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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
118 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
118 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* LocalAuthProvider — local-auth safety + audience binding (build-plan §3, §5).
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
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import {
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LocalAuthProvider,
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defaultLocalPrincipals,
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OPS_AUDIENCE,
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FINANCE_AUDIENCE,
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} from './local-auth.js';
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import { AuthError } from './cognito-auth.js';
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function bearer(token: string) {
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return { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } };
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}
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describe('LocalAuthProvider safety', () => {
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it('refuses to construct inside an AWS runtime even when env=local', () => {
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for (const v of ['AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME', 'AWS_EXECUTION_ENV']) {
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const prev = process.env[v];
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process.env[v] = 'sh-mcp-finance';
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try {
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expect(
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() =>
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new LocalAuthProvider({
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audience: OPS_AUDIENCE,
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principals: defaultLocalPrincipals(),
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env: 'local',
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}),
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).toThrow(/refuses to run inside an AWS/);
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} finally {
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if (prev === undefined) delete process.env[v];
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else process.env[v] = prev;
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}
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}
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});
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it('refuses to construct unless SH_MCP_ENV=local', () => {
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expect(
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() =>
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new LocalAuthProvider({
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audience: OPS_AUDIENCE,
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principals: defaultLocalPrincipals(),
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env: 'aws',
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}),
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).toThrow(/only be constructed when SH_MCP_ENV=local/);
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expect(
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() =>
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new LocalAuthProvider({
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audience: OPS_AUDIENCE,
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principals: defaultLocalPrincipals(),
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env: undefined,
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}),
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).toThrow();
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});
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it('constructs in local mode', () => {
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expect(
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() =>
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new LocalAuthProvider({
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audience: OPS_AUDIENCE,
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principals: defaultLocalPrincipals(),
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env: 'local',
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}),
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).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('LocalAuthProvider authentication', () => {
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const ops = new LocalAuthProvider({
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audience: OPS_AUDIENCE,
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principals: defaultLocalPrincipals(),
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env: 'local',
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});
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const finance = new LocalAuthProvider({
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audience: FINANCE_AUDIENCE,
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principals: defaultLocalPrincipals(),
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env: 'local',
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});
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it('resolves a known dev token to the right AuthContext', async () => {
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const ctx = await ops.authenticate(bearer('dev-ops-only'));
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expect(ctx.sub).toBe('ops-only@seahavenind.com');
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expect(ctx.scopes).toContain('ops:read');
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expect(ctx.aud).toBe(OPS_AUDIENCE);
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});
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it('rejects a missing token (→401)', async () => {
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await expect(ops.authenticate({ headers: {} })).rejects.toMatchObject({
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name: 'AuthError',
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code: 'missing_token',
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});
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});
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it('rejects an unknown token (→401)', async () => {
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await expect(ops.authenticate(bearer('not-a-real-token'))).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(AuthError);
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});
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it('AUDIENCE BINDING: an ops principal is rejected by the finance server', async () => {
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await expect(finance.authenticate(bearer('dev-ops-only'))).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'client_not_allowed',
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});
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});
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it('AUDIENCE BINDING: a finance principal is rejected by the ops server', async () => {
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await expect(ops.authenticate(bearer('dev-finance'))).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'client_not_allowed',
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});
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});
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it('the finance principal authenticates against the finance server', async () => {
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const ctx = await finance.authenticate(bearer('dev-finance'));
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expect(ctx.scopes).toContain('finance:read');
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expect(ctx.aud).toBe(FINANCE_AUDIENCE);
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});
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});
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