mirror of
https://github.com/Sea-Haven-Industries/sh-mcp.git
synced 2026-10-01 17:33:18 +00:00
Some checks are pending
deploy / deploy (push) Waiting to run
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
225 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript
225 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
|
|
* Tool definitions for the internal-data package.
|
|
*
|
|
* Three read-only ops-tier tools backed by the injected InternalDataClient:
|
|
* - lookup_work_order
|
|
* - lookup_purchase_order
|
|
* - lookup_site
|
|
*
|
|
* All three require the `ops:read` scope (§3 of design.md).
|
|
*
|
|
* Finance-tier note: these tools are ops-tier, so `redact()` is not called on
|
|
* their responses. If a future refactor moves payment or financial amounts here,
|
|
* call redact() on those fields per the design requirement that finance handlers
|
|
* MUST redact sensitive output.
|
|
*
|
|
* The client is passed in at server startup (not imported from a module-level
|
|
* singleton) so that tests can inject a mock without AWS credentials.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
import { defineTool, requireScope } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
|
|
import type { AuthContext } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
|
|
import type { InternalDataClient } from './client.js';
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Input / output types
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
export interface LookupWorkOrderInput {
|
|
workOrderId: string;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export interface LookupWorkOrderOutput {
|
|
found: boolean;
|
|
workOrder?: {
|
|
workOrderId: string;
|
|
title: string;
|
|
status: string;
|
|
siteId?: string;
|
|
assignedTo?: string;
|
|
createdAt: string;
|
|
updatedAt: string;
|
|
description?: string;
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export interface LookupPurchaseOrderInput {
|
|
purchaseOrderId: string;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export interface LookupPurchaseOrderOutput {
|
|
found: boolean;
|
|
purchaseOrder?: {
|
|
purchaseOrderId: string;
|
|
vendor: string;
|
|
status: string;
|
|
totalAmount?: number;
|
|
currency?: string;
|
|
issuedAt: string;
|
|
updatedAt: string;
|
|
lineItems?: Array<{ description: string; quantity: number; unitPrice: number }>;
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export interface LookupSiteInput {
|
|
siteId: string;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export interface LookupSiteOutput {
|
|
found: boolean;
|
|
site?: {
|
|
siteId: string;
|
|
name: string;
|
|
address?: string;
|
|
region?: string;
|
|
status: string;
|
|
assignedTechnicians?: string[];
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Tool factories — call makeTools(client) once at server startup
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
export function makeTools(client: InternalDataClient) {
|
|
const lookupWorkOrder = defineTool<LookupWorkOrderInput, LookupWorkOrderOutput>({
|
|
name: 'lookup_work_order',
|
|
description:
|
|
'Retrieve a Sea Haven work order by its ID. Returns current status, assigned site, ' +
|
|
'assigned technician, and description. Returns found=false when the ID does not exist.',
|
|
tier: 'ops',
|
|
requiredScope: 'ops:read',
|
|
inputSchema: {
|
|
type: 'object',
|
|
required: ['workOrderId'],
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
properties: {
|
|
workOrderId: {
|
|
type: 'string',
|
|
description: 'The unique work-order identifier (e.g. WO-20240101-001).',
|
|
minLength: 1,
|
|
maxLength: 128,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
handler: async (
|
|
input: LookupWorkOrderInput,
|
|
ctx: AuthContext,
|
|
): Promise<LookupWorkOrderOutput> => {
|
|
requireScope(ctx, 'ops:read');
|
|
|
|
const record = await client.getWorkOrder(input.workOrderId);
|
|
|
|
if (record === null) {
|
|
return { found: false };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
found: true,
|
|
workOrder: {
|
|
workOrderId: record.workOrderId,
|
|
title: record.title,
|
|
status: record.status,
|
|
siteId: record.siteId,
|
|
assignedTo: record.assignedTo,
|
|
createdAt: record.createdAt,
|
|
updatedAt: record.updatedAt,
|
|
description: record.description,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const lookupPurchaseOrder = defineTool<LookupPurchaseOrderInput, LookupPurchaseOrderOutput>({
|
|
name: 'lookup_purchase_order',
|
|
description:
|
|
'Retrieve a Sea Haven purchase order by its ID. Returns vendor name, status, total amount, ' +
|
|
'and line items. Returns found=false when the ID does not exist.',
|
|
tier: 'ops',
|
|
requiredScope: 'ops:read',
|
|
inputSchema: {
|
|
type: 'object',
|
|
required: ['purchaseOrderId'],
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
properties: {
|
|
purchaseOrderId: {
|
|
type: 'string',
|
|
description: 'The unique purchase-order identifier (e.g. PO-2024-00123).',
|
|
minLength: 1,
|
|
maxLength: 128,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
handler: async (
|
|
input: LookupPurchaseOrderInput,
|
|
ctx: AuthContext,
|
|
): Promise<LookupPurchaseOrderOutput> => {
|
|
requireScope(ctx, 'ops:read');
|
|
|
|
const record = await client.getPurchaseOrder(input.purchaseOrderId);
|
|
|
|
if (record === null) {
|
|
return { found: false };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
found: true,
|
|
purchaseOrder: {
|
|
purchaseOrderId: record.purchaseOrderId,
|
|
vendor: record.vendor,
|
|
status: record.status,
|
|
totalAmount: record.totalAmount,
|
|
currency: record.currency,
|
|
issuedAt: record.issuedAt,
|
|
updatedAt: record.updatedAt,
|
|
lineItems: record.lineItems,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const lookupSite = defineTool<LookupSiteInput, LookupSiteOutput>({
|
|
name: 'lookup_site',
|
|
description:
|
|
'Retrieve a Sea Haven site assignment record by its ID. Returns site name, address, ' +
|
|
'region, status, and assigned technicians. Returns found=false when the ID does not exist.',
|
|
tier: 'ops',
|
|
requiredScope: 'ops:read',
|
|
inputSchema: {
|
|
type: 'object',
|
|
required: ['siteId'],
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
properties: {
|
|
siteId: {
|
|
type: 'string',
|
|
description: 'The unique site identifier (e.g. SITE-NYC-001).',
|
|
minLength: 1,
|
|
maxLength: 128,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
handler: async (input: LookupSiteInput, ctx: AuthContext): Promise<LookupSiteOutput> => {
|
|
requireScope(ctx, 'ops:read');
|
|
|
|
const record = await client.getSite(input.siteId);
|
|
|
|
if (record === null) {
|
|
return { found: false };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
found: true,
|
|
site: {
|
|
siteId: record.siteId,
|
|
name: record.name,
|
|
address: record.address,
|
|
region: record.region,
|
|
status: record.status,
|
|
assignedTechnicians: record.assignedTechnicians,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return [lookupWorkOrder, lookupPurchaseOrder, lookupSite] as const;
|
|
}
|