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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
143 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
143 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* QBO tool definitions for the sh-mcp finance tier.
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*
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* Each tool is defined with defineTool() from @sh-mcp/shared. The handler:
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* 1. Calls requireScope() to enforce finance:read server-side (never trusts
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* UI-level tool-hiding as the access boundary).
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* 2. Calls the injected QboClientInterface — no direct HTTP from here.
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* 3. Passes all sensitive fields through redact() before returning.
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*
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* The client is injected rather than imported as a singleton so that:
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* - Tests can pass a mock without patching module state.
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* - Future servers can supply their own Secrets Manager-backed instance.
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*/
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import { defineTool, requireScope, redact, maskValue } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
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import type { AuthContext } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
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import type { QboClientInterface, QboVendor } from './client.js';
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import { QboThrottleError, QboApiError } from './client.js';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Output types (what the tool returns over the wire)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export interface VendorRecord {
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id: string;
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displayName: string;
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email?: string;
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phone?: string;
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active: boolean;
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balance?: number;
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/** Tax ID, always redacted when present */
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taxId?: string;
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}
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export interface SearchVendorsOutput {
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vendors: VendorRecord[];
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totalCount: number;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Input schema (JSON Schema object, used for MCP / OpenAPI generation)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const searchVendorsInputSchema = {
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type: 'object',
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required: ['query'],
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additionalProperties: false,
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properties: {
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query: {
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type: 'string',
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description:
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'Search term matched against vendor display name. ' + 'Case-insensitive substring match.',
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minLength: 1,
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maxLength: 200,
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},
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maxResults: {
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type: 'integer',
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description: 'Maximum number of vendors to return (1–100). Defaults to 20.',
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minimum: 1,
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maximum: 100,
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default: 20,
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},
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},
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} as const;
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export interface SearchVendorsInput {
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query: string;
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maxResults?: number;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Tool factory
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Returns the search_vendors ToolDef with the given QBO client injected.
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*
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* Usage:
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* import { makeSearchVendorsTool } from '@sh-mcp/qbo';
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* import { QboClientImpl } from '@sh-mcp/qbo/client';
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* const tool = makeSearchVendorsTool(new QboClientImpl());
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*/
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export function makeSearchVendorsTool(client: QboClientInterface) {
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return defineTool<SearchVendorsInput, SearchVendorsOutput>({
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name: 'search_vendors',
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description:
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'Search QuickBooks Online vendors by display name. ' +
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'Returns vendor contact details and account balance. ' +
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'Sensitive fields (tax IDs) are redacted in the response. ' +
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'Requires finance:read scope.',
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tier: 'finance',
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requiredScope: 'finance:read',
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inputSchema: searchVendorsInputSchema,
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async handler(input: SearchVendorsInput, ctx: AuthContext): Promise<SearchVendorsOutput> {
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// Server-side scope enforcement — authoritative, not a UI hint.
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requireScope(ctx, 'finance:read');
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const maxResults = input.maxResults ?? 20;
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let result;
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try {
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result = await client.searchVendors({
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query: input.query,
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maxResults,
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});
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof QboThrottleError) {
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// Surface throttle detail so callers can back off.
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const waitHint =
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err.retryAfterSeconds !== undefined ? ` Retry after ${err.retryAfterSeconds}s.` : '';
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throw new Error(`QBO rate limit exceeded.${waitHint}`);
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}
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if (err instanceof QboApiError) {
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throw new Error(`QBO API error (HTTP ${err.statusCode}): ${err.message}`);
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}
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throw err;
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}
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// Redact sensitive fields on every vendor before returning.
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const vendors: VendorRecord[] = result.vendors.map(
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(v: QboVendor): VendorRecord => ({
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id: v.id,
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// displayName and email/phone are vendor contacts — redact() leaves
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// vendor names and contact info intact per its contract.
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displayName: v.displayName,
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...(v.email !== undefined && { email: v.email }),
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...(v.phone !== undefined && { phone: v.phone }),
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active: v.active,
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...(v.balance !== undefined && { balance: v.balance }),
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// taxId is sensitive — run through redact() (required for finance tier)
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// and additionally through maskValue() for field-level character masking.
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...(v.taxId !== undefined && { taxId: maskValue(redact(v.taxId)) }),
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}),
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);
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return {
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vendors,
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totalCount: result.totalCount,
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};
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},
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});
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}
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