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* Add shared transport: dispatch, MCP + OpenAPI adapters, local auth
Add the single authoritative tool-execution path (executeTool) plus the two
universal interfaces over it (design.md §2.5, §7.3):
- dispatch.ts: scope enforcement, ajv input validation, rate limiting, finance
egress redaction (redactDeep), and structured audit emission on one path.
- audit.ts / rate-limit.ts: injected AuditLogger + RateLimiter abstractions.
- mcp.ts: low-level MCP Server with scope-filtered tools/list (tool-hiding) and
tools/call routed through executeTool.
- http.ts: Express host mounting /mcp, /openapi.json, POST /tools/:name, /healthz.
- openapi.ts: buildOpenApiDocument wraps the existing path generator into a full
OpenAPI 3.1 document.
- local-auth.ts: LocalAuthProvider (dev bearer tokens) that refuses to construct
outside SH_MCP_ENV=local and enforces audience binding (design.md §3, §6).
* Add in-memory dev clients; make package tool exports lazy
Add an in-memory Client implementation per integration package (seeded fake
data, no network) selected when SH_MCP_ENV=local (build-plan §4). Gmail/calendar/
tasks dev clients partition by ctx.sub; payments/qbo seed sensitive-looking
fields so the redaction egress path has real targets to mask.
Make the eager default-tool exports in tasks/reminders/qbo LAZY (getDefaultTools)
so importing a package barrel no longer constructs an AWS client at module load
(build-plan §7 'no I/O at import time') — the previous eager construction broke
server startup. Fix payments tsconfig rootDir (src, was '.') so its declarations
resolve under dist/index.d.ts like the other 8 packages.
* Add runnable sh-mcp-ops and sh-mcp-finance servers
Two thin composition-root servers over the shared transport (design.md §3):
- ops: internal-data, knowledge-base, google-maps, gmail, calendar, tasks,
reminders. finance: qbo, payments (audited + redacted on egress).
- config from env only (no hardcoded ids/issuer/tables); SH_MCP_ENV selects
LocalAuthProvider + dev clients (local) vs CognitoAuthProvider + real stubs
(aws). Finance applies the 15-min finance-token TTL ceiling (design.md §2.5).
- index.ts is the only place .listen() is called; a Lambda handler placeholder
is exported but not depended on.
- synth-only CDK stubs (no real IAM/Cognito/WAF) so 'cdk synth' has a valid app
(build-plan §6); READMEs document local run, dev tokens, curl, MCP Inspector.
* Add security-weighted test suite + coverage gate; wire tooling
Add tests for the highest-risk surface (build-plan §5, design.md §7.3):
tool-hiding, server-side scope enforcement (incl. forced hidden calls),
audience binding, input-schema validation, finance redaction on egress, audit
emission with hashed args, prompt-injection regression (tool output is data),
rate limiting, MCP conformance (in-memory transport round-trip), OpenAPI 3.1
validity, and local-auth safety. Add HTTP integration tests (supertest) for both
servers and per-package dev-client tests. 405 tests pass.
Wire the coverage gate into vitest.config.ts: 80% overall, with per-file
thresholds on the auth + dispatch crown jewels; exclude deferred real client
stubs, entrypoints, cdk apps, and aws-only config from the gate (documented).
Extend eslint flat config + add .prettierignore to cover servers/. Commit the
updated package-lock.json.
* Suppress pre-existing dev-tooling + out-of-scope scanner findings
Add written-justification suppressions for the 4 confirmed crit/high pre-push
scanner findings, none of which are in this PR's Phase 1 production code:
- npmaudit vitest / @vitest/coverage-v8 / vite: dev/test-only deps that never
run in the deployed server/Lambda runtime (pins carried from Phase 0b;
Dependabot will bump).
- gitleaks docs/agentforce-plan.md secret: that file is not on this branch and
not in this changeset; flagged for the maintainer to scrub on its own branch.
The deep agentic /sh-security-review (required for this auth/authz-touching PR)
was NOT run by the agent and is flagged outstanding in the PR body.
