open-swe/infra/test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts
Adam Moussa 404b3f6f75
feat: stand up dev properly — assets bucket + artifact CD + baked AMI + on-box uv sync (T7+T19+T14) (#18)
* feat(infra): build + pin the baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (T12 AMI / item 3)

Packer-build the custom base image and repoint AppService off the AL2023
placeholder onto it.

deploy/ami/open-swe-base.pkr.hcl — fix two bugs that blocked the first real
`packer build` (the config had only ever been `packer validate`'d at T8):
  - the file provisioner failed uploading the templates dir ('scp: …: Is a
    directory') — a trailing-slash contents-upload needs the dest dir to exist;
    added a 'mkdir -p /tmp/open-swe-templates' shell provisioner + dropped the
    dest trailing slash.
  - the shell provisioner's custom execute_command omitted {{ .Vars }}, so the
    environment_vars never reached provision.sh (which runs under set -u and
    aborted on CLOUDWATCH_AGENT_DEB_URL). Added {{ .Vars }}.

infra:
  - ami-cache.ts: BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID = ami-0545363bb147229ff (built 2026-06-26
    from open-swe-base-arm64-20260626-201929) + bakedOpenSweArm64() pinning it by
    exact id via MachineImage.genericLinux (offline, deterministic). Dropped the
    now-dead AL2023 cachedInContext helper + context key; kept the EBS/replacement
    discipline docs.
  - app-service.ts: machineImage → bakedOpenSweArm64().
  - open-swe-stack.ts: output BakedAmiId (was the AL2023 PinnedAmiId guard).
  - cdk.context.json → {} (AMI is a static id pin; no context lookups remain).
  - README: Baked AMI + EBS-replacement-discipline section.

tsc + cdk synth(dev+prod) + jest(16) clean; template ImageId = the baked AMI.

NOTE: held — do NOT merge until the open-swe-dev secret values are populated
(put-config.sh). The infra CD is live, so merging this to dev auto-deploys
OpenSweDevStack; without secrets the box boots but fetch-config fail-fasts →
unhealthy ALB target on the shared prod ALB. Merge once secrets are set (T14).

* fix(ami): ASCII-only AMI description + re-pin to ami-00080084502093021

Third packer bug: ami_description had an em-dash (non-ASCII); AWS rejects
non-ASCII in the AMI Description attribute, so packer registered then
DEREGISTERED the first AMI (ami-0545…) on the ModifyImageAttribute error.
Replaced with an ASCII '-'. Rebuilt clean → ami-00080084502093021 (available).
Re-pinned BAKED_OPEN_SWE_AMI_ID.

* fix(deploy): GitHub App + Slack required for prod only, not dev

Per the migration decision: do NOT create/duplicate a separate dev GitHub App or
Slack app — only prod owns the single shared app. So fetch-config.sh no longer
hard-requires the GitHub App quintet (ID/PRIVATE_KEY/INSTALLATION_ID/CLIENT_ID/
CLIENT_SECRET) + Slack/webhook secrets for dev; they move into the prod-only
block alongside the existing GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET/SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET.

Dev now boots with just DASHBOARD_JWT_SECRET + TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY + the active
provider key(s) + the langsmith sandbox keys. Dev is a deployment-validation env
(boot/health/boundary) with no GitHub/Slack/webhook integration; prod parity is
unchanged (prod still requires everything).

* feat: stand up dev properly — S3 assets bucket + artifact CD + on-box uv sync (T7+T19)

Make the dev/prod box deployable end-to-end: a real artifact pipeline and a
re-runnable on-box deploy, so OpenSweDevStack can come up genuinely healthy.

Infra (T7):
- assets-bucket.ts: open-swe-<env>-assets S3 bucket — BLOCK_ALL public access,
  SSE-S3, enforceSSL (deny non-TLS), versioned, lifecycle (expire noncurrent +
  abort MPU), RETAIN. Wired into OpenSweStack + CfnOutput.
- app-service.ts: open-swe-<env>-deploy SSM document that runs the baked
  /opt/open-swe/bin/deploy.sh (tag-scoped roll-the-box). machineImage is the
  baked open-swe-base-arm64 AMI (folds in the held #16).

IAM (app deploy role — cross-review gated):
- github-deploy-roles.ts: app role gains s3:PutObject/DeleteObject scoped to
  open-swe-<env>-assets/releases/* (CI uploads releases). Drops the generic
  AWS-RunShellScript grant now that the dedicated open-swe-<env>-deploy document
  is the only SendCommand path — closes the T4 BLOCK#3 arbitrary-shell timebox.

