sh-mcp/packages/shared/src/auth.ts
Adam Moussa 22c09e99fe
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Phase 1: runnable MCP + OpenAPI servers (ops + finance) (#3)
* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth

Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
  egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
  tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
  OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
  outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).

* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy

Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.

Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.

* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers

Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
  reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
  LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
  (aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
  is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
  (build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.

* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling

Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.

Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.

* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings

Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
  run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
  Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
  not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.

The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.

* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting

GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
  untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
  enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
  short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
  /tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
  request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
  express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
  returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
  per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.

Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.

* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)

extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.

* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)

Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:

- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
  so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
  and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
  Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
  server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
  that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
  AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.

- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
  key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
  recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
  escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
  sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
  flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.

+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.

Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
2026-06-26 13:33:21 -04:00

111 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Authorization interface and scope-enforcement guard.
*
* This file defines the scope-enforcement contract every tool handler relies on:
* 1. `ScopeError` — a typed error thrown when a required scope is absent.
* 2. `requireScope()` — enforces scope presence on an already-decoded
* AuthContext. Call this at the top of every tool handler.
* 3. `AuthProvider` interface — the contract the auth layer implements. Each
* server wires an AuthProvider into its request pipeline so that by the
* time `handler(input, ctx)` is called the context is already validated.
*
* The concrete implementation of `AuthProvider` now lives in `cognito-auth.ts`
* (`CognitoAuthProvider`) — built and verified after the 0a spike proved the
* live Cognito access-token shape (verified `sub`/`scope`/`client_id`, no native
* `aud`). It verifies the JWT signature against the pool JWKS, validates `iss`,
* enforces the `client_id` allow-list AS the audience boundary (the token has no
* `aud`), applies the finance TTL ceiling and deny-list, and extracts scopes.
* This file stays transport- and provider-agnostic; see docs/design.md §2.
*/
import type { AuthContext, Scope } from './types.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// ScopeError
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Thrown by `requireScope()` when the caller's AuthContext does not include
* the required scope.
*
* Transport adapters (OpenAPI handler, MCP dispatcher) should catch this and
* return an appropriate 403 / permission-denied response.
*/
export class ScopeError extends Error {
/** The scope that was required but absent. */
readonly requiredScope: Scope;
/** The `sub` from the AuthContext that triggered the error. */
readonly sub: string;
constructor(sub: string, requiredScope: Scope) {
super(`User "${sub}" does not have the required scope "${requiredScope}".`);
this.name = 'ScopeError';
this.requiredScope = requiredScope;
this.sub = sub;
// Maintain proper prototype chain for `instanceof` checks.
Object.setPrototypeOf(this, new.target.prototype);
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// requireScope
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Assert that `ctx` contains `scope`. Throws `ScopeError` if it does not.
*
* Call at the top of every tool handler before touching any input or reaching
* any downstream service:
*
* ```ts
* handler: async (input, ctx) => {
* requireScope(ctx, 'finance:read');
* // ... safe to proceed
* },
* ```
*
* NOTE: Server-side enforcement is authoritative. Tool-hiding in the agent UI
* is a convenience only (design.md §2.5). This guard enforces independently.
*
* NOTE: JWT signature/issuer/aud/client_id validation is NOT done here — see
* the TODO above. By the time `handler` is called, the `AuthProvider` has
* already validated the token and populated `ctx`.
*/
export function requireScope(ctx: AuthContext, scope: Scope): void {
if (!ctx.scopes.includes(scope)) {
throw new ScopeError(ctx.sub, scope);
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// AuthProvider interface (deferred 0a-gated auth layer contract)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Contract that each server's concrete auth layer must implement.
*
* The server's request pipeline calls `authenticate(req)` once per inbound
* request and passes the resolved `AuthContext` into every tool handler.
*
* `req` is typed as `unknown` so this interface stays transport-agnostic
* (works for an Express `Request`, a raw `IncomingMessage`, a Lambda event,
* or a test-double). The concrete implementation casts to the appropriate type.
*
* TODO(auth-layer-0a): Implement this interface in the deferred auth layer.
* A concrete implementation lives in `servers/sh-mcp-ops/src/auth.ts` and
* `servers/sh-mcp-finance/src/auth.ts` once that layer is built.
*/
export interface AuthProvider {
/**
* Extract and validate the inbound token from `req`, returning a fully
* populated AuthContext on success.
*
* Throws (or rejects) on any validation failure:
* - Missing / malformed Authorization header
* - Invalid JWT signature
* - Wrong issuer, audience, or client_id
* - Expired token
* - User on the deny-list
*/
authenticate(req: unknown): Promise<AuthContext>;
}