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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
273 lines
9.7 KiB
TypeScript
273 lines
9.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Security-weighted tests for the Cognito auth layer.
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*
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* The token claims here mirror the shape the 0a spike actually observed from
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* live Cognito (access token: prefixed `scope` string, `client_id`, `token_use`,
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* no native `aud`). The audience-boundary, scope-isolation, TTL-ceiling and
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* revocation cases are the trust-tier guarantees from design.md §2 — they are
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* the reason this file carries the heaviest coverage in the platform.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
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import { generateKeyPair, SignJWT, type JWTVerifyGetKey } from 'jose';
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import {
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CognitoAuthProvider,
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AuthError,
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extractScopes,
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extractBearerToken,
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cognitoIssuer,
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type CognitoAuthConfig,
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} from './cognito-auth.js';
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import { requireScope } from './auth.js';
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type KeyPair = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof generateKeyPair>>;
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const ISSUER = cognitoIssuer('us-east-1', 'us-east-1_TESTPOOL');
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const OPS_CLIENT = 'ops-app-client-id';
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const FIN_CLIENT = 'finance-app-client-id';
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// Signing keys for the suite, plus a second pair to forge bad signatures.
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const signing: KeyPair = await generateKeyPair('RS256');
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const attacker: KeyPair = await generateKeyPair('RS256');
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/** A JWKS resolver that returns our test public key (stands in for the pool's JWKS). */
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const jwks: JWTVerifyGetKey = async () => signing.publicKey;
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function baseConfig(overrides: Partial<CognitoAuthConfig> = {}): CognitoAuthConfig {
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return {
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issuer: ISSUER,
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audience: 'sh-mcp-ops',
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allowedClientIds: [OPS_CLIENT],
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scopePrefix: 'sh-mcp-ops',
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jwks,
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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function financeConfig(overrides: Partial<CognitoAuthConfig> = {}): CognitoAuthConfig {
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return baseConfig({
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audience: 'sh-mcp-finance',
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allowedClientIds: [FIN_CLIENT],
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scopePrefix: 'sh-mcp-finance',
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maxTtlSeconds: 900,
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ttlGuardedScopes: ['finance:read', 'finance:admin'],
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...overrides,
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});
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}
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interface MintOpts {
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issuer?: string;
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clientId?: string;
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scope?: string;
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tokenUse?: string;
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sub?: string;
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iat?: number;
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ttlSeconds?: number;
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signer?: KeyPair['privateKey'];
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}
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async function mint(opts: MintOpts = {}): Promise<string> {
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const iat = opts.iat ?? now;
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const ttl = opts.ttlSeconds ?? 3600;
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return new SignJWT({
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token_use: opts.tokenUse ?? 'access',
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client_id: opts.clientId ?? OPS_CLIENT,
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scope: opts.scope ?? 'sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-ops/ops:tasks openid email',
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})
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.setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'RS256' })
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.setSubject(opts.sub ?? 'user-sub-123')
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.setIssuer(opts.issuer ?? ISSUER)
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.setIssuedAt(iat)
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.setExpirationTime(iat + ttl)
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.sign(opts.signer ?? signing.privateKey);
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}
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describe('CognitoAuthProvider.authenticate', () => {
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it('accepts a valid access token and extracts sub + this tier’s scopes', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
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const ctx = await provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${await mint()}`);
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expect(ctx.sub).toBe('user-sub-123');
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expect(ctx.aud).toBe('sh-mcp-ops');
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expect(ctx.scopes).toEqual(['ops:read', 'ops:tasks']);
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});
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it('drops cross-tier and standard (openid/email) scopes', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
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const token = await mint({
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scope: 'sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-finance/finance:read openid email',
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});
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const ctx = await provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`);
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expect(ctx.scopes).toEqual(['ops:read']);
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});
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it('rejects a token from the wrong issuer', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
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const token = await mint({ issuer: 'https://evil.example.com/pool' });
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await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'invalid_token',
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});
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});
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it('AUDIENCE BOUNDARY: rejects an ops token presented to the finance server', async () => {
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const finance = new CognitoAuthProvider(financeConfig());
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const opsToken = await mint({ clientId: OPS_CLIENT, scope: 'sh-mcp-ops/ops:read' });
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await expect(finance.authenticate(`Bearer ${opsToken}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'client_not_allowed',
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});
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});
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it('rejects an id token (token_use !== "access")', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
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const token = await mint({ tokenUse: 'id' });
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await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'invalid_token',
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});
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});
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it('rejects an expired token', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const token = await mint({ iat: now - 7200, ttlSeconds: 3600 }); // expired ~1h ago
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await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'invalid_token',
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});
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});
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it('rejects a token signed by an unknown key (forged signature)', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
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const token = await mint({ signer: attacker.privateKey });
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await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'invalid_token',
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});
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});
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it('rejects a missing Authorization header', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
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await expect(provider.authenticate({ headers: {} })).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'missing_token',
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});
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});
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it('FINANCE TTL: rejects a finance-scoped token whose lifetime exceeds the ceiling', async () => {
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const finance = new CognitoAuthProvider(financeConfig());
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const longToken = await mint({
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clientId: FIN_CLIENT,
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scope: 'sh-mcp-finance/finance:read',
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ttlSeconds: 3600,
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});
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await expect(finance.authenticate(`Bearer ${longToken}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'ttl_exceeded',
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});
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});
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it('FINANCE TTL: accepts a finance-scoped token within the ceiling', async () => {
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const finance = new CognitoAuthProvider(financeConfig());
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const shortToken = await mint({
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clientId: FIN_CLIENT,
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scope: 'sh-mcp-finance/finance:read',
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ttlSeconds: 600,
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});
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const ctx = await finance.authenticate(`Bearer ${shortToken}`);
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expect(ctx.scopes).toEqual(['finance:read']);
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});
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it('does not apply the TTL ceiling to non-guarded scopes', async () => {
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const finance = new CognitoAuthProvider(financeConfig());
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// ops:read carried under the finance prefix is known but not TTL-guarded.
