sh-mcp/packages/internal-data/src/dev-client.ts
Adam Moussa 22c09e99fe
Some checks are pending
deploy / deploy (push) Waiting to run
Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth

Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
  egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
  tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
  OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
  outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).

* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy

Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.

Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.

* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers

Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
  reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
  LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
  (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
  is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
  (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.

* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling

Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.

Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.

* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings

Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
  run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
  Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
  not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.

The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.

* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting

GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
  untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
  enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
  short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
  /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
  request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
  express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
  returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
  per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.

Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.

* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)

extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.

* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)

Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:

- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
  so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
  and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
  Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
  server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
  that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
  AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.

- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
  key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
  recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
  escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
  sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
  flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.

+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.

Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00

124 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* InMemoryInternalDataClient — deterministic in-memory InternalDataClient.
*
* Holds a few FAKE work orders, purchase orders, and sites in memory. Returns
* null for unknown ids, matching the real client's contract. No AWS, no
* network.
*
* This is for build-plan §4 "in-memory dev clients (tools return real data
* locally)".
*/
import type {
InternalDataClient,
PurchaseOrderRecord,
SiteRecord,
WorkOrderRecord,
} from './client.js';
function seedWorkOrders(): Map<string, WorkOrderRecord> {
return new Map<string, WorkOrderRecord>([
[
'WO-1001',
{
workOrderId: 'WO-1001',
title: 'Replace dock lighting circuit',
status: 'in_progress',
siteId: 'SITE-01',
assignedTo: 'lauren@seahavenind.com',
createdAt: '2026-06-18T08:00:00Z',
updatedAt: '2026-06-22T16:30:00Z',
description: 'Pier B lighting circuit tripping under load; replace breaker and run.',
},
],
[
'WO-1002',
{
workOrderId: 'WO-1002',
title: 'Quarterly HVAC inspection',
status: 'open',
siteId: 'SITE-02',
createdAt: '2026-06-20T10:15:00Z',
updatedAt: '2026-06-20T10:15:00Z',
},
],
]);
}
function seedPurchaseOrders(): Map<string, PurchaseOrderRecord> {
return new Map<string, PurchaseOrderRecord>([
[
'PO-2001',
{
purchaseOrderId: 'PO-2001',
vendor: 'Coastal Supply & Hardware',
status: 'approved',
totalAmount: 1842.5,
currency: 'USD',
issuedAt: '2026-06-15T12:00:00Z',
updatedAt: '2026-06-16T09:00:00Z',
lineItems: [
{ description: 'Marine-grade breaker 30A', quantity: 4, unitPrice: 210.0 },
{ description: 'THWN wire, 250ft spool', quantity: 1, unitPrice: 1002.5 },
],
},
],
[
'PO-2002',
{
purchaseOrderId: 'PO-2002',
vendor: 'Tidewater Plumbing LLC',
status: 'pending',
totalAmount: 640.0,
currency: 'USD',
issuedAt: '2026-06-19T15:30:00Z',
updatedAt: '2026-06-19T15:30:00Z',
},
],
]);
}
function seedSites(): Map<string, SiteRecord> {
return new Map<string, SiteRecord>([
[
'SITE-01',
{
siteId: 'SITE-01',
name: 'Marina Pier Complex',
address: '88 Marina Way, Sea Haven, NY 11790',
region: 'North Shore',
status: 'active',
assignedTechnicians: ['lauren@seahavenind.com'],
},
],
[
'SITE-02',
{
siteId: 'SITE-02',
name: 'Bayfront Warehouse',
address: '23 Bayfront Rd, Sea Haven, NY 11790',
region: 'North Shore',
status: 'active',
},
],
]);
}
/** In-memory InternalDataClient seeded with a few fake records. */
export class InMemoryInternalDataClient implements InternalDataClient {
private readonly workOrders = seedWorkOrders();
private readonly purchaseOrders = seedPurchaseOrders();
private readonly sites = seedSites();
async getWorkOrder(workOrderId: string): Promise<WorkOrderRecord | null> {
return this.workOrders.get(workOrderId) ?? null;
}
async getPurchaseOrder(purchaseOrderId: string): Promise<PurchaseOrderRecord | null> {
return this.purchaseOrders.get(purchaseOrderId) ?? null;
}
async getSite(siteId: string): Promise<SiteRecord | null> {
return this.sites.get(siteId) ?? null;
}
}