7 +126,7 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
    const net = ENV_NET[env];
    const artifactPrefix = props.artifactPrefix ?? "releases/latest";

-    // Import the shared VPC with explicit attributes (no fromLookup → offline synth).
+    // Import the shared VPC with explicit attributes (no fromLookup -> offline synth).
    const vpc = ec2.Vpc.fromVpcAttributes(this, "Vpc", {
      vpcId: SHARED.vpcId,
      availabilityZones: [...SHARED.availabilityZones],
@ -134,13 +137,13 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
    const instanceSg = new ec2.SecurityGroup(this, "InstanceSg", {
      vpc,
      securityGroupName: `${p}-instance-sg`,
-      description: `${p} instance SG — ingress only from the shared ALB SG on :80; egress via NAT.`,
+      description: `${p} instance SG - ingress only from the shared ALB SG on :80; egress via NAT.`,
      allowAllOutbound: true,
    });
    instanceSg.addIngressRule(
      ec2.Peer.securityGroupId(SHARED.albSecurityGroupId),
      ec2.Port.tcp(80),
-      `${p}: shared ALB SG → nginx :80`,
+      `${p}: shared ALB SG to nginx :80`,
    );
    // Open the IMPORTED ALB SG to our instance via a STANDALONE egress rule, so we
    // never mutate the ALB SG's own (on-prem-owned) definition.
@ -150,12 +153,32 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
      fromPort: 80,
      toPort: 80,
      destinationSecurityGroupId: instanceSg.securityGroupId,
-      description: `${p}: ALB → instance nginx :80`,
+      description: `${p}: ALB to instance nginx :80`,
    });

+    // The app-deploy procedure (deploy/ami/deploy.sh) is a normal reviewable repo
+    // file; CDK base64-encodes it (single line - no `$`/regex-special chars in the
+    // base64 alphabet) and renders it into user-data's @@DEPLOY_SH_B64@@ token, so
+    // user-data writes it verbatim to /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh at first boot.
+    // The same file is run by the open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM document on every
+    // release - a single source of truth for "pull release, build venv, restart".
+    const deployShPath = path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "..", "deploy", "ami", "deploy.sh");
+    // Minify before embedding: strip full-line comments + blank lines (keep the
+    // shebang) so the base64 fits EC2's 25.6 KB user-data limit. The repo file
+    // keeps its comments; only the on-box copy is minified. deploy.sh becomes
+    // opaque base64 here, so this never affects user-data's heredoc parsing.
+    const deployShMin = fs
+      .readFileSync(deployShPath, "utf8")
+      .split("\n")
+      .filter((line, i) => i === 0 || (!/^\s*#/.test(line) && line.trim() !== ""))
+      .join("\n");
+    const deployShB64 = Buffer.from(deployShMin, "utf8").toString("base64");
+
    // Render the provisioning script's @@tokens@@ into the instance user-data.
    // userDataCausesReplacement makes a bootstrap change roll a fresh box (the box
-    // holds no durable state — see ami-cache.ts / user-data.sh).
+    // holds no durable state - see ami-cache.ts / user-data.sh). Editing deploy.sh
+    // therefore also rolls the box (its base64 is embedded here) - acceptable: the
+    // box is replacement-tolerant, and ongoing releases never touch user-data.
    const userDataPath = path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "..", "deploy", "ami", "user-data.sh");
    const userData = ec2.UserData.custom(
      fs
@ -163,7 +186,8 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
        .replace(/@@OPENSWE_ENV@@/g, env)
        .replace(/@@ASSETS_BUCKET@@/g, `${p}-assets`)
        .replace(/@@SERVER_NAME@@/g, net.dashboardHost)
-        .replace(/@@ARTIFACT_PREFIX@@/g, artifactPrefix),
+        .replace(/@@ARTIFACT_PREFIX@@/g, artifactPrefix)
+        .replace(/@@DEPLOY_SH_B64@@/g, deployShB64),
    );

