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* Phase 2a: Cognito auth substrate (CDK) + pre-token & group-sync Lambdas
Stands up the real AWS auth broker the servers already validate against
(SH_MCP_ENV=aws), surface-agnostic. Nothing deployed yet (gated on Google
secrets); CI synthesizes the stack.
infra/ — root CDK app, stack sh-mcp-auth:
- Cognito user pool, ESSENTIALS feature plan (required for the V2 pre-token
trigger), Google external OIDC IdP (client_id/secret resolved from Secrets
Manager at deploy via CFN dynamic reference, never inlined).
- Resource servers + per-tier app clients whose AllowedOAuthScopes ARE the
trust-tier boundary: ops=(read,tasks), exec=(ops+gmail/calendar, NO finance),
finance=(finance:read ONLY, 15-min access TTL). offline refresh 30d.
- Cognito groups sh-mcp-ops/-assistant/-finance/-admin.
- sync-state + deny-list DynamoDB tables (overrideLogicalId pinned so a future
refactor cannot replace+drop them; deny-list TTL attr 'expiresAt').
- Least-priv IAM (no wildcard action/resource; Google SA secret grant scoped to
the one secret), arm64 Lambdas, explicit 60-day log groups, alarms on the
seahaven-alarm-topics CMK (ALARM-state actions only, two-alarm group-sync).
auth/pre-token-gen — SUPPRESS-ONLY V2 Lambda. Maps Cognito group entitlement to
scopesToSuppress; NEVER scopesToAdd a tier scope (AllowedOAuthScopes stays the
ceiling). Reads last_successful_sync; fail-closed to base ops:read when stale.
auth/group-sync — mirrors Google Group membership into Cognito groups every 5 min
(jose-signed SA JWT -> Directory API, no googleapis dep); writes the freshness
marker ONLY on full success so a partial failure keeps the pre-token Lambda
failing closed.
37 new tests (suppress-only policy, fail-closed, reconcile diff, 16 CDK
assertions incl. Essentials/V2/per-client-scope/no-wildcard-IAM). 448 total pass;
tsc -b + infra typecheck + cdk synth + prettier clean; CI run-cdk-synth re-enabled.
App-client callback URLs are a context placeholder pending the surface decision.
Confluence map (1540098) + project memory updates owed once this deploys.
* Phase 2a: harden auth substrate per security-review + IAM cross-review
Both mandatory gates run on the 2a diff. GPT-4.1 IAM/Lambda cross-review: the
suppress-only invariant is now an executable fail-closed guard (a future edit
that sets scopesToAdd throws → no token minted). /sh-security-review fan-out +
proof-or-kill verifier: PASS (0 confirmed critical/high). The verifier refuted
the two "high" candidates (the email-case revocation "bypass" is symmetric — the
add path uses the same lowercasing filter, so an un-removable user could never
have been added; the empty-directory purge is a non-200 throw → stale marker →
fail closed). Three confirmed findings remediated:
- C2 (deny-list was inert): the sh-mcp-deny-list table was provisioned and
documented as "hard revocation" but no code read it. The pre-token Lambda now
reads it on every mint (DENY_LIST_TABLE env + grantReadData) and strips a
deny-listed sub to NO tier scopes, ahead of the next group sync. Fail-OPEN on
a DDB read error (logs deny_list_read_failed) so a blip can't lock everyone
out — group membership + its fail-closed 30-min window stay authoritative.
- C5 (finance 30-day refresh nullified the 15-min access TTL): refresh window is
now per-tier; finance caps at 8h, ops/exec keep 30d.
- C7 (nested Google-group members silently dropped): listGroupMembers now sets
includeDerivedMembership and skips non-USER rows, honoring the documented
"nested resolved" contract instead of pushing a phantom group address.
Also corrects the sync.ts comment that overstated fail-closed as instantaneous
(it is bounded by MAX_SYNC_AGE_MS). +8 tests (deny-list unit, hard-revocation
handler path, finance refresh window, deny-list env wiring); 456 pass. tsc -b,
cdk synth, prettier, eslint all clean.