* Address CodeQL findings: bound ajv error work + edge rate limiting
GHAS code-scanning alerts on this PR:
- dispatch.ts (js/resource-exhaustion): ajv ran with allErrors:true on
untrusted input, letting a crafted payload force unbounded error
enumeration. Switch to allErrors:false (default) so validation
short-circuits on the first failure; the 400 still names that path.
- http.ts (js/missing-rate-limiting): the authenticated routes (/mcp,
/tools/:name) had no edge throttle — auth/JWT verification ran on every
request before the per-sub dispatch limiter could apply. Add an IP-keyed
express-rate-limit in front of authenticate (120/60s default, configurable),
returning the standard 429 shape. Defense-in-depth over the per-sub +
per-tool limiter in executeTool; API GW/WAF remains the production edge.
Tests: +2 cases proving the edge limiter throttles before auth (429, not
401) on /tools and /mcp. 407 pass; tsc/eslint/prettier clean.
* Fix polynomial ReDoS in Bearer-token extraction (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)
extractBearerToken matched /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/ — \s and . both match a space,
so the two quantifiers overlap and a crafted header can drive polynomial
backtracking. Require the capture to start with a non-whitespace char
(/^Bearer\s+(\S.*)$/), removing the ambiguity → linear match. Behavior is
unchanged for real tokens; +2 regression tests.
* Harden auth + finance redaction (sh-security-review confirmed mediums)
Two confirmed medium findings from the agentic security review:
- Fail-open SH_MCP_ENV: config defaulted to 'local' when the var was unset,
so a deploy that forgot SH_MCP_ENV=aws would silently run LocalAuthProvider
and accept static dev bearer tokens (dev-finance-admin -> finance:admin).
Now fail-closed: SH_MCP_ENV must be explicitly 'local' or 'aws' or the
server refuses to start. Plus an independent guard in LocalAuthProvider
that refuses to construct in an AWS runtime (AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME /
AWS_EXECUTION_ENV present), regardless of the env flag.
- Finance egress redaction gap: redactDeep only wholesale-masked a sensitive
key when its value was a scalar; an object/array under a sensitive key was
recursed into, letting a bare nested value (e.g. {account:{number:...}})
escape the keyword-gated pattern matcher. Now the entire subtree under a
sensitive key is masked. No current finance tool emitted such shapes (all
flat strings), so this closes a latent hole in the universal safety net.
+4 tests (subtree redaction, AWS-runtime guard). 411 pass; coverage gate green.
Review also produced lows (memo free-text digits, unsalted argsHash,
unauth /openapi.json by-design, session-cap no-reset by-design) tracked
separately; 0 confirmed critical/high — review verdict PASS.
447 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
447 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Unit tests for @sh-mcp/payments tools.
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*
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* All tests use:
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* - A mock AuthContext with finance:read scope (unless testing scope rejection).
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* - A mock PaymentsClient — no real DynamoDB or AWS calls.
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*
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* Coverage targets:
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* - Happy path for each tool
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* - Empty result set
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* - Client error propagation
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* - Throttle / retry simulation (transient error then success)
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* - Scope enforcement: missing scope throws ScopeError
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* - Redaction: bank account, routing, card numbers are masked; vendor names are not
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
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import type { AuthContext } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
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import { requireScope } from '@sh-mcp/shared';
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import type { PaymentsClient, Payment } from '../src/client.js';
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import {
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makeLookupByVendorTool,
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makeLookupByInvoiceTool,
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makeLookupByCheckTool,
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} from '../src/tools.js';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Shared test fixtures
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/** A fully-scoped finance context — happy-path default. */
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const financeCtx: AuthContext = {
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sub: 'adam@seahavenind.com',
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scopes: ['finance:read'],
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aud: 'sh-mcp-finance',
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};
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/** A context that lacks finance:read — for scope-rejection tests. */
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const opsOnlyCtx: AuthContext = {
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sub: 'staff@seahavenind.com',
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scopes: ['ops:read'],
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aud: 'sh-mcp-ops',
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};
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const samplePayment: Payment = {
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paymentId: 'pmt-001',
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vendor: 'Acme Electrical Supply',
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vendorContact: 'billing@acme.example.com',
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amount: 4250.0,
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currency: 'USD',
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invoiceNumber: 'INV-2026-0042',
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checkNumber: '10412',
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paymentDate: '2026-05-15',
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status: 'cleared',
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bankAccountNumber: '123456789',
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bankRoutingNumber: '021000021',
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cardNumber: '4111111111111111',
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memo: 'Electrical supplies for Ronkonkoma site',
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};
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Mock client builder
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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function makeMockClient(overrides?: Partial<PaymentsClient>): PaymentsClient {
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return {
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getByVendor: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([samplePayment]),
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getByInvoice: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([samplePayment]),
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getByCheck: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([samplePayment]),
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// lookup_payment_by_vendor
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('lookup_payment_by_vendor', () => {
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let client: PaymentsClient;
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beforeEach(() => {
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client = makeMockClient();
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});
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it('returns payments and redacts sensitive fields on the happy path', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
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const result = await tool.handler({ vendor: 'Acme' }, financeCtx);
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expect(result.count).toBe(1);
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expect(result.payments).toHaveLength(1);
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const p = result.payments[0]!;
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// Vendor name and contact must be intact.