    this.instance = new ec2.Instance(this, "Instance", {
@ -177,13 +201,11 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
        ],
      },
      instanceType: new ec2.InstanceType(net.instanceType),
-      // TODO(T12-deploy): repoint to the custom open-swe-base-arm64 AMI baked by
-      // packer (deploy/ami). The AL2023 ARM64 cache is a synth-time placeholder
-      // (pinned in cdk.context.json) so the box DEFINITION synths offline; the
-      // baked AMI id is pinned (cdk context) before the first real deploy.
-      // user-data.sh assumes the baked layout (/opt/open-swe, openswe user, nginx,
-      // CloudWatch agent) — it is NOT runnable on the stock AL2023 placeholder.
-      machineImage: cachedArm64AmazonLinux2023(),
+      // The baked open-swe base AMI (deploy/ami packer build) - ARM64 Ubuntu 24.04
+      // with the /opt/open-swe layout, openswe user, nginx, and CW agent that
+      // user-data.sh assumes. Pinned by exact id (see ami-cache.ts); refresh by
+      // rebuilding and updating BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID.
+      machineImage: bakedOpenSweArm64(),
      role: props.instanceRole,
      securityGroup: instanceSg,
      userData,
@ -193,7 +215,7 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
      blockDevices: [
        {
          deviceName: "/dev/xvda",
-          // gp3 encrypted root; deleteOnTermination (no durable on-box state →
+          // gp3 encrypted root; deleteOnTermination (no durable on-box state ->
          // intentionally NO standalone RETAIN volume; see ami-cache.ts).
          volume: ec2.BlockDeviceVolume.ebs(30, {
            volumeType: ec2.EbsDeviceVolumeType.GP3,
@ -204,7 +226,35 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
      ],
    });

-    // Target group → instance:80 (nginx). Health check hits nginx's /healthz
+    // SSM deploy document (open-swe-<env>-deploy): runs the baked
+    // /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh to pull the latest release + restart. CI fires it
+    // (tag-scoped to project=open-swe,env=<env>) after uploading a release, so the
+    // app deploy role needs SendCommand ONLY on this document - NOT on the generic
+    // AWS-RunShellScript (closes the T4 BLOCK#3 arbitrary-shell timebox).
+    this.deployDocumentName = `${p}-deploy`;
+    new ssm.CfnDocument(this, "DeployDoc", {
+      name: this.deployDocumentName,
+      documentType: "Command",
+      documentFormat: "YAML",
+      updateMethod: "NewVersion",
+      content: {
+        schemaVersion: "2.2",
+        description: `Roll the ${p} box to the latest published release (runs /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh).`,
+        mainSteps: [
+          {
+            action: "aws:runShellScript",
+            name: "deploy",
+            inputs: {
+              // Fixed command - no parameters, so nothing untrusted is interpolated
+              // into the shell. The script itself reads /etc/open-swe/boot.env.
+              runCommand: ["bash /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh"],
+            },
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+    });
+
+    // Target group -> instance:80 (nginx). Health check hits nginx's /healthz
    // (returns 200; the dashboard TG health path defined in open-swe.nginx.conf).
    this.targetGroup = new elbv2.ApplicationTargetGroup(this, "Tg", {
      vpc,
@ -233,7 +283,7 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
      securityGroup: albSg,
    });

-    // (1) Webhooks — accepted on EITHER host (integrations may target either), and
+    // (1) Webhooks - accepted on EITHER host (integrations may target either), and
    // MUST be below the on-prem path-only rule 5 (see ENV_NET note).
    new elbv2.ApplicationListenerRule(this, "WebhooksRule", {
      listener,
@ -244,7 +294,7 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
      ],
      action: elbv2.ListenerAction.forward([this.targetGroup]),
    });
-    // (2) Dashboard SPA + /dashboard/api/ (OAuth) — DASHBOARD host ONLY. The hooks
+    // (2) Dashboard SPA + /dashboard/api/ (OAuth) - DASHBOARD host ONLY. The hooks
    // host intentionally serves nothing but /webhooks/* (rule 1), so the OAuth /
    // dashboard surface stays single-origin (OSWE-T12-02). Non-webhook paths on the
    // hooks host fall through to the on-prem default.
@ -255,7 +305,7 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
      action: elbv2.ListenerAction.forward([this.targetGroup]),
    });

