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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
106 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
106 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* EventBridge Scheduler client interface and implementation.
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*
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* The real AWS call is clearly stubbed/guarded behind this interface so:
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* - Tests inject a mock without any network or AWS SDK import side-effects.
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* - The production implementation is swapped in at server startup via dependency injection.
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*
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* TODO (DEFERRED auth layer — 0a gate): The production SchedulerClient should read its
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* AWS credentials from the environment (Lambda execution role) rather than from any
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* hardcoded credential chain. IAM cross-review is required before wiring the real client
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* into the server bundle (see design.md §2.5 and §8).
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*/
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export interface CreateScheduleInput {
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/** Unique name for the EventBridge schedule (must be [a-zA-Z0-9_-]+). */
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scheduleName: string;
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/** ISO-8601 datetime string at which the one-shot schedule fires. */
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scheduleAt: string;
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/** ARN of the Lambda target that delivers the reminder. */
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targetArn: string;
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/** Arbitrary payload forwarded to the target Lambda. */
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payload: Record<string, unknown>;
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/** ARN of the IAM role EventBridge Scheduler assumes to invoke the target. */
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roleArn: string;
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}
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export interface CreateScheduleOutput {
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/** The ARN of the created EventBridge schedule. */
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scheduleArn: string;
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}
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/**
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* Thin abstraction over the EventBridge Scheduler API.
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* Swap the real implementation in at server startup; inject a mock in tests.
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*/
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export interface SchedulerClient {
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createSchedule(input: CreateScheduleInput): Promise<CreateScheduleOutput>;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Production implementation
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Real SchedulerClient that calls the AWS EventBridge Scheduler API.
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*
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* IMPORTANT: This module intentionally does NOT import the AWS SDK at the top
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* level. The dynamic import inside createSchedule ensures no AWS SDK code (and
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* no credential-chain resolution) runs at import time — critical for unit tests
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* running without AWS credentials.
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*
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* TODO (production wiring): Before deploying, confirm:
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* - The Lambda execution role has `scheduler:CreateSchedule` on the target
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* schedule group (least-privilege per design.md §2.5).
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* - REGION defaults to process.env.AWS_REGION (set automatically in Lambda).
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* - TARGET_ARN and SCHEDULER_ROLE_ARN are injected via CDK environment variables
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* (never hardcoded).
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*/
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export class AwsSchedulerClient implements SchedulerClient {
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// Fields are stored now and used when the real AWS SDK call is uncommented (see TODO above).
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private readonly _region: string;
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private readonly _targetArn: string;
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private readonly _roleArn: string;
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constructor(opts: { region?: string; targetArn: string; roleArn: string }) {
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this._region = opts.region ?? process.env['AWS_REGION'] ?? 'us-east-1';
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this._targetArn = opts.targetArn;
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this._roleArn = opts.roleArn;
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// Read each field once so TypeScript does not flag them as write-only.
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void this._region;
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void this._targetArn;
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void this._roleArn;
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}
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async createSchedule(_input: CreateScheduleInput): Promise<CreateScheduleOutput> {
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// Dynamic import so the AWS SDK is not loaded during unit tests.
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// TODO: replace this stub with the real @aws-sdk/client-scheduler call
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// once the IAM cross-review gate (design.md §8) has been passed.
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// Example real call (do not remove — kept for implementer reference):
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//
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// const { SchedulerClient, CreateScheduleCommand } = await import(
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// '@aws-sdk/client-scheduler'
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// );
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// const client = new SchedulerClient({ region: this.region });
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// const result = await client.send(
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// new CreateScheduleCommand({
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// Name: input.scheduleName,
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// ScheduleExpression: `at(${input.scheduleAt})`,
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// ScheduleExpressionTimezone: 'UTC',
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// FlexibleTimeWindow: { Mode: 'OFF' },
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// Target: {
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// Arn: this.targetArn,
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// RoleArn: this.roleArn,
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// Input: JSON.stringify(input.payload),
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// },
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// })
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// );
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// return { scheduleArn: result.ScheduleArn! };
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throw new Error(
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'AwsSchedulerClient.createSchedule: production AWS SDK call is not yet wired. ' +
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'Inject a SchedulerClient mock in tests, or complete the IAM cross-review and ' +
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'uncomment the real SDK call before deploying.',
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);
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}
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}
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