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const longToken = await mint({
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clientId: FIN_CLIENT,
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scope: 'sh-mcp-finance/ops:read',
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ttlSeconds: 3600,
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});
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const ctx = await finance.authenticate(`Bearer ${longToken}`);
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expect(ctx.scopes).toEqual(['ops:read']);
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});
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it('rejects a revoked (deny-listed) user', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(
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baseConfig({ denyList: { isDenied: async (sub) => sub === 'revoked-user' } }),
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);
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const token = await mint({ sub: 'revoked-user' });
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await expect(provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${token}`)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: 'revoked',
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});
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});
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it('returns a context that satisfies requireScope for granted scopes only', async () => {
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const provider = new CognitoAuthProvider(baseConfig());
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const ctx = await provider.authenticate(`Bearer ${await mint()}`);
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expect(() => requireScope(ctx, 'ops:read')).not.toThrow();
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expect(() => requireScope(ctx, 'finance:read')).toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('extractScopes', () => {
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it('strips the tier prefix and keeps known scopes in order', () => {
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expect(extractScopes('sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-ops/ops:tasks', 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([
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'ops:read',
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'ops:tasks',
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]);
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});
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it('drops other tiers and standard scopes', () => {
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expect(
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extractScopes('sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-finance/finance:read openid email', 'sh-mcp-ops'),
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).toEqual(['ops:read']);
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});
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it('drops prefixed-but-unknown scopes', () => {
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expect(extractScopes('sh-mcp-ops/bogus:scope', 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([]);
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});
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it('de-duplicates', () => {
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expect(extractScopes('sh-mcp-ops/ops:read sh-mcp-ops/ops:read', 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([
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'ops:read',
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]);
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});
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it('handles empty / non-string input', () => {
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expect(extractScopes('', 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([]);
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expect(extractScopes(undefined, 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([]);
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expect(extractScopes(null, 'sh-mcp-ops')).toEqual([]);
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});
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});
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describe('extractBearerToken', () => {
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it('reads a raw Authorization header string', () => {
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expect(extractBearerToken('Bearer abc.def.ghi')).toBe('abc.def.ghi');
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});
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it('is case-insensitive on the scheme', () => {
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expect(extractBearerToken('bearer abc')).toBe('abc');
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});
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it('reads a plain headers object (either header casing)', () => {
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expect(extractBearerToken({ headers: { authorization: 'Bearer xyz' } })).toBe('xyz');
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expect(extractBearerToken({ headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer XYZ' } })).toBe('XYZ');
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});
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it('reads a Fetch Headers-like object', () => {
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const headers = new Headers({ authorization: 'Bearer fetchtoken' });
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expect(extractBearerToken({ headers })).toBe('fetchtoken');
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});
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it('throws AuthError on a missing header', () => {
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expect(() => extractBearerToken({ headers: {} })).toThrow(AuthError);
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});
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it('throws AuthError on a non-Bearer header', () => {
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expect(() => extractBearerToken('Basic abc')).toThrow(AuthError);
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});
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// ReDoS guard (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos): the matcher is /\s+(\S.*)/, not
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// the ambiguous /\s+(.+)/. These pin the behavior that the `\S` fix preserves.
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it('still captures a token that follows multiple separating spaces', () => {
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expect(extractBearerToken('Bearer abc.def')).toBe('abc.def');
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});
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it('rejects a "Bearer" header with no token after the whitespace', () => {
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expect(() => extractBearerToken(`Bearer ${' '.repeat(5_000)}`)).toThrow(AuthError);
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});
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});
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