-    // Route53 ALIAS records → the shared ALB, for both hostnames.
+    // Route53 ALIAS records -> the shared ALB, for both hostnames.
    const zone = route53.HostedZone.fromHostedZoneAttributes(this, "PublicZone", {
      hostedZoneId: SHARED.publicZoneId,
      zoneName: SHARED.publicZoneName,
@ -274,14 +324,14 @@ export class AppService extends Construct {
        zone,
        recordName: host,
        target: route53.RecordTarget.fromAlias(albAlias),
-        comment: `${p} ${label.toLowerCase()} → shared seahaven-com ALB`,
+        comment: `${p} ${label.toLowerCase()} -> shared seahaven-com ALB`,
      });
    }

    // IaC-owned CloudWatch log groups at 30-day retention. Names mirror the
    // CloudWatch-agent config (deploy/ami/templates/amazon-cloudwatch-agent.json);
    // owning them here makes retention declarative rather than agent-set. Logs are
-    // not durable state → DESTROY on stack delete.
+    // not durable state -> DESTROY on stack delete.
    for (const suffix of ["app", "user-data", "nginx-access", "nginx-error"]) {
      new logs.LogGroup(this, `Log-${suffix}`, {
        logGroupName: `/open-swe/${env}/${suffix}`,
--- a/infra/lib/constructs/assets-bucket.ts
+++ b/infra/lib/constructs/assets-bucket.ts
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
+import * as s3 from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-s3";
+import { Construct } from "constructs";
+import { EnvName, prefix } from "../config";
+
+/**
+ * The per-env S3 artifact bucket (`open-swe-<env>-assets`) the box pulls its
+ * release from (T7). CI builds the SPA + packages the app source and uploads
+ * `app.tar.gz` / `spa.tar.gz` under `releases/<sha>/` + `releases/latest/`
+ * (`build-artifacts.yml`, via the `githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env>` OIDC role);
+ * the box pulls `releases/latest/*` at boot / on deploy via its instance role.
+ *
+ * The bucket holds ONLY build artifacts — no secrets (those live in Secrets
+ * Manager + SSM), no durable runtime state (the langgraph store is in-memory and
+ * rebuilt every boot). It is therefore safe to treat as reproducible-from-CI, but
+ * we RETAIN it on stack delete so an accidental `cdk destroy` cannot strand the
+ * box with no artifact to pull on its next replacement.
+ *
+ * Security posture (locked, reviewed in T7):
+ *  - `BLOCK_ALL` public access (this is an internal artifact store; ALB/nginx is
+ *    the only public surface — never S3 directly).
+ *  - SSE-S3 encryption at rest + `enforceSSL` (deny any non-TLS request).
+ *  - versioned, so a bad release can be rolled back to the previous object
+ *    version (the last-good-artifact story in T19); a lifecycle rule expires
+ *    NONcurrent versions after 30 days so history does not grow unbounded.
+ *  - aborts incomplete multipart uploads after 7 days (cost hygiene).
+ *
+ * The name is the load-bearing contract: `instance-role.ts` (read), the app
+ * deploy role in `github-deploy-roles.ts` (write), and `user-data.sh` /
+ * `deploy.sh` (`@@ASSETS_BUCKET@@`) all reference `open-swe-<env>-assets` by
+ * literal name, so it is set explicitly here rather than auto-generated.
+ */
+export class AssetsBucket extends Construct {
+  public readonly bucket: s3.Bucket;
+
+  constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, envName: EnvName) {
+    super(scope, id);
+    const p = prefix(envName);
+
+    this.bucket = new s3.Bucket(this, "Bucket", {
+      bucketName: `${p}-assets`,
+      blockPublicAccess: s3.BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL,
+      encryption: s3.BucketEncryption.S3_MANAGED,
+      enforceSSL: true,
+      versioned: true,
+      // Artifacts are reproducible from CI, but RETAIN protects against an
+      // accidental stack delete leaving the box with nothing to pull (see above).
+      removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN,
+      lifecycleRules: [
+        {
+          id: "expire-noncurrent-artifact-versions",
+          noncurrentVersionExpiration: cdk.Duration.days(30),
+          abortIncompleteMultipartUploadAfter: cdk.Duration.days(7),
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+  }
+}
--- a/infra/lib/constructs/github-deploy-roles.ts
+++ b/infra/lib/constructs/github-deploy-roles.ts
@ -104,19 +104,18 @@ export class GithubDeployRoles extends Construct {
    );