112 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
112 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Injectable client interfaces for the group-sync handler, plus their real
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* implementations. Keeping the handler dependent on these interfaces (not the
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* concrete SDKs) is what makes the reconcile logic unit-testable without AWS or
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* Google in the loop.
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*/
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/** Reads group membership from the Google Workspace Directory API. */
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export interface DirectoryReader {
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/**
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* User email addresses of a Google Group, with nested groups flattened to their
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* underlying users (`includeDerivedMembership`). Non-user (GROUP) rows are excluded.
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*/
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listGroupMembers(groupEmail: string): Promise<string[]>;
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}
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/** Reconciles membership of a Cognito group. */
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export interface CognitoGroupTarget {
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/** Create the group if it does not already exist (idempotent). */
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ensureGroup(groupName: string): Promise<void>;
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/** Email addresses currently in the Cognito group. */
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listMembers(groupName: string): Promise<string[]>;
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addMember(groupName: string, email: string): Promise<void>;
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removeMember(groupName: string, email: string): Promise<void>;
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}
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/** Persists the freshness marker the pre-token Lambda fails closed on. */
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export interface SyncStateWriter {
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writeLastSuccessfulSync(epochMs: number): Promise<void>;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Real implementations (externalized at bundle time; exercised only in aws mode)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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import { SignJWT, importPKCS8 } from 'jose';
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/** Google service-account credentials (from Secrets Manager) for domain-wide delegation. */
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export interface GoogleServiceAccount {
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client_email: string;
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private_key: string;
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/** The admin user to impersonate for Directory reads (domain-wide delegation subject). */
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subject: string;
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}
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/**
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* Directory reader backed by a service account with domain-wide delegation.
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* Mints a short-lived bearer token via the OAuth2 JWT grant (signed with `jose`,
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* no googleapis dependency) and pages the Admin SDK members endpoint.
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*/
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export class GoogleDirectoryReader implements DirectoryReader {
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constructor(private readonly sa: GoogleServiceAccount) {}
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private async accessToken(): Promise<string> {
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const key = await importPKCS8(this.sa.private_key, 'RS256');
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const assertion = await new SignJWT({
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scope: 'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/admin.directory.group.readonly',
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})
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.setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'RS256', typ: 'JWT' })
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.setIssuer(this.sa.client_email)
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.setSubject(this.sa.subject)
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.setAudience('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token')
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.setIssuedAt(now)
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.setExpirationTime(now + 3600)
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.sign(key);
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const res = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
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body: new URLSearchParams({
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grant_type: 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer',
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assertion,
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}),
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});
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if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Google token exchange failed: ${res.status}`);
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const json = (await res.json()) as { access_token?: string };
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if (!json.access_token) throw new Error('Google token exchange returned no access_token');
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return json.access_token;
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}
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async listGroupMembers(groupEmail: string): Promise<string[]> {
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const token = await this.accessToken();
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const emails: string[] = [];
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let pageToken: string | undefined;
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do {
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const url = new URL(
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`https://admin.googleapis.com/admin/directory/v1/groups/${encodeURIComponent(groupEmail)}/members`,
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);
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url.searchParams.set('maxResults', '200');
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// Flatten nested groups to their underlying users (the documented contract).
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// Derived members come back as type USER; the nested GROUP rows themselves
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// are skipped below so they are never pushed as a phantom (un-resolvable) user.
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url.searchParams.set('includeDerivedMembership', 'true');
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if (pageToken) url.searchParams.set('pageToken', pageToken);
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const res = await fetch(url, { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
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if (!res.ok)
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throw new Error(`Directory members read failed for ${groupEmail}: ${res.status}`);
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const json = (await res.json()) as {
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members?: { email?: string; type?: string; status?: string }[];
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nextPageToken?: string;
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};
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for (const m of json.members ?? []) {
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// Only real users carry a tier scope; GROUP/derived rows resolve to no
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// Cognito user and would be silent no-op adds, so drop them here.
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if (m.email && m.status !== 'SUSPENDED' && m.type !== 'GROUP') emails.push(m.email);
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}
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pageToken = json.nextPageToken;
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} while (pageToken);
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return emails;
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}
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}
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