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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
102 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
102 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Structured audit logging for sensitive tool calls.
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*
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* design.md §2.5 / §7.3 (Audit row): every `finance:*` (and any future
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* `physical:*`) tool call must emit a structured audit record carrying the
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* user `sub`, the tool name, a HASH of the args (never the raw args), the
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* authorization decision, and the result. Secrets must never appear in the
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* record — args are hashed precisely so raw values and tokens cannot leak into
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* CloudWatch.
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*
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* The dispatcher (dispatch.ts) is the single emission point. An `AuditLogger`
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* is injected so production writes structured JSON to stdout (→ CloudWatch in
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* Lambda) while tests can assert against a capturing logger and never spam
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* stdout.
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*/
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import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
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/**
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* One structured audit record. Shape is asserted by the audit test
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* (design.md §7.3): no raw arg values, no secrets — only a hash.
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*/
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export interface AuditRecord {
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/** The user's Google-federated identity (Cognito `sub`). */
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sub: string;
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/** The tool that was invoked. */
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tool: string;
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/** SHA-256 hash (hex) of the canonicalized raw input — never the raw args. */
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argsHash: string;
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/** The authorization decision that gated the call. */
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decision: 'allow' | 'deny';
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/** Whether the handler completed or threw. */
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result: 'ok' | 'error';
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/** ISO-8601 emission timestamp. */
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ts: string;
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}
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/**
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* Sink for {@link AuditRecord}s. Injected into the dispatcher so the transport
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* layer never logs directly.
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*/
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export interface AuditLogger {
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log(record: AuditRecord): void;
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}
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/**
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* Default logger: one structured JSON line per record to stdout. In Lambda this
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* lands in CloudWatch Logs, satisfying design.md §2.5's audit requirement.
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*/
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export class ConsoleAuditLogger implements AuditLogger {
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log(record: AuditRecord): void {
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// A single JSON line keeps CloudWatch Insights queries simple.
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console.log(JSON.stringify({ kind: 'audit', ...record }));
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}
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}
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/** No-op logger for tests that don't assert on audit output. */
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export class NoopAuditLogger implements AuditLogger {
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log(_record: AuditRecord): void {
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// intentionally empty
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}
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}
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/**
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* Capturing logger for tests: records are pushed to `records` so a test can
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* assert the audit shape and that no raw arg value / secret appears.
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*/
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export class MemoryAuditLogger implements AuditLogger {
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readonly records: AuditRecord[] = [];
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log(record: AuditRecord): void {
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this.records.push(record);
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}
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}
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/**
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* Hash a tool's raw input into a stable hex digest for the audit record.
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*
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* The input is canonicalized (object keys sorted) before hashing so that two
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* logically-equal inputs produce the same hash. The RAW value never appears in
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* the output — this is what keeps secrets and PII out of the audit log.
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*/
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export function hashArgs(rawInput: unknown): string {
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const canonical = canonicalize(rawInput);
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return createHash('sha256').update(canonical).digest('hex');
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}
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/** Deterministic JSON serialization with sorted object keys. */
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function canonicalize(value: unknown): string {
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return JSON.stringify(sortKeys(value));
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}
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function sortKeys(value: unknown): unknown {
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if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(sortKeys);
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if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {
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const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
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for (const key of Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>).sort()) {
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out[key] = sortKeys((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key]);
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}
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return out;
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}
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return value;
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}
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