    // SendCommand also has to reference the command document. Scope to this env's
-    // open-swe deploy document.
-    // T4 BLOCK#3: GPT-4.1 flagged AWS-RunShellScript as an arbitrary-shell escalation
-    // path. TIMEBOXED (accepted until T19): the current SSM deploy runs deploy.sh via
-    // AWS-RunShellScript; it is already tag-scoped to env=<env> (statement above).
-    // TODO(T19): drop AWS-RunShellScript once `open-swe-<env>-deploy` is the only path.
+    // open-swe deploy document ONLY.
+    // T4 BLOCK#3 (CLOSED at T19): GPT-4.1 flagged AWS-RunShellScript as an
+    // arbitrary-shell escalation path. The dedicated `open-swe-${envName}-deploy`
+    // SSM document (app-service.ts) now runs the fixed, parameter-less command
+    // `bash /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh`, so AWS-RunShellScript is dropped here:
+    // this role can run ONLY that one document, and only on its own env's box
+    // (tag-scoped by the SsmSendCommandTagScoped statement above).
    this.appRole.addToPolicy(
      new iam.PolicyStatement({
        sid: "SsmSendCommandDocuments",
        actions: ["ssm:SendCommand"],
-        resources: [
-          `arn:aws:ssm:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT}:document/open-swe-${envName}-deploy`,
-          `arn:aws:ssm:${REGION}::document/AWS-RunShellScript`,
-        ],
+        resources: [`arn:aws:ssm:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT}:document/open-swe-${envName}-deploy`],
      }),
    );

@ -134,13 +133,17 @@ export class GithubDeployRoles extends Construct {
      }),
    );

-    // Read-only access to THIS env's artifact bucket only (CI uploads; the box
-    // pulls via its instance role — the app deploy role only reads to verify).
+    // Read+WRITE access to THIS env's artifact bucket only (T19): the
+    // build-artifacts workflow uploads app.tar.gz / spa.tar.gz under releases/*,
+    // then fires the deploy document so the box pulls them via its instance role.
+    // Object actions are scoped to releases/* (the only prefix CI writes), and to
+    // THIS env's bucket — a dev token can never write the prod bucket. No
+    // bucket-level mutation (no PutBucket*/Delete bucket) — that stays with CDK.
    this.appRole.addToPolicy(
      new iam.PolicyStatement({
-        sid: "ReadArtifactBucket",
-        actions: ["s3:GetObject"],
-        resources: [`arn:aws:s3:::open-swe-${envName}-assets/*`],
+        sid: "ReadWriteArtifactObjects",
+        actions: ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject"],
+        resources: [`arn:aws:s3:::open-swe-${envName}-assets/releases/*`],
      }),
    );
    this.appRole.addToPolicy(
--- a/infra/lib/constructs/instance-role.ts
+++ b/infra/lib/constructs/instance-role.ts
@ -33,11 +33,14 @@ export class InstanceRole extends Construct {
    );