Boot/deploy (T19):
- deploy/ami/deploy.sh: single, re-runnable app-deploy procedure — pull
  app.tar.gz/spa.tar.gz from S3, `uv sync --frozen --no-dev` (native ARM64 venv
  at the real path, py3.12 pre-baked), restart open-swe.service + reload nginx.
- user-data.sh: nginx starts BEFORE the app deploy (static /healthz -> the ALB
  target is healthy even before the first release); deploy.sh is base64-rendered
  by CDK into user-data (a normal reviewable repo file, not a heredoc) and the
  first-boot deploy is NON-FATAL (no release yet -> wait for the first SSM deploy).

CI (T7+T19):
- build-artifacts.yml (+ .github/scripts): build the SPA with bun (vite ->
  ui/.output/public -> spa.tar.gz), package the Python source via git archive
  (app.tar.gz, no ui/ no .venv), upload to releases/<sha>/ + releases/latest/ via
  the githubdeploy-open-swe-app-<env> OIDC role, then fire open-swe-<env>-deploy.
  push dev -> dev (auto); push main -> prod (env "prod" approval gate).

Local: ruff/shellcheck clean, tsc clean, jest 16/16, cdk synth offline OK,
deploy.sh base64 round-trips exact.

* harden(sec-review): tar extraction, deploy gating, least-privilege, secret guard

Address the /sh-security-review fan-out + proof-or-kill verifier pass. Only one
confirmed-high surfaced and it is PRE-EXISTING and out-of-diff (OSWE-IAC-AUDIT-01,
the account-wide CDK cfn-exec residual already documented in config.ts; recorded in
.security-review/suppressions.json with justification + flagged for the per-env
bootstrap-qualifier follow-up). The rest were verifier-downgraded to unverified;
these are the cheap defense-in-depth fixes worth taking regardless:

- deploy.sh: extract tarballs with --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions (root
  never honors an archive's uid/mode → no setuid/foreign-owned file can land); and
  treat "no release in S3 yet" as a benign exit 0, distinct from a real deploy
  failure (set -e stays loud once a release exists).
- publish-and-deploy.sh: gate on the AGGREGATE SSM Command.Status (+ TargetCount),
  not CommandInvocations[0], so a partial failure across the brief 2-instance
  replacement window can't be reported as success.
- instance-role.ts: scope the box's s3:GetObject to releases/* (mirrors the app
  role's write scope) instead of the whole bucket.
- package-artifacts.sh: fail-closed secret-shaped-file guard on app.tar.gz
  (defense in depth over .gitignore; scoped to data extensions so *_credentials.py
  source is not a false positive — verified against the real tree).

Deferred as documented follow-ups (verifier: unverified, supply-chain-gated to the
CI OIDC writer; bucket is BLOCK_ALL + enforceSSL + versioned): SHA-pinned immutable
releases/<sha>/ pulls + signed checksum (vs mutable latest/), single-tarball release
to remove the torn-read window, and app-aware ALB health (vs static nginx /healthz).

shellcheck/tsc/jest(16) clean; both stacks synth offline.

* fix(infra): ASCII-only EC2 SecurityGroup descriptions + synth-time guard

The instance-SG GroupDescription + ingress/egress rule descriptions carried an
em-dash / arrow (—, →). `tsc` and `cdk synth` accept them, but the EC2 API rejects
non-ASCII in GroupDescription ("Character sets beyond ASCII are not supported"),
so OpenSweDevStack's first deploy failed at the SG and rolled back. (Pre-existing
from #14; same class as the AMI-description ASCII bug.)

- app-service.ts: replace —/→ with ASCII (- / ->) in the SG GroupDescription, the
  ingress/egress rule descriptions, and the Route53 comment.
- test/ascii-aws-fields.test.ts: synth-time guard asserting EC2 SecurityGroup
  GroupDescription + rule descriptions are pure ASCII, so this fails the build
  instead of a deploy next time.

jest 18/18; tsc clean.

* fix(infra): SG rule descriptions use ASCII-charset-safe text (no `>`)

The first ASCII fix replaced the arrow with `->`, but EC2 SecurityGroup *rule*
descriptions allow a stricter set than ASCII — `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*`,
which EXCLUDES `<`/`>`. So OpenSweDevStack's second deploy still failed at the
ingress rule. Use "to" instead of "->", and tighten the guard test from "ASCII
only" to the exact EC2 allowed charset so it catches `>` (and `<`) too.

jest 18/18; tsc clean.