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expect(p.vendor).toBe('Acme Electrical Supply');
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expect(p.vendorContact).toBe('billing@acme.example.com');
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// Sensitive fields must be redacted (not equal to the originals).
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expect(p.bankAccountNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.bankAccountNumber);
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expect(p.bankRoutingNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.bankRoutingNumber);
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expect(p.cardNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.cardNumber);
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// Non-sensitive fields must be preserved.
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expect(p.amount).toBe(4250.0);
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expect(p.status).toBe('cleared');
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expect(p.paymentDate).toBe('2026-05-15');
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});
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it('forwards the vendor string and limit to the client', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
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await tool.handler({ vendor: 'Acme', limit: 5 }, financeCtx);
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expect(client.getByVendor).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Acme', { limit: 5 });
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});
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it('caps limit at 100', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
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await tool.handler({ vendor: 'Acme', limit: 9999 }, financeCtx);
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expect(client.getByVendor).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Acme', { limit: 100 });
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});
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it('returns empty result when the client returns no payments', async () => {
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client = makeMockClient({
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getByVendor: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
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});
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const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
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const result = await tool.handler({ vendor: 'Unknown Vendor' }, financeCtx);
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expect(result.count).toBe(0);
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expect(result.payments).toEqual([]);
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});
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it('propagates a client error', async () => {
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client = makeMockClient({
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getByVendor: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('DynamoDB unavailable')),
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});
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const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
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await expect(tool.handler({ vendor: 'Acme' }, financeCtx)).rejects.toThrow(
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'DynamoDB unavailable',
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);
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});
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it('retries and succeeds after a transient throttle error', async () => {
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// Simulate a throttle on the first call, success on the second.
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const throttleError = Object.assign(new Error('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException'), {
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name: 'ProvisionedThroughputExceededException',
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});
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const getByVendor = vi
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.fn()
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.mockRejectedValueOnce(throttleError)
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.mockResolvedValueOnce([samplePayment]);
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client = makeMockClient({ getByVendor });
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// The tool itself does not implement retry logic — that is the
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// responsibility of the client implementation. We verify here that
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// when the client internally retries and succeeds, the tool returns
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// the correct result. We simulate this by wrapping the tool call
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// in a simple retry loop (as a client-layer retry would do).
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const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
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let result;
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for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
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try {
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result = await tool.handler({ vendor: 'Acme' }, financeCtx);
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break;
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} catch {
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if (attempt === 1) throw new Error('Max retries exceeded');
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}
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}
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expect(result?.count).toBe(1);
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expect(getByVendor).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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});
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it('throws ScopeError when the caller lacks finance:read', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
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await expect(tool.handler({ vendor: 'Acme' }, opsOnlyCtx)).rejects.toThrow();
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// Verify that the error comes from requireScope, not from the client.
