Commit graph

2 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexandre Brandizzi
77a10e38ca fix(auth): cap reset abuse per account, key code hashes, send reset email off the request path
- Forgot Password is limited to 3 codes an hour and 10 a day per email, and
  an account gets 10 failed code checks a day across every code it is sent,
  so new client addresses and new codes no longer buy more guesses. Refused
  requests answer exactly like accepted ones.
- The reset email is queued to a background sender, and unregistered
  addresses store a row no code can match, so both paths do the same work
  and return without waiting on the mail provider. Each request also clears
  expired codes.
- Code hashes are HMAC-SHA256 under a key derived with HKDF from the JWT
  signing secret; rows in the previous unkeyed format stop matching.
- Email and code are read only from the JSON body.
2026-09-25 13:00:03 -03:00
Alexandre Brandizzi
c841e130be fix(auth): harden password reset codes against guessing and email enumeration
Forgot Password answers every address the same way and emails a code only
to an active account. Codes are stored as salted SHA-256 hashes, expire 15
minutes after issue, are replaced by a newer request, and are checked only
against the email they were issued to. Five failed checks delete the code;
attempts are reserved with one conditional UPDATE so concurrent guesses
cannot exceed the budget. VerificationCode requires the email, and email and
code are accepted in the JSON body so they stay out of URLs.

The three anonymous endpoints are rate limited to 10 requests per 15
minutes per client IP. Forwarded headers are trusted only through loopback
and private hops, since the API sits behind the EB load balancer and nginx.
The migration adds hash, salt, expiry and attempt columns and deletes the
old plaintext rows.
2026-09-25 12:21:29 -03:00