Tokens now carry a keyed hash of the account's security stamp, and every
authenticated request compares it with the stored stamp (cached for 60 s,
evicted in-process on change). A password reset or change, a deactivation
and a deletion all rotate or remove the stamp, so tokens issued before them
get 401. Tokens without the claim get 401 too.
* refactor(api): enforce service and data-service boundaries
* refactor(api): complete feature service boundaries
* refactor(identity): enforce service and data boundaries
* refactor(vendors): enforce service and data boundaries
* refactor(workorders): enforce service and data boundaries
* refactor(backend): enforce architecture and optimize dispatch
* style(backend): format changed architecture files
* fix(architecture): address backend review follow-ups
* fix(backend): sanitize exception disclosure in changed API endpoints
Replace raw exception-message disclosure (ex.Message) returned to API
callers with a stable sanitized public message plus correlated structured
internal logging, across the endpoints changed in this PR.
- Add SanitizedErrors helper: logs the original exception at Error with a
generated correlation id and returns a stable public message referencing
it so support can trace without exposing internals.
- Inject ILogger<T> into the 14 changed controllers and route every
ex.Message/dbex.Message disclosure through the helper, preserving status
codes, response shapes, and business data (e.g. OpenWorkOrders).
- Leave FluentValidation (vex.Errors) and existing fixed-message catches
untouched; out-of-scope controllers (Account/Contact/Employee/Asset/
PMSchedule) are unchanged.
- Add focused tests proving internal exception text is not returned and
that Error logging carrying the original exception is invoked.
* fix(architecture): abstract job run state access
* style: format board update service
* test: use collection assertion idiom