    // Read the build artifact from the env's S3 asset bucket (deploy = pull).
+    // Scoped to releases/* — the only prefix CI writes and the box pulls — so a
+    // compromised box (or stolen IMDS creds) cannot read anything else that might
+    // ever land in the bucket (least-privilege; mirrors the app role's write scope).
    this.role.addToPolicy(
      new iam.PolicyStatement({
        sid: "ReadArtifactObjects",
        actions: ["s3:GetObject"],
-        resources: [`arn:aws:s3:::${p}-assets/*`],
+        resources: [`arn:aws:s3:::${p}-assets/releases/*`],
      }),
    );
    this.role.addToPolicy(
--- a/infra/lib/open-swe-stack.ts
+++ b/infra/lib/open-swe-stack.ts
@ -2,12 +2,10 @@ import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
 import { Construct } from "constructs";
 import { EnvName, prefix } from "./config";
 import { AppService } from "./constructs/app-service";
+import { AssetsBucket } from "./constructs/assets-bucket";
 import { ConfigStore } from "./constructs/config-store";
 import { InstanceRole } from "./constructs/instance-role";
-import {
-  AL2023_ARM64_SSM_CONTEXT_KEY,
-  cachedArm64AmazonLinux2023,
-} from "./constructs/ami-cache";
+import { BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID } from "./constructs/ami-cache";

 export interface OpenSweStackProps extends cdk.StackProps {
  /** open-swe environment — drives the `open-swe-<env>-*` resource naming. */
@ -27,6 +25,7 @@ export interface OpenSweStackProps extends cdk.StackProps {
 export class OpenSweStack extends cdk.Stack {
  public readonly instanceRole: InstanceRole;
  public readonly configStore: ConfigStore;
+  public readonly assetsBucket: AssetsBucket;
  public readonly appService: AppService;

  constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props: OpenSweStackProps) {
@ -48,18 +47,17 @@ export class OpenSweStack extends cdk.Stack {
    // The instance role already grants read on open-swe-<env>/* + /open-swe-<env>/*.
    this.configStore = new ConfigStore(this, "Config", { envName });

-    // AMI cache discipline (see lib/constructs/ami-cache.ts). T3 is synth-only:
-    // resolve + surface the pinned AMI id ONLY when it is already cached in
-    // cdk.context.json, so synth never makes a live SSM call. T12 consumes
-    // `cachedArm64AmazonLinux2023()` for the actual ec2.Instance.
-    if (this.node.tryGetContext(AL2023_ARM64_SSM_CONTEXT_KEY) !== undefined) {
-      const amiId = cachedArm64AmazonLinux2023().getImage(this).imageId;
-      new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "PinnedAmiId", {
-        value: amiId,
-        description:
-          "Cached AL2023 ARM64 AMI id (pinned in cdk.context.json; consumed by the T12 EC2 instance).",
-      });
-    }
+    // T7: the S3 artifact bucket (open-swe-<env>-assets) CI uploads releases to
+    // and the box pulls app.tar.gz / spa.tar.gz from. The instance role already
+    // grants read on it by name; the app deploy role grants write.
+    this.assetsBucket = new AssetsBucket(this, "Assets", envName);
+
+    // Surface the baked open-swe base AMI id the box runs on (pinned by id in
+    // ami-cache.ts; refreshed by a deliberate packer rebuild → replacement).
+    new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "BakedAmiId", {
+      value: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID,
+      description: "Baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI id consumed by the EC2 instance.",
+    });