* fix(infra): minify embedded deploy.sh so user-data fits EC2's 25.6 KB limit

The base64 deploy.sh embedded in user-data pushed the encoded boot script to
27184 bytes, over EC2's 25600-byte cap, so OpenSweDevStack's instance failed with
"Encoded User data is limited to 25600 bytes". Strip full-line comments + blank
lines from deploy.sh before base64-embedding it (repo file keeps comments; only
the on-box copy is minified; the script is opaque base64 so user-data heredocs are
unaffected) -> rendered user-data drops to 16424 bytes (9 KB margin). Add a
synth-time guard test asserting EC2 user-data stays under 25600 bytes encoded.

jest 19/19; minified deploy.sh passes bash -n + shellcheck.
2026-06-26 18:49:09 -04:00

74 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript

import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib";
import { Template } from "aws-cdk-lib/assertions";
import { OpenSweStack } from "../lib/open-swe-stack";
const ENV = { account: "328440206208", region: "us-east-1" };
/**
* Several AWS APIs reject non-ASCII in fields that `cdk synth` happily emits and
* `tsc` happily compiles — so a stray em-dash/arrow only blows up at DEPLOY time
* (e.g. EC2 SecurityGroup GroupDescription: "Character sets beyond ASCII are not
* supported"). This has bitten us twice (the AMI Description, then the instance-SG
* description). This test fails the build at synth time instead.
*
* Scope: the EC2 fields with a documented ASCII/restricted-charset constraint —
* SecurityGroup GroupDescription and ingress/egress rule descriptions. (CloudFormation
* Output descriptions + Route53 comments accept UTF-8, so they are not asserted.)
*
* EC2 rule descriptions are stricter than ASCII: the allowed set is
* `a-zA-Z0-9. _-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*` — note it EXCLUDES `<` and `>`, which is why a
* naive em-dash -> "->" replacement still fails at deploy. We assert that exact set.
*/
// Characters NOT in the EC2 description allowed set.
const DISALLOWED = /[^a-zA-Z0-9. _:/()#,@[\]+=&;{}!$*-]/;
function synthDev(): Record<string, { Type: string; Properties?: Record<string, unknown> }> {
const app = new cdk.App();
const dev = new OpenSweStack(app, "OpenSweDevStack", {
stackName: "open-swe-dev",
env: ENV,
envName: "dev",
});
return Template.fromStack(dev).toJSON().Resources;
}
describe("ASCII-only EC2 description fields", () => {
const resources = synthDev();
it("SecurityGroup GroupDescription is ASCII", () => {
for (const [id, r] of Object.entries(resources)) {
if (r.Type !== "AWS::EC2::SecurityGroup") continue;
const desc = (r.Properties?.GroupDescription as string) ?? "";
expect(DISALLOWED.test(desc) ? `${id}: ${desc}` : "ascii").toBe("ascii");
}
});
it("SecurityGroup ingress/egress rule descriptions are ASCII", () => {
for (const [id, r] of Object.entries(resources)) {
const props = r.Properties ?? {};
const groups: Array<{ Description?: string }> = [];
if (Array.isArray(props.SecurityGroupIngress)) groups.push(...props.SecurityGroupIngress);
if (Array.isArray(props.SecurityGroupEgress)) groups.push(...props.SecurityGroupEgress);
// Standalone AWS::EC2::SecurityGroupEgress / ...Ingress resources.
if (r.Type === "AWS::EC2::SecurityGroupEgress" || r.Type === "AWS::EC2::SecurityGroupIngress") {
groups.push(props as { Description?: string });
}
for (const rule of groups) {
const desc = rule.Description ?? "";
expect(DISALLOWED.test(desc) ? `${id}: ${desc}` : "ascii").toBe("ascii");
}
}
});
// EC2 caps base64-encoded user-data at 25600 bytes; CDK + tsc don't check it, so
// an oversized boot script (e.g. an embedded deploy.sh) only fails at deploy.
it("EC2 user-data fits the 25600-byte encoded limit", () => {
for (const [id, r] of Object.entries(resources)) {
if (r.Type !== "AWS::EC2::Instance") continue;
const ud = (r.Properties?.UserData as { "Fn::Base64"?: string }) ?? {};
const script = typeof ud["Fn::Base64"] === "string" ? ud["Fn::Base64"] : "";
const encoded = Buffer.from(script, "utf8").toString("base64").length;
expect(`${id}: ${encoded} bytes`).toBe(encoded < 25600 ? `${id}: ${encoded} bytes` : "OVER 25600");
}
});
});