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expect(client.getByVendor).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('has the correct tool metadata', () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
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expect(tool.name).toBe('lookup_payment_by_vendor');
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expect(tool.tier).toBe('finance');
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expect(tool.requiredScope).toBe('finance:read');
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// lookup_payment_by_invoice
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('lookup_payment_by_invoice', () => {
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let client: PaymentsClient;
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beforeEach(() => {
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client = makeMockClient();
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});
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it('returns the matching payment with sensitive fields redacted', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByInvoiceTool(client);
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const result = await tool.handler({ invoiceNumber: 'INV-2026-0042' }, financeCtx);
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expect(result.count).toBe(1);
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const p = result.payments[0]!;
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expect(p.vendor).toBe('Acme Electrical Supply');
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expect(p.bankAccountNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.bankAccountNumber);
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expect(p.bankRoutingNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.bankRoutingNumber);
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expect(p.cardNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.cardNumber);
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});
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it('forwards the invoice number to the client', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByInvoiceTool(client);
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await tool.handler({ invoiceNumber: 'INV-2026-0042' }, financeCtx);
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expect(client.getByInvoice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('INV-2026-0042');
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});
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it('returns empty result when invoice is not found', async () => {
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client = makeMockClient({
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getByInvoice: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
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});
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const tool = makeLookupByInvoiceTool(client);
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const result = await tool.handler({ invoiceNumber: 'INV-NOTFOUND' }, financeCtx);
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expect(result.count).toBe(0);
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expect(result.payments).toEqual([]);
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});
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it('propagates a client error', async () => {
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client = makeMockClient({
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getByInvoice: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('Internal service error')),
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});
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const tool = makeLookupByInvoiceTool(client);
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await expect(tool.handler({ invoiceNumber: 'INV-2026-0042' }, financeCtx)).rejects.toThrow(
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'Internal service error',
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);
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});
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it('retries and succeeds after a transient throttle error', async () => {
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const throttleError = Object.assign(new Error('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException'), {
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name: 'ProvisionedThroughputExceededException',
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});
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const getByInvoice = vi
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.fn()
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.mockRejectedValueOnce(throttleError)
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.mockResolvedValueOnce([samplePayment]);
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client = makeMockClient({ getByInvoice });
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const tool = makeLookupByInvoiceTool(client);
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let result;
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for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
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try {
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result = await tool.handler({ invoiceNumber: 'INV-2026-0042' }, financeCtx);
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break;
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} catch {
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if (attempt === 1) throw new Error('Max retries exceeded');
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}
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}
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expect(result?.count).toBe(1);
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expect(getByInvoice).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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});
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it('throws ScopeError when the caller lacks finance:read', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByInvoiceTool(client);
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await expect(tool.handler({ invoiceNumber: 'INV-2026-0042' }, opsOnlyCtx)).rejects.toThrow();
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expect(client.getByInvoice).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('has the correct tool metadata', () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByInvoiceTool(client);
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expect(tool.name).toBe('lookup_payment_by_invoice');
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expect(tool.tier).toBe('finance');
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expect(tool.requiredScope).toBe('finance:read');
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// lookup_payment_by_check
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('lookup_payment_by_check', () => {
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let client: PaymentsClient;
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beforeEach(() => {
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client = makeMockClient();
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});
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it('returns the matching payment with sensitive fields redacted', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByCheckTool(client);
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const result = await tool.handler({ checkNumber: '10412' }, financeCtx);
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expect(result.count).toBe(1);
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const p = result.payments[0]!;
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expect(p.vendor).toBe('Acme Electrical Supply');