    // T12: compute + ingress. Imports the shared seahaven-vpc + ALB and adds the
    // env's EC2 box, instance SG, target group, listener rules, DNS, log groups.
@ -80,5 +78,13 @@ export class OpenSweStack extends cdk.Stack {
      value: this.appService.targetGroup.targetGroupArn,
      description: `${p} ALB target group ARN (→ instance:80 nginx).`,
    });
+    new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "AssetsBucketName", {
+      value: this.assetsBucket.bucket.bucketName,
+      description: `${p} S3 artifact bucket (CI uploads releases; box pulls).`,
+    });
+    new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "DeployDocumentName", {
+      value: this.appService.deployDocumentName,
+      description: `${p} SSM document that rolls the box to the latest release.`,
+    });
  }
 }
--- a/infra/test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts
+++ b/infra/test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
+import { Template } from "aws-cdk-lib/assertions";
+import { OpenSweStack } from "../lib/open-swe-stack";
+
+const ENV = { account: "328440206208", region: "us-east-1" };
+
+/**
+ * Several AWS APIs reject non-ASCII in fields that `cdk synth` happily emits and
+ * `tsc` happily compiles — so a stray em-dash/arrow only blows up at DEPLOY time
+ * (e.g. EC2 SecurityGroup GroupDescription: "Character sets beyond ASCII are not
+ * supported"). This has bitten us twice (the AMI Description, then the instance-SG
+ * description). This test fails the build at synth time instead.
+ *
+ * Scope: the EC2 fields with a documented ASCII/restricted-charset constraint —
+ * SecurityGroup GroupDescription and ingress/egress rule descriptions. (CloudFormation
+ * Output descriptions + Route53 comments accept UTF-8, so they are not asserted.)
+ *
+ * EC2 rule descriptions are stricter than ASCII: the allowed set is
+ * `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*` — note it EXCLUDES `<` and `>`, which is why a
+ * naive em-dash -> "->" replacement still fails at deploy. We assert that exact set.
+ */
+// Characters NOT in the EC2 description allowed set.
+const DISALLOWED = /[^a-zA-Z0-9. _:/()#,@[\]+=&;{}!$*-]/;
+
+function synthDev(): Record<string, { Type: string; Properties?: Record<string, unknown> }> {
+  const app = new cdk.App();
+  const dev = new OpenSweStack(app, "OpenSweDevStack", {
+    stackName: "open-swe-dev",
+    env: ENV,
+    envName: "dev",
+  });
+  return Template.fromStack(dev).toJSON().Resources;
+}
+
+describe("ASCII-only EC2 description fields", () => {
+  const resources = synthDev();
+
+  it("SecurityGroup GroupDescription is ASCII", () => {
+    for (const [id, r] of Object.entries(resources)) {
+      if (r.Type !== "AWS::EC2::SecurityGroup") continue;
+      const desc = (r.Properties?.GroupDescription as string) ?? "";
+      expect(DISALLOWED.test(desc) ? `${id}: ${desc}` : "ascii").toBe("ascii");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("SecurityGroup ingress/egress rule descriptions are ASCII", () => {
+    for (const [id, r] of Object.entries(resources)) {
+      const props = r.Properties ?? {};
+      const groups: Array<{ Description?: string }> = [];
+      if (Array.isArray(props.SecurityGroupIngress)) groups.push(...props.SecurityGroupIngress);
+      if (Array.isArray(props.SecurityGroupEgress)) groups.push(...props.SecurityGroupEgress);
+      // Standalone AWS::EC2::SecurityGroupEgress / ...Ingress resources.
+      if (r.Type === "AWS::EC2::SecurityGroupEgress" || r.Type === "AWS::EC2::SecurityGroupIngress") {
+        groups.push(props as { Description?: string });
+      }
+      for (const rule of groups) {
+        const desc = rule.Description ?? "";
+        expect(DISALLOWED.test(desc) ? `${id}: ${desc}` : "ascii").toBe("ascii");
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  // EC2 caps base64-encoded user-data at 25600 bytes; CDK + tsc don't check it, so
+  // an oversized boot script (e.g. an embedded deploy.sh) only fails at deploy.
+  it("EC2 user-data fits the 25600-byte encoded limit", () => {
+    for (const [id, r] of Object.entries(resources)) {
+      if (r.Type !== "AWS::EC2::Instance") continue;
+      const ud = (r.Properties?.UserData as { "Fn::Base64"?: string }) ?? {};
+      const script = typeof ud["Fn::Base64"] === "string" ? ud["Fn::Base64"] : "";
+      const encoded = Buffer.from(script, "utf8").toString("base64").length;
+      expect(`${id}: ${encoded} bytes`).toBe(encoded < 25600 ? `${id}: ${encoded} bytes` : "OVER 25600");
+    }
+  });
+});