sh-mcp/packages/shared/src/redact.test.ts
Adam Moussa 22c09e99fe
Some checks are pending
deploy / deploy (push) Waiting to run
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth

Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
  egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
  tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
  OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
  outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).

* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy

Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.

Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.

* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers

Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
  reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
  LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
  (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
  is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
  (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.

* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling

Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.

Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.

* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings

Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
  run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
  Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
  not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.

The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.

* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting

GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
  untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
  enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
  short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
  /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
  request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
  express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
  returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
  per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.

Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.

* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)

extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.

* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)

Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:

- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
  so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
  and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
  Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
  server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
  that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
  AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.

- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
  key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
  recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
  escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
  sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
  flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.

+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.

Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00

250 lines
8.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { redact, REDACTED } from './redact.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// SSN tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('redact — SSN', () => {
it('masks canonical SSN (NNN-NN-NNNN)', () => {
expect(redact('SSN: 123-45-6789')).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(redact('SSN: 123-45-6789')).not.toContain('123-45-6789');
});
it('masks spaced SSN (NNN NN NNNN)', () => {
const result = redact('Social security: 123 45 6789');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(result).not.toContain('123 45 6789');
});
it('masks bare 9-digit SSN after keyword', () => {
const result = redact('ssn 123456789');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(result).not.toContain('123456789');
});
it('masks SSN with "tax id" keyword', () => {
const result = redact('tax id: 123-45-6789');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('does NOT mask a bare 9-digit number without keyword', () => {
// Could be an invoice number, PO number, etc.
const result = redact('Invoice #987654321 is due.');
expect(result).not.toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('preserves surrounding text', () => {
const result = redact('Employee 123-45-6789 is John Smith.');
expect(result).toContain('Employee');
expect(result).toContain('John Smith');
expect(result).not.toContain('123-45-6789');
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Routing number tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('redact — routing numbers', () => {
it('masks routing number with keyword before', () => {
const result = redact('routing number 021000021');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(result).not.toContain('021000021');
});
it('masks ABA number with keyword', () => {
const result = redact('ABA: 021000021');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(result).not.toContain('021000021');
});
it('masks routing number with keyword after (parenthetical)', () => {
const result = redact('021000021 (routing)');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(result).not.toContain('021000021');
});
it('does NOT mask a bare 9-digit number that is not a routing number', () => {
// Phone number fragment or zip+4 style — no keyword context
const result = redact('Ref: 123456789 approved.');
expect(result).not.toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('preserves vendor name next to routing number', () => {
const result = redact('Vendor: Acme Corp, routing number 021000021');
expect(result).toContain('Acme Corp');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Account number tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('redact — account numbers', () => {
it('masks account number with keyword', () => {
const result = redact('account number 12345678');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(result).not.toContain('12345678');
});
it('masks acct # shorthand', () => {
const result = redact('acct #98765');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(result).not.toContain('98765');
});
it('masks account: prefix', () => {
const result = redact('Account: 1234567890123');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('does NOT mask invoice/PO numbers without account keyword', () => {
const result = redact('Invoice #12345 for Acme Corp');
expect(result).not.toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('does NOT mask numbers below 4 digits', () => {
const result = redact('account number 123');
// 3 digits is below the minimum — no match
expect(result).not.toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('preserves contact info adjacent to account number', () => {
const result = redact('Contact billing@acme.com for account number 987654321');
expect(result).toContain('billing@acme.com');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Card number tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('redact — card numbers', () => {
it('masks a valid 16-digit Visa card number', () => {
// 4111111111111111 is the canonical Luhn-valid test card
const result = redact('Card: 4111111111111111');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
expect(result).not.toContain('4111111111111111');
});
it('masks a hyphen-separated card number', () => {
const result = redact('Card: 4111-1111-1111-1111');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('masks a space-separated card number', () => {
const result = redact('Card: 4111 1111 1111 1111');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('masks a valid 15-digit Amex number', () => {
// 378282246310005 is the canonical Amex test card
const result = redact('Amex: 378282246310005');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('does NOT mask a 16-digit number that fails Luhn', () => {
// 1234567890123456 fails Luhn
const result = redact('Value: 1234567890123456');
expect(result).not.toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('does NOT mask phone numbers (10 digits, fail Luhn)', () => {
const result = redact('Call us at 5551234567');
// 10 digits is below the 13-digit minimum for card pattern
expect(result).not.toContain(REDACTED);
});
it('preserves vendor name next to card number', () => {
const result = redact('Charged Stripe account for 4111111111111111');
expect(result).toContain('Stripe');
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED);
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Vendor names and contacts left intact
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('redact — preserves vendor names and contacts', () => {
it('leaves company names intact', () => {
const result = redact('Vendor: Consolidated Edison Co.');
expect(result).toBe('Vendor: Consolidated Edison Co.');
});
it('leaves email addresses intact', () => {
const result = redact('Contact: billing@acmecorp.com');
expect(result).toBe('Contact: billing@acmecorp.com');
});
it('leaves phone numbers intact', () => {
// Standard US phone — 10 digits, below card threshold
const result = redact('Phone: 212-555-0100');
expect(result).toBe('Phone: 212-555-0100');
});
it('leaves street addresses intact', () => {
const result = redact('123 Main Street, New York, NY 10001');
expect(result).toBe('123 Main Street, New York, NY 10001');
});
it('leaves dollar amounts intact', () => {
const result = redact('Invoice total: $1,234.56');
expect(result).toBe('Invoice total: $1,234.56');
});
it('leaves invoice and PO numbers intact', () => {
const result = redact('PO #20240001, Invoice #INV-9999');
expect(result).toBe('PO #20240001, Invoice #INV-9999');
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mixed / realistic finance response
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('redact — realistic finance responses', () => {
it('masks multiple sensitive fields in a payment record', () => {
const payload = [
'Vendor: Acme Supply Co.',
'Contact: accounts@acme.com',
'Bank routing: 021000021',
'Account number: 123456789012',
'Check amount: $4,500.00',
'Employee SSN: 123-45-6789',
].join('\n');
const result = redact(payload);
// Sensitive fields masked
expect(result).not.toContain('021000021');
expect(result).not.toContain('123456789012');
expect(result).not.toContain('123-45-6789');
// Vendor name and contact intact
expect(result).toContain('Acme Supply Co.');
expect(result).toContain('accounts@acme.com');
// Dollar amount intact
expect(result).toContain('$4,500.00');
});
it('is idempotent — redacting twice produces the same result', () => {
const payload = 'SSN: 987-65-4321, routing number 021000021';
const once = redact(payload);
const twice = redact(once);
expect(once).toBe(twice);
});
it('handles empty string without error', () => {
expect(redact('')).toBe('');
});
it('handles string with no sensitive data unchanged', () => {
const clean = 'Lookup result: work order WO-12345 for site Central Park.';
expect(redact(clean)).toBe(clean);
});
});