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expect(p.bankAccountNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.bankAccountNumber);
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expect(p.bankRoutingNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.bankRoutingNumber);
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expect(p.cardNumber).not.toBe(samplePayment.cardNumber);
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});
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it('forwards the check number to the client', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByCheckTool(client);
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await tool.handler({ checkNumber: '10412' }, financeCtx);
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expect(client.getByCheck).toHaveBeenCalledWith('10412');
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});
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it('returns empty result when check number is not found', async () => {
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client = makeMockClient({
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getByCheck: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
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});
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const tool = makeLookupByCheckTool(client);
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const result = await tool.handler({ checkNumber: '99999' }, financeCtx);
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expect(result.count).toBe(0);
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expect(result.payments).toEqual([]);
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});
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it('propagates a client error', async () => {
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client = makeMockClient({
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getByCheck: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('Connection timeout')),
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});
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const tool = makeLookupByCheckTool(client);
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await expect(tool.handler({ checkNumber: '10412' }, financeCtx)).rejects.toThrow(
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'Connection timeout',
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);
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});
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it('retries and succeeds after a transient throttle error', async () => {
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const throttleError = Object.assign(new Error('ProvisionedThroughputExceededException'), {
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name: 'ProvisionedThroughputExceededException',
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});
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const getByCheck = vi
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.fn()
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.mockRejectedValueOnce(throttleError)
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.mockResolvedValueOnce([samplePayment]);
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client = makeMockClient({ getByCheck });
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const tool = makeLookupByCheckTool(client);
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let result;
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for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
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try {
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result = await tool.handler({ checkNumber: '10412' }, financeCtx);
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break;
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} catch {
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if (attempt === 1) throw new Error('Max retries exceeded');
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}
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}
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expect(result?.count).toBe(1);
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expect(getByCheck).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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});
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it('throws ScopeError when the caller lacks finance:read', async () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByCheckTool(client);
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await expect(tool.handler({ checkNumber: '10412' }, opsOnlyCtx)).rejects.toThrow();
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expect(client.getByCheck).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('has the correct tool metadata', () => {
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const tool = makeLookupByCheckTool(client);
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expect(tool.name).toBe('lookup_payment_by_check');
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expect(tool.tier).toBe('finance');
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expect(tool.requiredScope).toBe('finance:read');
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});
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});
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Redaction contract — cross-cutting
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('redaction contract', () => {
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it('does not redact vendor name or vendor contact', async () => {
|
|
const client = makeMockClient();
|
|
const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
|
|
const result = await tool.handler({ vendor: 'Acme' }, financeCtx);
|
|
|
|
const p = result.payments[0]!;
|
|
expect(p.vendor).toBe('Acme Electrical Supply');
|
|
expect(p.vendorContact).toBe('billing@acme.example.com');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('redacts all three sensitive fields when present', async () => {
|
|
const client = makeMockClient();
|
|
const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
|
|
const result = await tool.handler({ vendor: 'Acme' }, financeCtx);
|
|
|
|
const p = result.payments[0]!;
|
|
// None of the redacted values should equal the originals.
|
|
expect(p.bankAccountNumber).not.toBe('123456789');
|
|
expect(p.bankRoutingNumber).not.toBe('021000021');
|
|
expect(p.cardNumber).not.toBe('4111111111111111');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('omits redacted fields when they were undefined in the source', async () => {
|
|
const minimalPayment: Payment = {
|
|
paymentId: 'pmt-002',
|
|
vendor: 'Generic Vendor',
|
|
amount: 100,
|
|
currency: 'USD',
|
|
paymentDate: '2026-06-01',
|
|
status: 'cleared',
|
|
// No bankAccountNumber, bankRoutingNumber, or cardNumber
|
|
};
|
|
const client = makeMockClient({
|
|
getByVendor: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([minimalPayment]),
|
|
});
|
|
const tool = makeLookupByVendorTool(client);
|
|
const result = await tool.handler({ vendor: 'Generic' }, financeCtx);
|
|
|
|
const p = result.payments[0]!;
|
|
expect(p.bankAccountNumber).toBeUndefined();
|
|
expect(p.bankRoutingNumber).toBeUndefined();
|
|
expect(p.cardNumber).toBeUndefined();
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// requireScope integration check
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('requireScope integration', () => {
|
|
it('requireScope does not throw when finance:read is present', () => {
|
|
// Smoke-test the shared helper directly to confirm it accepts our fixture.
|
|
expect(() => requireScope(financeCtx, 'finance:read')).not.toThrow();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('requireScope throws when finance:read is absent', () => {
|
|
expect(() => requireScope(opsOnlyCtx, 'finance:read')).toThrow();
|
|
});
|
|
});
|